Human Rights in China joins 40 human rights organizations and the international community in strongly condemning the Hong Kong court’s unjust sentencing on November 5 of Hong Kong pro-democracy activist Joshua Wong, who had already been imprisoned for nearly six years, to an additional ten years in prison on charges of “conspiracy to collude with foreign forces to endanger national security.” This is yet another shameful step towards the ongoing destruction of Hong Kong’s democratic movement and deprivation of the Hong Kong people’s fundamental freedoms.

On November 6, 2026, a Macau court also found 69-year-old former pro-democracy legislator Au Kam San guilty on five counts, including “subversion of state power,” “endangering national security by maintaining ties with overseas organizations,” and “violating confidentiality obligations,” sentencing him to 12 years and 6 months in prison, with his sentence expected to end on January 29, 2038. Au Kam San was tried in a closed-door trial in September and his family was unable to hire a defense lawyer on his behalf, raising serious concerns about his right to due process.

Human Rights in China calls on the Hong Kong and Macau authorities to immediately release Joshua Wong and Au Kam San, alongside all political prisoners detained for peacefully exercising their fundamental rights. We also urge the international community not to turn a blind eye to Hong Kong and Macau’s deteriorating human rights situations, but to continue pressuring Beijing and holding those responsible accountable.

Law & Policy 法律与政策

Chinese Legislature Seeks Public Comment on 5 Bills: Criminal Procedure, Tax Administration, Renewable Energy, Financial Regulation & State-Owned Assets: The NPC Standing Committee opened public comment through December 5 on the draft Criminal Procedure Law amendment, Tax Collection Administration Law revision, Renewable Energy Law revision, Finance Law (second draft) and State-Owned Assets Law (second draft). The same session approved the Procuratorial Public Interest Litigation Law, Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law, Antarctic Activities and Environmental Protection Law, a Water Law revision, and Emergency Response Law amendments.

USALI This Week in Asian Law November 1 – November 7: The Procuratorial Public Interest Litigation Law clarifies the role of the powerful Procuratorate to bring civil and administrative litigation when “national interests or societal public interests” (undefined terms) are deemed to be at stake. In addition, proposed amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law would expressly prohibit presuming suspects’ guilt and limit use of “residential surveillance at a designated location” (RSDL) to national security and terrorism cases. RSDL allows police to hold suspects incommunicado outside regular detention facilities for up to six months.

HRIC on Twitter/X: On November 6, 2026, the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress voted to pass the “Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law of the People’s Republic of China,” comprising six chapters and 47 articles, effective from the date of its promulgation. Particularly concerning is that the law further strengthens the Chinese government’s control over cross-border investigations, the provision of evidence, and data flows, potentially creating new obstacles for independent investigations and human rights activism.

Crypto holders face tax reporting under new law passed by LegCo: Hong Kong’s new Inland Revenue (Amendment) Bill 2026 requires that “relevant crypto-asset service providers must begin collecting user transaction data next year.”

Cyber Security & Digital Rights 网络安全与数字权利

Police say linking mall cameras to AI facial recognition network complies with Hong Kong privacy laws: Police say connecting mall cameras to the SmartView network complies with Hong Kong’s privacy law, as they prepare to switch on AI facial recognition across it this month. Searches need an inspector’s approval, data is kept up to 180 days, and the network targets about 60,000 cameras by 2028. As of November 8 one tracker found no public response from the privacy commissioner.

What comes after networked authoritarianism?: Rebecca MacKinnon, who coined the term 15 years ago, argues that tech power is exercised by governments and companies in ways that are hard to challenge, pointing out that China is part of a network of authoritarian states building a global surveillance market.

Where the Weight Lies: A Balancing Act for the Governance of Open-Weight AI Models: The authors argue that debates over restricting Chinese (or American) open-weight models wrongly assume power travels with the weight file, when it actually sits in compute, hosting, standards and law. They say past restrictions on open technologies, from 1990s encryption to GitHub’s sanctions, pushed rivals toward their own institutions, and that “digital sovereignty” means four different things to four blocs.

Prominent Tibetan NGO’s website hit by cyberattack; data breach and AI-driven threats feared: The Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy’s website went down on October 30 and has reportedly been seriously compromised, apparently via an open port flagged by the host. The attackers and extent of data exposure, including possible credentials and sources inside Tibet, are still unknown. TibCERT notes China-linked actors often target Tibetans and warns that AI is raising the scale of such attacks.

China’s first AI-generated film is a flop. Some still see it as the future of cinema: Sanxingdui: Future Past opened October 23 and earned roughly $180,000 against a reported $1.5 million budget. Some industry insiders nonetheless say it is just the beginning of AI cinema in China, where short AI videos already draw huge online audiences.

Diaspora Community & Transnational Repression 海外社群和跨国镇压

Uyghurs facing deportation by Thailand say they will be ‘like slaves’ in China: Two Uyghur men held in Thailand since 2014 told rights groups in letters that they want to go “anywhere else but China,” and one said he would be “like a slave” there. They reportedly pleaded their case to Thailand’s National Human Rights Commission. Thailand’s foreign ministry declined to comment. The US and Canada had earlier reportedly offered to resettle such detainees, but Bangkok appeared to decline to avoid upsetting Beijing.

Related: China seeks arrest of five Uyghurs held in Thailand.

Chinese Embassy in Netherlands attempts to dissuade Dutch officials from meeting CTA President: In a November 4 letter, China’s embassy urged Dutch Foreign Affairs Committee members not to meet CTA President Penpa Tsering, calling Tibet “purely China’s internal affair” and the CTA a “separatist” body. The CTA president went ahead with meetings with Dutch officials and media and addressed the IPAC summit in The Hague.

Beyond censorship: China’s growing influence on Thailand’s media: Beijing has expanded its influence through embassy pressure, content-sharing deals, sponsored press trips, and Thai-language state outlets. In recent years, Thai PBS removed an online Taiwan interview after embassy contact and an art exhibition was censored in 2025. Thai newsrooms’ financial strain deepens the dependence, as one local journalist warns of becoming a “Chinese vassal state.”

Human Rights Defenders & Civil Society 人权捍卫者与公民社会

HRIC on Twitter/X: According to a report by Radio Free Asia’s Uyghur Service, Rahile Omar, a Uyghur woman from Shufu County in Kashgar who appeared in the “Xinjiang Police Files” released in 2022, has recently been confirmed to have died while serving her sentence, at just 23 years old.

Gonpo Kyi reportedly suffers bone fractures, internal injuries following repeated police assaults: Gonpo Kyi, sister of life-sentenced Tibetan businessman Dorjee Tashi, reportedly has broken bones and internal injuries after police repeatedly assaulted and dragged her away during peaceful protests in Lhasa, including an incident on October 26.

A pastor at a Beijing underground church has been arrested, his wife says: Pastor Cui Xianfeng (Edward Cui), founder of Beijing Jiaquan Church, was formally arrested on fraud charges on October 23, his wife told AP, amid a wider crackdown on unregistered churches. He and seven colleagues had been held since September on suspicion of “fraud,” a common charge used against religious practitioners operating outside of officially sanctioned spaces.

HRIC on Twitter/X: Hubei human rights defender Yin Xu’an was forcibly taken away on August 11, 2025, while seeking medical treatment in Beijing. His whereabouts remain unknown, and he has been forcibly disappeared for nearly one year and three months. A friend recently reportedly received a handwritten plea letter signed by Yin, stating that he is being held in secret at a psychiatric hospital in the Huangjinshan Development Zone of Huangshi, where he has been placed in solitary confinement and is not receiving the necessary specialist treatment for his severe cardiovascular and cerebrovascular diseases.

HRIC on Twitter/X: Chinese grassroots environmental advocate Zhang Wenbin was taken away across provincial borders on October 20 by the Wanzai County Public Security Bureau in Yichun, Jiangxi Province, and criminally detained on “extortion” charges. His family said police had notified them that he would be held for at least 37 days. On the same day, two other local environmental volunteers from Jiangxi, Luo Wenbin and Xiong Qu, were also criminally detained by Wanzai police on suspicion of the same offense.

HRIC on Twitter/X: Ding Xingan, a leader of a house church in Pingxiang, Jiangxi, is being held under suspicion of “organizing others to illegally cross national borders or frontiers” for traveling to Indonesia to attend theological training. On October 18, 2026, around 40 armed police officers raided two house church meeting sites in Pingxiang, taking away 27 attendees. All were eventually released except Ding Xingan and fellow church worker Liang Yichao, who remain in custody.

Who Supervises the Sky Eye?: Independent journalist Fu Song reported “wave after wave of retaliatory actions against him and his collaborator” after his investigation exposed that a hotel linked to the Chinese Academy of Sciences sold access to the FAST radio telescope’s protected zone. Said retaliation included calls from the authorities and police questioning of a friend. According to this article, state-media “red-washing” let the exposé spread while Fu’s account of pressure from the authorities was suppressed.

A Loyal Journalist Takes the Helm: Cui Shixin, a former People’s Daily deputy editor-in-chief, was named head of the All-China Journalists Association, which enforces a code putting Party loyalty first. CMP highlights his seven years running Tibet Daily, including four commentaries blaming the “Dalai separatist forces” after the 2008 protests, and contrasts him with Chang Ping, who was demoted for questioning Tibet censorship and now lives in exile.

Translations: On the Long-Delayed COVID-Themed Film “Angel in White” and the Sanitization of Memory: The film, based around the Wuhan lockdowns, was not released on its official November 6 release date. Online commentary on the film criticized filmmakers for not including a character based on Dr. Li Wenliang and noted “the vast gulf between the film’s heroic depiction of doctors on the front lines of the pandemic and what ordinary Chinese people remember most vividly about those years.”

HRIC on Twitter/X: Zhang Jianhong, the former executive of Apple Daily and administrative president of Next Digital Group, recently appeared in political propaganda for Phoenix TV. Originally scheduled for release in 2028 upon completion of his sentence, he has now been released early and participated in a Shenzhen visitation program organized by the Hong Kong Correctional Services Department. It is a common practice of the Chinese authorities to coerce detained lawyers, journalists, human rights activists, and dissidents into participating in propaganda footage through televised confessions, public repentance, and official media interviews, in which the individuals admit to mistakes and disavow their past.

Court rejects ex-press union head Ronson Chan’s bid to take police obstruction appeal to top court: The High Court judge who upheld his conviction refused to grant the former press union head permission to take his case to the Court of Final Appeal. Chan was convicted over delaying showing his ID to police in 2022 and served five days after losing his appeal in May.

Hong Kong national security police arrest man over allegedly importing ‘seditious’ books: National security police arrested a 34-year-old Mong Kok man on November 5 under the national security law for allegedly importing seditious publications from Taiwan in October, an offense carrying up to seven years. Local media identified him as head of the prisoner support group Waiting Bird.

Related: Hong Kong prisoner support group says Customs confiscated over 60 books imported from Taiwan. Waiting Bird said books due October 13 arrived a week late with over 60 volumes missing, after customs reportedly seized them under national security rules.

China’s Reach & Internal Control 中国: 内控与外扩

Schooling China’s Storytellers: Five Chinese universities opened international communication schools this year, turning Xi’s “tell China’s story well” push into a degree program. These programs openly aim to promote the image of the Party, with Fudan partnering with state-owned media Xinhua and the Communication University of China pledging to “shoulder the mission of the national team.”

Under its Sinicisation Policy, China Shuts Down Three Tibetan Schools in Golog: Since late August, authorities have closed three private or community Tibetan schools in Golog, including a nomadic boarding primary school in Machen County, which was founded in 1995 and was the county’s last of its kind. The displaced children are being sent to new state boarding schools outside the prefecture, such as Golog Tsoshar Middle School near Xining, opened September 1 with 1,200 mostly Tibetan students. Educator Gyal Lo calls self-run Tibetan schools “a thorn in [Beijing’s] side.”

Related: Thousands of Students from Nomadic Regions in Tibet Transferred to Urban Colonial Boarding Schools. After the October 22 earthquake, 1,498 students from Drachen (Bachen) County in Nagchu were relocated to Lhasa between November 1 and 3, in what the outlet calls “urban colonial-style boarding schools.” Students from large Golog schools are similarly being moved to Xining and Haidong state schools.

International Responses 国际反应

Estonian MPs meet Dalai Lama, urge Tibetans not to lose hope for statehood: A delegation of Estonian parliamentarians met the Dalai Lama in Dharamshala on November 5 and urged Tibetans not to lose hope for statehood. Earlier Estonian delegations made a similar point, saying Estonia’s peaceful path to independence offers Tibetans reason for hope.

Taiwan detains a Communist Party leader over alleged Chinese sponsorship in election: Authorities detained Lin Te-wang, founder of the fringe Taiwan People’s Communist Party, accusing him of directing a party member to run for ward chief in Hsinchu under the sponsorship and direction of China’s Communist Party. The case comes ahead of Taiwan’s November 28 local elections.

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Transnational repression is top of the headlines this week, as Milan prosecutors announced on October 28 the conclusion of their investigation into ten suspects in a transnational repression case targeting “Teacher Li” or Ying Li, 34, who has millions of followers on social media and has long publicly criticized the Chinese government. Among those investigated are four Chinese nationals accused of organized crime, along with two Italians. Prosecutors allege that this group, acting under orders from Chinese police, monitored and suppressed Chinese dissidents living in Italy, with the intent to “control and silence them.”

Meanwhile, Tibetan education sociologist Gyal Lo’s residence in Toronto was recently served with documents related to litigation against him in Chinese courts. When critics reside abroad, Beijing attempts to extend pressure to their new locations through civil litigation and judicial procedures. Gyal Lo has long documented Tibet’s boarding school system, pointing out that a large number of Tibetan children are separated from their families and placed in state-established boarding schools, where their native language, cultural traditions, and ethnic identity are undermined. Since fleeing to Canada in 2021, his relatives in Tibet have been harassed, Chinese state media has launched attacks against him, and he has also reportedly been under suspected surveillance in Toronto and Geneva.

Last week, HRIC translated and posted a statement from Zhou Yiran, daughter of lawyer Zhou Shifeng who was jailed for seven years as part of the 709 Crackdown in 2015. She describes the lasting harm persecution causes families, including a childhood without her father, her mother’s death in 2024 after the family’s plight led to years of untreated illness, and ongoing repressive measures such as her father’s WeChat ban and restrictions on her phone number. Zhou Yiran demands that the wrongful verdicts of the 709 Crackdown be overturned and an independent investigation be made into all claims of torture, forged evidence and political interference.

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Law & Policy 法律与政策

NPC Observer 11/02: The NPC Standing Committee will meet on November 2-6 and plans to address ten bills, including a Criminal Procedure Law amendment likely headed to the full NPC in March. The Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law is also expected to pass on Friday, November 6.

Opinions on Adapting to the Development of Artificial Intelligence Technology to Help Build an Employment-Friendly Development Model: The October 23 guideline sets 18 tasks in six areas to grow AI jobs while cushioning displacement. It urges “unemployment buffer periods” and advance notice to affected workers, employment-risk assessments for large AI projects, and a cautious pace in labor-intensive sectors.

USALI This Week in Asian Law: The Ministry of Commerce proposed Special Provisions on Protecting Chinese Trade Secrets (保护中国商业秘密特别规定) that would allow it to penalize foreign entities whose infringement of Chinese trade secrets harms or threatens China’s sovereignty, security, or development interests.

Cyber Security & Digital Rights 网络安全与数字权利

Kylian Mbappe apologises after ‘dictator’ comment angers Chinese fans: Kylian Mbappé apologized in French, Mandarin and English, saying his comment was “ill-judged” and “hurt many people,” after intense backlash from China over an interview clip in which he referred to a meme of his face superimposed over “some guy, I think he’s a Chinese dictator,” understood to be Mao Zedong. Mbappé lost at least two Chinese sponsors, including dairy giant Mengniu, and La Liga also apologized, though the suspension of La Liga broadcasts and the suspension of Mbappé’s Xiaohongshu (Red Note) account remained in place. AP notes that the online censorship around the incident meant many ordinary Chinese people did not know exactly what Mbappé said, since his original joke was scrubbed from Chinese social media.

Graphika finds China-linked Spamouflage accounts posing as US voters on X: Graphika found three China-linked account sets on X posing as American voters and posting divisive content on politics, social issues and the midterms. Two of the sets had earlier been typical Spamouflage accounts that attacked Guo Wengui and Falun Gong before switching to US-focused content.

Warning Signals: Venezuela and the Risk of AI-Powered Chinese Digital Authoritarianism: Venezuela, which already runs a surveillance system built largely on Chinese Huawei, ZTE and Hikvision equipment, could add Chinese AI through a July 2025 memorandum with sanctioned firm iFlytek. Facial and voice recognition combined with the Carnet de la Patria ID database could enable preemptive profiling.

WeChat, QQ Users Banned for Hiding the Emperor’s New Clothes: Users have reported permanent suspensions from WeChat and QQ after posting the sentence “Lately, I’ve grown used to quiet, uneventful days” (Xíguàn le jìnlái píngpíngdàndàn de rìzi), which likely “triggered keyword scans with its non-sequential incorporation of Xi Jinping’s name.” Users complain that platforms tend to simply accept false positives as preferable to missing any politically sensitive content.

CDT’s “404 Deleted Content Archive” Summary for September 2026: CDT archived 31 deleted pieces from the Chinese internet covering topics including the Sun Meihua case (a Beijing woman found in Shandong after 26 years), a Guangzhou stabbing which targeted women, the Shaoyang 100-million-yuan official extortion case, Beijing’s drone-storage ban, Xingyu workers’ labor activism, and Wuhan’s fines on Guo Degang’s performance organizers.

Hong Kong privacy watchdog issues guidance on AI ‘smart glasses’ to curb covert surveillance: The Hong Kong privacy commissioner’s December 2025 CCTV guidance describes covert surveillance as “a last resort,” and China issued a voluntary smart-glasses code after outrage over covert filming with Rokid glasses.

Diaspora Community & Transnational Repression 海外社群和跨国镇压

Uyghur Rights Groups Urge Thailand Not to Deport Two Uyghur Refugees to China: Rights groups and three Thai civil-society networks warned that two Uyghurs held since 2014, who were pardoned on October 21 and moved to Bangkok immigration detention, risk torture and disappearance if returned to China. No lawyers, rights groups, or Thailand’s human rights commission have been allowed to visit them. Thailand deported 109 Uyghurs in 2015 and 40 more in February 2025, whose fate is still unknown.

Human Rights Defenders & Civil Society 人权捍卫者与公民社会

HRIC on Twitter/X: On October 30, 2026, International Political Prisoners Day, Luo Shengchun, wife of human rights lawyer and defender Ding Jiaxi, called on the Chinese government to release her husband. Since December 26, 2019, he has been imprisoned for his work advocating civic connection and political participation, freedom of speech, and the rule of law.

Beijing Queer film festival cancelled after harassment from authorities: The Love Queer Cinema Week, planned for October 30 to November 8, was cancelled after what is understood to have been sustained police harassment, including repeated phone calls in recent weeks. Several international filmmakers had already traveled to China. IndieChina festival in New York was also cancelled last year amid pressure from Beijing.

Keeping China’s Labor Misery Off the Record: Labor journalist Feng Rui was released on bail on October 21 after 37 days of detention for “picking quarrels.” The piece also notes the detention of journalist Hong Guangyu and the closure of China Labor Trends as a push to keep workers’ grievances fragmented. It adds that the state promotes “new popular literature” about workers to turn their hardship into “positive energy.”

HRIC on Twitter/X: In August 2024, public-account writer Hui Jian (Wu Kai) exposed Anhui chamber of commerce head Liu Ren in Cambodia over alleged telecom fraud parks and violent lending, then refused to delete the piece under pressure. In November 2024, a group was hired who posed as police, abducted Hui Jian, forced him to delete his articles and tortured him to death. Online rumors then claimed that he had been detained for extortion. The truth emerged only after Liu Ren was repatriated in June 2026 and the verdict was disclosed in late October.

76岁北京维权军嫂国俪堃被当局剥夺退休金和医保，维权公民的养老保障被中共当局“武器化” [Guo Likun, a 76-year-old Beijing-based rights activist and military spouse, has been stripped of her pension and medical insurance by the authorities. This incident exemplifies the “weaponization” of pension security for rights-defending citizens by the Chinese Communist Party]: According to Weiquanwang, 76-year-old military widow Guo Likun, a Beijing rights activist whose husband died after a 2015 forced demolition, has had her pension and medical insurance paused since July, citing her 2021-2023 sentence for “picking quarrels.” The group calls this a “weaponization” of retirement security.

China to demolish over 200 monks’ dwellings at Sershul Monastery in Tibet: Authorities reportedly carried out a demolition campaign on October 25 or 26 targeting more than 200 monks’ homes at Dza Sershul Monastery in Kham, founded in 1760 and now home to over 1,200 monks. It follows the earlier removal of over 200 young monks in 2018, protest arrests, and a wave of demolitions at Larung Gar since the Ethnic Unity Law took effect.

Hong Kong independent bookstore Luck Win to shut Mong Kok branch by year end after half a century: The bookstore, founded in 1984, will close by December 31. It was disqualified from the Hong Kong Book Fair in June alongside Elmbook, after being attacked by pro-Beijing paper Wen Wei Po for allegedly stocking “independence” titles.

Officers lack power to order identity proof under police ordinance, court hears as Ronson Chan seeks top court appeal: The former Hong Kong Journalists Association chair is asking the Court of Final Appeal to hear his obstruction conviction, which stemmed from a September 2022 stop where he delayed showing his ID. The High Court upheld the conviction on May 29 and Chan served five days.

China’s Reach & Internal Control 中国: 内控与外扩

TCHRD Raises Alarm Over Information Blackout, Aid Restrictions After Tibet Earthquake: Police are suppressing independent casualty updates and restricting grassroots aid after the October 22 quake. State media report 16 dead and 76 injured, but one local source estimates about 50 deaths in their own social circle. Volunteers heading to Drachen County reportedly must sign government pledges or are turned back at checkpoints, as in past disasters such as Dingri and Kyirong.

China expels a record number from Communist party amid Xi’s intensified purges of top officials: The fifth plenum confirmed the expulsion of a record 33 officials, including ex-Politburo members Zhang Youxia and Ma Xingrui and ex-general Liu Zhenli. Attendance fell to 279 members, the lowest of Xi’s tenure. A senior discipline official said the Central Committee under Xi has “eliminated serious hidden dangers” in the party, state and military. The expulsions and record plenum absences underscored the scale of Xi’s purges ahead of the 2027 Party Congress.

Hello Kitty firm apologises, scraps Japan TV tie-up after China anger: Sanrio apologised and ended its merchandise collaboration with the Japanese spy drama Vivant after Chinese state media attacked its portrayal of Chinese agents torturing Japanese operatives as distorting history. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman said the show reveals a force in Japan seeking to “vilify and smear China.” The episode comes amid frayed China-Japan ties and Sanrio’s growing China sales.

International Responses 国际反应

US imprisons two Chinese nationals who tried to recruit military service members to spy for Beijing: Liren “Ryan” Lai, 40, and Yuance Chen, 39, were each sentenced to 30 months in prison plus three years’ supervised release in California after admitting to acting as agents of China’s Ministry of State Security. They arranged “dead drop” cash payments, photographed a U.S. Navy base and recruiting station, and tried to identify service members to recruit. They were arrested in June 2025.

US bans imports from 3 Chinese biotech companies over forced labor allegations: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security is blocking shipments from BGI Group, BGI Genomics and MGI Tech under the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, saying their genetic testing in Xinjiang aids the surveillance and repression of ethnic minorities and forced labor. BGI denies the accusation. The action comes before an expected Xi-Trump meeting in Shenzhen, BGI’s home city.

Current Events 热点新闻

Mining in Tibet in 2026: The Copper Boom, Troubled Rivers and the Question of Who Benefits: Zijin Mining began phase II of its Julong copper mine in January 2026, targeting 300,000-350,000 tonnes a year, while the Gyama mine’s revenue rose 68% in the first quarter. 2026 studies found that the mining footprint on the plateau grew more than eightfold, and trace metals like mercury and cadmium rose above background levels in eastern Tibet’s sediments. This piece argues that there is no clear evidence that local Tibetans benefit from these mining activities and calls for independent water testing, public environmental data, and community participation.

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Author: Zhou Yiran

China Observer

I am Zhou Yiran, the daughter of Zhou Shifeng, former director of Beijing Fengrui Law Firm.

In 2015, China experienced what is now widely known as the “709 Crackdown.” My father, Zhou Shifeng, was one of the human rights lawyers criminally prosecuted during these events. He was sentenced to seven years in prison and was not released until September 24, 2022.

I write these words not only because he is my father, but also because this political persecution that occurred during my childhood changed my family and profoundly influenced my upbringing.

I hope that Chinese society and the international community can unflinchingly face the events of the 709 Crackdown, promote the correction of related wrongful convictions, hold those responsible for illegal and rights-infringing acts accountable, and ensure that the basic rights and dignity of every individual are respected.

I demand that the current Chinese leadership immediately and unconditionally rectify the erroneous verdicts against human rights lawyers and citizens during the 709 Crackdown, declare them innocent according to law, and hold those responsible for all illegal acts accountable as confirmed through investigation.

I. My childhood, a forced separation from my father

When the 709 Crackdown occurred in 2015, I was only five years old. In September 2022, when my father returned home after serving his sentence, I was twelve and a half years old.

These seven years should have been a time for a child to be pampered by their father’s side, to grow, and to gradually learn about the world. I should have had more opportunities to tell my father about school, ask him questions, and receive his companionship when I encountered difficulties. But these ordinary and precious moments have instead become an irreparable loss.

On July 9, 2015, late at night, my father had still not returned home. I remember calling him several times to ask when he would be back. The first time, he said, “I’m not coming home today.” A little while later, I called again to ask if he was almost home. He told me he would be back the next morning. I still wasn’t satisfied, and so I called again. I was just a little girl waiting for my dad to come home, repeatedly confirming if he was almost there. In the end, I could only helplessly say, “Okay.”

I didn’t know then that it might be the last time in my childhood that I would wait normally for my father to come home.

The next morning, my father was taken away by three plainclothes officers. According to my father’s later account, they didn’t show any identification or give any reason.

It is hard for a child to understand why the father who she spoke to on the phone the day before suddenly disappeared, and remained gone for over seven years. I gradually came to understand that this wasn’t just family separation, but also long-term damage left on a child by political persecution.

II. My mother single-handedly supported the family, until she left me forever

After my father’s arrest, my mother took on sole responsibility of caring for me.

My mother was already in poor health. After my father’s arrest, her condition worsened, and she was hospitalized multiple times. Even though she was disabled and had difficulty moving, she still insisted on cooking for me and taking me to and from school. Many times, my mother would get up before dawn to prepare breakfast for me, only to collapse heavily to the ground due to exhaustion. I was too young then to understand the immense pain she endured. I only knew that she was trying her best to take care of me.

More than seven years later, my father finally returned home. My mother once wrote him a message on her phone:

“You’ve been gone for seven years, and I haven’t died.”

Every time I think of those words, I feel unbearable pain.

At the end of 2023, my mother was hospitalized again for emergency treatment. On July 3, 2024, she left me forever.

Later, I learned that when the 709 Crackdown occurred, my mother’s pacemaker was already due for a battery replacement. However, due to my father’s arrest and sentencing, and our family’s prolonged period of extreme hardship, this matter was not addressed in a timely manner.

I have always felt pain and regret about this. I cannot change the fact that my mother is gone, nor can I be certain how many more years she would have been with me if none of this had happened. But I know that if my father hadn’t been arrested, our family would at least have had the opportunity to face the difficulties together, instead of my mother bearing so much alone.

When my mother passed away, I not only lost my mother, I also forever lost the family time we might have had.

I don’t want to attribute the loss of a loved one to a single reason. But I cannot avoid the fact that the damage caused by political persecution does not just end with that person’s release from prison. It may continue to affect a family, even leaving irreparable consequences.

III. My father returned, but over seven years of separation could not be erased

After my father’s release, he tried his best to take care of me. I was grateful to him, and I knew he loved me very much.

Later, I heard my father and family talk about how much he doted on me when I was little, and how attached I was to him. But more than seven years of separation cannot be completely made up for with just a simple “you’re back.”

When my father returned to my life, I was no longer the five-year-old child who longed for his return every day. I had grown up, started having my own thoughts, and experienced many moments when my father couldn’t be there for me. We have to get to know each other again and rebuild our closeness. This feeling is difficult to explain in a few words. My father is right beside me, yet some intimacy that should have formed naturally needs to be rebuilt.

I believe this is a kind of damage caused by the 709 Crackdown that is easily overlooked. When people talk about political persecution, they often focus on how many years the detainees were sentenced to, what treatment they received, and what jobs they lost, but they neglect to account for their children’s loss of companionship, the forced severing of family bonds, and the life a family must rebuild after years of separation.

For me, these are all things that really happened.

IV. I want to know, what crime did my father commit?

My father wrote to me many times while in prison, but as far as I know, many of these letters were confiscated.

On the eve of Children’s Day in 2019, my father negotiated with the relevant authorities regarding a phone call to me. After that, my father told me, although other inmates were allowed to speak with their families according to regulations, my father was only allowed to make two phone calls in his nearly six years in prison.

For a child who hasn’t seen their father for so long, one phone call or one letter is an incredibly precious thing.

I have always wanted to ask: What Chinese law did my father violate? Why did he have to endure such treatment?

My father has described to me his arrest, interrogation, prosecution, and sentencing. He told me that when he was taken away, he didn’t see any legal documents nor was he given a clear reason. During the subsequent investigation, he suffered prolonged forced immobilization and restrictions on his right to legal representation, among other unjust treatment. According to the materials my father provided, he also alleged that certain authorities forged or altered some legal documents, tampered with important audio evidence, and violated his litigation rights during the trial. These allegations involve serious legal issues and should be verified by an independent and impartial investigation.

I was not one of the investigators in the case at the time, nor did I personally witness every detail of my father’s detention. As his daughter, I witnessed my father’s arrest and personally experienced the changes in our family life over the next seven years. I have every reason to demand that the relevant authorities thoroughly examine the evidence and appeals my father submitted, instead of leaving these questions unanswered.

My father also told me that during the case proceedings, certain officials conveyed to him the message that the law cannot truly limit their power to arrest whomever they wish. If this is true, then the issue is not merely my father’s personal experience, but whether any ordinary person can receive legal protection. The law should not deprive a person of protection because of their profession, viewpoint, or expressed opinions. Whether anyone is guilty or not should be determined based on facts and the law, through a fair judicial process.

V. What I know about the 709 Crackdown should not be forgotten

After my father’s arrest, I gradually learned that he was not the only one facing criminal prosecution. The Beijing Fengrui Law Firm was impacted, and many human rights lawyers, citizens, and activists were arrested, prosecuted, or sentenced. Many families have suffered separation, fear, and hardship similar to ours.

My father also told me about what he believed was improper interference in his case and showed me his long-preserved complaint materials. In these materials, my father alleged that Sun Lijun, then a leader in the Ministry of Public Security, and Meng Jianzhu, then Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, exerted undue influence on the handling of the case. He also made specific accusations against relevant personnel in Tianjin, including prosecutors and judicial officers.

These accusations involving specific individuals should be investigated according to evidence and the law, and cannot be based solely on the statements of any one party to replace a formal investigation and finding. Equally important, however, the relevant authorities cannot refuse to investigate or allow the case to remain unresolved for a long time simply because the accused holds an important position.

After his release from prison, my father did not stop appealing and filing complaints. He compiled materials, reported the situation to relevant authorities, and also spoke to the international community about the 709 Crackdown.

To my knowledge, he submitted appeal materials to relevant authorities but encountered obstacles in seeking judicial relief. He also filed a complaint and lawsuit regarding the permanent ban of his WeChat account, hoping to resolve the issue through legal means. My father believes that the ban on his WeChat account is related to his continued exposure of the 709 Crackdown. The relevant parties should provide an explanation of the pertinent reasons and responsibilities based on the facts.

These incidents have also affected my life. Once, my school notified parents to pick up their children after school via a group chat. Because my father couldn’t receive the information, I waited alone outside the school on a cold winter night. Another time, the school notified parents to pay the fee for the high school entrance exam physical education test. My father was again delayed because he couldn’t receive the notification in time. Similar incidents have occurred multiple times.

For adults, a blocked social media account might just be a minor inconvenience. But for a minor, when parents can’t receive school notifications, the impact extends to their most mundane and ordinary daily lives.

In mid-September 2026, my mother’s original mobile phone number, which I was using, was again restricted from two-way communication. The reason given was involvement in telecommunications fraud. I do not understand the specific basis for this action and hope that the relevant authorities can explain the facts and handle this matter according to the law.

I do not ask anyone to give me special treatment because of my family background. I only hope that I can study normally, contact my family, and receive fair treatment when I encounter problems, just like other ordinary citizens.

VI. I do not seek special treatment, but justice.

For years, my father has been appealing his case.

I know this path is not easy.

But I also believe that a person’s release from prison does not mean all issues in the case have been resolved; a family’s rebuilding does not mean the previous harm has automatically disappeared. If the judgment is erroneous, it should be corrected according to law.

If the investigators used torture to extract confessions, fabricated evidence, illegally restricted personal freedom, or committed other illegal acts, they should be investigated according to law, and those responsible should be held accountable based on the investigation results.

If certain personnel abused their power to interfere with the judiciary, the facts should be investigated, and they should not be exempt from investigation simply because they once held powerful positions.

I hope the relevant authorities will conduct a public and thorough review of the cases related to the 709 Crackdown, handle the appeals according to law, and explain the results to the parties involved and their families.

I also hope that other lawyers, citizens, and their families who were affected by the 709 Crackdown will receive fair treatment.

I put forward these demands not because I believe my father will never make mistakes, nor because I want anyone to be convicted without investigation.

What I ask is this: every case should be handled based on facts and the law; every serious charge of wrongdoing should be thoroughly investigated; and everyone who has been treated unjustly should have the opportunity to obtain redress through a fair process.

This is the true meaning of the law.

VII. My Appeal

I am a daughter who lost her father’s companionship for over seven years during the 709 Crackdown, and who later lost her mother.

I cannot relive my childhood, nor can I bring my mother back to my side.

However, I hope that my experience can help more people see that the 709 Crackdown was not just a case of a group of lawyers and citizens who were arrested and sentenced. It also changed the fate of many families, affected the growth of many children, and left indelible scars on the hearts of some.

I solemnly appeal:

First, I demand that the current ruling party in China acknowledge and admit the 709 Crackdown, immediately and unconditionally push for the correction of the relevant erroneous judgments, and declare the lawyers and citizens who should be declared innocent in accordance with the law, restoring their due rights and dignity.

Second, I demand that the relevant authorities conduct a lawful, independent, and impartial investigation into the serious allegations of illegal arrests, torture to extract confessions, fabrication of evidence, and interference with the judiciary in the “709” cases. Those found guilty of illegal and criminal acts should be held accountable according to law, without discrimination based on the position or status of those involved.

Third, I demand that relevant judicial organs accept and review the appeals of the parties involved according to law, respond to relevant legal questions openly and transparently, and ensure that the affected parties and their families receive truthful and clear answers.

Fourth, I call on the international community, human rights organizations, the legal profession, and the media to continue to pay attention to the 709 Crackdown, to help preserve and verify relevant evidence, and to continue pushing for fair handling of cases to prevent similar incidents from happening again.

I hope that one day, when people talk about the 709 Crackdown, they will not only remember those who were taken away, the verdicts, and the suffering of those families, but also see society’s commitment to justice and the possibility of correcting wrongdoing.

I do not want any child to experience what I went through.

I also do not want any family to be forced to endure long-term separation and irreparable harm simply because a loved one upholds their legal beliefs.

I am still young, but I know that some things cannot be erased simply because time has passed.

What I demand is not sympathy, but justice; not special treatment, but equality before the law; not retaliation against anyone, but that the facts be ascertained, that responsibility be investigated, and that wrongs be corrected.

The 709 Crackdown must not be forgotten, those who were harmed must not be forgotten, and justice must not be forgotten.

Zhou Yiran

October 23, 2026

Note: This article contains sections concerning the specific handling process of my father’s case, the actions of certain personnel, and judicial procedures. It is primarily based on the oral account of my father, Zhou Shifeng, the complaint documents which he provided, and other publicly available materials related to the 709 Crackdown. All accusations should be based on original materials, official documents, and the result of lawful investigations.

[This article was first published in China Spring. Please credit the source when reprinting.

Author: Zhou Yiran]

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On October 18, at least 20 individuals were detained by police at a private home in Pingxiang City, Jiangxi Province, where a number of Christians were gathered to discuss scripture with Deng’an Church leader Mr. Ding. Witnesses report at least 40 police officers involved in the raid. The incident follows a recent trend of increased pressure on Chinese “house churches” which conduct religious worship outside of official government-sanctioned spaces, and have faced harassment and prosecution for doing so. The status of Ding and other church workers, who were still detained as of early last week, remains unclear.

According to Weiquanwang, land-rights activist Chen Jianfang remains under house arrest following her release in October 2023 after serving a four-and-a-half-year sentence for “inciting subversion of state power.” She has reportedly been prevented from seeking hospital treatment or attending church, while friends attempting to visit have been turned away or taken to a police station. Weiquanwang also reports that she lost 14 teeth as a result of torture and abuse during her imprisonment.

Meanwhile, China’s Central Committee is holding its fifth plenary session from October 26-29, the last major gathering before the 2027 Party Congress where Xi is expected to take a fourth term. Analysts say it will ratify recent purges, replace those removed, and tighten internal control, with some speculating Xi could take on the title of “party chairman.” Other reporting notes that millions of officials have been investigated and hundreds of senior figures and generals purged.

Law & Policy 法律与政策

NPCSC Session Watch: Rights of the Accused, Cross-Border Corruption, Tax Administration, Public Interest Litigation, Renewable Energy & Global AI Governance: China’s legislature will meet November 2-6 to review ten bills, including an amendment to the Criminal Procedure Law (likely headed to the full NPC in March), the Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law, and revisions to the Renewable Energy and Tax Collection Administration laws. It will also consider ratifying the treaty creating the Chinese-led World AI Cooperation Organization (WAICO). The CPL reforms pushed by scholars include allowing counsel at interrogations and setting limits on so-called “residential surveillance at a designated location.”

Related: Torture Tales from China’s Black Jails. Safeguard Defenders has released a new book, “People’s Republic of the Disappeared,” exposing the cruelty of “residential surveillance at a designated location” (“black jails”) through the first-hand stories of those subjected to it.

USALI This Week in Asian Law: China issued outbound-investment rules (effective December 1) requiring reports of foreign demands for tech, data or divestment, and tightened export controls on tunnel-boring machines and drone parts.

2026 AI Regulations in China: Enforcement, Guidance and Compliance: Regulators moved to active enforcement in April, acting against Jianying, Maoxiang and Jimeng for failing to implement AI-content labelling rules. The Supreme People’s Court’s September 7 opinions set notice-and-takedown duties for AI providers and address voice cloning and training data.

Related: China’s AI Regulation in 2026: New Laws, Rules, and Compliance Requirements. A comprehensive AI law is on the 2026 legislative agenda, but no draft exists yet. The amended Cybersecurity Law added an AI provision, rules on human-like companion AI took effect July 15, and an AI agent policy and the September AI Safety Governance Framework 3.0 extend regulation to agents.

Hong Kong press group urges authorities to scrap new rules tightening media access to land records: New land title rules would limit searches to nine specified purposes that do not include news reporting, so journalists would need the registrar’s approval on public-interest grounds. The Hong Kong Journalists Association says this system, set to start in the first half of 2027, is a threat to investigative reporting.

The foreign judge Hong Kong was looking for: Samuel Bickett argues that retired New Zealand judge Sir Terence Arnold, 79, newly named as the sixth overseas judge on the Court of Final Appeal, has a record of siding with the state in security and liberty cases, including a vote to clear extradition to China on Beijing’s assurances. Bickett notes that six of the ten overseas judges in his 2024 report have since left and urges Arnold to decline before taking the oath.

Cyber Security & Digital Rights 网络安全与数字权利

How Generative AI is Scaling Transnational Repression: Citizen Lab researchers say Anthropic’s September threat report is concrete evidence that AI is being built into cross-border repression, citing a China-aligned operator who used Claude to track Uyghurs in Syria and recruit informants. They urge AI companies to publish dedicated reports, improve detection and refusals, notify affected communities and preserve evidence.

HRIC on Twitter/X: Kylian Mbappe, the famous Real Madrid player, has lost endorsements in China and has been censored by social media platforms over his recent acknowledgement of an internet meme that superimposes his face over a portrait of a Chinese dictator, adding that he often uses it with friends. Mbappe didn’t name names, but an image of his face superimposed on a portrait of Mao Zedong has been circulating online for months. Dongpeng Beverage (a beverage brand), Mengniu, and Miaokelanduo announced the termination of their business cooperation with him, citing “zero tolerance for behavior that hurts national feelings.”

AI Authorship in a Party Mouthpiece: Jilin Daily ran an autumn essay bylined “AI” on October 12, which media circles called a first for a Party paper. CMP says the piece was part of an essay contest inviting readers to compete with AI, although the paper didn’t disclose the model or give readers that context.

Who Hit the Brakes on Negative Public Opinion?: A Dongchedi test video showing the brake pedal bracket snapping on Huawei-backed Maextro’s V800 minivan disappeared from platforms within 24 hours, prompting discussion online related to who was responsible for removing the video. A week later, the industry ministry opened a safety probe, with an unusual caveat: the “Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), the country’s top internet control body, would be joining the investigation to look into the problem ‘reflected online.’”

Taiwan says China cyberattacks, disinformation up ahead of local elections: Taiwan’s National Security Bureau says China spread over 2.5 million pieces of disputed content in the first nine months of 2026, about 48% more than the year prior. It warns of rising operations ahead of November 28 local elections, focused on energy, food security, defense and candidates. Beijing has denied interference.

冯正虎：一篇文章”违规”，整个账号被封停？——正虎纪实百家号账号被封事件始末 [Feng Zhenghu: One article “violation” and the entire account was suspended? — The whole story of the suspension of Zhenghu’s Baijiahao account]: The Baijiahao account Zhenghu Jishi was banned on October 18 after one article describing the author’s experience in promoting rule of law and the Constitution was found to “contain violations.” The author appealed, arguing only the single article should be pulled. Due to China’s real-name registration laws, the harshly disproportionate measures taken against accounts that are found to have crossed censorship “red lines” have a significant impact on individuals’ ability to re-access internet platforms.

Diaspora Community & Transnational Repression 海外社群和跨国镇压

Taiwan charges five men over plot to run over comedian for his Xi Jinping jokes: New Taipei prosecutors indicted five Taiwanese men for allegedly accepting NT$450,000 from a China-based contact known as “K” to injure comedian Huang Yi-hao, whose comedy mocks Xi Jinping. A suspect allegedly tracked Huang with a GPS tag, and on September 11 a car struck his scooter, luckily only leaving him with bruises.

Fengsuo Zhou: “The CCP’s Trajectory Was Set in 1989”: “The CCP’s trajectory was set in 1989.” HRIC Executive Director Zhou Fengsuo spoke with SpeakFreely about how the Tiananmen massacre shaped the Party’s path—from crushing political reform to building a system of high-tech repression.

Legally in the US, Hong Kong citizens caught in ICE crackdown: ICE has reportedly detained at least a dozen Hong Kongers at US airports since June and pressed them to sign voluntary-departure agreements, though they hold Biden-era Deferred Enforced Departure protection through early February 2027. DHS says the deferral “does not confer legal status,” and there has been no announcement of an extension under Trump.

Human Rights Defenders & Civil Society 人权捍卫者与公民社会

New Call for China to Free U.S. Scholar Min Zin, Detained Since June: Forum 2000 and the International Coalition for Democratic Renewal call for the release of Burmese democracy advocate and US citizen Min Zin, detained since June 3 in Yunnan after being invited to a university workshop. He is held on suspicion of espionage, and the U.S. State Department designated him wrongfully detained in August.

Online post purportedly by Chinese students calls for restoring term limits for Xi: An “open letter” purportedly from students at 14 Chinese universities appeared on October 26, the day a Party plenum opened, urging restored presidential term limits, democratic constitutional amendment and room for public discussion. RFA could not independently verify the authors or whether the letter in fact came from inside China.

China covered up the cause of a detained Uyghur father’s death: Police in Aksu confirmed to RFA that bus driver Yasinjan Toxti died in custody in a “re-education” facility in 2018, contradicting the traffic-accident story given to his family. He had been detained repeatedly since 2016 over religious suspicion, including pausing his bus so passengers could pray, and his sister in Belgium says other relatives were later detained as well.

Translation: “The Shawshank Redemption” Hits Chinese Theaters at Last, But “Had to Cut a Slice Off Its Tongue” First: Commentator Li Yuchen’s essay says the August 28 release’s subtitles changed “homosexual” to “people who are different,” “queer” to “pervert,” and “institutionalized” to “cage-tamed.” She argues the wording tracks a 2017 industry code and strips the film’s political metaphor, but cites the restored Fight Club ending as proof that “the line is elastic.”

Media Without “Humanity”: After singer Na Ying improvised a tribute song during a concert, Hunan’s Xiaoxiang Morning Post asked authorities directly whether she had broken pre-approval rules. Critics, including state outlets, branded the move as “informant-style reporting,” which crosses the line from fact-checking to policy enforcement.

UN experts warn of human rights violations facing North Koreans forcibly repatriated from China: Three years after China’s resumption of mass returns, UN-appointed experts say many returnees remain unaccounted for and face a longstanding pattern of rights violations, with women also exposed to trafficking and exploitation. They call on China to honor non-refoulement and on North Korea to disclose returnees’ fates.

李翘楚：已就山东省政府作出的《驳回行政复议申请决定书》向其上级行政单位提交了《行政复议监督反映书》 [Li Qiaochu: I have submitted an “Administrative Reconsideration Supervision Report” to the superior administrative unit regarding the “Decision to Reject the Application for Administrative Reconsideration” issued by the Shandong Provincial Government.]: Li, who applied to marry imprisoned democracy activist Xu Zhiyong, asked the State Council to correct Shandong’s July 15 decision rejecting her bid to force the prison bureau to act. She argues that the “penal enforcement” ground has no legal basis and was applied at the wrong stage. She notes the same prison reportedly helped 28 inmates register marriages in 2024, yet no agency has given her a written decision in over 16 months.

Hong Kong’s Vanishing Rainbow Shows How China’s Social Control Travels: Hong Kong’s largest LGBTQ carnival was cancelled for a second year as Pride organizers lost another venue to a “booking overlap,” while foreign embassies’ LGBT+ events in China face increasing pressure.

China’s Reach & Internal Control 中国: 内控与外扩

China’s sanctions on Taiwan allies project its power, but with limited effect: Beijing’s October 12 sanctions on Paraguay’s ICT minister and Belize’s foreign minister serve to project power and warn off potential Taiwan allies, analysts say, but in fact have little financial bite and haven’t dented Taiwan’s ties.

CCTV cameras at Hong Kong malls to be linked to police surveillance network, says security chief: Security chief Chris Tang says police are in the final stages of talks with private shopping centers to link their cameras to the “SmartView” network, with live-feed access depending on crime risk. The target is 66,500 cameras by 2031, with facial recognition capabilities planned.

HRIC on Twitter/X: In Serbia, student-led protestors won a historic victory in elections which ousted populist president Alexander Vučić. Vučić is one of Beijing's closest partners in Europe, describing the bilateral relationship as an "ironclad friendship." Chinese capital has heavily invested in Serbia's mining and steel industries, and Huawei's surveillance systems have been installed in Belgrade. The election results signal a potential shift away from Beijing.

International Responses 国际反应

Six-monthly report on Hong Kong: 1 January to 30 June 2026: The UK government’s new report on Hong Kong states that its national security laws have “expanding scope and application” and have damaged freedom of expression, assembly, and the press. It cites rule amendments giving police power over devices and travel, as well as the new Procedural Matters Regulation.

Related: Hong Kong slams UK’s ‘untruthful remarks’ in 6-monthly report highlighting ‘expanding scope’ of national security laws. Hong Kong and Beijing rejected the report as “untruthful remarks, slanders and smears.”

The Global Cost of Ignoring Xinjiang: The authors of this opinion piece argue that Western attention to the Uyghur crisis has faded, yet Xinjiang is at the heart of “two of the most consequential policy challenges of our time”—global climate and nuclear risks. They cite Xinjiang’s coal-to-chemicals buildout, its role in polysilicon and forced labor in solar supply chains, and new construction at the Lop Nur nuclear test site, calling the region a “sacrifice zone” where local resistance has been eliminated, with an estimated 400,000-500,000 Uyghurs and other Turkic people imprisoned.

Pentagon designates Confucius Institutes a national security threat: On October 23, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said that the Pentagon added Confucius Institutes to its list of institutions threatening national security, saying “sleeper organizations” resurfaced under new names after Congress banned them. The move follows the earlier audit of partnerships with 30 universities and the lists of blacklisted foreign entities.

Current Events 热点新闻

Powerful earthquake hits Tibet killing 16 people, reports say: A magnitude 7.0 quake struck Baqên County in Nagqu at 10:33 p.m. on October 22, killing at least 16, injuring dozens, and collapsing hundreds of homes.

Related: Rescuers search for survivors after deadly earthquake in China’s Tibet region. The temperature and altitude conditions have impacted rescue efforts, and official media reports that communications have gone down in some areas.

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The Pretoria-area residence and office of Dalai Lama representative Dhundup Gyalpo was attacked with petrol bombs on October 14, causing extensive damage. He escaped through a bedroom window and reportedly sustained minor injuries from broken glass. The property had previously been attacked on July 6. Tibetan rights groups have raised concerns about transnational repression, but the police are still investigating.

Reports raise concerns over the health of political prisoners: Feng Rui (pen name Xiao Wu), editor of labor outlet Chiapas Dongfeng TV who was detained in Guangzhou on September 14 for “picking quarrels” after his team published a 200-page annual labor-rights review, has reportedly fallen ill from lengthy interrogations. Furthermore, Wang Yi, pastor of Chengdu’s Early Rain Covenant Church who is currently serving a nine year sentence for “inciting subversion of state power” and “illegal business operations,” is reported to have advanced liver cancer. Wang Yi has been allowed only five family visits during nearly eight years in custody. The authorities must urgently allow his family to visit him, provide his family with reliable medical information, and ensure he receives appropriate medical care.

Several recent cases have highlighted the push for “national security” among students. In the mainland, Harbin Engineering University warned 20 students (7 undergraduates, 13 graduates) for using unauthorized VPNs, reportedly after a classmate informed on them, sparking commentary on a resurgence of “informer culture.” Tibetan university students report being forced to sign statements swearing their opposition to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile, the Central Tibetan Administration. And in Hong Kong, a new national security platform from the police aimed at school pupils was launched on October 6 to about 700 students. The “NSmarties” platform lets children generate personalized stories on Xi Jinping’s “holistic approach to national security,” and features voices of the Hong Kong police commissioner and security chief.

Law & Policy 法律与政策

China moves to curb tech exports, including AI, citing national security risks: China’s commerce ministry proposed restricting or banning exports of 40 technologies spanning AI, chips and solar, citing national security. Exports of AI models trained on sensitive national data and defense-focused AI agents would be banned, and models with 2 trillion or more parameters could be restricted.

Paralysed in a crash between orders, Keeta rider’s case exposes ‘major loophole’ in proposed gig work laws: Hong Kong’s labor authorities have proposed new legislation purportedly to protect the gig economy’s platform workers, but which labor advocates say would in fact be “even narrower in scope than delivery firms’ existing insurance coverage.” A courier who crashed between orders and was left paralyzed would not be protected, as the proposed scheme would only cover riders from the moment they set off to collect an order until delivery or cancellation.

HRIC on Twitter/X: Starting November 1, China’s enterprises that fail to pay social insurance contributions will face fines of up to three times the amount owed. The State Taxation Administration recently released the “National Tax Administrative Penalty Discretion Standards (2026 Edition)”, which for the first time incorporates social insurance fees into a unified national tax administrative penalty discretion system.

Cyber Security & Digital Rights 网络安全与数字权利

HRIC Digital Rights Report - September 2026: HRIC’s monthly digital rights roundup covers Anthropic’s disclosure of a PRC-aligned operation that used Claude to compile dossiers on religious and diaspora groups, and Hong Kong’s planned “AI City Brain,” whose integration with police platforms HRIC says raises monitoring concerns. It also covers censorship and AI-labelling campaigns, phishing aimed at activists, and Chinese AI-propaganda simulators.

‘Super app’ aimed at UK students uses servers owned by Chinese firm on US blacklist: “ZyMix, which is being pushed on university campuses as the UK’s first super app designed ‘for gen Z’, combining chat, payments and community features, has a contract with a German-based subsidiary of Tencent Holdings,” the Guardian reports. Tencent was recently put on a list of firms that the U.S. government alleges work closely with the Chinese military.

China-linked hackers hit Fiji: US embassy: China-linked hackers reportedly kept access to the network of an unnamed Suva-based regional organization for several days between July and August. The report frames the breach as part of wider targeting of Pacific governments and telecoms, while China’s embassy rejected the claim as evidence-free politicization.

DeepSeek barred from government agency IT systems: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security ordered civilian federal agencies to strip DeepSeek products from their IT systems and stop buying them, including third-party tools built on its models. The order went out quietly in July and was published October 19 under the 2018 Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act, apparently its first use against an AI company. DHS cited risks including collection of personal data, user fingerprinting, possible malware, and “transfer of sensitive data to the PRC.”

What’s the impact of China’s influence on the gaming industry?: Chinese game companies are increasingly shaping the global industry. Yet, games developed from within China face strict censorship and Chinese gamers must register using their real names, which allows monitoring of in-game communications.

Dalai Lama’s birthday, politically sensitive events used to target Tibetans online, TibCERT warns.: TibCERT documented two China-linked campaigns around the Dalai Lama’s 91st birthday: a Mustang Panda–linked email campaign delivering the LOTUSLITE backdoor, and a compromised Tibetan website that profiled visitors and served malware. Lures used themes like the Ethnic Unity Law and Lobga Rangzen’s self-immolation. TibCERT logged 49 incidents in the quarter.

Translation: Why Isn’t it “Foreign Interference” When They Praise China?: A WeChat post questions why foreign influencers’ praise escapes the scrutiny applied to foreign criticism, noting Hainan budgeted ¥894,000 to bring foreign creators on promotional trips in 2026. It argues paid, algorithm-boosted “positive energy” content shouldn’t be used to dismiss Chinese people’s own experiences.

Diaspora Community & Transnational Repression 海外社群和跨国镇压

HRIC on Twitter/X: BEA’s London branch canceled a payment from HRIC to a third party in September, raising questions about the extraterritorial reach of China’s political sanctions and the responsibilities of financial institutions operating under UK regulation.

HRIC on Twitter/X: According to Voice of America, Yang Yiming, a reporter stationed in Prague for the Chinese state media outlet Guangming Daily, stood trial at the Prague City Court on October 14 on charges of “engaging in unauthorized activities for foreign powers.” The 32-year-old Yang was arrested by Czech police on January 17 this year and is the first person in the Czech Republic to be prosecuted under Section 318a of the Criminal Code.

The Silent Reach of Chinese Intelligence in Taiwan: An opinion piece by a former Tibetan diplomat cites a pilgrim who says she was stopped at a Mount Kailash checkpoint and shown photos of her at a CTA reception in Taipei. He argues that this case demonstrates how Beijing surveils exiles and civil society even in Taiwan and urges counter-intelligence awareness and cooperation with Taipei.

Human Rights Defenders & Civil Society 人权捍卫者与公民社会

“Not Our Business”: Sun Meihua, a Beijing woman with schizophrenia who vanished in 2000, was found in a Shandong village in September. Online discussion of her case was swiftly scrubbed. Unlike the 2022 “chained woman” case, authorities issued no statement, and police reportedly said moving her was “not their business.”

Taiwanese Nurse Describes Intense Interrogation During Tibet Visit: A Taiwanese nurse surnamed Lin stated that Chinese officials, one a state security officer, questioned him on a hotel balcony during a tour to Tibet about his military service, political views and hospital work. They also asked whether he would be willing to support unification with China in exchange for a higher salary. Lin says the experience has made him reluctant to return. Three of his tour group’s eight members were questioned.

Chinese authorities force closure of Tibetan girls’ school in Amdo Golog: The Prairie Talent Girls’ School, founded in 2005 by monk Ragya Jigme Gyaltsen to educate nomad girls, was permanently closed on August 27 and renamed Ragya Town Girls’ Middle School under a “privately run, publicly funded” arrangement. Its founder’s vocational school was shut in July 2024, and former students shared grief online.

Former Qinghai monastery abbot jailed over Dalai Lama prayers, photos, teachings: Lobsang Tenpa, former abbot of Ragya Monastery, was sentenced to five years in prison after a secret trial around October 5, following an August police raid that found photos of the Dalai Lama and a thumb drive of his speeches. He had earlier been detained in 2025 for leading Dalai Lama long-life prayers, but nothing is known of his formal charges or legal representation.

61-year-old gets 3-month hospital order after displaying colonial flag, ‘seditious’ slogans outside flat: Yang Chau-kei, who is 61 and diagnosed with schizophrenia, got a three-month hospital order after being convicted of displaying colonial flags and protest slogans outside her Tin Shui Wai flat in 2024. The magistrate found cumulative intent to challenge China’s sovereignty, though she said she assumed security staff would remove the items.

Frozen Out: Boom News founder Tang Ho-wing, arrested September 30 on suspected sedition over a video of the Prince Edward commemoration and bailed October 2, says that all of his bank accounts were frozen without a formal order, and is now living on cash and cannot even find delivery work. The HKJA warned that frontline journalists face similar risks.

Political commentator charged with revealing nat. security probe says police gave no confidentiality warning: Wong Kwok-ngon (Wong On-yin), 72, the first person tried for disclosing details of a national security investigation, told the District Court that the details of his police meeting were already public before he spoke about the matter on YouTube.

Hong Kong Pride event axed due to ‘booking overlap,’ marking group’s 2nd consecutive venue cancellation: The Hong Kong Pride Parade committee’s November 14 Rainbow Market at Central Market was cancelled after the venue said it “could no longer host it,” a month after the group paid a deposit. This incident follows the Pink Dot carnival’s cancellations in 2025 and 2026 over venue and licensing problems.

China’s Reach & Internal Control 中国: 内控与外扩

China sentences three people to death for running Myanmar scam centres: A Fujian court sentenced Wei Huairen, Chen Dawei and Liao Jingfang to death for the “Wei family” gang’s 14 scam compounds in Myanmar’s Kokang region. Three others were given life sentences and 55 received sentences of 3 to 24 years.

China seeks deeper security and intelligence cooperation with Tajikistan: On October 19, Premier Li Qiang called for stronger law enforcement cooperation and intelligence sharing with Tajikistan, invoking Beijing’s campaign against terrorism, separatism and extremism. For human rights advocates, the proposed cooperation warrants scrutiny of its implications for Uyghurs and others at risk of cross-border surveillance or forced return.

A Vanishing Debate: A 13-minute exchange at China’s Taiwan Affairs Office’s September 30 press conference between a TAO spokesperson and Taiwanese journalists over the Flying Tigers, Chiang Kai-shek and the ROC constitution was cut from the official “full transcripts” released by the TAO and People’s Daily.

USALI This Week in Asian Law: The Hong Kong government renewed the free-to-air television licenses of TVB, HKTVE, and i-Cable HOY for the next twelve years. The renewal terms require the stations to produce more English-language national education programs and programs aimed at “telling good stories” about Hong Kong.

International Responses 国际反应

Taiwan says drives away 16 Chinese ships involved in ‘maritime harassment’: On October 18, Taiwan’s coast guard said it drove away 16 Chinese vessels (12 official coast guard and research ships plus four fishing boats) running simultaneous operations off its east, south and southwest coasts and around Pratas. The coast guard called it “hybrid warfare.”

Philippines summons Chinese ambassador to protest remarks it says threatened force: Ambassador Jing Quan said China “may easily win” a conflict with the Philippines but “will not use force.” Manila called it a “thinly veiled threat” and moved to summon Jing, while the Chinese embassy said he was selectively quoted.

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This Month: AI-Powered Surveillance, PRC-Aligned Misuse of Anthropic’s Claude, and Hong Kong’s “AI City Brain”

Recent developments in China and Hong Kong continue to raise concerns about the use of artificial intelligence for surveillance, intelligence gathering, and monitoring politically “sensitive” individuals and communities. In September 2026, two developments were particularly noteworthy: Anthropic’s disclosure of a suspected Chinese state-linked intelligence operation involving the misuse of its AI models, and Hong Kong’s announcement of plans to develop an AI-powered “City Brain.”

In September, Anthropic published its report Detecting and Countering Misuse of AI, revealing that it had disrupted a suspected China-based, PRC government-aligned intelligence operation involving the misuse of its Claude AI models between December 2025 and August 2026. According to Anthropic, the operators used Claude for intelligence analysis, directing the platform to produce dossiers, including “personnel research drafts,” investigative “clue reports,” and daily “situational awareness” to target religious leaders, diaspora communities, and organizations considered politically sensitive by Chinese authorities.

The targets included senior Catholic cardinals across Asia, the leadership of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, the Central Tibetan Administration, Tibetan advocacy organizations such as the International Campaign for Tibet and Students for a Free Tibet, as well as Falun Gong practitioners and affiliated media organizations. Anthropic also reported that China-based actors linked to public and state security organs used Claude to target organizers of Tiananmen Square commemorations.

The operators collected extensive personal information, including individuals’ dates and places of birth, immigration dates, and social media accounts. They also conducted reconnaissance of religious facilities, gathering floor plans, photographs of building facades, and structural diagrams. Their monitoring extended across Chinese and international social media platforms, including WeChat, Xiaohongshu, Douyin, Weibo, LinkedIn, Instagram, Threads, X, and Facebook.

These findings illustrate how generative AI can reduce the time and resources needed to compile profiles and analyze information about surveillance targets. (There is no evidence that these operators accessed other users’ private Claude conversations.) This is only one of several recent examples in which state agents used various AI tools to develop sophisticated cyberattacks and intrusions, obtain confidential information, or simply manipulate AI-generated content. In an earlier disclosure, OpenAI reported that a person associated with Chinese law enforcement had used ChatGPT to edit reports concerning operations against dissidents and foreign political figures.

Anthropic’s report underscores the risks of AI tools and the responsibility of AI developers to detect and disrupt misuse. Platforms should exercise diligence when handling user information and promptly inform the public of any identified interference or misuse. Human rights defenders should also exercise caution when sharing personal or confidential information with AI tools and platforms.

On September 16, Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee announced plans to develop an “AI City Brain” in his annual Policy Address. The proposed system would use AI to integrate and analyze data from Hong Kong’s government departments and digital infrastructure in real time, with the stated aim of improving urban management and emergency response. Although a senior official subsequently said the system was not intended to surveil individuals, the proposal notably includes law-enforcement tools such as the Security Bureau’s Emergency Monitoring and Support Centre and a police-led Inter-departmental Major Incident Platform. Their integration raises concerns about how the system could be used to monitor individuals, particularly without clear limits on data access, retention, and independent oversight.

The risks associated with the AI City Brain extend beyond conventional surveillance. Integrating large amounts of citizens’ personal data into an AI-powered system introduces additional concerns related to data breaches, unauthorized access, and misuse. Such integration would also significantly expand the authorities’ ability to comprehensively monitor individuals, connect information from different sources, and infer patterns of behavior. AI-generated assessments may also contain errors or biases that could harm individuals if used in official decisions. These risks warrant particular scrutiny in Hong Kong’s increasingly restrictive political environment.

In Case You Missed It: Other Digital Rights and Cybersecurity News

Great Firewall, Censorship, and Information Control

• CAC expands campaign against AI-generated content: On September 2, the Cyberspace Administration of China reported cumulative removal of more than 5.61 million items, action against over 49,000 accounts, and measures against more than 2,400 websites and apps in its AI campaign. These are official cumulative figures, not September-only totals. The notice describes expanded face and voice databases and tighter screening of training material and AI outputs, linking anti-abuse enforcement with broader content controls.

• Two-month crackdown on fabricated short-video personas: On September 30, the CAC announced a campaign targeting staged hardship narratives, false professional identities, AI impersonation, and manufactured conflict. While the stated targets include fraud and deceptive marketing, broad enforcement could also potentially chill legitimate accounts of poverty and social grievances.

• As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) covers up the extent of the mudslide disaster in Tibet, several netizens have been arrested for posting related information: Chinese authorities have censored footage and punished at least ten citizens for “spreading rumors” online about death tolls following the catastrophic August 26 Gyirong Port mudslide on the Tibet-Nepal border, while barring foreign journalists from accessing the disaster zone.

• Minitrue: Find, Delete, and Block Chai Jing Video on Cultural Revolution Leader: A leaked CAC directive ordered platforms to find, delete, and block a Chai Jing documentary segment on Gang of Four figure Wang Hongwen using video fingerprinting technology, part of broader efforts to suppress Cultural Revolution history.

• Translation: Article on Media’s Survival Fails to Survive: A frank WeChat article from Zhejiang’s provincial propaganda department candidly admitted the structural crisis facing Chinese local media, including control by tech platforms and shrinking revenue, was censored within hours, illustrating how even officially sanctioned honesty about media decline is unwelcome.

• Minitrue: ByteDance Censors’ List of 5,241 Sensitive Terms: CDT published and analyzed a leaked 2020 internal ByteDance moderation lexicon of 5,241 sensitive words and phrases covering political figures, historical events, and locations, used to censor content across TikTok’s sister apps Douyin and Toutiao.

• Translation: “Eventually, We All Learned to Keep Quiet”: Prompted by censorship following a Guangzhou mass stabbing which targeted women, this essay reflects on how self-censorship has become an internalized survival skill in China, warning that suppressed anger curdles into dangerous societal numbness rather than genuine social harmony.

• Scripting the Source: Chinese state TV journalists reveal that live interviews are increasingly pre-scripted before filming even begins, with interviewees given talking points to recite. This “risk management” shift strips journalism of its function as authentic, on-the-spot information gathering.

• China’s Online Environment Gets Colder and Darker: Li Yuan describes persistent pessimism on Chinese social media amid economic slowdown and unemployment, challenging the official “positive energy” narrative even as space for substantive criticism narrows.

AI Propaganda and Social Media Manipulation

• HRIC on X: People’s Daily opened an account on Threads, complete with a blue verification checkmark, posting feel-good content like Guangzhou night scenes, dragon boat races, and light shows. One post garnered over three thousand views and just eleven likes, but the replies painted a starkly different picture: one comment paired an old photo of Xi Jinping sitting at a computer with the caption “Watch me cut off your VPN.”

• HRIC on X: Huanyu Zhiying 1.0, unveiled by Sun Yat-sen University in April, can simulate foreign-media coverage, predict how different audiences might react, then refine Chinese messaging in response. Instead of broadcasting a narrative and seeing what lands, researchers can potentially test it against synthetic audiences first.

• HRIC on X: ASPI’s analysis of the “Global Audience Intelligence Response 1.0” system describes more than 10,000 simulated personas covering 18 countries. The system uses survey and social media data to model foreign audience reactions and refine messaging, raising concerns about AI-assisted influence operations.

Digital Policy and Regulation

• New rules for multi-channel networks take effect September 1: The rules require registration, identity verification, content management, and platform reporting for organizations supporting online creators. They also require adherence to official political and public-opinion priorities and prohibit broadly defined conduct involving negative information and divisive topics. These provisions raise concerns about further restrictions on online expression.

• China’s top court posts guidelines on deepfakes, voice cloning, and algorithmic price discrimination: The Supreme People’s Court issued guidance addressing unauthorized deepfakes and voice cloning, platforms’ responsibility for responding to infringing content, algorithmic price discrimination, and AI-generated misinformation.

• Policy Address 2026: Hong Kong to appoint AI commissioner and consider deepfake laws – leader John Lee: In his Policy Address, John Lee announced a new AI Commissioner post to combat AI-enabled crime and said the government will study deepfake legislation, following cases of scammers using cloned voices to steal over HK$10 million.

• Beijing bans drone possession in the city after earlier moves to tighten rules: Beijing will ban possessing drones within city limits starting mid-November, extending an earlier May sales ban, following a fatal June crash in which a small aircraft struck a Beijing skyscraper. The authorities will offer buyback subsidies for existing owners.

Cybersecurity & Data Privacy

• The Global Data Center Boom Is a Gift to Spies: shared “colocation” data centers, where Chinese and American companies often lease space in the same facility, create espionage risks far simpler than hacking, as tenants can physically tamper with neighboring servers.

• HRIC on X: According to the New York Times, California cybersecurity firm Calif recently disclosed a high-risk “zero-click” worm attack targeting WeChat, dubbed “WeWorm.” Victims do not even need to click links, download files, or answer calls—a single WeChat call from a compromised contact could serve as the entry point for intrusion.

• HRIC on X: Restrictions on direct access to leading foreign AI services such as ChatGPT and Claude have encouraged corporate employees in mainland China to use third-party AI relay services. Requests for help with coding, system maintenance, and troubleshooting may expose internal code, server logs, VPN configurations, and authentication credentials to those intermediaries.

Digital Transnational Repression

• HRIC on X: A new phishing campaign is targeting Chinese human rights defenders and activists with fake party invitations that appear to come from familiar contacts and trusted invitation services. These messages may lead to fake login pages designed to steal passwords, authentication codes, or active sessions.

• Chinese Online Harassment and Death Threats Against Me Continue as I Speak for Uyghurs: This personal essay is part of an ongoing series in which the Uyghur Times founder recounts continued online death threats and hacking attempts linked to Chinese state networks, alongside the detention of dozens of his relatives in China in apparent retaliation for his journalism abroad.

Technological Competition & State Power

• Chinese AI firms accused of unauthorized model distillation: US agencies accused six Chinese AI developers of extracting capabilities from leading US models through fraudulent accounts and access-evasion methods; China rejected the allegations. Separately, Anthropic reported blocking distillation campaigns linked to seven Chinese labs. The allegations concern different sets of actors and should not be treated as a single finding.

• HRIC on X: Chinese judicial materials describe criminal prosecutions over unauthorized cross-border transport of Starlink terminals, highlighting restrictions on access to satellite communications outside state-controlled networks.

• China’s AI security debate: Chinese officials rejected calls to constrain China’s AI development while intelligence chief Chen Yixin warned about AI-enabled disinformation and cyberattacks. The debate illustrates how authorities frame AI as both a strategic asset and a threat to political security.

• Technology controls and freedom of movement: New Chinese rules permitting exit bans for technology-export violations prompted Taiwan to warn technology workers of detention risks, connecting technology competition with restrictions on individual mobility.

• US–China AI talks: The two governments agreed to establish a communication channel for AI-related incidents and hold an AI dialogue in November. The practical implications for rights protections and accountability remain unclear.

• Open-Weight Diplomacy: This analysis argues that China’s low-cost, open-weight AI models could deepen overseas dependence on Chinese chips, cloud infrastructure, and training services, extending the Digital Silk Road model into AI.

Current Events

• HRIC on X: China’s youth employment landscape is already dire, and AI is exacerbating the problem. A record-breaking 12.7 million graduates are entering the job market this year, and the unemployment rate among urban youth aged 16 to 24 rose to 17.9% in July.

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Read the original English version here.

中国人权（HRIC）呼吁东亚银行（BEA）解释为何在中国政府对该组织实施制裁仅数周后，其伦敦分行便将一笔由中国人权汇往第三方供应商账户的款项退回。尽管中国人权多次质询，包括提交正式投诉及亲自前往银行交涉，东亚银行仍拒绝就其决定作出解释。

这一事件引发了外界的严重关切：一家受英国监管的金融机构是否正在执行北京针对一家美国人权组织的政治制裁？第三方是否仅仅因为与中国针对的组织开展合法业务而受到审查？

2026年8月5日，中国政府将中国人权列入针对美国实体的反制裁清单，禁止中国境内的组织和个人与中国人权进行交易或合作。该决定公布后，中国人权的网站遭到高强度且持续的分布式拒绝服务（DDoS）攻击，导致其线上运作长时间中断。这些攻击对中国人权与公众沟通及开展人权工作的能力造成了重大阻碍。

随后发生的这起银行退汇事件，进一步加剧了外界对中国制裁措施在境外产生实际后果的担忧。

9月3日，中国人权向一家在东亚银行开户的英国独立企业发起了一笔国际电汇。该笔款项未能送达。

东亚银行随后书面确认资金已退回汇出行，但未说明作出该决定的原因。

9月16日，中国人权执行主任周锋锁亲自前往位于沙夫茨伯里大道75号的东亚银行伦敦分行，询问退回款项的原因。银行职员拒绝提供解释，坚称他们只会与收款账户持有人讨论该笔交易。

中国人权随后提交了正式投诉，要求东亚银行解释退汇的依据，并说明该行是否对涉及中国人权的交易设有限制。在10月9日的回复中，东亚银行再次拒绝解释退汇原因。相反，该行表示中国人权并非其客户，因此没有监管依据将中国人权的信函登记为正式投诉。东亚银行还拒绝确认未来是否会处理涉及中国人权的汇款，仅表示每笔交易都将视具体情况逐案审查。随后，该行试图单方面终止双方的信函沟通。

东亚银行已多次确认退回了该笔款项，但始终拒绝说明原因。

该事件还对无关联的第三方造成了令人担忧的影响。此次汇款的预期收款方是一家英国独立企业，此前与中国人权并无任何联系，在这笔交易之前甚至不知道该组织的存在。然而，东亚银行的代表却直接向该企业盘问其与中国人权的关系，引起了该企业极大的警觉和担忧。一笔普通的商业交易，竟成为审查一家与中国人权的人权活动毫无瓜葛的企业的理由。为保护该企业免受进一步的压力或连带影响，中国人权不会公开其身份。

这一事件引发了外界对金融监控以及中国制裁在境外产生寒蝉效应的严重关切。如果企业因与北京针对的组织有业务往来而遭到盘问，它们可能会对与这些组织开展哪怕是日常、合法的交易产生顾虑。

因此，政治制裁的后果可能会超出其直接针对的目标，波及完全没有政治背景的企业和个人。

关于该银行的背景：东亚银行总部位于香港，在中国大陆拥有广泛的业务。其高级管理层成员曾在中国政治机构（包括中国人民政治协商会议）中担任重要职务。该银行此前还曾冻结过香港市民支援爱国民主运动联合会（支联会）的资金，该组织数十年来一直在香港主办每年的六四天安门纪念活动。

这些事实使得东亚银行在对待中国人权一事上的透明度显得尤为重要。

中国政府8月5日实施的制裁，禁止的是中国境内的组织和个人与中国人权进行特定交易与合作，并未强加给英国金融机构拒绝涉及中国人权合法汇款的义务。

如果东亚银行通过其英国业务执行中国政府的制裁，这将引发关于北京政治制裁的域外延伸效力，以及在英国监管下运营的金融机构之职责的严重质疑。

这一问题远不止于一笔被退回的汇款。国际银行网络绝不能沦为威权政府跨越国界、限制人权组织合法活动的工具。

中国人权呼吁东亚银行就为何退回9月3日的汇款作出明确解释，披露中国政府对中国人权的制裁是否在其决定中起了任何作用，并澄清在其英国业务中涉及中国人权的交易是否受到限制。

中国人权同时呼吁英国相关金融监管机构展开调查，审视在英国运营的金融机构是否正在执行中国政府的制裁，以及此类做法是否符合英国法律和监管义务。

中国人权将继续通过适当的监管及其他渠道追寻答案。

一笔日常的金融交易不应成为政治审查的借口。没有任何人权组织应当因外国政府的制裁而在金融上遭到孤立，也没有任何企业应当仅仅因为接纳人权组织作为客户而惧怕承担后果。

进行合法金融交易的自由对于公民社会的独立性至关重要。保护这种自由是抵制跨国镇压的重要组成部分。

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Human Rights in China (HRIC) calls on Bank of East Asia (BEA) to explain why its London branch returned a payment from HRIC to a third-party vendor’s account, just weeks after the Chinese government imposed sanctions against the organization. Despite repeated inquiries, including a formal complaint and an in-person visit to the bank, BEA has refused to explain its decision.

The incident raises serious concerns about whether a UK-regulated financial institution is giving effect to Beijing’s political sanctions against an American human rights organization, and whether third parties are being subjected to scrutiny simply for conducting legitimate business with organizations targeted by China.

On August 5, 2026, the Chinese government placed HRIC on a list of counter-sanctioned U.S. entities, prohibiting organizations and individuals within China from conducting transactions or cooperating with HRIC. Following the announcement, HRIC’s website came under intense and sustained distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, disrupting its online operations for an extended period. These attacks created significant challenges for HRIC’s ability to communicate with the public and carry out its human rights work.

This subsequent banking incident raises further concerns about the practical consequences of China’s sanctions beyond its borders.

On September 3, HRIC initiated an international wire transfer to an independent business in the United Kingdom holding an account with Bank of East Asia. The payment was not delivered.

BEA subsequently confirmed in writing that the funds had been returned to the remitting bank, but provided no explanation for the decision.

On September 16, HRIC Executive Director Fengsuo Zhou personally visited BEA’s London branch at 75 Shaftesbury Avenue and asked why the payment had been returned. Bank staff declined to provide an explanation, insisting that they would discuss the transaction only with the holder of the receiving account.

HRIC subsequently submitted a formal complaint, asking BEA to explain the grounds for returning the payment and whether the bank maintains restrictions on transactions involving HRIC. In its October 9 response, BEA again declined to explain why the payment was returned. Instead, the bank stated that HRIC was not its customer and that there was therefore no regulatory basis for registering HRIC’s correspondence as a formal complaint. BEA also declined to confirm whether future payments involving HRIC would be processed, stating that each transaction would be considered on a case-by-case basis. The bank then sought to bring the correspondence to a close.

BEA has repeatedly confirmed that it returned the payment, but has refused to explain why.

The incident also had a concerning impact on an unrelated third party. The intended recipient, an independent UK business, had no previous connection with HRIC and was not even aware of the organization before this transaction. Yet, representatives of Bank of East Asia directly questioned the business about its relationship with HRIC, causing considerable alarm and concern. An ordinary commercial transaction thus became grounds for scrutiny of a business with no involvement in HRIC’s human rights activities. To protect the business from any further pressure or repercussions, HRIC will not disclose its identity.

This incident raises serious concerns about financial surveillance and the chilling effect of China’s sanctions beyond its borders. If businesses are questioned about their associations with organizations targeted by Beijing, they may become reluctant to conduct even routine, lawful transactions with such organizations.

The consequences of political sanctions can therefore extend beyond their immediate targets, affecting businesses and individuals who have no political involvement whatsoever.

To provide context regarding the bank itself, Bank of East Asia is headquartered in Hong Kong and maintains extensive operations in mainland China. Members of its senior leadership have held significant positions in China’s political institutions, including the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. This bank has also previously frozen funds belonging to the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China, an organization that for decades organized Hong Kong’s annual June 4 Tiananmen commemorations.

These facts make transparency about BEA’s treatment of HRIC particularly important.

The Chinese government’s August 5 sanctions prohibit organizations and individuals within China from conducting certain transactions and cooperation with HRIC. They do not impose obligations on British financial institutions to reject lawful payments involving HRIC.

If Bank of East Asia is applying Chinese government sanctions through its UK operations, this would raise serious questions about the extraterritorial reach of Beijing’s political sanctions and the responsibilities of financial institutions operating under British regulation.

The issue extends far beyond a single returned payment. International banking networks must not become instruments through which authoritarian governments can restrict the lawful activities of human rights organizations across national borders.

HRIC calls on Bank of East Asia to provide a clear explanation of why it returned the September 3 payment, disclose whether the Chinese government’s sanctions against HRIC played any role in its decision, and clarify whether transactions involving HRIC are subject to restrictions within its UK operations.

HRIC also calls on the relevant UK financial regulatory authorities to examine whether Chinese government sanctions are being applied by financial institutions operating in the United Kingdom, and whether such practices are consistent with British law and regulatory obligations.

HRIC will continue pursuing answers through appropriate regulatory and other channels.

A routine financial transaction should not become an occasion for political scrutiny. No human rights organization should be financially isolated by a foreign government’s sanctions, and no business should fear consequences simply for accepting one as a customer.

The freedom to conduct lawful financial transactions is essential to the independence of civil society. Protecting that freedom is an important part of resisting transnational repression.

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Citizen journalist Xiao Wu (Feng Rui) has been missing in China since September 14. Reports indicate that he has been criminally detained by Guangzhou police on suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble,” but no official announcement has been made yet. Informed sources say his detention is related to organizing and compiling the report “Such Hardship, How to Rest: A Review of 2025 Labor Rights Incidents.”

In Hong Kong, the authorities continue to crack down on social media activity that appears supportive of pro-democracy movements. National security police arrested one man and one woman on October 6 over allegedly seditious social media pages, reportedly the “YellowInsurance” platform that mixed insurance promotion with pro-protest content. Sources identified the man as a licensed insurance agent and ex-localist, and the woman as a friend suspected of helping manage the accounts. Police also charged a 52-year-old man over social media posts allegedly meant to provoke hatred towards the central and Hong Kong governments and the judiciary. The case was publicly announced only after his court appearance, breaking the usual police practice of issuing a statement when charges are filed, and gave no details regarding the content of the posts.

Law & Policy 法律与政策

China’s new development plan includes AI safety goals – Xinhua: The Party Central Committee and State Council issued guidelines with 19 measures across five areas to accelerate “new quality productive forces,” including full rollout of the “AI Plus” push to spread AI across industries. They also call for technology monitoring, early risk warning and emergency response so AI is “safe, reliable and controllable,” echoing Xi’s summer remark that AI should stay “always under human control.”

USALI This Week in Asian Law: “The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security released for comment draft regulations that would give gig workers basic employment protections with respect to pay, rewards and penalties, working hours and intensity, rest periods, workplace safety, severe weather, vocational training, social insurance, personal data, and collective bargaining.”

Cyber Security & Digital Rights 网络安全与数字权利

The FBI has seized tools used by Chinese hackers for cyber operations, officials say: The FBI and Justice Department seized the scanning tool “Microscan” and phishing tool “FishHub,” used by the Flax Typhoon group, which operated through Chinese firm Integrity Technology Group. They had been used against a US power company, Japanese and Polish airports, and Taiwanese universities and critical infrastructure.

China accelerates DeepZang AI upgrades under ‘ethnic integration’ agenda: At an October 5 seminar in Hohhot, the developers of DeepZang, a Tibetan-language LLM launched in March, discussed better dialect handling, real-time Tibetan-Mandarin translation, and wider use in education, healthcare and governance. An ICT report found the model repeats official Chinese narratives on sensitive topics and restricts others, such as self-immolation protests.

Alibaba sues Pentagon to denounce being classified as a Chinese military affiliate: Alibaba has sued over its addition to the Pentagon’s Section 1260H list of Chinese military companies in June, saying the listing has “no basis in fact or law.” The Pentagon’s filing cites Alibaba’s censorship tools, joint ventures with state firms such as Norinco-linked Qianxun, and golden-share arrangements, while Alibaba says Chinese-law compliance is not military affiliation.

Trump Vowed to Wall Off TikTok From China. Did He?: Previously unreported details shed new light on TikTok’s messy corporate split and add new urgency to U.S. lawmakers’ concerns about TikTok, particularly as the company faces continued skepticism over multiple safety issues.

HRIC on Twitter/X: The U.S. Department of State is offering a bounty for information on the identity and whereabouts of Chinese national Zhang Yu, a director of Shanghai Shiyan Technology Co., Ltd., who reportedly conducted hacking activities on behalf of the Shanghai State Security Bureau of China’s Ministry of State Security.

Diaspora Community & Transnational Repression 海外社群和跨国镇压

Thai court dismisses detention challenge by Chinese journalist sought by Beijing: A Bangkok court rejected Bai Zhaodong’s challenge a day after Thailand opened extradition proceedings at Beijing’s request. Bai is a UN-recognized refugee, held since January after Thai authorities twice cancelled flights to a third country that offered asylum. His extradition hearing is set for January 25, 2027.

Wolf Warriors in Sheep’s Clothing: China’s New Subnational Diplomacy in Australia: Australia’s Prime Minister Albanese and his efforts to “stabilize” the Australia-China relationship since his election in 2022 have led to a shift in the Chinese government’s strategy to exert influence within the country, writes John Fitzgerald. “Among the knock-on effects in Australia was a flurry of Chinese diplomatic initiatives at the local level. Consular staff in Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, and Perth now plainly assumed they were licensed by Albanese and his business entourage to press for local Australian compliance with their own demands on a range of issues. In meetings with local governments and peak community bodies, they carried a message: tolerating comments or events that displeased or offended the Chinese state or CCP would embarrass not just China or its ruling party, but the government of Australia.”

Taiwan accuses Hong Kong residents of hiring 4 people to spy on lawmaker critical of China: Prosecutors indicted four people for allegedly surveilling DPP lawmaker Puma Shen, a Taipei mayoral candidate, with money from two Hong Kong residents they link to an “overseas hostile force.” The private investigator allegedly received about NT$360,000 in 2024, and a camera was aimed at Shen’s home.

HRIC on Twitter/X: According to a report by Deutsche Welle, August Hanning, the former president of the Federal Intelligence Service, is suspected of leaking confidential German information to China’s intelligence services. Investigators are examining his post-retirement consulting work with multiple countries, with potential ties to Chinese intelligence being a key focus.

Human Rights Defenders & Civil Society 人权捍卫者与公民社会

HRIC on Twitter/X: Cheng Lei, former CCTV anchor and Australian-Chinese journalist who was imprisoned in China for over three years, detailed her experiences under residential surveillance and detention in a new interview.

HRIC on Twitter/X: Pastor Jin Mingri of Zion Church received this year’s Lantos Human Rights Award, a testament to Pastor Jin’s courage under immense pressure and a show of solidarity with the many persecuted faith communities in China.

HRIC on Twitter/X: China’s well-known “fake buster” Wang Hai and his team have recently faced intense crackdown by Dalian police, stemming from his long-standing support for the rights of Dalian cherry growers.

Uyghur Pop Singer Ablajan Awut Ayup’s Release from Prison Confirmed: Uyghur Post verified that the singer, detained in 2018 in Guma, has reappeared in photos on Douyin, with earlier claims placing his release in February 2026. He has released a Chinese-language love song, “Perfect,” and fans’ comments hint he was held in a camp but say it “cannot be discussed openly.”

Tiananmen vigil organiser Chow Hang-tung files appeal against subversion sentence: Chow filed an appeal against her seven-year, three-month sentence, handed down September 11 for inciting subversion over the Tiananmen vigils. Lee Cheuk-yan received seven years and Albert Ho five years and two months. Lee’s wife said her husband would also appeal.

Elderly man arrested for criminal damage after red paint splashed on Kwun Tong lawmakers’ office: A 66-year-old was arrested for splashing red paint at the Sau Mau Ping Estate office shared by lawmakers Bill Tang and Chan Pui-leung. Police said no national security or triad elements were involved, and he reportedly accused the lawmakers of ignoring his complaints.

Po Leung Kuk charity appoints 16 ‘national security tutors’ under gov’t scheme: The charity inaugurated its first group of national security education instructors on October 7 at the Science Museum, under the government’s district-tutor scheme. The program, which aims to teach students about the National Security Law, has trained over 3,300 tutors citywide.

China’s Reach & Internal Control 中国: 内控与外扩

Chinese Authorities Removing Tibetan Signboards in Chengdu: Authorities in Chengdu removed Tibetan-language signage from private business Charingma Interior Design Co. on October 5, only allowing the shop name written in Chinese characters on the sign. The manager stated that many of the shop’s older Tibetan customers cannot read Chinese. The action follows the rollout of the Ethnic Unity Law, which has caused Tibetan text to increasingly vanish from public signage.

HRIC on Twitter/X: Two scholars from Yale University in the United States were recently named in a research report which states that after participating in an official Chinese forum on Xinjiang in 2024, the scholars’ publicly expressed praise was used by Chinese state media to defend repressive policies in Xinjiang.

China sanctions Paraguay and Belize officials over ties with Taiwan: China sanctioned Paraguay’s communications minister, Gustavo Villate, and Belize’s foreign minister, Francis Fonseca, calling them “pawns” of Taiwan independence forces. The measures, which came two days after Taiwan’s National Day, freeze assets in China and bar entry, and are largely symbolic.

Satellite images show attack jets at Chinese military facility in Laos: Satellite images from September 30 show about eight K-8 light attack jets and over two dozen support vehicles at a new China-Laos facility at Ban Keun, still building its runway. Analysts say it may be China’s first fully fledged overseas military base in Southeast Asia, while Beijing calls it joint training and support.

Another former top Chinese leader in Tibet sacked for corruption: Ding Yexian, former deputy head of the Tibet Autonomous Region’s People’s Congress standing committee, was expelled from the Party on October 9 after an April probe. He is accused of bribery.

China’s Panchen for aligning all religious work in Tibet with China’s national assimilation law: The government-appointed Panchen Lama, Gyaltsen Norbu, told a Shigatse meeting on September 30 that all religious work in Tibet must align with Party policy, including the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law. Xinhua reported he urged in-depth study and publicity of the law and religious regulations.

A “Red Tourism” Push for the Long March: For state media coverage of the 90^th anniversary of the Long March, official narratives centered on National Day travel along Long March sites, with themed trains, an AI-powered museum in Guiyang, and dramas filmed along the route. This article traces “red tourism” from 2004 as a way to build patriotic identity and develop poor regions.

International Responses 国际反应

European Parliament calls to free Hong Kong political prisoners and suspend extradition arrangements: On October 7, the European Parliament adopted its EU-China policy recommendations by 454 votes to 86, with 110 abstentions. On Hong Kong, they urge Beijing to free Jimmy Lai, Benny Tai, Joshua Wong, Leung Kwok-hung, Owen Chow, Chow Hang-tung and the jailed members of the Hong Kong 47, and to suspend all extradition arrangements to Hong Kong until judicial independence and free expression are restored.

Related: European Parliament’s China-policy report condemns forced assimilation drive in Tibet. The European Parliament’s new recommendations on EU-China relations condemn forced “Sinicisation” in Tibet and the Ethnic Unity Law, demand information on the missing Panchen Lama Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, and call for closing Chinese “overseas police stations.”

Related: EU lawmakers vote to reject Chinese pressure on Taiwan’s global role. The same report also rejects China’s attempts to restrict Taiwan’s international participation, cites Beijing’s pressure over VP Hsiao Bi-khim’s EP-organized conference, and opposes China’s distortion of UN Resolution 2758. It reaffirms the EU’s One China policy, notes the EU never endorsed Beijing’s “One China principle,” and urges closer ties and a continuous naval presence.

US says Fiji-based Chinese official paid bribes for Beijing: The State Department barred Zhao Fugang, director of Suva’s Overseas Chinese Service Centre, from the United States for allegedly bribing Fijians to advance Chinese interests. Zhao denies the allegations and China’s foreign ministry called them slander. The United States also named a Palau Senate president and a former Marshall Islands mayor.

EU to limit Chinese hybrid vehicle imports to 350,000 a year: After an October 9 Beijing deal that EU trade chief Šefčovič said would cut Chinese hybrid shipments by more than half over four years, Bloomberg reports the cap would be 350,000 cars in year one, rising 6% annually, possibly from December 1—EU leaders must still approve it.

Related: China warns France, Germany against ‘protectionist’ trade tools. China’s commerce ministry urged France and Germany not to encourage EU “protectionist tools” after Macron and Merz asked for a credible trade instrument allowing rapid responses to trade aggression. The letter did not name China but came days before EU trade chief Šefčovič’s Beijing trip. Beijing had earlier threatened a “resolute response” to any Section 301-style EU tool.

Taiwan’s Lai says the island will not give up its freedom in National Day speech: In his October 10 National Day speech, Lai said Taiwan cherishes peace but won’t give up its freedom, adding that boosting defenses isn’t a provocation. Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office accused him of clinging to a “Taiwan independence” mindset, and 13 Chinese aircraft crossed the median line the same day.

U.S. urges China to stop pressure on Taiwan after militia vessel spotted: The State Department called China’s activity east of Taiwan “deeply destabilizing” after Reuters reported a maritime militia boat, Minfudingyu 07902, spotted off Hualien in mid-August alongside a coast guard cutter and research vessel. Taiwanese officials say Beijing may be rehearsing a blockade, while Taiwan’s coast guard said the vessels stayed outside restricted waters.

Philippines flags near-doubling of Chinese presence in disputed waters: Manila monitored 101 Chinese navy and coast guard ships in September around Thitu Island, Second Thomas Shoal, Sabina Shoal and Scarborough Shoal, nearly double the number of the previous month. An alleged Chinese fighter-jet interference with a Philippine patrol plane near Scarborough was among the incidents.

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Hong Kong national security police confirmed that eight people were arrested in September over the August 31 Prince Edward station commemoration, among them independent journalist Tang Ho-wing of Boom News, who was filming the gathering. The Hong Kong Journalists Association says it is the first publicly known sedition arrest of a journalist under the 2024 security law, much to the condemnation of the association and civil society organizations. Tang was released on bail after his sedition arrest, which police have not tied to any specific act beyond his coverage and livestream.

Meanwhile, a Tibet Watch report, built on police tenders and procurement records, found that drone fleets and counter-drone systems have been deployed across Tibet for “stability maintenance” purposes, especially in protest-prone areas such as Driru and Derge. The report documents 12 contracts for DJI equipment worth about ¥24.8M and urges the UK and US to restrict Chinese-made drones with cameras.

Also: in its first public “espionage alert,” the UK’s MI5 stated that the China General Technology Research Institute is a front tied to China’s Ministry of State Security, and that the Institute had already funded projects involving 100+ UK-linked academics in areas including AI and cybersecurity. The government told universities to end all arrangements with the Institute, warning that collaboration could breach the UK’s National Security Act. China’s embassy denounced the claims as falsehoods.

Law & Policy 法律与政策

A few notes on the Ethnic Unity Law: A commentary on China’s Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, which took effect July 1, explains why minzu should be translated as “ethnic” rather than “nationality,” as official English versions blur ethnic identity with citizenship.

NPC Calendar: October 2026: The revised National Defense Mobilization Law takes effect on October 1. This upcoming session is expected to review the draft revision to the Tax Collection Administration Law, the draft amendments to the Emergency Response Law, and 14 other unspecified laws that were respectively approved by the State Council leadership on August 31 and September 18.

USALI This Week in Asian Law: September 27 – October 03: Beginning October 1, 2026, the Ministry of Public Security has expanded powers to inspect companies’ handling of data and personal information. The new Measures for Public Security Organs’ Supervision and Inspection of Cyberspace Security update 2018 rules to reflect the 2021 Data Security Law and Personal Information Protection Law.

Cyber Security & Digital Rights 网络安全与数字权利

HRIC on Twitter/X: Taiwan’s Center for Technology, Democracy, and Society recently released a report examining censorship biases in two mainstream large language models, ChatGPT-5.2 and Gemini 3. The results showed that the Chinese responses from both models were more evidently aligned with censorship narratives compared to the English responses.

HRIC on Twitter/X: A cybersecurity firm tested Alibaba’s open-source large model Tongyi Qiwen (Qwen) and found it evades facts on sensitive political issues, parroting the official line. Qwen has been downloaded globally over 3 billion times, and is used by American companies like Airbnb and Uber.

HRIC on Twitter/X: U.S. cybersecurity firm Proofpoint disclosed that a hacker group suspected to be linked to the Chinese government impersonated prominent figures in the U.S. AI sector in February and July this year, launching phishing attacks against experts researching AI export controls and military AI applications at U.S. universities, think tanks, and law firms, with the intent to steal their email accounts and gain insight into how U.S. society discusses and formulates AI policies.

HRIC on Twitter/X: On the afternoon of October 4, well-known Taiwanese host Cai Kangyong attended the launch event for the campaign headquarters of Shen Boyang, Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party’s candidate for Taipei mayor. Overnight, his Weibo account with 36 million followers had all its content wiped clean and all follows reset to zero.

US arrests California man for allegedly smuggling $300m worth of computer servers to China: Greg Lui, owner of Earthmade Computer, was arrested on charges of using false paperwork and shipments through Malaysia and Singapore to route export-controlled GPU servers to China in 2023–24. He faces counts of conspiracy, smuggling and money-laundering, in a case that follows Taiwan’s recent prosecutions over smuggled Nvidia servers.

OpenAI reveals huge ‘co-ordinated campaign’ to attack ChatGPT: OpenAI says it disrupted a July campaign, involving 15,000+ users, to extract its models’ hidden reasoning, attributing a core cluster to people linked to China’s Moonshot AI. Moonshot has not responded, and OpenAI says no encryption was broken.

West-to-east energy, east-to-west computing: The Uyghur costs of China’s digital order: The author argues that Beijing is turning the Uyghur region into a Eurasian AI and data hub, pointing to the SCO Digital Economy Forum in Urumqi, as an extension of its long-standing resource extraction. She says the push rests on Uyghur land, energy and labor while the forum ignored the surveillance and forced-labor concerns tied to the region.

Translation: Censored Commentary on Beijing’s Drone Storage Ban: A mild WeChat post about Beijing’s new rule banning drone possession, storage and sale citywide from November 15 was deleted. The rule followed the June crash of a manned aircraft into the CITIC Tower, and the post’s removal fits a pattern of censoring even non-critical commentary on security measures.

CDT’s “404 Deleted Content Archive” Summary for August 2026: August’s censorship roundup covered the Guo Degang “red tune” probe, criticism of banquet culture after alleged sexual assaults in Hangzhou, Huawei’s “bamboo cicada” meme backlash, and security checks around Tiananmen. It also covered the surprise hit animated film “Niu Lai” and the heavily censored Gyirong flood.

Diaspora Community & Transnational Repression 海外社群和跨国镇压

China pressured Munich institute to cancel Taiwan author event: Taiwan’s Munich office says the Chinese consulate unsuccessfully pressed Literaturhaus München to cancel author Yang Shuang-tzu’s talk, offering to fund an event with a Chinese author instead. The office also said that the event’s interpreter wouldn’t translate certain words such as “Taiwan” and that some audience members asked “sensitive” political questions.

FBI arrests woman accused of spying on Taiwan leader’s family for China: Irvine realtor Wanying “Heather” Zhang was arrested at LAX before a flight to China and charged as an unregistered Chinese agent. She allegedly surveilled and photographed the Seattle-area family of President Lai’s son in 2025 at the direction of Chinese officials.

Recent Incidents Highlight Chinese Transnational Repression in Taiwan: This piece describes attacks such as the smearing of a Taipei comedy club’s entrance with feces after a comedian mocked Xi. It also covers earlier paint attacks on exiled Hong Kong figures and a growing number of impersonation cases. It notes that attackers are often paid locals or fly-in operatives, which gives plausible deniability, though a link to China is unclear in the comedy club case.

TYC youth activists storm Chinese Embassy in New Delhi on China’s National Day: About 30 Tibetan Youth Congress activists protested at the Chinese Embassy on China’s National Day, rejecting Beijing’s sovereignty claims. Delhi Police detained them for several hours before releasing them that evening.

Human Rights Defenders & Civil Society 人权捍卫者与公民社会

HRIC on Twitter/X: Noted democratic figure Yang Tianshui’s sister, Yang Guixiang, passed away unexpectedly on August 18. Yang Guixiang advocated tirelessly for her brother over his 22 years of imprisonment. As we advocate for prisoners of conscience behind bars, we must not overlook the families who stand behind them.

China grants a singer a rare exemption over censorship after an unapproved tribute song: Chengdu authorities said singer Na Ying needed no extra approval for singing “Curved Moon” as a tribute to her late friend Liu Huan, calling it a brief, fragmentary performance during audience interaction. China requires pre-approval of all live-performance content. The exemption came weeks after Wuhan fined the organizers of comedian Guo Degang’s show.

‘Stand on the right side of history’: Starbucks urged to close stores in China’s Xinjiang: The World Uyghur Congress called on Starbucks to “stand on the right side of history” and close its first two Urumqi stores, which opened September 29. US House China Committee chair John Moolenaar called the move “morally bankrupt,” while Starbucks China’s CEO said the company will keep investing in the region.

Related: China Turns Starbucks Opening in Uyghur Homeland Into Propaganda Opportunity Amid Western Criticism. Chinese state media and officials promoted the Urumqi stores as proof of prosperity and normalcy, using footage of Uyghur dancing and the stores’ “ethnic” design.

Cardinal Zen, singer Denise Ho and 3 other trustees take 2019 protest fund convictions to top court: Cardinal Joseph Zen, Denise Ho, Margaret Ng, Cyd Ho and Hui Po-keung are taking their convictions for failing to register the 612 Humanitarian Relief Fund to the Court of Final Appeal, after the Court of Appeal upheld them on September 3. They want the top court to clarify what counts as a “society” under the Societies Ordinance and what that means for freedom of association.

Press union urges police to handle all cases with ‘equal efficiency’ after same-day arrest over threats to pro-gov’t outlet: Police arrested a 24-year-old man within hours of a threatening letter with white powder reaching the pro-Beijing Sing Tao Probe. The HKJA welcomed the speed but urged equal efficiency, noting multiple threats against other press outlets remain unsolved.

A Second Death for a Student Outlet: Following April’s quiet shutdown of Beijing Normal University’s 20-year-old student publication Jingshi Scholars, the outlet Voice of the Voiceless revealed how alumni fought to save the account and preserve its archive. The piece frames it as a second “death” of the outlet, as campus media space shrinks.

China’s Reach & Internal Control 中国: 内控与外扩

National Security on the Silver Screen: The Ministry of State Security co-produced the spy drama The Long Watch, which topped ratings and which the People’s Daily promoted as showing national security is “every citizen’s responsibility.” The MSS seeks to use entertainment to build “security consciousness,” with Taiwan as a central theme.

The Chinese Communist Party forces Tibetan students and monks across the country to participate in celebrations on “National Day”: Per the headline, the Party compelled Tibetan students and monks to take part in National Day celebrations. This fits a long pattern of mandatory patriotic participation alongside tight limits on religious activity in Tibetan areas.

What China’s Laos foothold means for the region: China opened a joint support and training center and aviation academy at Laos’s Ban Keun airfield. Some call it China’s first full PLA overseas base in Southeast Asia, while others question what it adds beyond forces already in Yunnan.

Tom Cruise film Digger pulled from Hong Kong cinemas ahead of National Day release, censors tight-lipped: The satirical disaster comedy was pulled just before its October 1–2 Hong Kong and Macao release, with no showtimes and no official explanation. Local reports cite possible “sensitive content” or political satire and suggest cuts may be needed, while Taiwan released it on schedule.

Putting Overseas Film On the Record: Hong Kong’s culture secretary Rosanna Law said overseas filmmakers must submit an outline of a film’s “story content” and “message” before shooting in the city. It signals a possible new vetting mechanism for foreign crews.

A New Page for the People’s Daily: The Party’s flagship paper joined RedNote with a chipper, youth-targeted poem as part of a top-down push to keep Party media relevant as young audiences move to short-video and lifestyle apps.

Another Chinese Propaganda Outpost for Italy: Anhui’s International Communication Center opened a “European outpost” in Milan, the third such state-linked media office in Italy and second in Milan. It follows a Prato office opened in 2025, in a city with a large Chinese immigrant population.

HRIC on Twitter/X: U.S. think tank Jamestown Foundation published a long article titled “Xi Jinping’s Purges and the Taiwan Strait War,” analyzing the scale and implications of Xi’s recent military purges. Since 2022, 36 full and lieutenant generals have been formally dealt with, and another 65 senior officers have vanished from public view, likely purged. Of the seven Central Military Commission members at the end of 2022, only one remains today besides Xi Jinping himself.

International Responses 国际反应

Bipartisan US delegation reaffirms support for Tibet, say Trump-Xi meeting does not alter Washington’s position: A bipartisan House delegation led by Rep. Brian Mast met the Dalai Lama in Dharamshala and said the Trump-Xi summit doesn’t diminish US opposition to repression of Tibetans and Uyghurs. Mast was hopeful about the Assuring the Future of Tibet Act.

Latin America sees China as more positive global influence than US: Poll: The 2026 Latinobarómetro survey of 17 countries found 65% see China’s influence as positive versus 57% for the US, a first in the poll’s history. China is up from 48% in 2020, while the US still leads on overall favorability (63% vs. 58%), down from 73% in 2024.

HRIC on Twitter/X: The U.S. Senate passed the “Falun Gong Protection Act and Victims of Organ Harvesting” unanimously on September 28. According to Voice of America, the bill was jointly introduced in March this year by Republican Senator Ted Cruz and Democratic Senator Jeff Merkley. The bill requires the President to submit a list to relevant congressional committees, identifying individuals who have intentionally and directly carried out or facilitated organ harvesting within China. The assets of individuals on the list in the United States will be frozen, Americans will be prohibited from conducting transactions with them, and they will be denied visas, with existing visas subject to revocation.

Trump says he had ‘fruitful discussions’ about Jimmy Lai’s release with Xi Jinping: Trump said he raised the release of political prisoners, including Jimmy Lai and Min Zin, with Xi at last week’s summit, calling the talks “hopefully fruitful.” Lai’s daughter Claire said she was hopeful, though in May Trump said Xi told him Lai’s release was “a tough one,” and the White House hasn’t said whether broader Tibet and Uyghur rights issues were raised.

India issues standard Ladakh placenames that identify incursion spots: India’s Home Ministry released 28 official names for places and features in Ladakh, including parts of Aksai Chin and Gilgit-Baltistan and the 2020 friction points of Hot Spring and Gogra. It follows a similar naming of 27 Arunachal Pradesh locations about two months earlier, in response to China’s repeated naming of border areas.

Current Events 热点新闻

Return of the Pekingologist: Adrian Zenz argues that as China closes archives and criminalizes data-gathering, scholars need a forensic method he calls “Investigative Policy Analysis,” which treats Chinese bureaucratic paper trails as a field to be reverse-engineered. He says it helped expose the Xinjiang camps, by tracking Party watchwords (tifa) through construction bids and regulations, and the Uyghur forced-labor transfers. The method can’t measure implementation precisely, and he notes Beijing has scrubbed documents once they’re exposed.

Bollywood war drama Maatrubhumi gets gov’t approval, storyline now shows China in positive light: The Salman Khan film, originally Battle of Galwan, got an Indian government no-objection certificate after Information and Broadcasting Ministry officials approved a heavily revised storyline. Per the report, the new version portrays India-China ties in a positive light, and a November 13 release is possible once the censor board clears it. The original had drawn criticism from China and delays from India’s Defence Ministry as ties improved.

Seven Years in Tibet back on Netflix shelves after 20 years: The 1997 film returned to Netflix on October 1. Beijing objected to its depiction of the occupation and reportedly banned Brad Pitt, David Thewlis and director Jean-Jacques Annaud, who filmed in Argentina and Canada after China pressured India. Other celebrities China has banned or restricted over Tibet include Richard Gere, Martin Scorsese and Harrison Ford.

As India and China repair ties, a Tibet film tells the story of a forgotten resistance: Four Rivers Six Ranges dramatizes the Chushi Gangdruk fighters who helped the Dalai Lama escape in 1959. Anthropologist Carole McGranahan calls it a “Tibetan telling of the history of Tibet.” Its India release, set for September 11, the day before Xi’s BRICS arrival, was delayed amid the India-China thaw. Chinese state media attacked it as separatist.

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Human Rights in China (HRIC) has published a report documenting a pattern of organized violence against anti-Xi protesters during Xi Jinping’s September 23–25 Washington visit, closely mirroring attacks at the 2023 San Francisco APEC summit.

Demonstrators calling for freedom in Tibet, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Taiwan gathered near the White House, chanting “Xi Jinping has got to go.” Some even dressed as Winnie the Pooh, a banned meme comparing Xi to the cartoon bear, as part of the broader satirical and political dissent against Xi’s state visit. As thousands of pro-democracy, Tibetan, Uyghur, and Hong Kong protesters gathered near Xi’s hotel and the Chinese Embassy, they faced repeated encirclement, banner-snatching, pepper-spraying, and physical assaults from organized pro-Beijing crowds: an estimated 100 overseas Chinese associations bussed in with centralized logistics and stipends, while unidentified men in matching dark clothing and face masks moved between the crowds, filming and attacking protesters, with one suspect reportedly protected by diplomatic immunity according to police. New York community leader Chen Shanzhuang, previously linked to organizing violence at the 2023 San Francisco incident, reappeared as an apparent on-site coordinator during the Washington attacks.

Despite extensive video evidence, only anti-Xi protesters faced arrest and prosecution (five arrests, including one transferred to ICE custody), while no pro-Beijing attackers have been criminally charged, mirroring the impunity seen in 2023. HRIC calls on U.S. law enforcement to investigate the assailants’ identities and possible links to Chinese diplomatic missions, and questions why diplomatic immunity would shield individuals from accountability for street violence against people exercising their constitutional rights.

In other news related to the summit, 37 members of Congress wrote to Trump urging him to personally press Xi to repeal China’s “Ethnic Unity and Progress Law,” warning it threatens religious freedom and enables transnational repression against Tibetans, Uyghurs, and other minorities worldwide. The wife of detained seismologist Youlin Chen said the White House assured her Trump would press Xi for her husband’s release, along with that of scholar Min Zin, as both remain designated “wrongfully detained” by the US. In the meantime, AI, trade, and Taiwan issues were left largely unresolved.

Law & Policy 法律与政策

Does China Intend to Target Taiwan With New National Security Legislation?: Taiwanese officials worry that China may roll out further national security legislation targeting Taiwan following the Ethnic Unity Law, citing recent exit-entry regulations, cyberspace security measures, and the National Defense Mobilization Law as building blocks for expanded “long-arm” jurisdiction.

USALI This Week in Asian Law 09/25: The National People’s Congress Standing Committee plans to study a dedicated law on “filing and review,” the process for checking whether regulations, local laws, and judicial interpretations comply with the constitution and national law. The process has led to changes in local rules that, for example, restricted the schooling, jobs, and welfare benefits of relatives of people accused or convicted of crimes. The law would consolidate review systems now run separately by the legislature, the government, the courts, and other state bodies.

Cyber Security & Digital Rights 网络安全与数字权利

Translation: “Eventually, We All Learned to Keep Quiet”: Prompted by censorship following a Guangzhou mass stabbing which targeted women, this essay reflects on how self-censorship has become an internalized survival skill in China, warning that suppressed anger curdles into dangerous societal numbness rather than genuine social harmony.

Scripting the Source: Chinese state TV journalists reveal that live interviews are increasingly pre-scripted before filming even begins, with interviewees given talking points to recite. This “risk management” shift strips journalism of its function as authentic, on-the-spot information gathering.

China’s Approach to AI: Infrastructural Statecraft, Managed Pluralism: This analysis argues China’s AI development model is best understood as “the government builds the stage, enterprises put on the show”; in other words, state-controlled infrastructure is paired with managed competition among firms, distinct from a more market-driven approach.

New rules to protect tech secrets could strand Taiwanese visitors in China: China’s new rules allowing exit bans for tech-export violations have prompted Taiwan to warn semiconductor and tech workers of detention risk, with analysts saying the rules reflect Beijing’s fear of losing AI talent and IP to the US.

China, US agree to set up channel for AI safety incidents: Following the Trump-Xi summit, both countries agreed to establish a bilateral communication channel for AI-related incidents and a formal “AI Dialogue” set for November, alongside continued Board of Trade cooperation and military crisis-communication mechanisms.

Related: Trump and Chinese president Xi end summit without major agreement on AI. The three-day Washington summit closed with pageantry and a two-month trade truce extension but no binding AI framework, despite months of buildup, drawing criticism that the leaders squandered a chance to address the AI arms race.

Diaspora Community & Transnational Repression 海外社群和跨国镇压

HRIC on Twitter/X: On the morning of September 22, an alarming incident of transnational repression occurred outside the Chinese Consulate-General in Toronto. ​A man wearing a Chinese national flag pin—strongly suspected of being consulate personnel—openly and violently tore down protest banners and shoved an elderly female demonstrator. Confronting the peaceful protesters, he aggressively issued blatant death threats: “Under the Anti-Secession Law, I can have you shot!” and “Believe it or not, I’ll beat you to death!” ​When a bystander stepped in to intervene and reminded him, “This is Canada,” the man showed no restraint, brazenly shouting back, “Fuck Canada!” along with a stream of profanities.

130 UN human rights experts issued a joint statement calling on the international community to stop “transnational repression.”: Over 130 UN Special Procedures mandate holders and Treaty Body members issued a landmark joint statement urging states, tech companies, and INTERPOL to combat transnational repression, including spyware, AI-enabled surveillance, and cross-border intimidation.

HRIC on Twitter/X: The English edition of Xu Zhiyong’s essay collection “A Beautiful China” was launched at Georgetown University Law Center on September 22, 2026, with more than twenty friends, human rights advocates, publishers, scholars, and lawyers in attendance. The launch came just ahead of Xi Jinping’s visit to the US, offering the international community a chance to hear a voice beyond China’s official narrative.

Human Rights Defenders & Civil Society 人权捍卫者与公民社会

HRIC on Twitter/X: Wang Yi, pastor of Chengdu Early Rain Covenant Church, who is currently serving his sentence in Sichuan, has reportedly been diagnosed with late-stage liver cancer. This news has sparked strong international concern for his health and safety. Pastor Wang Yi was arrested on December 9, 2018; on December 30, 2019, he was sentenced to 9 years in prison on charges of “inciting subversion of state power” and “illegal business operations” related to his role in running the church.

HRIC on Twitter/X: Human rights defender Shi Tingfu passed away on September 22 while serving his sentence in Shashi Prison, Aksu, Xinjiang, only four months before he was supposed to be released. The prison authorities told Mr. Shi’s son that his father had died of a heart attack. Mr. Shi was arrested on January 15, 2024, for helping fruit farmers from the Aksu Production and Construction Corps defend their rights.

HRIC on Twitter/X: On September 23, 2026, Chen Yunfei, a member of Chengdu Qiuyu Shengyue Church, was formally arrested by the Wujiang District Police in Chengdu City on charges of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.”

HRIC on Twitter/X: Human rights defender Jia Xun was released from prison upon completion of his sentence on September 21, 2026. Four years ago, Jia was arrested across provinces by Henan police in Beihai, Guangxi, accused of using VPNs to access overseas websites such as Facebook and Twitter, “spreading false information, stirring up trouble, and causing serious disruption to public order,” and was subsequently sentenced to four years in prison for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.”

HRIC on Twitter/X: In a leaked clip from a private gathering, SOHO China founder Pan Shiyi (潘石屹) recounts the chilling fallout of Ren Zhiqiang (任志强)’s private dissent. According to Pan, Ren sent an internal letter to just 11 people, and Pan was the first on the list. While other recipients inside China were swiftly rounded up, Pan narrowly escaped detention only because he had already arrived in the United States.

The Chinese Communist Party’s plan to build a “love the Party” propaganda station at a pilgrimage site in Gonjo County, Tibet, has sparked public petitions in opposition.: Chinese authorities’ plan to build a Communist Party propaganda station at a Buddhist pilgrimage site in Gonjo County, Tibet, has triggered rare public petitions of opposition from local Tibetans, reflecting broader resentment over religious sites being used for political indoctrination.

Security Bureau weighs action as years-old Joshua Wong film tops Netflix charts following state-backed media report: Hong Kong’s Security Bureau said it is “taking relevant follow-up actions” after a pro-Beijing newspaper flagged that the 2017 documentary Joshua: Teenager vs. Superpower, about jailed activist Joshua Wong, had unexpectedly topped Netflix Hong Kong’s charts, though authorities stopped short of confirming any ban.

Elderly woman to stand trial under nat. security legislation despite psychosis diagnosis: Yang Chau-kei, 61, diagnosed with psychosis and delusional disorder, will go to trial in October for displaying seditious materials outside her Tin Shui Wai flat, after the court proceeded despite her psychiatric evaluation and denial of bail.

Hong Kong court to rule on ex-Stand News editor’s appeal bid against sedition conviction in 6 months: A Hong Kong appellate court will rule within six months on Patrick Lam’s bid to overturn his sedition conviction as former acting editor of the shuttered outlet Stand News, in a case seen as a bellwether for press freedom.

Hong Kong slams EU report claiming ‘deterioration of fundamental freedoms’ in the city: Hong Kong authorities rejected the EU’s annual report citing “continued deterioration of fundamental freedoms” and intense national-security focus, calling the assessment biased and accusing Brussels of double standards.

Prison authorities accuse ‘anti-China’ figures of ‘fabricating lies’ after US group says guards rehearsed Jimmy Lai’s death: Hong Kong’s Correctional Services Department accused “anti-China” advocacy groups of “fabricating lies” after a US-based foundation reported that Stanley Prison guards had rehearsed procedures for the event of Jimmy Lai’s death in custody, amid concerns over his deteriorating health.

Hong Kong 47: Ex-district councillor says he has ‘no regrets’ after release from prison: Ng Kin-wai, released after five years and seven months for conspiracy to subvert state power, said he stood by his pro-democracy activism, acknowledging Hong Kong’s changed political reality while refusing to call it acceptable.

Questioning Hong Kong’s lack of a banned book list is ‘soft resistance’ – outgoing nat. security police chief: Outgoing national security police chief Andrew Kan stated that even asking why Hong Kong won’t publish a list of banned books itself constitutes “soft resistance,” reflecting the vague, expansive use of the undefined term to police public discourse.

China’s Reach & Internal Control 中国: 内控与外扩

HRIC on Twitter/X: BBC Verify has discovered that Apple Maps blurs satellite images of thousands of military and political facilities in China for users outside the country, including detention sites linked to allegations of forced labor and torture, as well as the Urumqi No. 1 Prison where Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti is held. While blurring military bases may have security justifications, erasing facilities accused of large-scale arbitrary detention alongside them effectively helps authorities cover up evidence.

How China is trying to stop an expert exodus: Beijing seeks to prevent Chinese-trained PhDs and researchers from emigrating abroad as China races to retain scientific talent amid intensifying tech competition. Relatedly, new exit-ban regulations restrict citizens with access to sensitive “industrial or technological security” knowledge from leaving the country.

International Responses 国际反应

Hong Kong Watch research finds US$8.8 billion in Western investment funneled to sanctioned Chinese entities: A new Hong Kong Watch investigation found 230 Western financial institutions, including BlackRock and JPMorgan, have legally funneled $8.8 billion into China’s sanctioned military-industrial complex by exploiting loopholes in US sanctions rules, such as ambiguous naming requirements and joint-venture carve-outs.

Alarm bells sound in Brussels as EU sales of Chinese hybrid cars rocket: Sales of Chinese-made hybrid vehicles in the EU have exploded from 659 units in 2022 to over 160,000 in the first seven months of 2026 as Chinese automakers like BYD sidestep EU tariffs targeting fully electric cars, prompting Brussels to request voluntary export curbs.

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HRIC is in close contact with witnesses and victims of the attacks. Media is welcome to reach out for further information.

Chinese version / 中文版

On September 23, before Xi arrived in Washington, the Waldorf Astoria hotel where he would be staying went into full security lockdown. A tall, anti-climbing fence was constructed around the hotel with police stationed by the barrier, a security perimeter spanning approximately three blocks was established between 9^th and 12^th Streets, with a checkpoint set up on 10^th Street, and in the days leading up to the visit, emergency no-parking zones and road closures were progressively implemented on sections of 10^th Street, 12^th Street, Constitution Avenue, and Pennsylvania Avenue surrounding the hotel.

After Xi Jinping’s arrival, the area outside the security barriers was quickly occupied by two starkly contrasting groups: on one side were Chinese democracy activists, Tibetans, Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, and other protesters brandishing slogans such as “Xi Jinping Step Down” and “China wants freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law,” while on the other side, a dense sea of ​​red flags bearing five yellow stars marked the large crowds of pro-Beijing supporters waiting at the hotel, the airport, and along the motorcade route. At one point, around 200 members of Xi’s welcoming party gathered outside the hotel, waving Chinese and American flags and chanting slogans of welcome.

Reports from the welcoming camp itself stated that approximately 100 overseas Chinese associations participated, including the American Fujian Association, the Fujian Sanshan Association, the Fujian United Association, the Lianjiang Association, and various chambers of commerce, with some groups chartering buses from New York, Philadelphia, and other locations to travel to Washington, DC. Chen Shanzhuang, quoted in reports by the welcoming side, noted that he had arrived in Washington two or three days in advance. In other words, this was not a chance street encounter between a few supporters and protesters; rather, Xi Jinping’s visit brought together two large groups with diametrically opposed political stances within a highly secured yet extremely confined public space. The roar of more than three thousand protesters pierced through the massive, organized efforts of pro-CCP forces to block them out. Reporters confirmed that even from locations such as the entrance to the White House banquet hall, protest chants of “Xi Jinping, you are not welcome! Xi Jinping, xia tai (step down)!” could be clearly heard.

Just prior to Xi Jinping’s arrival in the United States, HRIC joined 29 other human rights, press freedom, and civil society organizations in signing an open letter that not only called for the release of political prisoners and an end to transnational repression, but also put forward a specific demand: that Xi publicly guarantee, before arriving in the United States, that members of his delegation and “affiliated individuals” would not engage in transnational repression or collective retaliation against protests and boycotts during the visit.

This demand was not based on hypothetical concerns. In recent years, the U.S. Department of Justice has indicted multiple officials from China’s Ministry of Public Security, accusing them of using thousands of fake online identities to monitor, harass, and threaten Chinese pro-democracy activists in the United States. Meanwhile, a report on transnational repression released this June by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) identified physical assaults, threats against family members in China, digital harassment, forced repatriation, censorship, and “lawfare” as tools employed by the Chinese government and associated actors against overseas critics.

For this reason, the events that unfolded on the streets of Washington, D.C., from September 23 to 25 cannot be reduced merely to a clash between “supporters and protestors” on the sidelines of a diplomatic visit. Instead, given the established track record of transnational repression, critical questions must be asked: Who was organizing the crowds? Who was monitoring the protesters? And why did individuals peacefully expressing dissent once again become targets of physical assault?

From Harassment and Pepper Spray to Physical Assault

Conflicts began the day Xi Jinping arrived. Outside Joint Base Andrews, where welcoming crowds and anti-Xi protesters were initially kept apart, scuffles broke out over the seizure of banners and physical altercations ensued. Video footage from the scene shows individuals entering the ranks of protesters to film and snatch items, as well as someone using a stainless-steel flagpole wrapped in a Chinese national flag to jab at protesters. On September 24, the conflict escalated further: protesters Geng Guanjun, Hu Pizheng, Huang Mingfa, and Guo Jianxin were sprayed with pepper spray by pro-Beijing individuals while demonstrating against Xi, and protestor Niu Pengfei was surrounded, choked, beaten, and dragged by several individuals dressed in black.

That same day, a smaller group of Chinese pro-democracy protesters was also surrounded and attacked while First Lady Peng Liyuan was out in public. In the early hours of September 25, another physical altercation occurred outside the Chinese Embassy. Publicly available video shows protesters being attacked near the embassy entrance, prompting police intervention. Washington police confirmed five protest-related arrests on September 24, including charges involving the assault of a police officer, the unlawful seizure of another person’s property, and simple assault. The repeated incidents of banner-snatching, pepper spray, harassment, and beatings over several days caused the protests to quickly escalate from a confrontation of beliefs into a matter of personal safety.

Even more noteworthy is the repeated appearance—across footage from various locations—of a group of individuals dressed in black who exhibited highly similar patterns of behavior: young-to-middle-aged men wearing matching dark clothing, baseball caps, face masks, earpieces, or sunglasses, some carrying black umbrellas, moved between the welcoming crowds and the protesters, filmed the demonstrators, and rapidly converged whenever a confrontation broke out. Based on their uniform attire, conduct, and equipment, activists on the ground identified some of these individuals as security personnel accompanying the Chinese delegation. On-site video footage clearly shows one woman among this group specifically targeting pro-democracy activists with pepper spray.

The question of these individuals’ identities has moved beyond mere street-level speculation. Hong Kong Democracy Council (HKDC) reported that Washington police explicitly told representatives from Students for a Free Tibet (SFT) that at least one of the assailants was not detained “because he has diplomatic immunity,” while Samuel Bickett stated that police told SFT the individual was part of the diplomatic team accompanying Xi Jinping. Hong Kong activist Joey Siu pointed out that several of the activists who were attacked are U.S. citizens. As of this writing, the U.S. State Department has not publicly disclosed the individual’s name or specific status; however, if police were indeed unable to arrest a suspect accused of assaulting protesters due to diplomatic immunity, the issue is clear: the U.S. government must clarify whether this person was part of Xi Jinping’s diplomatic or security entourage and explain why diplomatic immunity would serve as an obstacle to addressing street violence.

The organized nature of the welcoming contingent was unmistakable. Reports from the welcoming side itself explicitly stated that around 100 Chinese expatriate associations participated in the event, listing various hometown associations and chambers of commerce; another report noted that groups from New York, Brooklyn, Flushing, Philadelphia, and elsewhere transported participants to Washington in chartered buses. In on-site interview footage, some elderly participants openly told interviewers that their attendance was organized by “New York hometown associations.” Numerous videos and screenshots circulated on social media showing the mass transport of participants by bus, the centralized distribution of boxed meals, and even recruitment notices. One widely shared recruitment message detailed arrangements such as transportation, accommodation, and an $80 stipend, though different sources cited varying figures for the actual payment.

Regardless of the final payment situation, this centralized organization by expatriate associations, the interstate bus charters, the bulk distribution of flags, and the provision of communal meals all indicate a mobilization effort that was carefully planned and well-resourced. In contrast, dissident organizations and individuals mostly traveled to Washington D.C. independently. This asymmetry in manpower, resources, and operational capacity directly shaped the dynamics on the street.

Familiar faces from San Francisco reappear in Washington

This situation warrants concern partly because it demonstrates a clear continuity with events that occurred during Xi Jinping’s visit to the APEC summit in San Francisco in 2023. A systematic review of over two thousand photos, videos, police records, medical reports, WeChat group messages, and testimonies from more than thirty witnesses revealed that, while clashes occurred from both sides during Xi’s four-day visit to San Francisco, the most severe acts of violence were perpetrated by pro-CCP activists and individuals who coordinated their actions from within the welcoming crowd: anti-Xi protesters were struck with flagpoles and metal objects, sprayed with chemicals, and subjected to punches and kicks, with some even beaten to the point of temporary unconsciousness. The investigation also confirmed that the Chinese Consulate General in Los Angeles covered hotel and meal expenses for some of the individuals present to welcome Xi; at least 35 pro-Beijing overseas Chinese associations attended; and at least four diplomats from the Chinese consulates in San Francisco or Los Angeles appeared in the welcoming crowds and interacted with individuals who were later involved in violent clashes. Chinese diplomatic missions have denied these findings, claiming that the crowds welcoming Xi Jinping were also subjected to provocation and violence. A report titled Exporting Repression, jointly produced by HKDC and SFT, documented 34 specific incidents of harassment, intimidation, and assault, and tracked various overseas Chinese associations and figures closely linked to United Front networks.

Some key organizers from 2023 reappeared at the Washington D.C. event, most notably John Chen Shanzhuang (陈善庄), a pro-Beijing community leader from New York. Investigations into the San Francisco incident revealed that Chen had organized a group from New York to travel to San Francisco to welcome Xi Jinping. Three years later, Chen arrived in Washington days in advance of the visit and appeared publicly at the welcoming event, which involved approximately 100 overseas Chinese associations. Video footage obtained by Human Rights in China clearly shows that, at the scene when pro-democracy activists were attacked, Chen was the only person holding a megaphone and visibly acting as an on-site coordinator. Individuals wearing hats, face masks, and sunglasses, dressed in dark clothing, could be seen operating around him. At these locations, pro-democracy activists were surrounded, struck with umbrellas, beaten, and sprayed with pepper spray. Chen’s repeated presence at pro-Beijing mobilization efforts and scenes of violence during Xi Jinping’s two visits to the United States constitutes significant evidence that should warrant investigation by U.S. law enforcement.

During a confrontation on September 24 near 17^th Street NW and New York Avenue, police arrested five individuals protesting against Xi Jinping; one of them, Pi Qiaohai, was subsequently transferred to ICE custody.

Attacks against pro-democracy activists during the APEC summit in San Francisco in November 2023 were documented by organizations such as Human Rights in China (HRIC) and investigated in detail by the media. According to HRIC’s current information, no pro-CCP individuals faced criminal charges for violence directed at anti-Xi protesters at that time; similarly, as of the publication of this article, there are no public records of pro-Beijing attackers facing criminal charges for the events in Washington D.C. In stark contrast, all five individuals arrested on September 24 near 17^th Street NW and New York Avenue, confirmed by HRIC through legal counsel to be anti-Xi pro-democracy activists, faced legal action, with Pi Qiaohai subsequently placed in ICE detention. In both instances, anti-Xi activists were arrested and criminally prosecuted, yet there appear to be no corresponding records of prosecution for the pro-Beijing individuals suspected of carrying out attacks, despite the existence of extensive video footage. U.S. law enforcement agencies have a responsibility to explain this stark disparity.

The most critical question regarding Xi Jinping’s visit to the U.S. is not whether welcoming crowds have the right to support him—they certainly do, it is not as if protesters opposing Xi Jinping possess some special political right, they were merely exercising the freedoms of expression and assembly to which everyone in the United States is entitled. The real issue is whether an individual who has left China due to opposition to the Chinese government remains subject to surveillance, harassment, intimidation, or even physical assault in the United States because of that same political stance, and whether U.S. law enforcement and diplomatic systems can identify and prevent such conduct in a timely manner when the perpetrators may be linked to Chinese diplomatic missions or official delegations.

Even before Xi Jinping arrived in the United States, HRIC called upon his delegation and their U.S.-based associates to refrain from engaging in transnational repression against protesters. After the visit concluded, this issue did not vanish; instead, it became even more concrete due to the various videos captured on the streets. For Chinese dissidents who have long endured the pressures of being targeted from all sides, harassed, and subjected to transnational repression, the events in Washington raise a very simple question: once they have left China, can they truly voice opposition to the Chinese government on the streets of a democratic nation without fearing physical assault?

Additional Details and Observations

Altercations involving items being snatched from protestors and attacks with flagpoles occurred outside Joint Base Andrews on September 23. On September 24, as First Lady Peng Liyuan was leaving the National Museum of Asian Art, Geng Guanjun reported being jabbed with the tip of an umbrella, knocked to the ground, and sprayed in the eyes with pepper spray; Niu Pengfei reported being surrounded and attacked by three individuals dressed in black; Huang Mingfa reported being pepper-sprayed three times and kicked; and Guo Jianxin reported a woman spraying pepper spray at four pro-democracy activists. That same afternoon, near the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Falun Gong practitioner Xin Qin reported being pulled down, beaten, and bitten by Li Huahong and others.

Late on the night of September 24 and into the early hours of September 25, several individuals reported that people emerging from the direction of the Chinese Embassy attacked protesters who were displaying projected images. Yuan Zegang stated that he was stabbed in the abdomen with a rod-like object and that his vehicle sustained damage to its windows and body; other reports indicated that one person was left bleeding on the ground and required hospitalization. Publicly available video footage shows that after police arrived, some of those involved in the altercation retreated toward the embassy. Law enforcement must ascertain the identities of these individuals—whether they were embassy staff, security personnel hired by the embassy, ​​members of Xi Jinping’s delegation, or others.

On September 25, incidents involving banner-snatching, encirclement, and physical blows occurred again outside the National Archives.

HRIC seeks further investigation into the following questions:

• Have official cases been opened for every incident of assault involving video evidence, injuries, and witnesses that occurred over the three-day period?

• Have the individuals who attacked protesters using pepper spray, umbrellas, flagpoles, and other objects been identified?

• Who are the individuals dressed in black, who repeatedly concealed their identities with hats, masks, and sunglasses, and rapidly gathered during the clashes? Is there any shared organization, employment, or chain of command linking them?

• What is the identity of the individuals who emerged from the Chinese embassy side to participate in the clashes?

• How was Li Huahong handled after being handcuffed by the police? Was a formal case opened? Were criminal charges filed?

• Why is there no record of criminal prosecution to date for the individuals suspected of carrying out assaults, despite the existence of extensive publicly available video footage?

While the 2023 San Francisco incident is not the main concern of this article, it offers a reference point that cannot be ignored: similar large-scale mobilizations by pro-Beijing diaspora groups—featuring some of the same organizers, individuals clad in black to conceal their identities, umbrellas, flagpoles, and pepper spray, alongside the surrounding, stalking, filming, and physical assault of anti-Xi Jinping protesters—reappeared almost identically in Washington D.C., three years later.

Human Rights in China does not question anyone’s right in the United States to welcome Xi Jinping, wave the Chinese flag, or express support for the Chinese government; opposition to Xi Jinping is likewise protected by the U.S. Constitution. However, whoever commits violence must be investigated and held legally accountable. To date, information available to HRIC indicates that no pro-CCP individuals were criminally prosecuted for violence against anti-Xi protesters in San Francisco in 2023; similarly, there are no public records of pro-Beijing attackers facing criminal prosecution for the events in Washington in 2026. Meanwhile, anti-Xi pro-democracy activists were among those arrested and criminally prosecuted in connection with both incidents.

Diplomatic courtesies must not serve as a shield for the CCP to suppress dissent, diplomatic immunity cannot justify impunity for street violence, and political stances must not determine who receives legal protection and who faces prosecution.

Appendix: Video screenshots and links to related evidence

In on-site video footage provided by protester Cai Xiaoli, a large group of individuals dressed in black are seen attacking pro-democracy activists. One woman sprays pepper spray at four people, while Chen Shanzhuang directs the scene while holding a megaphone. Link to original YouTube video: 习近平访美期间：华盛顿有组织袭击民运人士，辣椒水攻击，陈善庄现场指挥

Sequential screenshots:

Li Laoshi on Twitter/X (李老师不是你老师)：

China Action on Twitter/X：

Cai Xiaoli (蔡晓丽) on Twitter/X:

Yuan Zegang (袁泽刚) on Twitter/X:

Sound of Hope on Twitter/X：

Jie Lijian (界立建) on Twitter/X:

Chen Xiangwei (陈翔威) on Twitter/X：

ZhengWei on Twitter/X：

Byron Wan on Twitter/X：

“Team Leader Li is not your team leader” (李班长不是你班长) on Twitter/X：

Huang Yaoyi (黃耀毅) on Twitter/X:

ALLIN on Twitter/X：

News Coverage

FTV/Yahoo! News: “Protesters Attacked by ‘CCP Personnel’! Netizens Slam: Bringing Transnational Repression to the Forefront”: https://tw.news.yahoo.com/抗議者遭-中共人員-攻擊-網轟-把跨境鎮壓擺上檯-083528320.html

Liberty Times: “Protesters Gather Outside the White House! Footage Reveals ‘Xi Jinping’ Being Slapped”: https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/5585903

Liberty Times: “Protesters Swarm Outside Hotel Where Xi Jinping Is Staying; ‘Unidentified Individuals’ Spotted Monitoring the Scene”: https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/5585961

NTD News, “On the night of the Trump-Xi summit, CCP agents attacked protesters outside the Chinese embassy”: https://www.ntdtv.com/b5/2026/09/25/a104136250.html

NTD News, “Faces of Xi supporters revealed; at least 39 protest groups turned out to ‘welcome’ Xi”: https://www.ntdtv.com/gb/2026/09/25/a104136124.html

NTD News, “News Weekly: Trump-Xi Summit Concludes; 39 Groups Stage Persistent Protests of the Event”: https://www.ntdtv.com/gb/2026/09/26/a104136676.html

NTD San ​​Francisco: “Pro-CCP Individual Attacks Falun Gong Practitioner in Washington; Police Make Arrest and Open Case”: https://ntdsf.tv/2026/09/24/親共者華盛頓襲擊法輪功學員-警方逮捕立案/

The Epoch Times: “Protesters in Washington D.C. Assaulted by CCP Thugs During Xi’s U.S. Visit” (Chen Deyi): https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/9/26/n14857674.htm

The Epoch Times, “Pro-Beijing Woman Arrested After Allegedly Attacking Protester Amid Trump–Xi Summit”: https://www.theepochtimes.com/china/pro-beijing-woman-arrested-after-allegedly-attacking-protester-amid-trump-xi-summit-6094648

The Epoch Times, “In Photos: What We Saw in DC Outside Trump–Xi Summit”: https://www.theepochtimes.com/article/in-photos-what-we-saw-in-dc-outside-trump-xi-summit-6095147

Vision Times: “Protesters Attacked During Xi’s US Visit: Mystery Surrounding Chinese Man in Face Mask and Black Umbrella Revealed”: https://kzg.io/news/gb/2026/09/28/1105365.html

Vision Times: “Clashes Erupt Between Welcoming Crowds and Protesters!”: https://kzg.io/news/gb/2026/09/24/1105229.html

Chinascope, “Beijing-Organized Xi Supporters Clashed with Protesters Outside Andrews Airport”: https://chinascope.org/archives/41343

Voice of Freedom and Democracy — “A Record from the Scene of the Protest Against Xi Jinping’s US Visit in Washington (Part B) — Twitter Video”: https://myxth.org/archives/10961

WJLA 7News, “Several arrested as crowds gather near White House for Chinese President’s visit”: https://wjla.com/news/local/dc-white-house-support-protest-chinese-president-xi-jinping-china-arrest-police-new-york-avenue-17th-street-crime-trump-washington

inkl, “What Really Happened Outside the White House During Xi’s Visit…”: https://www.inkl.com/news/what-really-happened-outside-the-white-house-during-xis-visit-involving-five-arrests-and-two-standoffs

Tibetan Review (Citing MPD arrest figures from WUSA9): https://www.tibetanreview.net/arrests-reported-as-tibetans-other-protesters-dogged-president-xi-on-second-day-of-his-us-state-visit/

The Diplomat, “’Xi, You’re Not Welcome’…”: https://thediplomat.com/2026/09/xi-youre-not-welcome-as-trump-hosts-chinas-leader-thousands-protest-in-washington/

ClickOrlando, “Protesters of Xi’s policies push for change in earshot of White House visit with Trump”: https://www.clickorlando.com/news/politics/2026/09/25/protesters-of-xis-policies-push-for-change-in-earshot-of-white-house-visit-with-trump/

Voice of America: “Xi Jinping Faces Protests from Multiple Groups and Ethnic Communities During U.S. Visit”: https://www.voachinese.com/a/xi-jinping-s-visit-to-the-u-s-met-with-protests-organized-by-various-groups-20260924/8204227.html

Voice of America, “Protesters and Supporters Gather Outside the National Archives”: https://www.voachinese.com/a/national-archives-protesters-and-supporters-20260925/8204303.html

Radio Free Asia, “Xi Jinping’s Visit to the U.S.: Support and Protests Coexist on the Streets of Washington”: https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/xinwenkuaixun/2026/09/24/xi-us-visit-washington-supporters-protesters/

RFI: “Protest groups ‘welcome’ Xi Jinping in Washington; hundreds shout ‘not welcome’ outside the Chinese Embassy”: https://www.rfi.fr/cn/中国/20260924-抗议团体华盛顿-迎-习近平-中使馆外数百人高喊-不受欢迎

BBC Chinese, “Demonstrators Gather in Washington, D.C. to Protest Xi Jinping’s Visit to the U.S.”: https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/articles/cwly7j71n1k4o/sim

ADV Podcaster (at 46 minutes): https://www.youtube.com/live/Ew5igWMd248?is=aY-2dWp_sNMag0dP

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9月23日下午，在习近平抵达华盛顿DC之前，他下榻的华尔道夫酒店已经被层层封锁。酒店外竖起高大的防攀爬围栏，警方在围栏旁驻守；从9街至12街一带形成约三个街区的警戒区域，10街设有检查点，酒店周围的10街、12街、宪法大道和宾夕法尼亚大道多个路段从访问前数日起陆续实施紧急禁停和封路。习近平抵达后，围栏之外很快被两种截然不同的人群占据：一边是举着“习近平下台”“中国要自由、民主、人权、法治”等标语的中国民主人士以及藏人、维吾尔人、香港人和其他抗议者；另一边则是一片密集的五星红旗，大批亲北京欢迎者在酒店、机场和车队沿线守候。酒店外一度有约200名欢迎者挥舞中美国旗、高喊欢迎口号；欢迎方自己的中文报道则称，此次共有约100个侨团参加，包括美国福建同乡会、福建三山会、福建联合总会、连江同乡会及多个商会，一些团体从纽约、费城等地包车前往华盛顿DC。陈善庄在欢迎方报道中说，他本人提前两三天就已经来到华盛顿。换言之，这并非几名支持者偶然与抗议者在街头相遇，而是习近平的访问把人数众多、政治立场完全相反的两批人集中到了高度戒备却又极为狭窄的公共空间内。三千多名抗议者的怒吼，冲破了亲共势力兴师动众的阻挡。记者证实，即使站在白宫宴会厅门口等地点，也能清楚听到“Xi Jinping, you are not welcome!习近平下台”等抗议口号。

就在习近平抵达美国前，HRIC与另外29个人权、新闻自由和公民社会组织联署公开信，除了要求释放政治犯、停止跨国镇压外，还专门提出了一个十分具体的要求：习近平应在抵美前公开保证，其代表团成员以及“在美国的关联人员”不会针对此次访问期间的抗议和抵制行为实施跨国镇压或集体报复。这一要求并非假设性的担忧。过去数年，美国司法部已经起诉多名中国公安部人员，指控其利用数以千计的虚假网络身份监控、骚扰和威胁身在美国的中国民主人士；美国国会及行政当局中国委员会今年6月发表的跨国镇压报告则将肢体攻击、对中国境内家属的威胁、数字骚扰、强迫回国、审查和“法律战”等列为中国政府及相关行为者针对海外批评者使用的工具。也正因如此，9月23日至25日华盛顿DC街头发生的事情，不能仅仅被简化为一次外交访问外围“支持者与反对者互殴”：需要追问的是，在一个已经存在跨国镇压长期记录的背景下，谁在组织人员、谁在监视抗议者，以及为什么一些和平表达异议的人再次成为实体攻击的对象。

从围堵、辣椒水到肢体攻击

冲突从习近平抵达当天就已经开始。安德鲁斯联合基地外，欢迎者和反习近平抗议者原本被分隔开来，随后即发生争抢标语和肢体冲突；现场视频显示有人进入抗议队伍拍摄、抢夺物品，并有人使用缠有五星红旗的不锈钢旗杆捅向抗议者。9月24日，冲突进一步升级：抗议人士耿冠军、胡丕政、黄明发、郭鉴鑫在抗议习近平时遭亲北京人士喷射辣椒水；牛鹏飞被多个黑衣人围住掐脖殴打拖拽；同日，在彭丽媛外出期间，一支规模较小的中国民运抗议队伍也遭到围堵和攻击。9月25日凌晨，中国驻美使馆外再次发生肢体冲突，公开视频显示抗议者在使馆门口附近遭到攻击，警方随后介入。华盛顿警方9月24日确认五起与示威有关的逮捕，包括两人涉嫌袭击警察、一人涉嫌非法夺取他人物品、两人涉嫌简单攻击。连续数日出现的抢夺标语、辣椒水、围堵和殴打，使这次抗议很快从口号对峙升级为人身安全问题。

更引人关注的是，多个不同地点的影像中反复出现一批行动方式高度相似的黑衣人员：年轻或中年男性，统一穿着深色衣物，戴棒球帽、口罩、耳机或墨镜，一些人手持黑色长伞，在欢迎队伍与抗议者之间移动、拍摄抗议人士，并在冲突发生时迅速聚拢。现场活动人士根据其统一着装、行动方式和所携装备，将其中部分人员指认为中方随行安保或安全人员。现场视频清楚证明，这些黑衣人士中的一名女性，专门用辣椒水偷袭多位在场民运人士。这一身份问题并非只停留在街头猜测层面。Students for a Free Tibet（SFT）称，华盛顿警方曾明确告诉他们，至少一名参与袭击的人没有被拘留，“因为他具有外交豁免权”；HKDC随后转述了这一说法，Samuel Bickett则称警方向SFT表示，该人属于习近平此次访问的外交团队。邵岚（Joey Siu）指出，多名遭到攻击的活动人士本身是美国公民。美国国务院截至发稿尚未公开该人员的姓名和具体身份类别，但如果警方确实因外交豁免而无法拘捕一名涉嫌袭击抗议者的人员，那么问题已经十分明确：美国政府有必要说明此人是否属于习近平随行外交或安保团队，以及外交豁免为何会成为处理街头暴力的障碍。

欢迎队伍的组织化程度则十分清楚。欢迎方自己的报道明确称，大约100个华人侨团参与此次活动，并列出了多个同乡会和商会；另一篇欢迎方报道写到，纽约、布鲁克林、法拉盛、费城等地的团体以大巴集体运送参与者前往华盛顿。现场采访视频中，一些年长参与者也直接告诉采访者，他们是由“纽约同乡会”组织前来。社交媒体还流传多段大巴集中运送、统一领取盒饭的影像和招募截图，其中一份广泛转发的招募信息列出车费、食宿及80美元补贴等安排，不同来源对具体报酬数字另有不同说法。无论最终付款链条如何，侨团统一组织、跨州包车、成批发旗和集中提供餐食，都显示这是一场经过规划并投入资源的动员。与之相对，异议组织和个人大多自行前往华盛顿；双方在人力、资源和行动能力上的不对称，也直接塑造了街头局面。

旧金山的旧面孔，又出现在华盛顿DC

这种场景之所以值得警惕，还因为它与2023年习近平参加旧金山APEC峰会期间发生的事情有明显的连续性。对当年两千多张照片、视频、警方材料、医疗记录、微信群信息和三十多名证人的系统梳理显示，习近平访旧金山的四天里虽然双方都有发生冲突，但最严重的一批暴力由亲中共活动人士和混在欢迎人群中的协调行动者发动：反习近平抗议者遭到旗杆和金属物击打、化学喷雾、拳打脚踢，甚至有人被打至短暂失去意识。调查还确认，中国驻洛杉矶总领馆曾为部分欢迎者支付酒店和餐饮费用，至少35个亲北京侨团到场，至少四名中国驻旧金山或洛杉矶外交人员出现在欢迎队伍中，并与部分后来卷入冲突的人员发生互动；中国外交机构则否认这些调查结论，称欢迎习近平的人群同样遭到挑衅和暴力。HKDC与SFT此前联合完成的《Exporting Repression》报告则逐案记录了34起骚扰、恐吓和袭击，并追踪了多个与统战网络关系密切的侨团和人物。

一些2023年的关键组织者在此次华盛顿DC活动中再次出现，其中最醒目的就是纽约亲北京侨领陈善庄（John Chen Shanzhuang）。旧金山事件调查显示，陈善庄当年从纽约组织人员前往旧金山欢迎习近平；三年后，他再次提前数日来到华盛顿，并公开出现在此次约100个侨团参与的欢迎活动中。中国人权获得的视频清楚表明，在民运人士被攻击的场合，陈善庄是唯一一个手持扩音喇叭、明显发挥现场指挥作用的人。在他的周围，可以看到戴帽子、口罩、墨镜、身穿深色衣物的人员活动；正是在这些现场，民运人士遭到围堵、雨伞攻击、殴打和辣椒水袭击。陈善庄在两次习近平访美期间亲北京动员和暴力现场中的反复出现，是美国执法部门应当调查的重要线索。

9月24下午在西北17街和纽约大道的冲突中，警方抓捕五名抗议习近平的人士，其中一人皮乔海已经被送往ICE拘捕。

2023年11月旧金山APEC期间针对民运人士的攻击，有中国人权等组织的记录，也有媒体的详细调查。根据中国人权目前掌握的信息，当时没有亲共人士因为针对反习近平抗议者的暴力受到刑事起诉；2026年华盛顿DC，截至本文发表，同样没有看到亲北京袭击者受到刑事起诉的公开记录。与之形成鲜明对比的是，9月24日在西北17街和纽约大道附近被捕的五人，经中国人权通过律师确认，全部是反习近平的民运人士，其中皮乔海随后被转入ICE拘押。两次事件中，受到逮捕和刑事追究的都有反习近平民运人士，而大量公开影像中涉嫌实施攻击的亲北京人员却没有看到相应的起诉记录。美国执法机构有责任解释这种强烈反差。

习近平此次访美期间最值得追问的，因此并不是欢迎人群是否有权支持习近平——当然有，也不是反习近平抗议者是否拥有某种特殊的政治权利——他们行使的只是美国任何人都应当享有的表达和集会自由。真正的问题是，当一个人已经因为反对中国政府而离开中国，他是否仍会因为同样的政治立场，在美国受到监视、围堵、恐吓甚至袭击；以及当施压者可能与中国外交机构或官方代表团发生联系时，美国的执法和外交体系是否能够及时识别并阻止这种行为。HRIC在习近平抵美之前已经要求其代表团及其在美关联人员不得对抗议者实施跨国镇压；访问结束以后，这个问题非但没有消失，反而因为街头留下的一系列视频而变得更加具体。对于长期处在夹击、霸凌和跨国镇压压力下的中国异见者而言，华盛顿DC发生的事情提出了一个非常简单的问题：离开中国以后，他们究竟能不能在一个民主国家的街头，公开反对中国政府而不必担心因此遭到人身攻击？

补充事实与最新观察

9月23日安德鲁斯联合基地外发生抢夺和旗杆攻击；9月24日彭丽媛离开国立亚洲艺术博物馆时，耿冠军称遭雨伞尖捅击、被摔倒并遭辣椒水喷眼，牛鹏飞称遭三名黑衣人员围攻，黄明发称三次遭辣椒水喷射并被踢打，郭鉴鑫称一名女性向四名民运人士喷射辣椒水；同日下午环保署附近，法轮功学员辛勤称被李华红等人拉倒、殴打并咬伤；9月24日深夜至25日凌晨，中国驻美使馆外投屏抗议者遭杆状物和雨伞攻击，一人送医；9月25日国家档案馆外再次发生抢旗、围堵和挥拳。

9月24日深夜至25日凌晨，多名当事人称数名人员从中国驻美使馆一侧出来攻击投屏抗议者。袁泽刚称腹部被杆状物捅伤，车辆玻璃及车体遭破坏；相关报道指一人流血倒地并送医。公开视频显示警方到达后，一些参与冲突者退回使馆一侧。这些人究竟是使馆工作人员、使馆雇用的安保、习近平代表团成员还是其他人员，美国政府必须查明。

美国执法部门必须回答的问题

• 三天中每一起有视频、有伤者、有证人的攻击是否已经立案？

• 使用辣椒水、雨伞、旗杆和其他物品攻击抗议者的人是否已经被识别？

• 反复出现、以帽子、口罩和墨镜遮挡身份并在冲突中迅速聚集的黑衣人员究竟是谁？他们之间是否存在共同的组织、雇佣或者指挥关系？

• 使馆外从中国使馆一侧出来参与冲突的人员究竟是什么身份？

• 李华红被警察戴上手铐以后究竟如何处理？是否正式立案？是否提出刑事指控？

• 为什么大量公开影像中涉嫌实施攻击的人，截至目前没有看到相应的刑事起诉记录？

结语

2023年旧金山不是此次事件的中心议题，但它提供了一个无法忽视的参照：相似的大规模亲北京侨团动员、部分相同的组织人物、遮挡身份的黑衣人员、雨伞、旗杆和辣椒水，以及针对反习近平人士的围堵、跟踪、拍摄和肢体攻击，在三年后的华盛顿DC再次出现。

中国人权并不质疑任何人在美国欢迎习近平、挥舞中国国旗或者表达支持中国政府的权利；反对习近平同样受到美国宪法保护。问题应该只有一个：谁实施暴力，谁就应当受到调查和法律追究。

截至目前，中国人权掌握的信息显示，2023年旧金山没有亲共人士因为针对反习近平抗议者的暴力受到刑事起诉；2026年华盛顿DC也尚未看到亲北京袭击者受到刑事起诉的公开记录。与此同时，这两次事件中受到逮捕和刑事追究的都有反习近平民运人士。

在美国土地上，外交礼遇不能成为外国政府压制异议的保护伞，外交豁免不能成为街头暴力不被追问的理由，而政治立场更不能决定谁受到法律保护、谁受到法律追究。

附录：用户提供的连续视频截图

抗议者蔡晓丽提供的现场视频，众多黑衣人攻击民运人士，其中一女用辣椒水攻击四人，陈善庄手提扩音喇叭现场指挥：习近平访美期间：华盛顿有组织袭击民运人士，辣椒水攻击，陈善庄现场指挥

李老师不是你老师：

China Action：

蔡晓丽：

袁泽刚：

希望之声：

界立建：

陈翔威：

ZhengWei：

Byron Wan：

李班长不是你班长：

黃耀毅：

ALLIN：

新闻报道

民视/Yahoo奇摩新闻《抗议者遭”中共人员”攻击！网轰：把跨境镇压摆上台》（2026-09-25）：https://tw.news.yahoo.com/抗議者遭-中共人員-攻擊-網轟-把跨境鎮壓擺上檯-083528320.html

自由时报《白宫外抗议者聚集！”习近平”遭呼巴掌画面曝》：https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/5585903

自由时报《习近平下榻饭店外涌抗议者 “不明人士”现身监控》：https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/5585961

新唐人《川习会当晚 中使馆外中共特工袭击抗议者》：https://www.ntdtv.com/b5/2026/09/25/a104136250.html

新唐人《习支持者面目曝光 至少39个抗议群体”迎习”》：https://www.ntdtv.com/gb/2026/09/25/a104136124.html

新唐人《新闻周刊：川习会落幕 39团体集结抗议如影随形》：https://www.ntdtv.com/gb/2026/09/26/a104136676.html

新唐人旧金山台《亲共者华盛顿袭击法轮功学员 警方逮捕立案》：https://ntdsf.tv/2026/09/24/親共者華盛頓襲擊法輪功學員-警方逮捕立案/

大纪元《习访美期间 抗议者在华府遭到中共打手施暴》（陈德怡）：https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/9/26/n14857674.htm

The Epoch Times, “Pro-Beijing Woman Arrested After Allegedly Attacking Protester Amid Trump–Xi Summit”: https://www.theepochtimes.com/china/pro-beijing-woman-arrested-after-allegedly-attacking-protester-amid-trump-xi-summit-6094648

The Epoch Times, “In Photos: What We Saw in DC Outside Trump–Xi Summit”: https://www.theepochtimes.com/article/in-photos-what-we-saw-in-dc-outside-trump-xi-summit-6095147

看中国《习访美期间 抗议者被攻击 中方口罩男神秘黑伞被起底》：https://kzg.io/news/gb/2026/09/28/1105365.html

看中国《欢迎人群和抗议人群打起来了！》：https://kzg.io/news/gb/2026/09/24/1105229.html

Chinascope, “Beijing-Organized Xi Supporters Clashed with Protesters Outside Andrews Airport”: https://chinascope.org/archives/41343

自由民主之声《在华盛顿抗议习近平访美现场立此存照B——推特视频》：https://myxth.org/archives/10961

WJLA 7News, “Several arrested as crowds gather near White House for Chinese President’s visit”: https://wjla.com/news/local/dc-white-house-support-protest-chinese-president-xi-jinping-china-arrest-police-new-york-avenue-17th-street-crime-trump-washington

inkl, “What Really Happened Outside the White House During Xi’s Visit…”: https://www.inkl.com/news/what-really-happened-outside-the-white-house-during-xis-visit-involving-five-arrests-and-two-standoffs

Tibetan Review（转引 WUSA9 的 MPD 逮捕数字）：https://www.tibetanreview.net/arrests-reported-as-tibetans-other-protesters-dogged-president-xi-on-second-day-of-his-us-state-visit/

The Diplomat, “’Xi, You’re Not Welcome’…”: https://thediplomat.com/2026/09/xi-youre-not-welcome-as-trump-hosts-chinas-leader-thousands-protest-in-washington/

美联社（ClickOrlando 转载）, “Protesters of Xi’s policies push for change in earshot of White House visit with Trump”: https://www.clickorlando.com/news/politics/2026/09/25/protesters-of-xis-policies-push-for-change-in-earshot-of-white-house-visit-with-trump/

美国之音《习近平访美，遭遇多团体多族群集结抗议》：https://www.voachinese.com/a/xi-jinping-s-visit-to-the-u-s-met-with-protests-organized-by-various-groups-20260924/8204227.html

美国之音《抗议者与支持者齐聚国家档案馆外》：https://www.voachinese.com/a/national-archives-protesters-and-supporters-20260925/8204303.html

自由亚洲电台《习近平访美：华盛顿街头支持与抗议并存》：https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/xinwenkuaixun/2026/09/24/xi-us-visit-washington-supporters-protesters/

法广 RFI《抗议团体华盛顿”迎”习近平 中使馆外数百人高喊”不受欢迎”》：https://www.rfi.fr/cn/中国/20260924-抗议团体华盛顿-迎-习近平-中使馆外数百人高喊-不受欢迎

BBC中文《示威者聚集华府 抗议习近平访美》：https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/articles/cwly7j71n1k4o/sim

ADV Podcaster （at 46 minutes）：https://www.youtube.com/live/Ew5igWMd248?is=aY-2dWp_sNMag0dP

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Chinese President Xi Jinping is set to make a state visit to the United States from September 23 to 25, 2026, meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump in Washington for high-stakes bilateral talks. Experts flagged potential topics for the meeting to include the fate of the Busan tariff/export-control truce, a possible AI safety dialogue, the still-undelivered $14 billion Taiwan arms package, and whether any concrete deliverables emerge beyond symbolic “strategic stability” language.

Human rights groups, pro-democracy organizations, cultural groups, and more have begun gearing up for protests and actions to oppose Xi’s visit and raise awareness of human rights issues in China. On September 20, pro-democracy demonstrators encountered a parade involving pro-Beijing Chinese community groups in Flushing, New York. As the two sides broke into conflict, a man grabbed an anti-CCP banner and was subsequently handcuffed and taken away by police. Police also reportedly separated the groups during another confrontation.

Ahead of Xi’s visit, 30 human rights organizations, including Human Rights in China, also wrote a joint open letter to Xi Jinping, urging him to:

1. Immediately and unconditionally release prisoners of conscience, human rights defenders, and individuals arbitrarily detained due to their family members’ advocacy activities;

2. Repeal or amend laws passed during Xi’s tenure that violate international human rights obligations, including but not limited to the 2020 Hong Kong National Security Law and the 2026 Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress;

3. Confirm that individuals abroad, including the 14th Dalai Lama, who wish to travel to China to reunite with family and community, will be permitted safe entry;

4. Publicly commit, prior to arriving in the United States, that all members of Xi’s delegation and their associates in the U.S. will not engage in transnational repression or collective punishment retaliation against protests and boycotts during this visit.

Analysts say a successful, high-profile Washington summit would help Xi project strength domestically ahead of a possible unprecedented fourth term and reassure the military of his continued command amid ongoing PLA purges, with Taiwan arms sales seen as Beijing’s biggest red line concern. Taiwan conducted drills combining attack drones with missiles for the first time, which President Lai called proof of military modernization, as Taiwan awaits a still-postponed $14 billion US arms package.

Law & Policy 法律与政策

HRIC on Twitter/X: On September 15, China began implementing new entry and exit regulations, further tightening border controls. On the same day, the human rights organization Safeguard Defenders released an investigation pointing out that China’s use of “exit restrictions” (border controls) has been growing explosively in recent years. In just China’s Supreme People’s Court judgment database alone, there were 188,760 judgments mentioning “exit restrictions” in 2025.

Related: China can block citizens from leaving the country over national security or tech export violations. The rules, reflecting Beijing’s growing anxiety over tech transfer amid AI competition with the US, also let authorities deny entry to foreigners for one to five years over false visa information, and aim to curb citizens being lured abroad into forced scam operations.

HRIC on Twitter/X: Starting from November 15, 2026, Beijing will fully upgrade its drone control measures: The entire administrative area of Beijing will be designated as a drone control zone, prohibiting drone flights. Furthermore, within Beijing, it will be forbidden to possess or store drones and their core components, and also prohibited to transport or carry drones and their core components into Beijing. Drones and related equipment already stored in Beijing prior to this must be transferred outside the capital before November 15.

USALI This Week in Asian Law 09/18: The National Cybersecurity Standardization Technical Committee, a standards body guided by the Cyberspace Administration of China, released the third version in three years of its non-binding Artificial Intelligence Safety Governance Framework. Additionally, China’s Supreme People’s Court published four guiding cases on internet law, including holding a company liable for an AI-cloned celebrity voice used without consent in ads, while clarifying that AI search engines aren’t liable for pirated content links they promptly remove.

Advocates call for stronger consent laws as Hong Kong to criminalise persistent child sexual abuse and ‘cyberflashing’: Hong Kong’s Security Bureau confirmed it will create a new offense for prolonged child sexual abuse and criminalize “cyberflashing,” but advocacy group We Are X is pushing for stronger limits on the “honest but mistaken belief of consent” defense that survivors say lets attackers evade accountability.

Cyber Security & Digital Rights 网络安全与数字权利

Anthropic report reveals China-based AI-enabled surveillance on CTA, ICT and SFT: Anthropic disclosed that a China-based, government-aligned actor used Claude to conduct surveillance targeting the Central Tibetan Administration, ICT, and Students for a Free Tibet, including compiling personal data, monitoring social media, and researching religious venue floor plans for use in intelligence dossiers.

HRIC on Twitter/X: Huanyu Zhiying 1.0, unveiled by Sun Yat-sen University in April, can simulate foreign-media coverage, predict how different audiences might react, then refine Chinese messaging in response. Instead of broadcasting a narrative and seeing what lands, researchers can potentially test it against synthetic audiences first.

Related: HRIC on Twitter/X. An analysis by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute on the “Global Audience Intelligence Response 1.0” system reveals that the system has built a database covering 18 countries with over 10,000 simulated personas, drawing on international surveys, social media data, and research on attitudes toward China in different countries. It aims to simulate foreign media coverage and audience reactions, then adjust dissemination strategies accordingly.

Translation: Article on Media’s Survival Fails to Survive: A frank WeChat article from Zhejiang’s provincial propaganda department candidly admitted the structural crisis facing Chinese local media, including control by tech platforms and shrinking revenue, was censored within hours, illustrating how even officially sanctioned honesty about media decline is unwelcome.

MiniTrue: ByteDance Censors’ List of 5,241 Sensitive Terms: CDT published and analyzed a leaked 2020 internal ByteDance moderation lexicon of 5,241 sensitive words and phrases covering political figures, historical events, and locations, used to censor content across TikTok’s sister apps Douyin and Toutiao.

China and the US are competing for AI dominance but have shared concerns over safety: Ahead of a planned Trump-Xi summit, both nations continue competing fiercely for AI dominance—with Trump dismissing AI danger warnings as a “hoax”—even as officials on both sides acknowledge shared risks around AI-enabled cyberattacks and loss of human control.

China dismisses AI ‘fearmongering’ as spy chief warns of threat to Communist party rule: While China’s foreign ministry publicly rejected Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei’s call to slow and contain China’s AI progress as destructive “fearmongering,” China’s intelligence chief Chen Yixin separately warned domestically that AI poses a genuine internal threat to Communist Party rule via disinformation and cyberattacks, naming Anthropic’s Claude and OpenAI’s models as concerns.

Huawei unveils new chip technologies as Chinese firm steps up the AI race with Nvidia: Huawei launched its upgraded Atlas 960 SuperPoD computing cluster just before the Trump-Xi summit, underscoring China’s rapid push for chip self-sufficiency amid US export restrictions, though Chinese AI systems still often rely on some American components.

Policy Address 2026: Hong Kong will build an ‘AI City Brain’ for urban management: John Lee unveiled the “AI City Brain” initiative to consolidate data for traffic and emergency response across multiple government bureaus, modeled on systems already deployed across mainland Chinese cities since Hangzhou’s 2016 pilot.

Related: Planned AI ‘City Brain’ system not meant for surveillance – top Hong Kong official. Amid lawmakers’ privacy concerns, Hong Kong’s Chief Secretary defended the planned HK$200 million “AI City Brain,” insisting it will only monitor traffic and urban conditions, not individuals or crime.

Policy Address 2026: Hong Kong to appoint AI commissioner and consider deepfake laws – leader John Lee: In his Policy Address, John Lee announced a new AI Commissioner post to combat AI-enabled crime and said the government will study deepfake legislation, following cases of scammers using cloned voices to steal over HK$10 million.

Diaspora Community & Transnational Repression 海外社群和跨国镇压

A detained US scholar’s wife asks Trump for help as Xi’s Washington visit nears: Sylvia Zin, wife of detained scholar Min Zin, urged Trump to secure her husband’s release when meeting Xi next week; Jimmy Lai’s son Sebastien also lobbied Congress for his father’s release, noting Lai’s daughter is undergoing cancer treatment.

HRIC on Twitter/X: An exclusive Newsweek investigation has revealed a political warfare operation originating from China and spreading to the streets of the United States. In March of this year, the slogan “Hands Off Asia” first appeared on social media, and by the end of April, the Tricontinental Institute for Social Research officially launched an online campaign in Beijing. In July, the Colombo conference solidified it into the “Colombo Declaration,” directly targeting the U.S. military presence in Asia. By August, the movement had expanded to Philadelphia and New York.

HRIC on Twitter/X: Four members of Congress—Representatives James McGovern and James Walkinshaw and Senators Jeff Merkley and Tammy Duckworth—have issued a letter calling on the U.S. government to protect individuals who could face severe persecution if returned to China. The letter specifically highlights the cases of Guan Heng and human rights lawyer Wu Shaoping, both of whom HRIC has previously reported on.

Human Rights Defenders & Civil Society 人权捍卫者与公民社会

‘People had naive expectations’: How MeToo has changed in China: As #MeToo journalist Sophia Huang Xueqin was released after five years in prison, Chinese feminism has retreated into private, low-visibility spaces as hashtag campaigns have been scrubbed from the internet and a younger generation remains largely unaware of the movement’s earlier public battles.

Joint Statement: Ensure Sophia Huang Xueqin’s release and guarantee her freedom from arbitrary restrictions: Over 60 civil society organizations urged China to ensure Huang’s genuine freedom upon release, warning against continued surveillance, harassment, or restrictions, and called for legal reforms preventing the misuse of subversion charges against human rights defenders.

Friends, rights groups worry for Chinese #MeToo activist’s life after jail: Friends of Sophia Huang Xueqin and rights groups fear she’ll face a “non-release release” with ongoing surveillance and restricted freedom, a pattern seen with other released Chinese dissidents like Zhang Zhan.

Macau concludes first closed-door nat. security trial against ex-lawmaker and Tiananmen vigil co-organiser Au Kam San: Proceedings concluded in Macau’s first-ever closed-door national security trial against former lawmaker and Tiananmen vigil organizer Au Kam San, who faces up to 25 years for subversion; critics called the secret process “farcical” given he lacked independent counsel.

NGO concerned about South China Morning Post reporter Minnie Chan, 3 years after apparent disappearance: Reporters Without Borders marked three years since defense reporter Minnie Chan vanished after covering Beijing’s Xiangshan security forum, saying sources believe she’s held on undisclosed national-security charges potentially carrying a 10-year sentence.

Two Tibetan Officials Expelled After Joining Prayer Group for the Dalai Lama: Two Tibetan government officials in Lithang County were expelled from their posts after Chinese authorities discovered they’d secretly joined a 2024 prayer group for the Dalai Lama during his knee surgery, illustrating Beijing’s strict suppression of devotion to the exiled leader even among its own officials.

China Shuts Down Livestream After Tibetan Woman Singing a Tibetan Song: Authorities abruptly cut a Tibetan woman’s livestream simply for singing a Tibetan song, part of intensified Sinicization under the new Ethnic Unity Law that removes Tibetan language from public life and livestreaming, a key income source for many Tibetans.

HRIC on Twitter/X: HRIC has translated Gao Zhen’s final statement from his one-day, closed-door trial for infringing on the reputation of “heroes and martyrs” with works created before the law he was charged with, in a strong defense of artistic freedom and rule of law.

Rights group, relatives accuse China of using torture in prison: A Chinese Human Rights Defenders report examined 209 prisoners from 2016–2025 who alleged torture and mistreatment, finding a fifth beaten and 16 dying from denied medical care, with authorities rarely investigating complaints and sometimes punishing those who raise them despite China’s UN torture-convention obligations.

‘Soft resistance’ is the ‘most malicious’ threat to nat. security in Hong Kong – security chief: Security chief Chris Tang called the vaguely-defined “soft resistance” the most dangerous of Hong Kong’s “four great national security risks” precisely because its harm isn’t obvious, a term used since 2021 without ever being legally defined.

Netflix and the Nanny State: An analysis of Chinese streaming platforms’ content restrictions, framing state oversight of entertainment (à la Netflix’s total exclusion from China) as part of Beijing’s broader “nanny state” approach to controlling cultural and media content.

‘Cantonese is strictly forbidden’: Hong Kong school principal apologises after unapproved language ban sparks outrage: Prestigious Good Hope School faced backlash after a leaked graduation video guideline declared Cantonese “STRICTLY FORBIDDEN” in favor of English or Mandarin; the principal apologized, calling it an unapproved draft that didn’t reflect school policy, though the incident fueled fears about Cantonese’s status in Hong Kong.

China’s Reach & Internal Control 中国: 内控与外扩

China expels two top ‘disloyal’ military leaders from Communist Party: Beijing expelled Zhang Youxia—Xi’s longtime ally and second-in-command of the Central Military Commission—and Liu Zhenli from the Communist Party over corruption and disloyalty, continuing a purge that leaves just two active members on the once seven-member CMC, timed days before Xi’s Washington summit.

Policy Address 2026: Hong Kong to expand gov’t-funded national security exhibition: John Lee announced Hong Kong will expand its government-funded National Security Exhibition Gallery — which has drawn 1.9 million visitors since 2024 — to promote the idea that “security brings prosperity.”

International Responses 国际反应

European Parliament calls for sanctions on Hong Kong officials over arbitrary detentions and crackdown on fundamental freedoms: MEPs overwhelmingly passed a resolution urging Magnitsky-style sanctions against Hong Kong and Chinese officials over the jailing of Tiananmen vigil organizers and bookseller Leticia Wong, also calling for repeal of the security laws and review of Hong Kong’s WTO status.

US lawmakers hold hearing on plight of jailed media tycoon Jimmy Lai, as Hong Kong slams ‘hypocrisy’: The Congressional-Executive Commission on China held a hearing featuring Lai’s son Sebastien and introduced a bill targeting officials over Hong Kong political prisoners; Hong Kong’s government angrily rejected the hearing as collusion with “anti-China” forces and denied any press-freedom dimension to Lai’s case.

Taiwan Hits Out at Chinese Checkbook Diplomacy, Even as Also Engaging In It: Leaked documents show that China has offered cash and grants to Pacific and African nations to isolate Taiwan diplomatically. The piece notes Taiwan also supports allies like Eswatini with similar financial inducements, but it is unable to match Beijing’s spending power.

Chinese ship rams Philippines gov’t vessel in South China Sea: Coastguard: A China Coast Guard ship rammed the Philippine fisheries vessel BRP Datu Magat Salamat off Palawan while it delivered fuel to Filipino fishermen, causing damage but no injuries; Beijing blamed Manila for allegedly cutting across its bow.

Current Events 热点新闻

‘This is seriously bold’: How China turned Taiwan tensions into a top-rating TV spy drama: The Long Watch (Jiaofeng), a 40-episode series co-produced with China’s Ministry of State Security dramatizing decades of cross-strait espionage, has become a surprise hit for directly depicting sensitive history, including a fictionalized nod to Taiwan’s 1995-96 strait crisis, surprising viewers with its boldness.

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An open letter to Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping

Re: Human rights improvements ahead of September 24, 2026 visit to Washington, DC

We, the undersigned organizations dedicated to protecting and promoting human rights, democracy, and religious freedom, write on the occasion of your forthcoming visit to Washington, DC. We urge that ahead of your arrival you agree to release prisoners of conscience, pledge an end to transnational repression, and commit to critical legal reforms, among other actions. Such steps would diminish criticism around the visit of your government’s human rights violations.

Since you assumed power in late 2012, our organizations have documented—and some have lived—your government’s widespread, systematic human rights crimes, which violate domestic and international legal obligations. Tibetans, Uyghurs, and other communities continue to face your government’s atrocity crimes designed to erase their culture, identity, and language, and their rights to free speech and fair trials. Your government’s violations of Hong Kong’s once-vibrant civic culture and free media, and of the rights-defense efforts undertaken by faith leaders and communities, feminists, journalists, lawyers, public health experts, and other activists across China are well-documented. Newly-imposed laws, such as the Ethnic Unity and Progress Law, stand in stark contrast to your government’s obligations under international human rights law. We share United Nations human rights experts’ concerns that the scope and scale of arbitrary detention across China may alone constitute crimes against humanity, and stand in solidarity with victims and survivors across the country.

We are equally concerned about your government’s use of transnational repression and collective punishment to arbitrarily silence speech and limit conduct outside China. Many of the signatories to this letter have been harassed, stalked, or surveilled in the United States by Chinese government or Chinese Communist Party authorities or their proxies. Some US-based activists’ family members in China have been targeted by your government in retaliation for those activists’ work. We are encouraged by the US’ and other governments’ efforts to investigate and prosecute these blatantly extralegal activities, and we will continue to document these violations as long as is necessary.

In order to address these grave concerns, we urge that you take the following steps ahead of your visit:

• Immediately and unconditionally release prisoners of conscience, human rights defenders, and those arbitrarily detained for family members’ activism, including but not limited to those with a strong connection to the US and whose release has been sought by US lawmakers: Dr. Gulshan Abbas, Ekpar Asat, Chow Hang-tung, Rahile Dawut, Ding Jiaxi, Dong Yuyu, Pastor Gao Quanfu, Gao Zhen, Gao Zhisheng, the 11^th Panchen Lama Gedhun Choekyi Niyima, Go Sherab Gyatso, Albert Ho, Jimmy Lai, Lee Cheuk-yan, Min Zin, Ilham Tohti, Lobsang Tsering, Wang Bingzhang, Pastor Wang Yi, Yang Maodong, and the leaders of the Zion Church;

• Announce an intent to repeal or amend laws passed during your leadership that breach international human rights obligations, including but not limited to the 2020 Hong Kong National Security Law and the 2026 Ethnic Unity and Progress Law;

• Confirm that individuals outside China, including 2007 US Congressional Gold Medal recipient His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama, who wish to travel to the country to reunite with family members and communities will be allowed to do so, and do so safely; and

• Publicly affirm prior to arrival in the US that all members of your delegation, and its associates based in the US, will refrain from transnational repression and collective punishment in response to acts of protests and resistance around your visit.

Absent such steps we believe your visit will only deepen global public concern about your government’s intentions regarding human rights.

As advocacy organizations we are committed to working on behalf of the communities, principles, and laws that form the basis of our work, and to making recommendations for human rights progress. In this spirit we welcome an opportunity to meet directly with you on this visit. We can be reached via DCChinahumanrights2026@proton.me.

Signatories:

1. Uyghur Academy International

2. Campaign for Uyghurs

3. World Uyghur Congress

4. Committee to Protect Journalists

5. Reporters Without Borders

6. No Business With Genocide

7. Iona Advisory

8. Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation

9. Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights

10. Amnesty International USA

11. Uyghur American Association

12. Hudson Institute

13. Freedom House

14. ChinaAid

15. International Campaign for Tibet

16. Safeguard Defenders

17. Center for Uyghur Studies

18. Uyghur Human Rights Project

19. Georgetown Center for Asian Law

20. Hong Kong Watch

21. Alliance for Citizens Rights

22. Network of Chinese Human Rights Defenders

23. Fortify Rights

24. Network for Uyghur Rights

25. CSW

26. Human Rights Foundation

27. International Tibet Network

28. Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation

29. Human Rights in China

30. Humanitarian China

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This Month: Flooding Tragedy, Social Stability & Censorship

Devastating flash floods along the Nepal–Tibet border in late August exposed the human cost of China’s information controls. While more than 1,000 people were confirmed dead and thousands remained missing across the affected region, Chinese authorities minimized information about casualties, restricted independent reporting, and detained people for sharing information about the disaster.

Eyewitness footage disappeared from Chinese social media, while authorities used image-recognition technology to identify and remove sensitive content and flooded online spaces with official material to bury independent accounts. Authorities reportedly detained or fined at least 10 people for questioning official accounts of the disaster online.

This response reflected a broader pattern in China of prioritizing “social stability” over the free flow of information. Under this approach, authorities restrict information that could generate public criticism, expose official failures, or lead to demands for accountability. At the same time, state media promote carefully managed narratives that emphasize social order and the government’s ability to respond to crises. Following the Nepal–Tibet floods, for example, Chinese state media focused on rescue operations and the government’s response while downplaying the full scale of the destruction. Similarly, five years after the deadly 2021 Zhengzhou floods, in August, authorities continued censoring posts that commemorated victims and preserved public memories of the disaster.

This approach also extended beyond disasters and explicitly political speech. Authorities removed a straightforward WeChat post describing the exhausting security checks required to visit Beijing’s Zhengyangmen gate, illustrating how even ordinary frustration can be censored when it reflects negatively on the government’s security agenda. Similar restrictions affected expressions of grief in Hong Kong, where organizers encountered rejected advertisements and shuttered memorial displays after hundreds gathered to mourn Wang Wang, a stray dog tortured and killed in Guangdong.

Although such censorship may protect the government from criticism and preserve an appearance of stability in the short term, it comes at the expense of public safety and access to reliable information. During a disaster, timely reporting can help residents understand the risks they face, locate missing relatives, identify areas in need of assistance, and make informed decisions about whether to evacuate. Restricting that information can delay emergency responses, fuel rumors, weaken public trust, and make it more difficult to determine the true scale of the damage.

The effects of these controls are not limited to emergencies. A WeChat essay translated by China Digital Times this month described China’s keyword-based censorship as blunt and counterproductive, arguing that it blocks harmless speech, fails to address genuine harms, and forces users to communicate through riddles. The essay highlights how broad and automated restrictions can interfere with ordinary communication, even when users are not criticizing the government or discussing politically sensitive issues.

The examples covered this month—from disaster footage and complaints about security checks to memorials for a stray dog—perfectly illustrate this problem. They show that speech does not need to resemble conventional political dissent to become a target in China. Censorship increasingly shapes not only what people may criticize, but also what they may know, witness, mourn, and say about their everyday lives. As the boundaries of restricted speech continue to expand, the distinction between controlling political dissent and controlling ordinary public expression becomes increasingly difficult to draw.

In Case You Missed It: Other Digital Rights and Cybersecurity News

Great Firewall, Censorship, and Information Control

• Translation: “You Can’t Address Sexual Assault at Banquets Without Addressing the Nature of Power”: A censored WeChat post examined two recent cases of alleged sexual assault by Chinese officials, arguing that piecemeal responses to individual scandals fail to address the systemic issue: the lack of institutional checks on official power that enables such abuse to recur.

• Translations: “Sometimes Forgetting Is as Terrible as the Disaster.” Censored Reflections on the Deadly Zhengzhou Floods, Five Years On: Marking five years since Zhengzhou’s deadly 2021 floods (398 dead, many deaths concealed), two censored Chinese essays reflect on memory, grief, and the “Raincoat Dad” who mourned his drowned daughter, warning that societal amnesia allows man-made disasters to recur. Posts merely commemorating the tragedy, without demanding accountability, were still censored.

• Translation: No Scaling the Great Firewall in the Library: A Hunan Library notice suspended library Wi-Fi after patrons were caught using censorship circumvention tools, publishing partly redacted phone numbers of offenders as a warning that internet use is tied to real identities. Commenters noted circumventing on personal mobile data is safer than on institutional networks, which face heavier scrutiny and retaliation against administrators.

• HRIC on Twitter/X: There has been a recent crackdown on content referencing a traditional bamboo “cicada” toy as satirical commentary on Huawei. The toy, which emits a continuous “wah-wah” sound when shaken, was noticed by netizens for its sound effect similar to the synchronized, exaggerated gasps of surprise from the audience at Huawei launch events. Searches for “bamboo cicada” on Weibo were wiped clean, while Douyin, Kuaishou, Xiaohongshu, and WeChat public accounts saw a flood of account restriction notices. On August 2, “Is it overkill to take down Yu Chengdong parody videos?” trended on hot searches, with some state-affiliated media starting to defend the removals and bans.

AI Propaganda and Social Media Manipulation

• Hanging a Banner for Chinese AI: People’s Daily recently ran a symmetrical, parallel-column front page proclaiming Xi Jinping’s “concern” for both domestic AI development (”beneficial, safe, equitable”) and China’s role in bridging the global AI divide for developing nations. CMP explains: “The unusual column design, with its carefully conceived symmetry—a propaganda appropriation of the traditional parallel saying, or duilian (对联)—is meant no doubt to be a powerful parallelism announcing the Chinese Communist Party leadership’s twin convictions on artificial intelligence, for the country and for the world.”

• HRIC on Twitter/X: The Wall Street Journal reported that multiple new studies have found U.S. artificial intelligence models unconsciously exhibit similarities to China’s censored chatbots when answering certain sensitive questions, while AI companies have made limited efforts to address this issue.

• The Problem with Peach: Chinese AI-generated influencer “Peach Fang,” star of a viral AI drama with 200 million views, sparked controversy after promoting contact lenses she cannot physically wear or test, raising questions about AI personas making false claims to bodily experience. State media and lawyers noted AI “endorsers” lack legal personhood, exposing regulatory blind spots around synthetic marketing.

• Translation: “AI Has Determined That My Press Card Is a Fake”: A China Youth Daily journalist recounts the surreal experience of an interview subject’s AI chatbot confidently declaring his official press card a fake, illustrating the growing, sometimes absurd, ways AI tools are reshaping trust, misinformation, and censorship dynamics in Chinese journalism and society.

Cybersecurity & Data Privacy

• HRIC on Twitter/X: On August 5, U.S. cybersecurity company VulnCheck released a research report stating that routers shipped from Shenzhen Zhibotong Electronics (Zbtlink/ZBT) come pre-installed with a backdoor program in their firmware. As soon as the device is powered on, it continuously initiates outbound connections to several fixed overseas command-and-control servers, with two primary nodes hosted on Alibaba Cloud in Shanghai and Shenzhen, respectively.

• Royal Navy drone cameras linked to China raise security concerns: Cameras on the UK Royal Navy’s Chinese-component K3 Scout surveillance drones, used by UK special forces, were found sending routine “heartbeat” signals to a device in China during a cybersecurity assessment. The UK Ministry of Defence stated that no sensitive data was compromised but has cut the drones’ internet connectivity. The incident adds to mounting concern over Chinese-made components embedded in Western military and critical infrastructure systems.

• Hong Kong mulls AI facial recognition-enabled drones to police smoking ban at construction sites, 39 fines issued so far: Hong Kong’s Labour Department has issued 39 fines and 11 improvement notices since a construction-site smoking ban took effect in mid-July, and is now exploring adding AI facial recognition to its infrared drones (already used to detect cigarette heat signatures) to better identify offenders, with development expected to take 9–12 months. The move raises questions regarding the expanded use of AI facial recognition drones for surveillance purposes.

• Hong Kong police arrest 10 for dangerous driving in first drone-assisted traffic crackdown: Hong Kong police arrested 10 drivers for dangerous driving on the Kwun Tong Bypass in their first drone-assisted traffic operation, using aerial surveillance alongside unmarked “stealth cars” to gather evidence.

• HRIC on Twitter/X: A New York Times’ investigation into a recent leak from cybersecurity researcher Mark Hofner on the “Foreign Personnel Dynamic Control Platform” reveals new details about the tool, which tracked over 700 foreign nationals residing locally. Greg Walton, a senior investigator at the Canadian SecDev Group, described the incident as a symptom of “surveillance proliferation” driven by an ever-expanding ecosystem of vendors, contractors, and public security departments: each additional platform creates more places where sensitive personal data could be misconfigured, copied, or exposed.

Digital Transnational Repression

• Toolkit to Counter the Chinese Communist Party’s Transnational Repression: Human Rights Foundation’s new anti-TNR toolkit includes tips for digital safety for those impacted or potentially targeted by transnational digital repression.

• Taiwan says it was hit by ‘abnormal’ AI-assisted cyber-attack: Taiwan detected a first-of-its-kind cyberattack on government agencies last month, in which hackers used open-source AI agents like OpenClaw to build an autonomous hacking tool that operated like a coordinated cyber team. Taiwan didn’t name a culprit, but has long accused China of “hybrid warfare” including near-daily cyberattacks.

• A fake website and a deluge of CVs: the Australian firm embroiled in an FBI probe into alleged Chinese espionage: A small Brisbane consultancy, Horizzen, discovered a fake AI-generated website impersonating its identity had been used as part of a broader Chinese intelligence recruitment network targeting Western defense and security experts.

Civil Society & Resistance Under Pressure

• From petitions to memes: How students made dissent visible: The piece traces how Chinese student dissent has evolved from formal petitions toward subtler, coded forms like memes, puns, and symbols (echoing tactics from the 2022 “White Paper Movement”) to evade censorship while still expressing discontent. This shift reflects both technology’s role in activism and authorities’ tightening crackdown on any direct challenge to the state.

Technological Competition & State Power

• Nvidia senior manager linked to Supermicro scheme smuggling AI servers to China: Taiwan indicted nine people, including a senior Nvidia manager and two Supermicro employees, for allegedly forging documents to smuggle 74 AI servers with restricted B300 chips to China via Japan, Indonesia, and Hong Kong, evading US export controls.

• The rise of AI weather forecasting as China emerges as a leader in race to improve predictions: As Typhoon Dolphin approached, Chinese AI weather models like Shanghai AI Lab’s Fengwu, Huawei’s Pangu, and Fudan’s Fuxi worked alongside traditional forecasting, with Fengwu predicting the typhoon’s landfall time and location within 30 minutes and 30km five days out. China is emerging as a leader in AI weather prediction, though such models still lag traditional systems in forecasting storm intensity.

• ByteDance trains massive AI model in bid to rival Anthropic: ByteDance is pre-training a roughly 10-trillion-parameter AI model — more than triple the size of Moonshot’s Kimi K3 — aiming to approach the scale of Anthropic’s Mythos system, per industry estimates. The project reflects intensifying competition among Chinese AI labs to match or exceed US frontier models, amid earlier US accusations that Moonshot’s Kimi K3 was built by distilling Anthropic’s technology.

• HRIC on Twitter/X: Forbes reported on August 5 that U.S. AI data labeling companies are supplying OpenAI, Anthropic, and even the U.S. military on one hand, while selling the same sets of training data to China’s top AI labs on the other. For years, Washington has imposed layer upon layer of restrictions on chips, yet has done almost nothing to regulate training data.

• Taiwan detains Nvidia worker in chip smuggling probe: source familiar with case: Taiwanese prosecutors detained an Nvidia employee as part of a widening probe into smuggling roughly 50 AI servers with restricted Nvidia chips to China via forged documents, bringing the total detained to seven people including Super Micro and Albatron staff. Nvidia denies involvement, saying it only sells through vetted partners and “smuggling is a nonstarter.”

• China’s tech advances are causing chaos from Silicon Valley to the White House: A wave of Chinese breakthroughs—free, powerful open-weight AI models like Kimi K3, mass-produced specialty chips, and advanced robotics—has triggered market selloffs and split Silicon Valley, with firms like Microsoft and Nvidia opposing restrictions on open models while OpenAI and Anthropic call them security risks.

Current Events

• Could AI take your job? Some workers in China already know the answer: Chinese workers, from Wuhan taxi drivers displaced by autonomous vehicles to a Beijing cinematographer replaced by AI software, describe deep anxiety over AI-driven job losses, with some winning court-ordered severance after AI replaced them. Even China’s state media now acknowledges the “collision” between AI and traditional labor rights, signaling a shift in Beijing’s tone on the issue.

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In March 2026, Gao Zhen delivered his closing statement in a one-day, closed-door trial for infringing on the reputation of China’s “heroes and martyrs” with artworks he had created decades earlier, more than ten years before the creation of the very law he was charged with. Below, HRIC has translated the full text of Gao Zhen’s final statement to the court.

On August 25, 2026, Gao Zhen was sentenced to three years in prison.

Read the original text in Chinese here. / 读中文原文。

Gao Zhen: A Helpless Defense and Confession

My Final Statement

Your Honor, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Court:

I thank the presiding judge for granting me the opportunity and time, in accordance with the law, to deliver this “final statement.” Given that I am still a suspect awaiting a final verdict, and in the spirit of the principle that a defendant is innocent until proven guilty, please allow me to present my defense and statement as an artist who holds the Christian faith.

At the suggestion of my defense counsel, and to better exercise the legitimate rights granted to a defendant by the Constitution, I have chosen to present my words in writing so that Your Honor has a relatively detailed and comprehensive reference when making the final ruling.

I am ashamed to admit that as a Christian, I do not fully understand why God has allowed this misfortune to befall me in my frail, elderly years rather than twenty years ago, when I was in the prime of my youth and strength. After all, it is the three allegedly illegal sculptures I created over two decades ago that are the primary reason I have been designated a “criminal suspect” by the authorities and find myself standing in the dock today. Faced with such a vast span of time, I feel perplexed, but I trust there is a deeper meaning here that eludes my immediate understanding.

At this moment, I feel as though I have fallen into a dream with no foreseeable end, or perhaps stumbled into a dramatic experimental theater piece where I am forced to play a villainous role for which I am ill-suited; or else, through some twist of fate, I have become an unwitting participant in a collaborative piece of performance art.

Yet, the reality before me is undeniable and must be faced: I am now standing in the dock.

This situation brings to mind two revered figures bearing the surname “Su”: the ancient Greek philosopher Socrates1 and the great Northern Song Dynasty literary giant Su Dongpo. This is likely because both men, in their respective eras, were unfortunate enough to stand in the dock on trumped-up charges, much like myself. Furthermore, the nature of the accusations against them was essentially similar: nothing related to the pursuit of wealth that the world often covets, rather, they were prosecuted for their words (and artistic creation also falls within the scope of freedom of expression).

The former was charged with “showing disrespect to the state’s gods and corrupting the youth,” while the latter was accused of “criticizing the imperial carriage and harboring malicious intent” (slandering the imperial court). The former, upholding his philosophical concept of “knowing that one knows nothing,” frequently scrutinized the “learned scholars” of his time, who fancied themselves all-knowing, and exposed their ignorance; this offended the intellectual elite, who fabricated charges against him and brought him to court. The latter fell into disgrace during the second year of the Yuanfeng era under Emperor Shenzong of the Northern Song Dynasty; after writing poems such as “Ode to the Cypress,” he was removed from his position by a censor and imprisoned—an event known in history as the “Crow Terrace Poetry Trial” (Wutai Shian), which marked the beginning of literary inquisitions in China.

The former voluntarily renounced the opportunity for exile—a legal option at the time to escape the death penalty—and refused a final offer from his wealthy friend Crito to help him flee, instead calmly facing the Athenian court and its grand jury of five hundred citizens to deliver his “final statement” (recorded in Plato’s Apology). At the conclusion of his address, he left behind profound parting words: “The hour of departure has arrived, and we go our separate ways—I to die, and you to live. Which is better? Only God knows.” He then drank the cup of poisoned wine that would cause future generations to sigh with regret, meeting death with composure and bidding farewell to a world fraught with turmoil.

The latter, however, was fortunate enough to have Emperor Shenzong personally review his case file shortly after his imprisonment. The Emperor issued an imperial decree stating, “A poet’s words are of no concern to Ourselves,” ordering his release. Although demoted to a post in Huangzhou, Su went on to pen masterpieces that have captivated readers and endured through the ages: the First Ode on the Red Cliff and the Second Ode on the Red Cliff.

Coincidentally, when Socrates faced charges and when I stood here in the dock, we were both elderly men nearing seventy, with young children at home who still required our care and companionship. Yet, he could calmly let go and face death with magnanimity, whereas I, mindful of my young child waiting day and night for my return, found myself yearning desperately to go home and reunite with my family after just over half a year in prison. This is surely because, in my heart, love, freedom, and the responsibilities of fatherhood far outweigh any adherence to abstract ideologies or the pursuit of posthumous renown.

Your Honor, ladies and gentlemen, and fellow citizens: please forgive me for recounting these historical episodes before addressing the specifics of the case at hand. I do so with no intention of basking in the reflected glory of these sages or seeking cheap fame.

I am under no illusion regarding my own standing compared to these two sages, the former a prophet sent by God during the “Axial Age,” a foundational figure of Western and indeed global civilization, holding a significance for China and the world comparable to that of our own sages Laozi, Confucius, and Mencius; the latter a deeply influential poet, painter, and calligrapher in our native culture. I, however, am merely an admirer of theirs—a contemporary artist weathered by the passage of time, awaiting the judgment and ultimate placement that history alone can bestow.

I mention them not only because of the natural association drawn from our shared experiences of falling afoul of authority, but also to remind everyone—myself included—that we are but wayfarers in the flow of time and the evolution of history. The words and deeds of today determine the roles we will play and the positions we will hold in future histories.

Whether our actions today can withstand the scrutiny of history depends on whether we possess an innate conscience, the professional ethics demanded by our respective roles, and the strength of character, moral courage, and sense of justice to transcend worldly interests.

Using history as a mirror is a spiritual safeguard that prevents us from doing anything today that would disgrace our dignity and honor.

Therefore, I respectfully and humbly remind Your Honor, who holds the power today to determine the defendant’s guilt or innocence and the nature of any offense, that you embody the fairness of the law. Regarding this case specifically, I respectfully request that you rigorously review the prosecution’s indictment to determine whether charging me with the crime of “infringing upon the reputation and honor of heroes and martyrs”—an offense introduced into the Criminal Law in 2021—based on sculptures I created between 2005 and 2009, a period when this specific crime did not yet exist, is in fact compliant with the law?

I earnestly request that you strictly scrutinize the prosecution’s indictment. The prosecution charges me with the crime of “infringing upon the reputation and honor of heroes and martyrs,” a provision added to the Criminal Law in 2021—alleging that sculptures I created between 2005 and 2009 (a time when this specific crime did not yet exist) constitute a criminal offense. I ask: Is this charge compliant with regulations? Does this violate the fundamental legal principle that “what is not prohibited by law is permitted”?

It is the obligatory duty and honor of Your Honor, as the presiding judge in this case, to render a fair and impartial verdict.

Below, I present the necessary and specific arguments and statements in response to the indictment served upon me.

Let us first look at the opening paragraph of the indictment, which identifies my place of residence and status: “The defendant, Gao Zhen... currently resides at Factory Building 7-A, Baishi Jingu Industrial Park, Yanjiao Development Zone, Sanhe City, Langfang City, Hebei Province, and serves as the Supervisor of Sanhe Ruiyi Trading Co., Ltd.”

Regarding my address: The Provisions on the Handling of Criminal Cases by Public Security Organs clearly state that “A place of habitual residence refers to the location where a citizen has continuously resided for more than one year after leaving their place of household registration.” Based on this definition, my place of habitual residence is a location in New York, USA, not the “Yanjiao Baishi Jingu Industrial Park” cited in the indictment.

That location was merely a temporary residence where I stayed for about two months to organize my belongings after returning to China with my wife and children in June 2024. In fact, I immigrated to New York, USA, as an “individual of extraordinary ability” in 2012. Although I have frequently traveled between New York and Beijing over the past decade or so, whenever I returned to China, I primarily stayed in the 798 Art District in Beijing. I never treated the factory building at Baishi Jingu Industrial Park as a place of habitual residence. Its actual function was simply a warehouse for storing items, including artworks.

Therefore, I have reason to suspect that the prosecution designated this location as my habitual residence in order to resolve issues regarding jurisdictional authority over the case.

Next, let us consider the designation of my identity as “Supervisor of Sanhe Ruiyi Trading Co., Ltd.”

I had never heard of this “Supervisor” role before, and to this day, I remain unclear as to what such a position actually entails. In contrast, my identity as an artist is widely known. Given the prosecution’s misidentification of my role, it is necessary to briefly outline my artistic career:

In 1978, following the Cultural Revolution, I was admitted to the Shandong University of Arts and Design. Upon graduating in 1981, I was assigned to the Jinan Mass Art Museum to provide art instruction. Shortly thereafter, I transferred to the Jinan Painting Academy (now the Jinan Art Museum) to pursue professional artistic creation. I became the youngest professional painter at the academy during my twenties and have continued to engage in creating modern and contemporary art ever since, up until my retirement in 2016.

My work has been exhibited in museums, galleries, and other art spaces across the globe. It has been featured in significant academic publications such as A History of China Modern Art, History of Contemporary Chinese Art, A History of Art in 20th-Century China, and A History of Ideas in Pioneering Contemporary Chinese Art. Furthermore, several of my pieces are held in the collections of renowned institutions, including the Centre Pompidou in France and the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art in the United States. These facts amply demonstrate that my true identity is that of an artist, not a “Supervisor” for some company.

What raises questions is that since my detention on August 26, 2024, the investigating officers have interrogated me more than thirty times. They informed me that they had conducted investigations at both the Jinan Art Museum (my former workplace) and my former art studio in Beijing (in the 798 Art Zone), and were fully aware that I am, in reality, an artist.

How, then, after ten months of investigation, could they fail to acknowledge my true identity in the indictment, choosing instead to fabricate the role of “Supervisor”?

When considering the context of the indictment, it is evident that the prosecution identified my address as the Baishi Jingu Industrial Park in Yanjiao and labeled my role as “Supervisor” not merely to establish procedural jurisdiction. Rather, the intent was to deliberately strip away my identity as an artist. By doing so, they sought to portray the incriminated artwork as the “malicious creation” of a non-artist harboring “resentment,” thereby substantiating the “fact” that I had committed the crime intentionally.

In my view, public security, procuratorial, and judicial organs, as state institutions charged with maintaining public order and punishing unlawful acts, ought to operate based on principles of seeking truth from facts and maintaining objectivity and impartiality. They should base their actions on facts and the law, objectively and fairly determining whether a defendant is guilty and what offense has been committed; they must not allow subjective biases to lead to erroneous judgments, the fabrication of “facts,” or even the creation of a specific type of “criminal.”

Acting in such a manner not only violates the contemporary principle of the rule of law but also risks creating unjust, false, or wrongful cases reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution, thereby stripping the current legal system of its due dignity. The catastrophe of the Cultural Revolution serves as a cautionary tale that must be heeded.

The second paragraph of the indictment states: “The investigation of this case was concluded by the Sanhe Public Security Bureau. On November 28, 2024, the case was transferred to this Court for prosecution, with the defendant, Gao Zhen, accused of infringing upon the reputation and honor of heroes and martyrs. After accepting the case... this Court heard the opinions of the defense counsel... The case was returned to the public security organ for supplementary investigation twice due to unclear facts and insufficient evidence, and the review period for prosecution was extended three times due to the case’s gravity and complexity.”

However, during this period, my defense counsel twice applied for my release on bail pending trial, citing my advanced age, frailty, and ailments affecting my waist and legs that hindered my mobility, but these requests were denied. Counsel also proposed that my sentencing align with precedents for similar cases, but this suggestion was likewise rejected.

This demonstrates that while the prosecution “heard” the defense counsel’s opinions, it did not “adopt” them. Therefore, it is misleading to state broadly that the defense’s opinions were “heard,” as this might create the false impression that the defense’s position aligned with that of the prosecution.

The third paragraph of the indictment states: “It has been legally established that between 2005 and 2009, the defendant Gao Zhen, harboring resentment toward a former state leader, conspired with others at a studio in Beijing’s 798 Art Zone to maliciously create a large number of sculptures that distorted and caricatured the heroic image of said leader. These works were then shipped overseas for exhibition and media coverage under the name ‘Gao Brothers.’ Subsequently, Gao Zhen moved the aforementioned sculptures to the Baishi Jingu Industrial Park (Factory Building 7-A) in the Yanjiao Development Zone, Sanhe City, Hebei Province, for storage.”

I acknowledge that the details regarding the timing and location of the creation of the sculptures, the timing of the exhibitions, and the subsequent storage site are substantially accurate; I myself also provided this same account during successive interrogations by the public security authorities.

However, I strongly disagree with the characterizations used in the indictment, such as “harboring resentment” and “distorting and caricaturing.” Such language is highly subjective and arbitrary; it amounts to an attack on my underlying intent based on a presumption of guilt, rather than objective, rigorous legal terminology.

More importantly, this description is fundamentally at odds with my true motives and mindset as a professional artist when creating these works, as well as the artistic concepts ultimately embodied in the pieces.

Below, I offer a more specific rebuttal regarding the inaccuracies in this paragraph.

Let us first address the term “a large number.” This presumably refers to the work titled Miss Mao. Admittedly, in my quest to create a satisfactory Pop Art piece with distinct local characteristics, I did invest a great deal of time and material into experimentation and comparison. I produced various prototype versions in different sizes to determine which effect best aligned with my original creative vision.

However, for an artist, no matter how much effort is expended or how many experimental pieces are produced during the creative process, only one is typically selected as the definitive version for exhibition within the art world. This was the case when the work was exhibited at the Kemper Museum of Contemporary Art in Kansas, USA, where only a single piece was displayed, rather than cluttering the gallery with every experimental model and unfinished prototype.

This follows the same logic as a manufacturer that invests significant resources in designing and comparing multiple prototypes to ensure high product quality, ultimately selecting just one model for market release.

Therefore, it is highly inappropriate for the indictment to conflate a large inventory of experimental pieces, defective items, and semi-finished goods that were awaiting further processing with a “large number” of criminal acts on my part.

As for the other two accused works, The Execution of Christ and Mao’s Guilt, each exists as a unique piece upon completion; there is simply no basis for describing them as a “large number.” The confusion likely stems from the fact that Execution is a large-scale installation composed of eight individual sculptures; its sheer physical size created the misleading impression of a “large quantity.”

Thus, the term “large number” used by the prosecution is not only imprecise but also risks misleading the court into imposing a harsher sentence.

Next, I will present a detailed defense against the allegations of “harboring resentment,” “malicious creation,” and “distortion and vilification,” explaining the creative concepts behind the specific works in question.

Let us begin chronologically with Miss Mao, created between 2005 and 2006.

The primary form of this work derives from a cartoon doll (a “readymade” object) sold in stores at the time. Its hairstyle borrows from a widely recognized public figure, while the addition of Pinocchio’s long nose and a pair of female breasts completes the composition—a work synthesized through the deconstruction and combination of these four elements.

Please note that the use of readymades and public imagery for symbolic transformation that is infused with the artist’s own conceptual intent is a common creative method among contemporary artists worldwide and a hallmark characteristic of Pop Art.

The most classic example is the French artist Marcel Duchamp, who drew a mustache and goatee on a print of the Mona Lisa, thereby pioneering conceptual art. Similarly, the American Pop Art master Andy Warhol transformed portraits of celebrities like Marilyn Monroe and Mao Zedong into mass-reproducible cultural symbols.

Within China’s renowned “Political Pop” movement, the imagery of “former state leaders” (as cited in the indictment) was a primary resource used by artists to represent the cultural characteristics of a specific era. My work Miss Mao represents one such expression within this movement.

In terms of artistic methodology, this figure accurately reflects and expresses the type of complex cultural characteristics of the “post-Mao era” (the period following the Cultural Revolution): it retains traces of past political imprints while simultaneously embodying an atmosphere that was relatively relaxed, absurd, and even humorous.

In short, Miss Mao is an ambiguous artistic figure. I deliberately rendered it in a female or cartoon-like form precisely to avoid having it rigidly equated with any specific real-life individual.

The indictment’s direct equation of the figure with a “former state leader” is not only a serious misinterpretation but also diminishes the work’s conceptual significance—the figure actually represents every Chinese person who lived through that era and was shaped by its prevailing ideologies.

Consider next the works The Execution of Christ and Mao’s Guilt, created between 2007 and 2009.

Both works draw their creative inspiration from the film and television performances of character actor Gu Yue, as well as the scandal surrounding his solicitation of a sex worker, and were created using him as the model.

The Execution also draws upon a visual precedent: the famous painting The Execution of Emperor Maximilian by the French Impressionist pioneer Édouard Manet. I adopted Manet’s classic composition, replacing the original soldiers with seven “lookalike” actors modeled after Gu Yue, all aiming their weapons at a figure of “Jesus Christ” based on a young French man.

The decision to present Gu Yue in the plural, as seven figures, was intended to signal that the image does not specifically refer to the “great figure” he famously portrayed; otherwise, a single gunman would have sufficed.

For a contemporary artist, it is a legitimate artistic pursuit to revitalize art history classics and provoke critical thought through “parody” and “appropriation.”

I hoped that by juxtaposing “Jesus Christ” with the ambiguous figure of Gu Yue—who embodies the roles of ordinary person, celebrity, and lookalike actor—I could prompt viewers to reflect on grand themes such as the relationship between the divine and the human, cultural differences between East and West, violence versus peace, and confrontation versus reconciliation.

How could a work born of such deep artistic contemplation possibly be accused of being “maliciously fabricated” or a “distorted caricature”?

Setting aside the question of whether the work’s model is Gu Yue or a “former national leader,” I urge the prosecutor to compare it with historical footage from 1962 of the relevant leaders handling firearms during the “Grand Military Skills Competition” initiated by Luo Ruiqing. Does my work show any signs of “vilification” in its physical depiction of the subject?

If an artist truly intended to maliciously caricature someone, wouldn’t the concise, potent medium of political cartoons be a far better choice? Why expend nearly three years—along with immense human and material resources—to create a large-scale, realistic sculpture?

This brings to mind an incident from the past: shortly after this work was completed in 2009, I placed a sculpture of the gun-wielding Gu Yue on the ground floor of “The High Place” coffee shop (在树上咖啡) in 798 Art District. I then invited Officer Hou from the police station next door to take a look and determine whether the display was appropriate. After viewing the work, Officer Hou and his superiors all stated: “There is no distortion or vilification; there are no issues.”

Why, then, after seventeen years, have the Sanhe Public Security Bureau and the prosecutor chosen to accuse this same work of “malicious distortion and vilification”?

At a recent pre-trial conference, the prosecutor remarked: “The numerous sculptures and photographs in this case either incorporate elements characteristic of the hero’s image or directly replicate that image.”

This very phrasing demonstrates that there is no “distortion or vilification” in my work; after all, if the work is a “direct replication,” it is impossible for it to result in vilification. This suggests that the claim of “vilification” is merely the prosecutor’s subjective bias rather than an objective fact about the work; such a self-contradictory accusation in the indictment amounts to nothing less than a frame job.

Regarding the creative concept behind Mao’s Guilt: This work was also inspired by rumors surrounding the actor Gu Yue and was modeled on him.

As a character actor known for portraying the “Great Leader,” Gu Yue’s scandals not only damaged his own reputation but also deeply hurt the feelings of admirers who had inextricably linked him with the image of the leader he portrayed (the prosecutor’s view of my work reflects this same deep-seated association).

Artistically depicting Gu Yue in an act of repentance creates a rich artistic tension; at the same time, it allows me, as a Christian, to express a sense of repentance for the “original sin” shared by all humanity, as well as to offer an indirect reflection on the history of the Cultural Revolution.

Kneeling in repentance is the most devout posture a Christian can adopt. It is far removed from the “harboring of resentment” alleged in the indictment. On the contrary, creating this work was, in a sense, an act of benevolent intercession. That is precisely why the figure’s expression was sculpted to appear so solemn, profound, and realistic.

Admittedly, once an artwork is completed, it takes on a life of its own: some have criticized the piece for potentially “glamorizing” the subject (arguing that an atheist could not possibly offer such devout repentance), while others have drawn parallels to West German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s “Kniefall von Warschau” (Warsaw Genuflection) or perceived a message of Christian forgiveness.

Art inherently allows for diverse interpretations. For the prosecutor, who is completely unfamiliar with contemporary art, to level such baseless accusations driven by ideological prejudice is a clear overreach.

Although their aim is to incriminate me, I choose to emulate Jesus Christ on the cross and pray that God forgives them, for “they know not what they do.”

I would even like to thank the prosecutor for using such extreme measures to reignite the latent power of these long-forgotten early works.

At this point, it is necessary to emphasize a fundamental principle: evaluating avant-garde experimental art requires specialized expertise. Evaluations of such art should be left to art critics and scholars, rather than being subjected to the dogmatic, politicized characterizations of individuals lacking this professional background, or even the use of criminal penalties to deprive artists of their freedom.

Relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China grant the accused and their defense counsel the right to request the testimony of individuals with specialized knowledge. This was precisely why we requested during the pre-trial conference that the renowned art critic Dr. Zhu Qi appear in court to provide professional testimony.

Furthermore, the fourth paragraph of the indictment alleges that I, “in collusion with others, transmitted photographic images of the aforementioned sculptures to the X platform for online dissemination... and authorized others to use the images for a book cover.”

Regarding this allegation, I have repeatedly stated: I never authorized Mr. Rong Wei of New York’s Boden Books to use the image for the cover; in fact, I explicitly rejected his request. My attendance at the award ceremony was precisely for the purpose of addressing this matter in person. The testimony from Mr. Rong Wei, as submitted by my defense counsel and certified under the Hague Convention, fully establishes my innocence.

As for the X platform account, it was registered by my younger brother, Gao Qiang, many years ago. I have never posted the images in question on that platform. A recent public statement by Gao Qiang corroborates this point.

The indictment’s claim that these actions “seriously infringed upon the reputation of a former state leader and harmed the public interest” is purely baseless speculation.

If these works which were created twenty years ago truly posed such a grave threat, why did the authorities take no action at that time? By imposing a harsh sentence now and thereby thrusting these works back into the international media spotlight, are they not artificially creating even more severe “harmful” consequences?

I respectfully urge Your Honor to consider the following questions:

Is there any clear legal provision supporting the classification of a historical figure who passed away half a century ago as an untouchable “hero or martyr”?

Do the portrait and privacy rights of such a historical and public figure supersede the public’s right to artistic expression and historical evaluation?

Is a specialized actor (such as Gu Yue) legally equated with the actual leader he portrays?

In all modern civilized nations, public authority must be subject to the supervision and criticism of the citizenry—criticism that naturally encompasses artistic forms.

Today, the grand vision of the state emphasizes the “rule of law” domestically while advocating for “building of a community with a shared future for mankind” internationally. Yet, if the rule of law cannot be genuinely implemented at home, such grand international aspirations remain out of reach.

Although I have lived abroad for many years, I continue to yearn for the realization of the true rule of law in my homeland.

The rule of law entails equality before the law; yet, because this case involved a “high-ranking” revolutionary martyr (as Prosecutor Li put it), the prosecution sought to deviate from the customary sentencing practice for similar cases—which typically results in a term of less than one year—and instead pushed for the maximum three-year sentence. This clearly violates the principle of legal equality.

Moreover, the use of criminal penalties is entirely inappropriate for using artistic reflection to address the actions of historical figures who committed grave errors during their lifetimes (such as instigating the Cultural Revolution).

During the back-and-forth proceedings of this case, Prosecutor Li, who was in charge of the matter, told my defense lawyer that the case was highly sensitive and beyond his decision-making authority, requiring higher-level consultation. However, he implied that if the sentence were around one and a half years, he would advise me to accept a plea deal.

Persuaded by my lawyer and family, and considering that I had already been detained for over six months—being elderly and frail, with a young child in urgent need of my presence—I reluctantly stated: although I maintained my innocence, I would accept a plea deal in order to reunite with my family sooner, provided the sentence followed the precedent for similar cases (around one year). Prosecutor Li sincerely agreed to report this proposal.

Yet, a few days later, Assistant Prosecutor Sun Yang abruptly announced to me that the sentence sought was three years. When I questioned how the policy of leniency for pleading guilty and accepting punishment was actually being applied, she shouted irrationally: “Pleading guilty and accepting punishment means three years! If you don’t plead guilty, the sentence will be even higher!”

I was deeply shocked to see a nation’s statutory sentencing laws and policies of leniency interpreted and manipulated in such a crude manner.

To speak honestly: I have reached the age of seventy, I have endured the hardships of the Great Famine and the humiliations of the Cultural Revolution, I have performed grueling manual labor, taken risks, and experienced both love and pain; and as such, I feel my life has been fulfilled.

If it were not for my young son, who is only six or seven years old, weeping day and night and begging God to let his father come home, and my reluctance to let my children suffer the same pain of losing a father that I endured in my own childhood—then, for me personally, what would a few extra years in prison matter if it meant standing by my convictions?

I was willing to humble myself for my young son’s sake and make a compromise against my conscience just this once, but the prosecution denied me that opportunity. So be it! Spending two more years in prison to preserve my lifelong integrity and conscience is worth it!

In this era rife with taboos, cowardice constantly torments the hearts of those with a conscience. Now, having finally “completed the lesson of imprisonment,” I will no longer feel that inexplicable sense of shame.

This case is not, at its core, an ordinary criminal case, but a political case akin to the “Crow Terrace Poetry Trial” that befell Su Dongpo.

If the court rules to imprison an innocent artist, or even impose the maximum possible sentence, it would not uphold the dignity of the law. Instead, it would tarnish the nation’s image of “governing the country according to the law” and potentially set a terrible precedent for “artistic imprisonment” in 21st-century China.

This would leave a stain on history that the judge presiding over this case would surely not wish to bear.

Finally, it must be emphasized that the works in question were created against a historical backdrop where “reflection on the Cultural Revolution” was advocated from the top down. At that time, Ba Jin called for the establishment of a “Cultural Revolution Museum,” and Premier Wen Jiabao repeatedly warned against a resurgence of the Cultural Revolution. These works were the inevitable products of that specific historical period, which is precisely why there was no action against them back then.

In summary, the prosecution’s charges are based on subjective speculation and ideological bias, standing in stark violation of the fundamental principle that “everything not prohibited by law is permitted.” Therefore, I respectfully urge Your Honor to exercise keen discernment and render a just verdict.

Please forgive me for taking up so much time to read this lengthy statement.

I do this not only to secure my own early release, but also to ensure that other artists do not face charges and imprisonment for similar acts of free expression; and, even more importantly, so that my fellow citizens may all enjoy freedom from fear within a true rule-of-law framework.

Here, I wish to quote the famous words of Mr. Hu Shih: “Striving for your own freedom is striving for the freedom of your country!”

Regarding the final verdict, I shall follow the example of the ancient sage Socrates and calmly accept whatever fate holds in store.

Allow me to conclude my statement with a simple prayer, in the manner of a Christian:

Merciful Heavenly Father, please hear the plea of ​​an innocent artist and prisoner; may the Lord Jesus Christ bestow special grace, mercy, and comfort upon my young children; I humbly ask the Lord to show mercy to me and to my fellow countrymen who are suffering alongside me; may the Lord forgive our debts and sins, and may Your will be done on earth as it is in heaven, forevermore.

Amen!

Thank you all!

Respectfully submitted by the defendant, Gao Zhen

Written on August 28, 2025

Revised on March 28, 2026

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Sophia Huang Xueqin is widely recognized for her work on human rights and commitment to press freedom. She is a journalist and one of the most prominent figures associated with China’s #MeToo movement. For years, she reported on and advocated for gender equality and supported survivors of sexual harassment and gender-based violence.

In September 2021, Sophia was preparing to start graduate studies in the UK. However, she and a friend, human and labour rights activist Wang Jianbing, were arrested in Guangzhou, China on 19 September, and detained incommunicado for more than five months. While in detention, both Sophia and Jianbing were reportedly subjected to ill-treatment, with negative impacts on their health.

During their trial in September 2023, the prosecution focused on their role in co-organizing weekly gatherings with fellow activists, as well as their participation in an online course on non-violence and online posts they had published or shared on issues deemed “sensitive” by the Chinese government.

Their convictions in June 2024 for “inciting subversion of state power” were based solely on the permissible exercise of their human rights, including the rights to freedom of the press and expression as well as association. Their case is emblematic of the Chinese government’s ongoing crackdown on journalists, human rights defenders, feminist activists and civil society voices calling for social justice and respect for human rights.

Wang, who was sentenced to three and a half years, was released in March 2025.

While Sophia Huang Xueqin is expected to be released on 18 September, we are concerned that she will face restrictions after leaving prison. She was subject to a “supplemental sentence” of four years’ deprivation of political rights, a punishment that is routinely imposed on human rights defenders and journalists to restrict their ability to speak, publish and organise long after their prison terms end. The legal provisions permitting this punishment are incompatible with international human rights standards, not to mention the fact that no one should be punished simply for exercising their human rights.

We call on the Chinese authorities to:

• Ensure Sophia Huang Xueqin is released immediately and is not subjected to any further arbitrary detention and allowed to move freely;

• Guarantee her rights to freedom of expression, press, association and peaceful assembly, alongside her right to participate in public life, including her ability to communicate freely with family, friends, supporters and civil society groups;

• Ensure she is not subjected to surveillance, harassment, intimidation, retaliation or restrictions on her movement and communications; and

• Amend domestic laws, notably the Criminal Law, to ensure their compliance with international law and standards, and prevent the misuse of legal provisions to restrict the rights of human rights defenders and others.

Sophia Huang Xueqin’s journalism and advocacy have inspired countless people both inside and outside China. Sophia Huang Xueqin should never have been imprisoned for her human rights and journalism work. As she approaches the end of her sentence, she deserves not only release, but freedom from any and all undue restrictions on her rights.

Signatory organizations:

1. Alliance for Citizens Rights

2. Amnesty International

3. ARTICLE 19

4. Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)

5. Bay Area Friends of Tibet

6. Cambodian Center for Independent Media (CCIM)

7. Cambodian Journalists Alliance Association (CamboJA)

8. Center for Uyghur Studies (CUS)

9. China Deviants

10.CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation

11. Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)

12.Dandelion Solidarity

13.European Values Center for Security Policy (EVC)

14.Fortify Rights

15.Freedom House

16.Front Line Defenders

17.Georgetown Center for Asian Law

18.Global Alliance for Tibet & Persecuted Minorities

19.GreatFire

20.Grupo de Apoio ao Tibete-Portugal

21.Hong Kong Committee in Norway

22.Hong Kong Labour Rights Monitor

23.Hong Kong Media Overseas

24.Hong Kong Watch

25.Hongkonger in Deutschland e.V. 香港人在德國協會

26.Hongkongers in Britain (HKB)

27.Hongkongers in Lothians

28.Human Rights Foundation (HRF)

29.Human Rights in China (HRIC)

30.Human Rights Watch

31.Humanitarian China

32.Independent Chinese PEN Center (ICPC)

33.Index on Censorship

34.International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), within the framework of the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders

35.International Service for Human Rights (ISHR)

36.International Tibet Network

37.International Women’s Media Foundation

38.Legal Initiatives for Vietnam (LIV)

39.Network of Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD)

40.No Business With Genocide

41.Northern California Hong Kong Club

42.PEN America

43.PEN Nederland

44.PEN Sweden

45.Reading UK Stands with HK

46.Reporters Without Borders (RSF)

47.Safeguard Defenders (SD)

48.Santa Barbara Friends of Tibet

49.Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center

50.Students for a free Tibet - India

51.Students for A Free Tibet Oslo

52.Students For a Free Tibet, Japan

53.Swedish Tibet Committee

54.Taiwan Association for Human Rights (TAHR) 55.The Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong (CFHK) Foundation

56.The Rights Practice

57.Tibet Initiative Deutschland e.V.

58.Viet Tan

59.World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), within the framework of the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders

60.World Uyghur Congress (WUC)

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On September 11, 2026, the West Kowloon Law Courts in Hong Kong sentenced three former leaders of the dissolved Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (HKASPDMC) in a national security case on charges of “inciting subversion of state power.” The Alliance, former chairman Lee Cheuk-yan and former vice-chairwoman Chow Hang-tung had been found guilty on August 21, while former vice-chairman Albert Ho pleaded guilty before the trial. Chow Hang-tung was sentenced to seven years and three months in prison, Lee Cheuk-yan to seven years, and Albert Ho to five years and two months. The HKASPDMC was also fined HK$1.5 million.

The case did not involve violence or the threat of violence, “nor had the defendant put forward any specific means of implementation or timetable” to end one-party rule in mainland China, one of the Alliance’s central tenets. Nevertheless, the court still found that the offence was “of a serious nature.” Former HKASPDMC Standing Committee member Lau Ka-yee stated that the HKASPDMC has always upheld freedom of speech and that she believes the sentence is excessive. The UN Human Rights Office criticized the sentences, calling them “regrettable,” while UN High Commissioner for Human Rights urged that sentences be quashed and that Hong Kong’s National Security Law be brought into line with China’s international human rights obligations. Relatives and family members decried their years-long prison terms as “totally unjust,” and have said that two of the defendants will appeal.

In other news, Macau will hold its first national security trial behind closed doors next week, a court said on Friday, in a case against a former pro-democracy lawmaker charged with “subversion.” Former Macau lawmaker Au Kam San in July 2025 became the first person to be arrested under the expanded law, with authorities alleging he had ties to foreign groups endangering China.

Law & Policy 法律与政策

China’s top court posts guidelines on deepfakes, voice cloning, algorithmic price discrimination: China’s Supreme People’s Court issued its first nationwide judicial rules on AI disputes, barring unauthorized deepfakes and voice cloning, holding platforms liable if they fail to act on infringing content, and also addressing algorithmic price discrimination and AI-generated misinformation.

China’s Draft Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law – How Will It Affect Foreign Companies?: China’s draft law extends anti-graft enforcement across borders, requiring foreign companies to cooperate with investigations, restrict evidence-sharing with foreign regulators, and enable retaliatory sanctions, creating potential compliance conflicts for multinationals caught between Chinese restrictions and foreign disclosure laws like the US FCPA.

How not to be a human rights lawyer in China: A new amendment to China’s Lawyers Law, effective September 1, formally enshrines “support for CCP leadership” as a legal qualification for practicing law, converting a prior administrative requirement into statutory political loyalty test that further squeezes space for rights-oriented lawyers.

Cyber Security & Digital Rights 网络安全与数字权利

HRIC on Twitter/X: Anthropic claims that since February 2026, it has identified and blocked unauthorized model distillation activities targeting Claude by seven Chinese AI labs; efforts to train their own models using data and reasoning capabilities generated by Claude.

HRIC on Twitter/X: According to The New York Times, pessimistic sentiments on Chinese social media are continuing to spread, and can no longer be easily covered up by the official “positive energy” narrative.

China’s Online Environment Gets Colder and Darker: Li Yuan describes growing, persistent pessimism across Chinese social media driven by economic slowdown and unemployment, which censors struggle to fully suppress even as the space for substantive critique continues to narrow through AI-powered surveillance tools.

Six Chinese AI firms accused of aggressively copying US frontier models: US agencies (NSA, FBI, CISA) accused DeepSeek, Moonshot AI, Alibaba, MiniMax, StepFun, and Z.AI of running “aggressive, malicious” campaigns since late 2024 to distill capabilities from Claude, GPT, Gemini, and Grok using fraudulent accounts and proxy evasion tactics, with China dismissing the claims as groundless.

Beijing bans drone possession in the city after earlier moves to tighten rules: Beijing will ban possessing drones within city limits starting mid-November, extending an earlier May sales ban, following a fatal June crash in which a small aircraft struck a Beijing skyscraper. The authorities will offer buyback subsidies for existing owners.

China’s Huawei Technologies faces racketeering trial in New York: Jury selection began in Huawei’s long-running US criminal trial over alleged trade-secret theft, sanctions violations in North Korea and Iran, and surveillance assistance to Iran during 2009 protests. Huawei called the prosecution’s narrative “demonstrably false.”

The Global Data Center Boom Is a Gift to Spies: shared “colocation” data centers, where Chinese and American companies often lease space in the same facility, create espionage risks far simpler than hacking, as tenants can physically tamper with neighboring servers.

HRIC on Twitter/X: The New York Times’ latest investigation reveals that, against the backdrop of the United States tightening export controls on advanced AI chips to China, Sugon Group, a Chinese tech company listed on the U.S. Department of Commerce’s “Entity List,” may still be obtaining U.S. advanced AI computing equipment and computing power through channels such as affiliated companies, overseas supply chains, and data centers in Southeast Asia.

HRIC on Twitter/X: According to the New York Times, California cybersecurity firm Calif recently disclosed a high-risk “zero-click” worm attack targeting WeChat, dubbed “WeWorm.” Victims do not even need to click links, download files, or answer calls—a single WeChat call from a compromised contact could serve as the entry point for intrusion.

HRIC on Twitter/X: Judicial materials disclosed by Chinese authorities show that China is increasingly treating Starlink terminals operated by Elon Musk’s SpaceX as a priority concern in border security and cross-border communications control, and has already used criminal prosecution to punish the unauthorized cross-border transport of Starlink equipment.

HRIC on Twitter/X: Due to the inability to normally directly use certain foreign top-tier AIs like ChatGPT and Claude in mainland China, corporate employees have turned to extensively using third-party AI “relay stations.” To get AI assistance with programming, operations and maintenance, and troubleshooting, they may send internal code, server logs, VPN configurations, or even authentication credentials directly to the relay services.

Chinese Online Harassment and Death Threats Against Me Continue as I Speak for Uyghurs: This personal essay is part of an ongoing series in which the Uyghur Times founder recounts continued online death threats and hacking attempts linked to Chinese state networks, alongside the detention of dozens of his relatives in China in apparent retaliation for his journalism abroad.

CDT’s “404 Deleted Content Archive” Summary for July 2026: July’s censorship roundup centered on the deadly Guangxi dam breach and Zhengzhou flood anniversary, alongside a Changsha parking dispute that exposed cadre privilege, controversy over razor-wire fencing at Mount Tai, debate following two Chinese mathematicians’ Fields Medal wins, and comparisons of Taiwan’s outspoken versus China’s muted reaction to food-safety scandals.

Diaspora Community & Transnational Repression 海外社群和跨国镇压

Over 60 TYC activists detained after protesting Xi’s visit near BRICS venue in New Delhi: At least 64 Tibetan Youth Congress activists, including senior leaders, were detained by Delhi Police after staging a late-night protest near the BRICS Summit venue against Xi Jinping’s presence, part of a broader wave of Tibetan demonstrations, surveillance, and preventive detentions during his first India visit in nearly seven years.

The release of the Tibetan historical film “Four Rivers and Six Ranges” in India has been postponed by one week, reportedly due to Xi Jinping’s upcoming visit to the country.: The theatrical release of Four Rivers and Six Ranges, depicting the Dalai Lama’s 1959 flight from Tibet, which Chinese state media has denounced as “separatist,” was pushed back a week in India, reportedly to avoid controversy during Xi Jinping’s visit for the BRICS summit.

An international Tibetology symposium was cancelled in Nepal, which was criticized as an overinterpretation of signals from the Chinese Communist Party.: Some observers argue Nepal’s cancellation of the international Tibetan studies conference under alleged Chinese pressure reflected an overcautious “overinterpretation” of Beijing’s signals rather than an explicit Chinese demand, as the event was ultimately moved online.

Sydney man jailed for three and a half years over fake defence reports prepared for Chinese spies: Alexander Csergo, a Shanghai-based Australian consultant, was sentenced to three and a half years for reckless foreign interference after compiling fabricated, plagiarized reports on Australian defense, AUKUS, and critical minerals for Chinese intelligence operatives in exchange for cash.

Human Rights Defenders & Civil Society 人权捍卫者与公民社会

Two Tibetan Monks Jump into River to Escape Arrest by Chinese Authorities: Two young Tibetans hiding at Nyarong Monastery after being banned from becoming monks jumped into a river and drowned in January 2026 while fleeing Chinese authorities who came to arrest them for illegally residing there.

Dorje Tenzin Rinpoche, the abbot of Mentang Monastery in Jiuzhi County, Tibet, has been missing for nearly nine months since his arrest.: Chogtrul Dorje Tenzin, abbot of Mentang Monastery and founder of a Tibetan-language vocational school in Qinghai’s Golog Prefecture, remains missing nearly nine months after his December 2025 detention, with authorities providing no explanation and his school forced to close.

2 men with autism jailed for 3 years over joining a Taiwan group that advocated independence for Hong Kong: Chan Tai-sum, 27, and Ng Chi-tung, 25—both diagnosed with autism—were sentenced to 36–38 months after pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit secession for their involvement with the Taiwan-based Hong Kong Democratic Independence Union, with the judge rejecting claims that Chan’s attempt to seek foreign asylum should reduce his sentence.

Wall Street Journal publisher convicted in Hong Kong of deterring reporter from union role: A Hong Kong court convicted Dow Jones of unlawfully deterring former reporter Selina Cheng, now chair of the Hong Kong Journalists Association, from running for the press union’s leadership, though it acquitted the company of firing her over her union role, in a case widely seen as a press-freedom bellwether.

HRIC on Twitter/X: “Pillar of Shame” Tiananmen commemoration artwork creator Jens Galschiøt responded to the prosecution’s application in the Hong Kong Alliance case to confiscate “Pillar of Shame” and other June Fourth historical materials, stating that he never transferred legal ownership of the work to the Hong Kong Alliance, nor has he consented to the Hong Kong authorities confiscating, seizing, destroying, disposing of, or transferring it.

China’s Reach & Internal Control 中国: 内控与外扩

USALI This Week in Asian Law: Courts sentenced three senior officials for corruption and the party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection expelled two former ministers from the party and referred both for prosecution on bribery allegations.

A Family Dispute: A licensing fee dispute between a Shaanxi provincial broadcaster and CCTV’s national distribution arm—both ultimately CCP-controlled but nominally commercial entities—reveals the odd internal dynamics of China’s state-owned media landscape, where a struggling provincial network failed to pay $11 million in fees amid a broader collapse in local TV ad revenue and viewership.

HRIC on Twitter/X: A new report released in September 2026 by Safeguard Defenders unveils the other side of the camera lens at China Global Television Network (CGTN). The report interviews eight former CGTN employees, including anchors, editors, and producers, describing a work environment starkly different from that of ordinary international news organizations: news values often give way to political propaganda, and journalists and editors must face strict censorship and self-censorship.

Satellite images show China advancing into contested India border territory as Xi travels to New Delhi: Satellite imagery shows China rapidly building infrastructure in contested Arunachal Pradesh territory near villages like Gelemo and Taksing, with local Tagin residents reporting Indian troops retreating as Chinese forces advance, a stark contrast to Xi’s simultaneous diplomatic “reconciliation” visit to New Delhi.

Related: Xi Jinping gets red carpet at Brics summit amid thaw in India-China relations. Xi Jinping received a ceremonial welcome in New Delhi for his first India visit in seven years, marking a diplomatic thaw since the deadly 2020 Galwan border clash, as India and China publicly project unity within BRICS while quietly competing for regional influence.

International Responses 国际反应

HRIC on Twitter/X: On September 8, Philippine Defense Secretary Teodoro spoke at the Seoul Defense Dialogue hosted in South Korea. As he discussed the South China Sea situation and compliance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a staff member handed him a piece of letter paper from a Chinese military attaché at the Chinese Embassy in South Korea reiterating China’s opffiucial stance rejecting the 2016 South China Sea arbitration ruling.

NSC adviser urges caution on travel to China amid new rules: Ahead of new Chinese entry-exit rules, a Taiwanese national security adviser warned that Taiwan’s civil servants, religious group members, and tech-sector engineers are prime targets for Chinese intelligence gathering, citing cases of police and judicial personnel being questioned about infrastructure and internal operations during China visits.

UN expresses deep concern over China’s tightening restrictions on Tibetans: UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk told the Human Rights Council’s 63rd session that China’s “tightening restrictions” on Tibetan religious freedom are “deeply troubling,” calling for urgent policy change.

Bipartisan U.S. Lawmakers Demand DHS Briefing on Uyghur Forced Labor Law Enforcement: A bipartisan coalition of US lawmakers pressed DHS for a briefing on Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act enforcement, citing concerns over declining detention rates in high-risk sectors despite a record 43-company expansion of the sanctions list.

Conflict over Taiwan would be disastrous, de facto US ambassador warns: The top US diplomat in Taipei, Raymond Greene, said any Taiwan Strait conflict would harm the global economy more than WWII, calling the upcoming Trump-Xi summit an opportunity to avoid “miscalculations” as the US reinforces Indo-Pacific defense partnerships.

Beijing has no right to interfere in vice president’s visit to Italy: MOFA: Taiwan’s foreign ministry rejected Beijing’s criticism of Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim’s visit to a European Parliament-organized democracy conference in Italy, after China lodged formal protests with Rome and Brussels over the “one China” principle.

Current Events 热点新闻

At least 25 dead in cargo ship fire at China’s Qingdao port: At least 25 people died and 5 were hospitalized after a fire broke out aboard the Liberian-flagged Ocean Melody while docked for repairs at a state-owned Qingdao shipyard; Xi ordered urgent rescue efforts and a safety investigation.

Tung Chee-hwa, Hong Kong’s first post-Handover leader, dies at 89: Hong Kong’s first post-Handover chief executive, a Beijing-backed shipping tycoon who governed through the Asian financial crisis, SARS outbreak, and the historic 2003 anti-Article 23 protests before resigning in 2005, passed away last week.

Call in China to end English’s core status sparks debate: A viral post by math teacher Tang Jiafeng calling to strip English of its core-subject status in Chinese schools, arguing AI translation has reduced its necessity, reignited a long-running debate. Critics like Hu Xijin warned against politicizing language education, citing its role in global competitiveness and equity.

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