U.S. Supreme Court’s Cisco Ruling Narrows Human Rights Litigation Options
By Han Wang
On June 23, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a ruling in Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe, a case dealing with corporate liability for assisting the Chinese government in surveilling and persecuting members of a religious group. The Court ruled that federal courts may not hear human rights claims under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), and, separately, that aiding-and-abetting claims are not actionable under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA). This represents a major shift in U.S. human rights litigation: In 2000, Human Rights in China assisted Zhou Fengsuo, now Executive Director of HRIC, to bring a case against Li Peng in New York under the aforementioned statutes for his role in the Tiananmen Square Massacre. Last week’s decision will significantly restrict victims’ options to seek accountability from actors who assist foreign governments in carrying out human rights abuses.
In 2011, several Falun Gong practitioners filed a class action lawsuit against Cisco Systems, alleging that the company, through its headquarters in San Jose, California, designed, developed, and helped maintain certain components of China’s “Golden Shield,” a nationwide surveillance and domestic security system in China that significantly enhanced the Chinese government’s ability to identify, locate, arrest, and interrogate Falun Gong practitioners.
According to the complaint, the Golden Shield was intended to establish a nationwide internet surveillance network capable of collecting and analyzing information about Falun Gong practitioners, including their residential addresses, employment records, financial information, IP addresses, and connections with other practitioners. The plaintiffs alleged that, in order to secure contracts with the Chinese government, Cisco’s headquarters directed an extensive marketing campaign targeting Chinese authorities. The plaintiffs alleged that beginning in 1998, Cisco’s then-Chief Executive Officer, John Chambers, reportedly met on multiple occasions with Jiang Zemin, then General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and President of China. They also alleged that Chambers discussed the objectives of the Golden Shield with Chinese officials. According to the complaint, Cisco ultimately obtained multiple government contracts and allegedly developed customized technological features specifically designed to assist Chinese public security authorities in identifying, apprehending, and interrogating Falun Gong practitioners. The plaintiffs contended that Cisco knowingly designed, developed, and maintained the system despite its awareness that the Chinese government would use it to persecute Falun Gong practitioners, thereby providing substantial assistance to the alleged human rights violations.
The action was filed in 2011 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. In 2014, the district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently allege that their claims sufficiently touched and concerned the United States to satisfy the requirements of the ATS. The court also held that the complaint failed to adequately plead aiding-and-abetting liability under international law.
The plaintiffs appealed. In 2023, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit partially reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Ninth Circuit held that the ATS permits federal courts to recognize claims based on aiding-and-abetting liability, and that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that Cisco knowingly provided substantial assistance to the Chinese government’s violations of international law. The court further concluded that the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) permits claims against individual defendants for aiding and abetting torture.
On June 23, 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its decision in Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I, reversing the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanding the case for further proceedings.
The Supreme Court held that federal courts lack authority to create new causes of action under the ATS. The Court explained that the ATS is primarily a jurisdictional statute and does not itself create substantive rights or causes of action. Although the Court’s 2004 decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain left limited room for federal courts to recognize a narrow class of well-defined, universally accepted, and judicially manageable causes of action under customary international law, the majority reversed course and eliminated this discretion left by Sosa. The Court emphasized that cases arising under the ATS often implicate sensitive issues of foreign affairs and international relations, making it difficult for courts to assess whether recognizing new causes of action would adversely affect the foreign policy interests of the United States. The Constitution assigns Congress—not the judiciary—the authority to define and punish offenses against the law of nations. Accordingly, the Court argued whether to establish additional causes of action is a legislative question reserved for Congress.
The Supreme Court further held that, although the TVPA authorizes victims of torture or extrajudicial killing to seek civil remedies against those directly responsible, the statute does not expressly provide for aiding-and-abetting liability. According to the Court, Congress’s silence on this issue indicates that it did not intend to create such a basis for liability. Consequently, the plaintiffs could not pursue aiding-and-abetting claims against Cisco or the individual defendants under either the ATS or the TVPA.
The Cisco litigation can be regarded as one of the most significant corporate accountability cases in the field of international human rights law. It was also the first case in which a major American technology company appeared before the Supreme Court of the United States for allegedly assisting the Chinese government in its persecution of Falun Gong practitioners.
The decision is expected to have far-reaching implications for international human rights litigation in the United States. By holding that federal courts lack authority to create new causes of action under the ATS through federal common law, the Supreme Court effectively closed the limited judicial pathway left open by Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. The Court’s conclusion that the TVPA does not authorize aiding-and-abetting liability further restricts efforts to hold corporate actors accountable for assisting foreign governments in committing torture, enforced disappearances, and other grave human rights abuses.
From the perspective of international human rights protection, the ruling substantially narrows the scope of which victims of serious human rights abuses may seek relief in U.S. courts. The ATS had long served as one of the principal legal mechanisms for pursuing civil claims against corporations alleged to have participated in serious human rights violations committed abroad. For victims of torture, arbitrary detention, and religious persecution, U.S. courts have historically represented one of the few available forums in which meaningful judicial remedies could be sought. By significantly increasing the barriers to holding multinational corporations accountable through U.S. litigation, the decision has been viewed by many human rights advocates as a major setback for international human rights enforcement.
Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I has largely foreclosed the use of the ATS and the TVPA to pursue corporate liability for aiding and abetting serious human rights abuses committed abroad. However, it has not eliminated all means for international human rights litigation in the United States. The ruling limits only the judicial interpretation of the ATS and the TVPA; it does not preclude claims brought under other federal or state laws that provide independent causes of action and jurisdictional bases. So long as plaintiffs can assert an independent cause of action under U.S. law and satisfy the applicable requirements for personal jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, and other jurisdictional prerequisites—for example, where the relevant wrongful conduct, resulting injury, or other material facts occurred within the United States—they may still pursue civil remedies in U.S. courts. Therefore, whether similar cases can proceed in the future will increasingly depend on the existence of independent federal or state law causes of action, the strength of the case’s connection to the United States, and whether Congress chooses to enact legislation expressly authorizing such actions.
美国最高法院Cisco案判决：国际人权诉讼的重要转折
2026年6月23日，美国最高法院在 Cisco Systems, Inc. 诉 Doe 案中作出裁决。该案涉及美国企业是否因协助中国政府监控和迫害宗教团体成员而应承担的法律责任问题。最高法院裁定，联邦法院不得依据《外国人侵权法》（Alien Tort Statute，ATS）审理人权诉讼；并且另行裁定，依据《酷刑受害者保护法》（Torture Victim Protection Act，TVPA）提起的“协助和教唆“（aiding-and-abetting）类诉讼同样不具有可诉性。这标志着美国人权诉讼领域的一次重大转变：2000年，“中国人权“（Human Rights in China，HRIC）曾协助周锋锁（现任该组织执行主任）依据上述法律，在纽约就李鹏在天安门事件大屠杀中所扮演的角色对其提起诉讼。上周的这一裁决，将大幅限制受害者在美国法院追究那些协助外国政府实施严重侵犯人权行为者民事责任的能力。
2011年，多名法轮功学员对思科系统公司（Cisco Systems）提起集体诉讼，指控该公司通过其位于加利福尼亚州圣何塞的总部，设计、开发并协助维护中国“金盾工程“的某些组成部分。“金盾工程“是中国一套覆盖全国的监控与国内安全系统，它大幅增强了中国政府识别、定位、逮捕和审讯法轮功学员的能力。
根据起诉书，“金盾工程“旨在建立一个覆盖全国的互联网监控网络，能够收集和分析有关法轮功学员的信息，包括他们的住址、就业记录、财务信息、IP地址，以及与其他学员之间的联系。原告指称，为了取得与中国政府的合同，思科总部指挥了一场针对中国当局的大规模营销活动。原告指称，自1998年起，思科时任首席执行官约翰·钱伯斯（John Chambers）据称曾多次与时任中共中央总书记、中国国家主席江泽民会面。原告还指称，钱伯斯曾与中国官员讨论“金盾工程“的目标。根据起诉书，思科最终获得了多项政府合同，并据称开发了定制化的技术功能，专门用于协助中国公安机关识别、抓捕和审讯法轮功学员。原告主张，思科明知中国政府会利用该系统迫害法轮功学员，却仍然有意地设计、开发并维护该系统，从而为上述被指控的侵犯人权行为提供了实质性协助。
该案件于2011年在美国加利福尼亚州北区联邦地区法院提起诉讼。2014年，地区法院驳回了起诉，认定原告未能充分证明其诉讼请求与美国之间存在足够的“接触与关联“（touch and concern），以满足《外国人侵权法》（ATS）的要求。法院还认定，该起诉书未能充分陈述国际法下“协助和教唆“（aiding-and-abetting）的责任要件。
随后原告提起上诉。2023年，美国第九巡回上诉法院部分推翻了地区法院的判决，并将案件发回重审。第九巡回法院认定，《外国人侵权法》（ATS）允许联邦法院受理基于“协助和教唆“（aiding-and-abetting）责任的诉讼请求，并认定原告已充分指称思科明知故犯地为中国政府违反国际法的行为提供了实质性协助。该法院进一步认定，《酷刑受害者保护法》（TVPA）允许针对个人被告就协助和教唆酷刑行为提起诉讼。
2026年6月23日，美国最高法院在 Cisco Systems, Inc. 诉 Doe I 案中作出判决，推翻了第九巡回法院的判决，并将案件发回重审。
最高法院认定，联邦法院无权依据《外国人侵权法》（ATS）创设新的诉因（cause of action）。最高法院阐释道，ATS 主要是一部关于管辖权的法律，其本身并不创设实体权利或诉因。尽管最高法院在2004年 Sosa vs. Alvarez-Machain 案中曾留有余地，允许联邦法院依据习惯国际法承认一类范围狭窄、定义明确、获得普遍接受且适于司法处理的诉因，但多数意见此次推翻了先例，取消了 Sosa 案所留下的这一裁量空间。最高法院强调，依据 ATS 提起的案件往往牵涉外交事务和国际关系方面的敏感问题，法院难以评估承认新的诉因是否会对美国的外交政策利益，从而产生不利影响。宪法将“界定并惩处违反国际法之罪行“的权力赋予了国会，而非司法机关。因此，最高法院主张，是否设立额外的诉因属于立法问题，应留待国会决定。
最高法院进一步认定，尽管《酷刑受害者保护法》（TVPA）授权酷刑或法外处决的受害者可以向直接责任人寻求民事判决，但该法律并未明文规定“协助和教唆“（aiding-and-abetting）责任。最高法院认为，国会在这一问题上的沉默，表明其无意创设此种责任依据。因此，原告无论是依据《外国人侵权法》（ATS）还是《酷刑受害者保护法》（TVPA），都无法就协助和教唆行为对思科或各名个人被告提起诉讼。
思科案可被视为国际人权法领域最重要的企业问责案件之一。它也是首例美国大型科技公司因被指控协助中国政府迫害法轮功学员而出现在美国最高法院面前的案件。
这一判决预计将对美国法院下的国际人权诉讼产生深远影响。最高法院认定联邦法院无权通过联邦普通法依据《外国人侵权法》（ATS）创设新的诉因，从而实际上关闭了 Sosa 诉 Alvarez-Machain 案所留下的那条有限的司法起诉途径。最高法院关于《酷刑受害者保护法》（TVPA）不允许“协助和教唆“（aiding-and-abetting）责任的结论，则进一步限制了人们追究企业行为主体责任的努力——即追究那些协助外国政府实施酷刑、强迫失踪及其他严重侵犯人权行为的企业的责任。
从国际人权保护的角度来看，这一判决大幅缩小了人权的严重受害者可在美国法院寻求诉讼的范围。长期以来，《外国人侵权法》（ATS）一直是针对被指控参与在境外实施严重侵犯人权行为的企业提起民事诉讼的主要法律机制之一。对于酷刑、任意拘押和宗教迫害的受害者而言，美国法院历来是少数几个能够寻求实质性司法判决的机构之一。由于这一判决大幅提高了通过美国诉讼追究跨国公司责任的门槛，许多人权倡导者将其视为国际人权执法的一次重大倒退。
Cisco Systems, Inc. vs.Doe I 案在很大程度上排除了利用《外国人侵权法》（ATS）和《酷刑受害者保护法》（TVPA）就企业协助和教唆境外严重侵犯人权行为追究其责任的可能性。然而，这并未完全消除在美国进行国际人权诉讼的所有途径。该判决所限制的仅是对 ATS 和 TVPA 的司法解释，并不排除人权受害者依据其他提供独立诉因和管辖权依据的联邦或州法律提起诉讼。只要原告能够依据美国法律主张一项独立的诉因起诉，并满足关于属人管辖权、事项管辖权及其他管辖权前提的相关要求——例如，相关的不法行为、由此造成的损害或其他重大事实发生在美国境内——他们仍然可以在美国法院寻求民事救济。因此，今后类似案件能否继续推进，将越来越取决于是否存在独立的联邦或州法律诉因、案件与美国之间联系的紧密程度，以及国会是否选择制定明文授权此类诉讼的立法。