Human Rights in China (HRIC) has published a report documenting a pattern of organized violence against anti-Xi protesters during Xi Jinping’s September 23–25 Washington visit, closely mirroring attacks at the 2023 San Francisco APEC summit.

Demonstrators calling for freedom in Tibet, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Taiwan gathered near the White House, chanting “Xi Jinping has got to go.” Some even dressed as Winnie the Pooh, a banned meme comparing Xi to the cartoon bear, as part of the broader satirical and political dissent against Xi’s state visit. As thousands of pro-democracy, Tibetan, Uyghur, and Hong Kong protesters gathered near Xi’s hotel and the Chinese Embassy, they faced repeated encirclement, banner-snatching, pepper-spraying, and physical assaults from organized pro-Beijing crowds: an estimated 100 overseas Chinese associations bussed in with centralized logistics and stipends, while unidentified men in matching dark clothing and face masks moved between the crowds, filming and attacking protesters, with one suspect reportedly protected by diplomatic immunity according to police. New York community leader Chen Shanzhuang, previously linked to organizing violence at the 2023 San Francisco incident, reappeared as an apparent on-site coordinator during the Washington attacks.

Despite extensive video evidence, only anti-Xi protesters faced arrest and prosecution (five arrests, including one transferred to ICE custody), while no pro-Beijing attackers have been criminally charged, mirroring the impunity seen in 2023. HRIC calls on U.S. law enforcement to investigate the assailants’ identities and possible links to Chinese diplomatic missions, and questions why diplomatic immunity would shield individuals from accountability for street violence against people exercising their constitutional rights.

In other news related to the summit, 37 members of Congress wrote to Trump urging him to personally press Xi to repeal China’s “Ethnic Unity and Progress Law,” warning it threatens religious freedom and enables transnational repression against Tibetans, Uyghurs, and other minorities worldwide. The wife of detained seismologist Youlin Chen said the White House assured her Trump would press Xi for her husband’s release, along with that of scholar Min Zin, as both remain designated “wrongfully detained” by the US. In the meantime, AI, trade, and Taiwan issues were left largely unresolved.

Law & Policy 法律与政策

Does China Intend to Target Taiwan With New National Security Legislation?: Taiwanese officials worry that China may roll out further national security legislation targeting Taiwan following the Ethnic Unity Law, citing recent exit-entry regulations, cyberspace security measures, and the National Defense Mobilization Law as building blocks for expanded “long-arm” jurisdiction.

USALI This Week in Asian Law 09/25: The National People’s Congress Standing Committee plans to study a dedicated law on “filing and review,” the process for checking whether regulations, local laws, and judicial interpretations comply with the constitution and national law. The process has led to changes in local rules that, for example, restricted the schooling, jobs, and welfare benefits of relatives of people accused or convicted of crimes. The law would consolidate review systems now run separately by the legislature, the government, the courts, and other state bodies.

Cyber Security & Digital Rights 网络安全与数字权利

Translation: “Eventually, We All Learned to Keep Quiet”: Prompted by censorship following a Guangzhou mass stabbing which targeted women, this essay reflects on how self-censorship has become an internalized survival skill in China, warning that suppressed anger curdles into dangerous societal numbness rather than genuine social harmony.

Scripting the Source: Chinese state TV journalists reveal that live interviews are increasingly pre-scripted before filming even begins, with interviewees given talking points to recite. This “risk management” shift strips journalism of its function as authentic, on-the-spot information gathering.

China’s Approach to AI: Infrastructural Statecraft, Managed Pluralism: This analysis argues China’s AI development model is best understood as “the government builds the stage, enterprises put on the show”; in other words, state-controlled infrastructure is paired with managed competition among firms, distinct from a more market-driven approach.

New rules to protect tech secrets could strand Taiwanese visitors in China: China’s new rules allowing exit bans for tech-export violations have prompted Taiwan to warn semiconductor and tech workers of detention risk, with analysts saying the rules reflect Beijing’s fear of losing AI talent and IP to the US.

China, US agree to set up channel for AI safety incidents: Following the Trump-Xi summit, both countries agreed to establish a bilateral communication channel for AI-related incidents and a formal “AI Dialogue” set for November, alongside continued Board of Trade cooperation and military crisis-communication mechanisms.

Related: Trump and Chinese president Xi end summit without major agreement on AI. The three-day Washington summit closed with pageantry and a two-month trade truce extension but no binding AI framework, despite months of buildup, drawing criticism that the leaders squandered a chance to address the AI arms race.

Diaspora Community & Transnational Repression 海外社群和跨国镇压

HRIC on Twitter/X: On the morning of September 22, an alarming incident of transnational repression occurred outside the Chinese Consulate-General in Toronto. ​A man wearing a Chinese national flag pin—strongly suspected of being consulate personnel—openly and violently tore down protest banners and shoved an elderly female demonstrator. Confronting the peaceful protesters, he aggressively issued blatant death threats: “Under the Anti-Secession Law, I can have you shot!” and “Believe it or not, I’ll beat you to death!” ​When a bystander stepped in to intervene and reminded him, “This is Canada,” the man showed no restraint, brazenly shouting back, “Fuck Canada!” along with a stream of profanities.

130 UN human rights experts issued a joint statement calling on the international community to stop “transnational repression.”: Over 130 UN Special Procedures mandate holders and Treaty Body members issued a landmark joint statement urging states, tech companies, and INTERPOL to combat transnational repression, including spyware, AI-enabled surveillance, and cross-border intimidation.

HRIC on Twitter/X: The English edition of Xu Zhiyong’s essay collection “A Beautiful China” was launched at Georgetown University Law Center on September 22, 2026, with more than twenty friends, human rights advocates, publishers, scholars, and lawyers in attendance. The launch came just ahead of Xi Jinping’s visit to the US, offering the international community a chance to hear a voice beyond China’s official narrative.

Human Rights Defenders & Civil Society 人权捍卫者与公民社会

HRIC on Twitter/X: Wang Yi, pastor of Chengdu Early Rain Covenant Church, who is currently serving his sentence in Sichuan, has reportedly been diagnosed with late-stage liver cancer. This news has sparked strong international concern for his health and safety. Pastor Wang Yi was arrested on December 9, 2018; on December 30, 2019, he was sentenced to 9 years in prison on charges of “inciting subversion of state power” and “illegal business operations” related to his role in running the church.

HRIC on Twitter/X: Human rights defender Shi Tingfu passed away on September 22 while serving his sentence in Shashi Prison, Aksu, Xinjiang, only four months before he was supposed to be released. The prison authorities told Mr. Shi’s son that his father had died of a heart attack. Mr. Shi was arrested on January 15, 2024, for helping fruit farmers from the Aksu Production and Construction Corps defend their rights.

HRIC on Twitter/X: On September 23, 2026, Chen Yunfei, a member of Chengdu Qiuyu Shengyue Church, was formally arrested by the Wujiang District Police in Chengdu City on charges of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.”

HRIC on Twitter/X: Human rights defender Jia Xun was released from prison upon completion of his sentence on September 21, 2026. Four years ago, Jia was arrested across provinces by Henan police in Beihai, Guangxi, accused of using VPNs to access overseas websites such as Facebook and Twitter, “spreading false information, stirring up trouble, and causing serious disruption to public order,” and was subsequently sentenced to four years in prison for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.”

HRIC on Twitter/X: In a leaked clip from a private gathering, SOHO China founder Pan Shiyi (潘石屹) recounts the chilling fallout of Ren Zhiqiang (任志强)’s private dissent. According to Pan, Ren sent an internal letter to just 11 people, and Pan was the first on the list. While other recipients inside China were swiftly rounded up, Pan narrowly escaped detention only because he had already arrived in the United States.

The Chinese Communist Party’s plan to build a “love the Party” propaganda station at a pilgrimage site in Gonjo County, Tibet, has sparked public petitions in opposition.: Chinese authorities’ plan to build a Communist Party propaganda station at a Buddhist pilgrimage site in Gonjo County, Tibet, has triggered rare public petitions of opposition from local Tibetans, reflecting broader resentment over religious sites being used for political indoctrination.

Security Bureau weighs action as years-old Joshua Wong film tops Netflix charts following state-backed media report: Hong Kong’s Security Bureau said it is “taking relevant follow-up actions” after a pro-Beijing newspaper flagged that the 2017 documentary Joshua: Teenager vs. Superpower, about jailed activist Joshua Wong, had unexpectedly topped Netflix Hong Kong’s charts, though authorities stopped short of confirming any ban.

Elderly woman to stand trial under nat. security legislation despite psychosis diagnosis: Yang Chau-kei, 61, diagnosed with psychosis and delusional disorder, will go to trial in October for displaying seditious materials outside her Tin Shui Wai flat, after the court proceeded despite her psychiatric evaluation and denial of bail.

Hong Kong court to rule on ex-Stand News editor’s appeal bid against sedition conviction in 6 months: A Hong Kong appellate court will rule within six months on Patrick Lam’s bid to overturn his sedition conviction as former acting editor of the shuttered outlet Stand News, in a case seen as a bellwether for press freedom.

Hong Kong slams EU report claiming ‘deterioration of fundamental freedoms’ in the city: Hong Kong authorities rejected the EU’s annual report citing “continued deterioration of fundamental freedoms” and intense national-security focus, calling the assessment biased and accusing Brussels of double standards.

Prison authorities accuse ‘anti-China’ figures of ‘fabricating lies’ after US group says guards rehearsed Jimmy Lai’s death: Hong Kong’s Correctional Services Department accused “anti-China” advocacy groups of “fabricating lies” after a US-based foundation reported that Stanley Prison guards had rehearsed procedures for the event of Jimmy Lai’s death in custody, amid concerns over his deteriorating health.

Hong Kong 47: Ex-district councillor says he has ‘no regrets’ after release from prison: Ng Kin-wai, released after five years and seven months for conspiracy to subvert state power, said he stood by his pro-democracy activism, acknowledging Hong Kong’s changed political reality while refusing to call it acceptable.

Questioning Hong Kong’s lack of a banned book list is ‘soft resistance’ – outgoing nat. security police chief: Outgoing national security police chief Andrew Kan stated that even asking why Hong Kong won’t publish a list of banned books itself constitutes “soft resistance,” reflecting the vague, expansive use of the undefined term to police public discourse.

China’s Reach & Internal Control 中国: 内控与外扩

HRIC on Twitter/X: BBC Verify has discovered that Apple Maps blurs satellite images of thousands of military and political facilities in China for users outside the country, including detention sites linked to allegations of forced labor and torture, as well as the Urumqi No. 1 Prison where Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti is held. While blurring military bases may have security justifications, erasing facilities accused of large-scale arbitrary detention alongside them effectively helps authorities cover up evidence.

How China is trying to stop an expert exodus: Beijing seeks to prevent Chinese-trained PhDs and researchers from emigrating abroad as China races to retain scientific talent amid intensifying tech competition. Relatedly, new exit-ban regulations restrict citizens with access to sensitive “industrial or technological security” knowledge from leaving the country.

International Responses 国际反应

Hong Kong Watch research finds US$8.8 billion in Western investment funneled to sanctioned Chinese entities: A new Hong Kong Watch investigation found 230 Western financial institutions, including BlackRock and JPMorgan, have legally funneled $8.8 billion into China’s sanctioned military-industrial complex by exploiting loopholes in US sanctions rules, such as ambiguous naming requirements and joint-venture carve-outs.

Alarm bells sound in Brussels as EU sales of Chinese hybrid cars rocket: Sales of Chinese-made hybrid vehicles in the EU have exploded from 659 units in 2022 to over 160,000 in the first seven months of 2026 as Chinese automakers like BYD sidestep EU tariffs targeting fully electric cars, prompting Brussels to request voluntary export curbs.

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HRIC is in close contact with witnesses and victims of the attacks. Media is welcome to reach out for further information.

Chinese version / 中文版

On September 23, before Xi arrived in Washington, the Waldorf Astoria hotel where he would be staying went into full security lockdown. A tall, anti-climbing fence was constructed around the hotel with police stationed by the barrier, a security perimeter spanning approximately three blocks was established between 9^th and 12^th Streets, with a checkpoint set up on 10^th Street, and in the days leading up to the visit, emergency no-parking zones and road closures were progressively implemented on sections of 10^th Street, 12^th Street, Constitution Avenue, and Pennsylvania Avenue surrounding the hotel.

After Xi Jinping’s arrival, the area outside the security barriers was quickly occupied by two starkly contrasting groups: on one side were Chinese democracy activists, Tibetans, Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, and other protesters brandishing slogans such as “Xi Jinping Step Down” and “China wants freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law,” while on the other side, a dense sea of ​​red flags bearing five yellow stars marked the large crowds of pro-Beijing supporters waiting at the hotel, the airport, and along the motorcade route. At one point, around 200 members of Xi’s welcoming party gathered outside the hotel, waving Chinese and American flags and chanting slogans of welcome.

Reports from the welcoming camp itself stated that approximately 100 overseas Chinese associations participated, including the American Fujian Association, the Fujian Sanshan Association, the Fujian United Association, the Lianjiang Association, and various chambers of commerce, with some groups chartering buses from New York, Philadelphia, and other locations to travel to Washington, DC. Chen Shanzhuang, quoted in reports by the welcoming side, noted that he had arrived in Washington two or three days in advance. In other words, this was not a chance street encounter between a few supporters and protesters; rather, Xi Jinping’s visit brought together two large groups with diametrically opposed political stances within a highly secured yet extremely confined public space. The roar of more than three thousand protesters pierced through the massive, organized efforts of pro-CCP forces to block them out. Reporters confirmed that even from locations such as the entrance to the White House banquet hall, protest chants of “Xi Jinping, you are not welcome! Xi Jinping, xia tai (step down)!” could be clearly heard.

Just prior to Xi Jinping’s arrival in the United States, HRIC joined 29 other human rights, press freedom, and civil society organizations in signing an open letter that not only called for the release of political prisoners and an end to transnational repression, but also put forward a specific demand: that Xi publicly guarantee, before arriving in the United States, that members of his delegation and “affiliated individuals” would not engage in transnational repression or collective retaliation against protests and boycotts during the visit.

This demand was not based on hypothetical concerns. In recent years, the U.S. Department of Justice has indicted multiple officials from China’s Ministry of Public Security, accusing them of using thousands of fake online identities to monitor, harass, and threaten Chinese pro-democracy activists in the United States. Meanwhile, a report on transnational repression released this June by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) identified physical assaults, threats against family members in China, digital harassment, forced repatriation, censorship, and “lawfare” as tools employed by the Chinese government and associated actors against overseas critics.

For this reason, the events that unfolded on the streets of Washington, D.C., from September 23 to 25 cannot be reduced merely to a clash between “supporters and protestors” on the sidelines of a diplomatic visit. Instead, given the established track record of transnational repression, critical questions must be asked: Who was organizing the crowds? Who was monitoring the protesters? And why did individuals peacefully expressing dissent once again become targets of physical assault?

From Harassment and Pepper Spray to Physical Assault

Conflicts began the day Xi Jinping arrived. Outside Joint Base Andrews, where welcoming crowds and anti-Xi protesters were initially kept apart, scuffles broke out over the seizure of banners and physical altercations ensued. Video footage from the scene shows individuals entering the ranks of protesters to film and snatch items, as well as someone using a stainless-steel flagpole wrapped in a Chinese national flag to jab at protesters. On September 24, the conflict escalated further: protesters Geng Guanjun, Hu Pizheng, Huang Mingfa, and Guo Jianxin were sprayed with pepper spray by pro-Beijing individuals while demonstrating against Xi, and protestor Niu Pengfei was surrounded, choked, beaten, and dragged by several individuals dressed in black.

That same day, a smaller group of Chinese pro-democracy protesters was also surrounded and attacked while First Lady Peng Liyuan was out in public. In the early hours of September 25, another physical altercation occurred outside the Chinese Embassy. Publicly available video shows protesters being attacked near the embassy entrance, prompting police intervention. Washington police confirmed five protest-related arrests on September 24, including charges involving the assault of a police officer, the unlawful seizure of another person’s property, and simple assault. The repeated incidents of banner-snatching, pepper spray, harassment, and beatings over several days caused the protests to quickly escalate from a confrontation of beliefs into a matter of personal safety.

Even more noteworthy is the repeated appearance—across footage from various locations—of a group of individuals dressed in black who exhibited highly similar patterns of behavior: young-to-middle-aged men wearing matching dark clothing, baseball caps, face masks, earpieces, or sunglasses, some carrying black umbrellas, moved between the welcoming crowds and the protesters, filmed the demonstrators, and rapidly converged whenever a confrontation broke out. Based on their uniform attire, conduct, and equipment, activists on the ground identified some of these individuals as security personnel accompanying the Chinese delegation. On-site video footage clearly shows one woman among this group specifically targeting pro-democracy activists with pepper spray.

The question of these individuals’ identities has moved beyond mere street-level speculation. Hong Kong Democracy Council (HKDC) reported that Washington police explicitly told representatives from Students for a Free Tibet (SFT) that at least one of the assailants was not detained “because he has diplomatic immunity,” while Samuel Bickett stated that police told SFT the individual was part of the diplomatic team accompanying Xi Jinping. Hong Kong activist Joey Siu pointed out that several of the activists who were attacked are U.S. citizens. As of this writing, the U.S. State Department has not publicly disclosed the individual’s name or specific status; however, if police were indeed unable to arrest a suspect accused of assaulting protesters due to diplomatic immunity, the issue is clear: the U.S. government must clarify whether this person was part of Xi Jinping’s diplomatic or security entourage and explain why diplomatic immunity would serve as an obstacle to addressing street violence.

The organized nature of the welcoming contingent was unmistakable. Reports from the welcoming side itself explicitly stated that around 100 Chinese expatriate associations participated in the event, listing various hometown associations and chambers of commerce; another report noted that groups from New York, Brooklyn, Flushing, Philadelphia, and elsewhere transported participants to Washington in chartered buses. In on-site interview footage, some elderly participants openly told interviewers that their attendance was organized by “New York hometown associations.” Numerous videos and screenshots circulated on social media showing the mass transport of participants by bus, the centralized distribution of boxed meals, and even recruitment notices. One widely shared recruitment message detailed arrangements such as transportation, accommodation, and an $80 stipend, though different sources cited varying figures for the actual payment.

Regardless of the final payment situation, this centralized organization by expatriate associations, the interstate bus charters, the bulk distribution of flags, and the provision of communal meals all indicate a mobilization effort that was carefully planned and well-resourced. In contrast, dissident organizations and individuals mostly traveled to Washington D.C. independently. This asymmetry in manpower, resources, and operational capacity directly shaped the dynamics on the street.

Familiar faces from San Francisco reappear in Washington

This situation warrants concern partly because it demonstrates a clear continuity with events that occurred during Xi Jinping’s visit to the APEC summit in San Francisco in 2023. A systematic review of over two thousand photos, videos, police records, medical reports, WeChat group messages, and testimonies from more than thirty witnesses revealed that, while clashes occurred from both sides during Xi’s four-day visit to San Francisco, the most severe acts of violence were perpetrated by pro-CCP activists and individuals who coordinated their actions from within the welcoming crowd: anti-Xi protesters were struck with flagpoles and metal objects, sprayed with chemicals, and subjected to punches and kicks, with some even beaten to the point of temporary unconsciousness. The investigation also confirmed that the Chinese Consulate General in Los Angeles covered hotel and meal expenses for some of the individuals present to welcome Xi; at least 35 pro-Beijing overseas Chinese associations attended; and at least four diplomats from the Chinese consulates in San Francisco or Los Angeles appeared in the welcoming crowds and interacted with individuals who were later involved in violent clashes. Chinese diplomatic missions have denied these findings, claiming that the crowds welcoming Xi Jinping were also subjected to provocation and violence. A report titled Exporting Repression, jointly produced by HKDC and SFT, documented 34 specific incidents of harassment, intimidation, and assault, and tracked various overseas Chinese associations and figures closely linked to United Front networks.

Some key organizers from 2023 reappeared at the Washington D.C. event, most notably John Chen Shanzhuang (陈善庄), a pro-Beijing community leader from New York. Investigations into the San Francisco incident revealed that Chen had organized a group from New York to travel to San Francisco to welcome Xi Jinping. Three years later, Chen arrived in Washington days in advance of the visit and appeared publicly at the welcoming event, which involved approximately 100 overseas Chinese associations. Video footage obtained by Human Rights in China clearly shows that, at the scene when pro-democracy activists were attacked, Chen was the only person holding a megaphone and visibly acting as an on-site coordinator. Individuals wearing hats, face masks, and sunglasses, dressed in dark clothing, could be seen operating around him. At these locations, pro-democracy activists were surrounded, struck with umbrellas, beaten, and sprayed with pepper spray. Chen’s repeated presence at pro-Beijing mobilization efforts and scenes of violence during Xi Jinping’s two visits to the United States constitutes significant evidence that should warrant investigation by U.S. law enforcement.

During a confrontation on September 24 near 17^th Street NW and New York Avenue, police arrested five individuals protesting against Xi Jinping; one of them, Pi Qiaohai, was subsequently transferred to ICE custody.

Attacks against pro-democracy activists during the APEC summit in San Francisco in November 2023 were documented by organizations such as Human Rights in China (HRIC) and investigated in detail by the media. According to HRIC’s current information, no pro-CCP individuals faced criminal charges for violence directed at anti-Xi protesters at that time; similarly, as of the publication of this article, there are no public records of pro-Beijing attackers facing criminal charges for the events in Washington D.C. In stark contrast, all five individuals arrested on September 24 near 17^th Street NW and New York Avenue, confirmed by HRIC through legal counsel to be anti-Xi pro-democracy activists, faced legal action, with Pi Qiaohai subsequently placed in ICE detention. In both instances, anti-Xi activists were arrested and criminally prosecuted, yet there appear to be no corresponding records of prosecution for the pro-Beijing individuals suspected of carrying out attacks, despite the existence of extensive video footage. U.S. law enforcement agencies have a responsibility to explain this stark disparity.

The most critical question regarding Xi Jinping’s visit to the U.S. is not whether welcoming crowds have the right to support him—they certainly do, it is not as if protesters opposing Xi Jinping possess some special political right, they were merely exercising the freedoms of expression and assembly to which everyone in the United States is entitled. The real issue is whether an individual who has left China due to opposition to the Chinese government remains subject to surveillance, harassment, intimidation, or even physical assault in the United States because of that same political stance, and whether U.S. law enforcement and diplomatic systems can identify and prevent such conduct in a timely manner when the perpetrators may be linked to Chinese diplomatic missions or official delegations.

Even before Xi Jinping arrived in the United States, HRIC called upon his delegation and their U.S.-based associates to refrain from engaging in transnational repression against protesters. After the visit concluded, this issue did not vanish; instead, it became even more concrete due to the various videos captured on the streets. For Chinese dissidents who have long endured the pressures of being targeted from all sides, harassed, and subjected to transnational repression, the events in Washington raise a very simple question: once they have left China, can they truly voice opposition to the Chinese government on the streets of a democratic nation without fearing physical assault?

Additional Details and Observations

Altercations involving items being snatched from protestors and attacks with flagpoles occurred outside Joint Base Andrews on September 23. On September 24, as First Lady Peng Liyuan was leaving the National Museum of Asian Art, Geng Guanjun reported being jabbed with the tip of an umbrella, knocked to the ground, and sprayed in the eyes with pepper spray; Niu Pengfei reported being surrounded and attacked by three individuals dressed in black; Huang Mingfa reported being pepper-sprayed three times and kicked; and Guo Jianxin reported a woman spraying pepper spray at four pro-democracy activists. That same afternoon, near the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Falun Gong practitioner Xin Qin reported being pulled down, beaten, and bitten by Li Huahong and others.

Late on the night of September 24 and into the early hours of September 25, several individuals reported that people emerging from the direction of the Chinese Embassy attacked protesters who were displaying projected images. Yuan Zegang stated that he was stabbed in the abdomen with a rod-like object and that his vehicle sustained damage to its windows and body; other reports indicated that one person was left bleeding on the ground and required hospitalization. Publicly available video footage shows that after police arrived, some of those involved in the altercation retreated toward the embassy. Law enforcement must ascertain the identities of these individuals—whether they were embassy staff, security personnel hired by the embassy, ​​members of Xi Jinping’s delegation, or others.

On September 25, incidents involving banner-snatching, encirclement, and physical blows occurred again outside the National Archives.

HRIC seeks further investigation into the following questions:

• Have official cases been opened for every incident of assault involving video evidence, injuries, and witnesses that occurred over the three-day period?

• Have the individuals who attacked protesters using pepper spray, umbrellas, flagpoles, and other objects been identified?

• Who are the individuals dressed in black, who repeatedly concealed their identities with hats, masks, and sunglasses, and rapidly gathered during the clashes? Is there any shared organization, employment, or chain of command linking them?

• What is the identity of the individuals who emerged from the Chinese embassy side to participate in the clashes?

• How was Li Huahong handled after being handcuffed by the police? Was a formal case opened? Were criminal charges filed?

• Why is there no record of criminal prosecution to date for the individuals suspected of carrying out assaults, despite the existence of extensive publicly available video footage?

While the 2023 San Francisco incident is not the main concern of this article, it offers a reference point that cannot be ignored: similar large-scale mobilizations by pro-Beijing diaspora groups—featuring some of the same organizers, individuals clad in black to conceal their identities, umbrellas, flagpoles, and pepper spray, alongside the surrounding, stalking, filming, and physical assault of anti-Xi Jinping protesters—reappeared almost identically in Washington D.C., three years later.

Human Rights in China does not question anyone’s right in the United States to welcome Xi Jinping, wave the Chinese flag, or express support for the Chinese government; opposition to Xi Jinping is likewise protected by the U.S. Constitution. However, whoever commits violence must be investigated and held legally accountable. To date, information available to HRIC indicates that no pro-CCP individuals were criminally prosecuted for violence against anti-Xi protesters in San Francisco in 2023; similarly, there are no public records of pro-Beijing attackers facing criminal prosecution for the events in Washington in 2026. Meanwhile, anti-Xi pro-democracy activists were among those arrested and criminally prosecuted in connection with both incidents.

Diplomatic courtesies must not serve as a shield for the CCP to suppress dissent, diplomatic immunity cannot justify impunity for street violence, and political stances must not determine who receives legal protection and who faces prosecution.

Appendix: Video screenshots and links to related evidence

In on-site video footage provided by protester Cai Xiaoli, a large group of individuals dressed in black are seen attacking pro-democracy activists. One woman sprays pepper spray at four people, while Chen Shanzhuang directs the scene while holding a megaphone. Link to original YouTube video: 习近平访美期间：华盛顿有组织袭击民运人士，辣椒水攻击，陈善庄现场指挥

Sequential screenshots:

Li Laoshi on Twitter/X (李老师不是你老师)：

China Action on Twitter/X：

Cai Xiaoli (蔡晓丽) on Twitter/X:

Yuan Zegang (袁泽刚) on Twitter/X:

Sound of Hope on Twitter/X：

Jie Lijian (界立建) on Twitter/X:

Chen Xiangwei (陈翔威) on Twitter/X：

ZhengWei on Twitter/X：

Byron Wan on Twitter/X：

“Team Leader Li is not your team leader” (李班长不是你班长) on Twitter/X：

Huang Yaoyi (黃耀毅) on Twitter/X:

ALLIN on Twitter/X：

News Coverage

FTV/Yahoo! News: “Protesters Attacked by ‘CCP Personnel’! Netizens Slam: Bringing Transnational Repression to the Forefront”: https://tw.news.yahoo.com/抗議者遭-中共人員-攻擊-網轟-把跨境鎮壓擺上檯-083528320.html

Liberty Times: “Protesters Gather Outside the White House! Footage Reveals ‘Xi Jinping’ Being Slapped”: https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/5585903

Liberty Times: “Protesters Swarm Outside Hotel Where Xi Jinping Is Staying; ‘Unidentified Individuals’ Spotted Monitoring the Scene”: https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/5585961

NTD News, “On the night of the Trump-Xi summit, CCP agents attacked protesters outside the Chinese embassy”: https://www.ntdtv.com/b5/2026/09/25/a104136250.html

NTD News, “Faces of Xi supporters revealed; at least 39 protest groups turned out to ‘welcome’ Xi”: https://www.ntdtv.com/gb/2026/09/25/a104136124.html

NTD News, “News Weekly: Trump-Xi Summit Concludes; 39 Groups Stage Persistent Protests of the Event”: https://www.ntdtv.com/gb/2026/09/26/a104136676.html

NTD San ​​Francisco: “Pro-CCP Individual Attacks Falun Gong Practitioner in Washington; Police Make Arrest and Open Case”: https://ntdsf.tv/2026/09/24/親共者華盛頓襲擊法輪功學員-警方逮捕立案/

The Epoch Times: “Protesters in Washington D.C. Assaulted by CCP Thugs During Xi’s U.S. Visit” (Chen Deyi): https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/9/26/n14857674.htm

The Epoch Times, “Pro-Beijing Woman Arrested After Allegedly Attacking Protester Amid Trump–Xi Summit”: https://www.theepochtimes.com/china/pro-beijing-woman-arrested-after-allegedly-attacking-protester-amid-trump-xi-summit-6094648

The Epoch Times, “In Photos: What We Saw in DC Outside Trump–Xi Summit”: https://www.theepochtimes.com/article/in-photos-what-we-saw-in-dc-outside-trump-xi-summit-6095147

Vision Times: “Protesters Attacked During Xi’s US Visit: Mystery Surrounding Chinese Man in Face Mask and Black Umbrella Revealed”: https://kzg.io/news/gb/2026/09/28/1105365.html

Vision Times: “Clashes Erupt Between Welcoming Crowds and Protesters!”: https://kzg.io/news/gb/2026/09/24/1105229.html

Chinascope, “Beijing-Organized Xi Supporters Clashed with Protesters Outside Andrews Airport”: https://chinascope.org/archives/41343

Voice of Freedom and Democracy — “A Record from the Scene of the Protest Against Xi Jinping’s US Visit in Washington (Part B) — Twitter Video”: https://myxth.org/archives/10961

WJLA 7News, “Several arrested as crowds gather near White House for Chinese President’s visit”: https://wjla.com/news/local/dc-white-house-support-protest-chinese-president-xi-jinping-china-arrest-police-new-york-avenue-17th-street-crime-trump-washington

inkl, “What Really Happened Outside the White House During Xi’s Visit…”: https://www.inkl.com/news/what-really-happened-outside-the-white-house-during-xis-visit-involving-five-arrests-and-two-standoffs

Tibetan Review (Citing MPD arrest figures from WUSA9): https://www.tibetanreview.net/arrests-reported-as-tibetans-other-protesters-dogged-president-xi-on-second-day-of-his-us-state-visit/

The Diplomat, “’Xi, You’re Not Welcome’…”: https://thediplomat.com/2026/09/xi-youre-not-welcome-as-trump-hosts-chinas-leader-thousands-protest-in-washington/

ClickOrlando, “Protesters of Xi’s policies push for change in earshot of White House visit with Trump”: https://www.clickorlando.com/news/politics/2026/09/25/protesters-of-xis-policies-push-for-change-in-earshot-of-white-house-visit-with-trump/

Voice of America: “Xi Jinping Faces Protests from Multiple Groups and Ethnic Communities During U.S. Visit”: https://www.voachinese.com/a/xi-jinping-s-visit-to-the-u-s-met-with-protests-organized-by-various-groups-20260924/8204227.html

Voice of America, “Protesters and Supporters Gather Outside the National Archives”: https://www.voachinese.com/a/national-archives-protesters-and-supporters-20260925/8204303.html

Radio Free Asia, “Xi Jinping’s Visit to the U.S.: Support and Protests Coexist on the Streets of Washington”: https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/xinwenkuaixun/2026/09/24/xi-us-visit-washington-supporters-protesters/

RFI: “Protest groups ‘welcome’ Xi Jinping in Washington; hundreds shout ‘not welcome’ outside the Chinese Embassy”: https://www.rfi.fr/cn/中国/20260924-抗议团体华盛顿-迎-习近平-中使馆外数百人高喊-不受欢迎

BBC Chinese, “Demonstrators Gather in Washington, D.C. to Protest Xi Jinping’s Visit to the U.S.”: https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/articles/cwly7j71n1k4o/sim

ADV Podcaster (at 46 minutes): https://www.youtube.com/live/Ew5igWMd248?is=aY-2dWp_sNMag0dP

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9月23日下午，在习近平抵达华盛顿DC之前，他下榻的华尔道夫酒店已经被层层封锁。酒店外竖起高大的防攀爬围栏，警方在围栏旁驻守；从9街至12街一带形成约三个街区的警戒区域，10街设有检查点，酒店周围的10街、12街、宪法大道和宾夕法尼亚大道多个路段从访问前数日起陆续实施紧急禁停和封路。习近平抵达后，围栏之外很快被两种截然不同的人群占据：一边是举着“习近平下台”“中国要自由、民主、人权、法治”等标语的中国民主人士以及藏人、维吾尔人、香港人和其他抗议者；另一边则是一片密集的五星红旗，大批亲北京欢迎者在酒店、机场和车队沿线守候。酒店外一度有约200名欢迎者挥舞中美国旗、高喊欢迎口号；欢迎方自己的中文报道则称，此次共有约100个侨团参加，包括美国福建同乡会、福建三山会、福建联合总会、连江同乡会及多个商会，一些团体从纽约、费城等地包车前往华盛顿DC。陈善庄在欢迎方报道中说，他本人提前两三天就已经来到华盛顿。换言之，这并非几名支持者偶然与抗议者在街头相遇，而是习近平的访问把人数众多、政治立场完全相反的两批人集中到了高度戒备却又极为狭窄的公共空间内。三千多名抗议者的怒吼，冲破了亲共势力兴师动众的阻挡。记者证实，即使站在白宫宴会厅门口等地点，也能清楚听到“Xi Jinping, you are not welcome!习近平下台”等抗议口号。

就在习近平抵达美国前，HRIC与另外29个人权、新闻自由和公民社会组织联署公开信，除了要求释放政治犯、停止跨国镇压外，还专门提出了一个十分具体的要求：习近平应在抵美前公开保证，其代表团成员以及“在美国的关联人员”不会针对此次访问期间的抗议和抵制行为实施跨国镇压或集体报复。这一要求并非假设性的担忧。过去数年，美国司法部已经起诉多名中国公安部人员，指控其利用数以千计的虚假网络身份监控、骚扰和威胁身在美国的中国民主人士；美国国会及行政当局中国委员会今年6月发表的跨国镇压报告则将肢体攻击、对中国境内家属的威胁、数字骚扰、强迫回国、审查和“法律战”等列为中国政府及相关行为者针对海外批评者使用的工具。也正因如此，9月23日至25日华盛顿DC街头发生的事情，不能仅仅被简化为一次外交访问外围“支持者与反对者互殴”：需要追问的是，在一个已经存在跨国镇压长期记录的背景下，谁在组织人员、谁在监视抗议者，以及为什么一些和平表达异议的人再次成为实体攻击的对象。

从围堵、辣椒水到肢体攻击

冲突从习近平抵达当天就已经开始。安德鲁斯联合基地外，欢迎者和反习近平抗议者原本被分隔开来，随后即发生争抢标语和肢体冲突；现场视频显示有人进入抗议队伍拍摄、抢夺物品，并有人使用缠有五星红旗的不锈钢旗杆捅向抗议者。9月24日，冲突进一步升级：抗议人士耿冠军、胡丕政、黄明发、郭鉴鑫在抗议习近平时遭亲北京人士喷射辣椒水；牛鹏飞被多个黑衣人围住掐脖殴打拖拽；同日，在彭丽媛外出期间，一支规模较小的中国民运抗议队伍也遭到围堵和攻击。9月25日凌晨，中国驻美使馆外再次发生肢体冲突，公开视频显示抗议者在使馆门口附近遭到攻击，警方随后介入。华盛顿警方9月24日确认五起与示威有关的逮捕，包括两人涉嫌袭击警察、一人涉嫌非法夺取他人物品、两人涉嫌简单攻击。连续数日出现的抢夺标语、辣椒水、围堵和殴打，使这次抗议很快从口号对峙升级为人身安全问题。

更引人关注的是，多个不同地点的影像中反复出现一批行动方式高度相似的黑衣人员：年轻或中年男性，统一穿着深色衣物，戴棒球帽、口罩、耳机或墨镜，一些人手持黑色长伞，在欢迎队伍与抗议者之间移动、拍摄抗议人士，并在冲突发生时迅速聚拢。现场活动人士根据其统一着装、行动方式和所携装备，将其中部分人员指认为中方随行安保或安全人员。现场视频清楚证明，这些黑衣人士中的一名女性，专门用辣椒水偷袭多位在场民运人士。这一身份问题并非只停留在街头猜测层面。Students for a Free Tibet（SFT）称，华盛顿警方曾明确告诉他们，至少一名参与袭击的人没有被拘留，“因为他具有外交豁免权”；HKDC随后转述了这一说法，Samuel Bickett则称警方向SFT表示，该人属于习近平此次访问的外交团队。邵岚（Joey Siu）指出，多名遭到攻击的活动人士本身是美国公民。美国国务院截至发稿尚未公开该人员的姓名和具体身份类别，但如果警方确实因外交豁免而无法拘捕一名涉嫌袭击抗议者的人员，那么问题已经十分明确：美国政府有必要说明此人是否属于习近平随行外交或安保团队，以及外交豁免为何会成为处理街头暴力的障碍。

欢迎队伍的组织化程度则十分清楚。欢迎方自己的报道明确称，大约100个华人侨团参与此次活动，并列出了多个同乡会和商会；另一篇欢迎方报道写到，纽约、布鲁克林、法拉盛、费城等地的团体以大巴集体运送参与者前往华盛顿。现场采访视频中，一些年长参与者也直接告诉采访者，他们是由“纽约同乡会”组织前来。社交媒体还流传多段大巴集中运送、统一领取盒饭的影像和招募截图，其中一份广泛转发的招募信息列出车费、食宿及80美元补贴等安排，不同来源对具体报酬数字另有不同说法。无论最终付款链条如何，侨团统一组织、跨州包车、成批发旗和集中提供餐食，都显示这是一场经过规划并投入资源的动员。与之相对，异议组织和个人大多自行前往华盛顿；双方在人力、资源和行动能力上的不对称，也直接塑造了街头局面。

旧金山的旧面孔，又出现在华盛顿DC

这种场景之所以值得警惕，还因为它与2023年习近平参加旧金山APEC峰会期间发生的事情有明显的连续性。对当年两千多张照片、视频、警方材料、医疗记录、微信群信息和三十多名证人的系统梳理显示，习近平访旧金山的四天里虽然双方都有发生冲突，但最严重的一批暴力由亲中共活动人士和混在欢迎人群中的协调行动者发动：反习近平抗议者遭到旗杆和金属物击打、化学喷雾、拳打脚踢，甚至有人被打至短暂失去意识。调查还确认，中国驻洛杉矶总领馆曾为部分欢迎者支付酒店和餐饮费用，至少35个亲北京侨团到场，至少四名中国驻旧金山或洛杉矶外交人员出现在欢迎队伍中，并与部分后来卷入冲突的人员发生互动；中国外交机构则否认这些调查结论，称欢迎习近平的人群同样遭到挑衅和暴力。HKDC与SFT此前联合完成的《Exporting Repression》报告则逐案记录了34起骚扰、恐吓和袭击，并追踪了多个与统战网络关系密切的侨团和人物。

一些2023年的关键组织者在此次华盛顿DC活动中再次出现，其中最醒目的就是纽约亲北京侨领陈善庄（John Chen Shanzhuang）。旧金山事件调查显示，陈善庄当年从纽约组织人员前往旧金山欢迎习近平；三年后，他再次提前数日来到华盛顿，并公开出现在此次约100个侨团参与的欢迎活动中。中国人权获得的视频清楚表明，在民运人士被攻击的场合，陈善庄是唯一一个手持扩音喇叭、明显发挥现场指挥作用的人。在他的周围，可以看到戴帽子、口罩、墨镜、身穿深色衣物的人员活动；正是在这些现场，民运人士遭到围堵、雨伞攻击、殴打和辣椒水袭击。陈善庄在两次习近平访美期间亲北京动员和暴力现场中的反复出现，是美国执法部门应当调查的重要线索。

9月24下午在西北17街和纽约大道的冲突中，警方抓捕五名抗议习近平的人士，其中一人皮乔海已经被送往ICE拘捕。

2023年11月旧金山APEC期间针对民运人士的攻击，有中国人权等组织的记录，也有媒体的详细调查。根据中国人权目前掌握的信息，当时没有亲共人士因为针对反习近平抗议者的暴力受到刑事起诉；2026年华盛顿DC，截至本文发表，同样没有看到亲北京袭击者受到刑事起诉的公开记录。与之形成鲜明对比的是，9月24日在西北17街和纽约大道附近被捕的五人，经中国人权通过律师确认，全部是反习近平的民运人士，其中皮乔海随后被转入ICE拘押。两次事件中，受到逮捕和刑事追究的都有反习近平民运人士，而大量公开影像中涉嫌实施攻击的亲北京人员却没有看到相应的起诉记录。美国执法机构有责任解释这种强烈反差。

习近平此次访美期间最值得追问的，因此并不是欢迎人群是否有权支持习近平——当然有，也不是反习近平抗议者是否拥有某种特殊的政治权利——他们行使的只是美国任何人都应当享有的表达和集会自由。真正的问题是，当一个人已经因为反对中国政府而离开中国，他是否仍会因为同样的政治立场，在美国受到监视、围堵、恐吓甚至袭击；以及当施压者可能与中国外交机构或官方代表团发生联系时，美国的执法和外交体系是否能够及时识别并阻止这种行为。HRIC在习近平抵美之前已经要求其代表团及其在美关联人员不得对抗议者实施跨国镇压；访问结束以后，这个问题非但没有消失，反而因为街头留下的一系列视频而变得更加具体。对于长期处在夹击、霸凌和跨国镇压压力下的中国异见者而言，华盛顿DC发生的事情提出了一个非常简单的问题：离开中国以后，他们究竟能不能在一个民主国家的街头，公开反对中国政府而不必担心因此遭到人身攻击？

补充事实与最新观察

9月23日安德鲁斯联合基地外发生抢夺和旗杆攻击；9月24日彭丽媛离开国立亚洲艺术博物馆时，耿冠军称遭雨伞尖捅击、被摔倒并遭辣椒水喷眼，牛鹏飞称遭三名黑衣人员围攻，黄明发称三次遭辣椒水喷射并被踢打，郭鉴鑫称一名女性向四名民运人士喷射辣椒水；同日下午环保署附近，法轮功学员辛勤称被李华红等人拉倒、殴打并咬伤；9月24日深夜至25日凌晨，中国驻美使馆外投屏抗议者遭杆状物和雨伞攻击，一人送医；9月25日国家档案馆外再次发生抢旗、围堵和挥拳。

9月24日深夜至25日凌晨，多名当事人称数名人员从中国驻美使馆一侧出来攻击投屏抗议者。袁泽刚称腹部被杆状物捅伤，车辆玻璃及车体遭破坏；相关报道指一人流血倒地并送医。公开视频显示警方到达后，一些参与冲突者退回使馆一侧。这些人究竟是使馆工作人员、使馆雇用的安保、习近平代表团成员还是其他人员，美国政府必须查明。

美国执法部门必须回答的问题

• 三天中每一起有视频、有伤者、有证人的攻击是否已经立案？

• 使用辣椒水、雨伞、旗杆和其他物品攻击抗议者的人是否已经被识别？

• 反复出现、以帽子、口罩和墨镜遮挡身份并在冲突中迅速聚集的黑衣人员究竟是谁？他们之间是否存在共同的组织、雇佣或者指挥关系？

• 使馆外从中国使馆一侧出来参与冲突的人员究竟是什么身份？

• 李华红被警察戴上手铐以后究竟如何处理？是否正式立案？是否提出刑事指控？

• 为什么大量公开影像中涉嫌实施攻击的人，截至目前没有看到相应的刑事起诉记录？

结语

2023年旧金山不是此次事件的中心议题，但它提供了一个无法忽视的参照：相似的大规模亲北京侨团动员、部分相同的组织人物、遮挡身份的黑衣人员、雨伞、旗杆和辣椒水，以及针对反习近平人士的围堵、跟踪、拍摄和肢体攻击，在三年后的华盛顿DC再次出现。

中国人权并不质疑任何人在美国欢迎习近平、挥舞中国国旗或者表达支持中国政府的权利；反对习近平同样受到美国宪法保护。问题应该只有一个：谁实施暴力，谁就应当受到调查和法律追究。

截至目前，中国人权掌握的信息显示，2023年旧金山没有亲共人士因为针对反习近平抗议者的暴力受到刑事起诉；2026年华盛顿DC也尚未看到亲北京袭击者受到刑事起诉的公开记录。与此同时，这两次事件中受到逮捕和刑事追究的都有反习近平民运人士。

在美国土地上，外交礼遇不能成为外国政府压制异议的保护伞，外交豁免不能成为街头暴力不被追问的理由，而政治立场更不能决定谁受到法律保护、谁受到法律追究。

附录：用户提供的连续视频截图

抗议者蔡晓丽提供的现场视频，众多黑衣人攻击民运人士，其中一女用辣椒水攻击四人，陈善庄手提扩音喇叭现场指挥：习近平访美期间：华盛顿有组织袭击民运人士，辣椒水攻击，陈善庄现场指挥

李老师不是你老师：

China Action：

蔡晓丽：

袁泽刚：

希望之声：

界立建：

陈翔威：

ZhengWei：

Byron Wan：

李班长不是你班长：

黃耀毅：

ALLIN：

新闻报道

民视/Yahoo奇摩新闻《抗议者遭”中共人员”攻击！网轰：把跨境镇压摆上台》（2026-09-25）：https://tw.news.yahoo.com/抗議者遭-中共人員-攻擊-網轟-把跨境鎮壓擺上檯-083528320.html

自由时报《白宫外抗议者聚集！”习近平”遭呼巴掌画面曝》：https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/5585903

自由时报《习近平下榻饭店外涌抗议者 “不明人士”现身监控》：https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/5585961

新唐人《川习会当晚 中使馆外中共特工袭击抗议者》：https://www.ntdtv.com/b5/2026/09/25/a104136250.html

新唐人《习支持者面目曝光 至少39个抗议群体”迎习”》：https://www.ntdtv.com/gb/2026/09/25/a104136124.html

新唐人《新闻周刊：川习会落幕 39团体集结抗议如影随形》：https://www.ntdtv.com/gb/2026/09/26/a104136676.html

新唐人旧金山台《亲共者华盛顿袭击法轮功学员 警方逮捕立案》：https://ntdsf.tv/2026/09/24/親共者華盛頓襲擊法輪功學員-警方逮捕立案/

大纪元《习访美期间 抗议者在华府遭到中共打手施暴》（陈德怡）：https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/9/26/n14857674.htm

The Epoch Times, “Pro-Beijing Woman Arrested After Allegedly Attacking Protester Amid Trump–Xi Summit”: https://www.theepochtimes.com/china/pro-beijing-woman-arrested-after-allegedly-attacking-protester-amid-trump-xi-summit-6094648

The Epoch Times, “In Photos: What We Saw in DC Outside Trump–Xi Summit”: https://www.theepochtimes.com/article/in-photos-what-we-saw-in-dc-outside-trump-xi-summit-6095147

看中国《习访美期间 抗议者被攻击 中方口罩男神秘黑伞被起底》：https://kzg.io/news/gb/2026/09/28/1105365.html

看中国《欢迎人群和抗议人群打起来了！》：https://kzg.io/news/gb/2026/09/24/1105229.html

Chinascope, “Beijing-Organized Xi Supporters Clashed with Protesters Outside Andrews Airport”: https://chinascope.org/archives/41343

自由民主之声《在华盛顿抗议习近平访美现场立此存照B——推特视频》：https://myxth.org/archives/10961

WJLA 7News, “Several arrested as crowds gather near White House for Chinese President’s visit”: https://wjla.com/news/local/dc-white-house-support-protest-chinese-president-xi-jinping-china-arrest-police-new-york-avenue-17th-street-crime-trump-washington

inkl, “What Really Happened Outside the White House During Xi’s Visit…”: https://www.inkl.com/news/what-really-happened-outside-the-white-house-during-xis-visit-involving-five-arrests-and-two-standoffs

Tibetan Review（转引 WUSA9 的 MPD 逮捕数字）：https://www.tibetanreview.net/arrests-reported-as-tibetans-other-protesters-dogged-president-xi-on-second-day-of-his-us-state-visit/

The Diplomat, “’Xi, You’re Not Welcome’…”: https://thediplomat.com/2026/09/xi-youre-not-welcome-as-trump-hosts-chinas-leader-thousands-protest-in-washington/

美联社（ClickOrlando 转载）, “Protesters of Xi’s policies push for change in earshot of White House visit with Trump”: https://www.clickorlando.com/news/politics/2026/09/25/protesters-of-xis-policies-push-for-change-in-earshot-of-white-house-visit-with-trump/

美国之音《习近平访美，遭遇多团体多族群集结抗议》：https://www.voachinese.com/a/xi-jinping-s-visit-to-the-u-s-met-with-protests-organized-by-various-groups-20260924/8204227.html

美国之音《抗议者与支持者齐聚国家档案馆外》：https://www.voachinese.com/a/national-archives-protesters-and-supporters-20260925/8204303.html

自由亚洲电台《习近平访美：华盛顿街头支持与抗议并存》：https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/xinwenkuaixun/2026/09/24/xi-us-visit-washington-supporters-protesters/

法广 RFI《抗议团体华盛顿”迎”习近平 中使馆外数百人高喊”不受欢迎”》：https://www.rfi.fr/cn/中国/20260924-抗议团体华盛顿-迎-习近平-中使馆外数百人高喊-不受欢迎

BBC中文《示威者聚集华府 抗议习近平访美》：https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/articles/cwly7j71n1k4o/sim

ADV Podcaster （at 46 minutes）：https://www.youtube.com/live/Ew5igWMd248?is=aY-2dWp_sNMag0dP

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Chinese President Xi Jinping is set to make a state visit to the United States from September 23 to 25, 2026, meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump in Washington for high-stakes bilateral talks. Experts flagged potential topics for the meeting to include the fate of the Busan tariff/export-control truce, a possible AI safety dialogue, the still-undelivered $14 billion Taiwan arms package, and whether any concrete deliverables emerge beyond symbolic “strategic stability” language.

Human rights groups, pro-democracy organizations, cultural groups, and more have begun gearing up for protests and actions to oppose Xi’s visit and raise awareness of human rights issues in China. On September 20, pro-democracy demonstrators encountered a parade involving pro-Beijing Chinese community groups in Flushing, New York. As the two sides broke into conflict, a man grabbed an anti-CCP banner and was subsequently handcuffed and taken away by police. Police also reportedly separated the groups during another confrontation.

Ahead of Xi’s visit, 30 human rights organizations, including Human Rights in China, also wrote a joint open letter to Xi Jinping, urging him to:

1. Immediately and unconditionally release prisoners of conscience, human rights defenders, and individuals arbitrarily detained due to their family members’ advocacy activities;

2. Repeal or amend laws passed during Xi’s tenure that violate international human rights obligations, including but not limited to the 2020 Hong Kong National Security Law and the 2026 Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress;

3. Confirm that individuals abroad, including the 14th Dalai Lama, who wish to travel to China to reunite with family and community, will be permitted safe entry;

4. Publicly commit, prior to arriving in the United States, that all members of Xi’s delegation and their associates in the U.S. will not engage in transnational repression or collective punishment retaliation against protests and boycotts during this visit.

Analysts say a successful, high-profile Washington summit would help Xi project strength domestically ahead of a possible unprecedented fourth term and reassure the military of his continued command amid ongoing PLA purges, with Taiwan arms sales seen as Beijing’s biggest red line concern. Taiwan conducted drills combining attack drones with missiles for the first time, which President Lai called proof of military modernization, as Taiwan awaits a still-postponed $14 billion US arms package.

Law & Policy 法律与政策

HRIC on Twitter/X: On September 15, China began implementing new entry and exit regulations, further tightening border controls. On the same day, the human rights organization Safeguard Defenders released an investigation pointing out that China’s use of “exit restrictions” (border controls) has been growing explosively in recent years. In just China’s Supreme People’s Court judgment database alone, there were 188,760 judgments mentioning “exit restrictions” in 2025.

Related: China can block citizens from leaving the country over national security or tech export violations. The rules, reflecting Beijing’s growing anxiety over tech transfer amid AI competition with the US, also let authorities deny entry to foreigners for one to five years over false visa information, and aim to curb citizens being lured abroad into forced scam operations.

HRIC on Twitter/X: Starting from November 15, 2026, Beijing will fully upgrade its drone control measures: The entire administrative area of Beijing will be designated as a drone control zone, prohibiting drone flights. Furthermore, within Beijing, it will be forbidden to possess or store drones and their core components, and also prohibited to transport or carry drones and their core components into Beijing. Drones and related equipment already stored in Beijing prior to this must be transferred outside the capital before November 15.

USALI This Week in Asian Law 09/18: The National Cybersecurity Standardization Technical Committee, a standards body guided by the Cyberspace Administration of China, released the third version in three years of its non-binding Artificial Intelligence Safety Governance Framework. Additionally, China’s Supreme People’s Court published four guiding cases on internet law, including holding a company liable for an AI-cloned celebrity voice used without consent in ads, while clarifying that AI search engines aren’t liable for pirated content links they promptly remove.

Advocates call for stronger consent laws as Hong Kong to criminalise persistent child sexual abuse and ‘cyberflashing’: Hong Kong’s Security Bureau confirmed it will create a new offense for prolonged child sexual abuse and criminalize “cyberflashing,” but advocacy group We Are X is pushing for stronger limits on the “honest but mistaken belief of consent” defense that survivors say lets attackers evade accountability.

Cyber Security & Digital Rights 网络安全与数字权利

Anthropic report reveals China-based AI-enabled surveillance on CTA, ICT and SFT: Anthropic disclosed that a China-based, government-aligned actor used Claude to conduct surveillance targeting the Central Tibetan Administration, ICT, and Students for a Free Tibet, including compiling personal data, monitoring social media, and researching religious venue floor plans for use in intelligence dossiers.

HRIC on Twitter/X: Huanyu Zhiying 1.0, unveiled by Sun Yat-sen University in April, can simulate foreign-media coverage, predict how different audiences might react, then refine Chinese messaging in response. Instead of broadcasting a narrative and seeing what lands, researchers can potentially test it against synthetic audiences first.

Related: HRIC on Twitter/X. An analysis by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute on the “Global Audience Intelligence Response 1.0” system reveals that the system has built a database covering 18 countries with over 10,000 simulated personas, drawing on international surveys, social media data, and research on attitudes toward China in different countries. It aims to simulate foreign media coverage and audience reactions, then adjust dissemination strategies accordingly.

Translation: Article on Media’s Survival Fails to Survive: A frank WeChat article from Zhejiang’s provincial propaganda department candidly admitted the structural crisis facing Chinese local media, including control by tech platforms and shrinking revenue, was censored within hours, illustrating how even officially sanctioned honesty about media decline is unwelcome.

MiniTrue: ByteDance Censors’ List of 5,241 Sensitive Terms: CDT published and analyzed a leaked 2020 internal ByteDance moderation lexicon of 5,241 sensitive words and phrases covering political figures, historical events, and locations, used to censor content across TikTok’s sister apps Douyin and Toutiao.

China and the US are competing for AI dominance but have shared concerns over safety: Ahead of a planned Trump-Xi summit, both nations continue competing fiercely for AI dominance—with Trump dismissing AI danger warnings as a “hoax”—even as officials on both sides acknowledge shared risks around AI-enabled cyberattacks and loss of human control.

China dismisses AI ‘fearmongering’ as spy chief warns of threat to Communist party rule: While China’s foreign ministry publicly rejected Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei’s call to slow and contain China’s AI progress as destructive “fearmongering,” China’s intelligence chief Chen Yixin separately warned domestically that AI poses a genuine internal threat to Communist Party rule via disinformation and cyberattacks, naming Anthropic’s Claude and OpenAI’s models as concerns.

Huawei unveils new chip technologies as Chinese firm steps up the AI race with Nvidia: Huawei launched its upgraded Atlas 960 SuperPoD computing cluster just before the Trump-Xi summit, underscoring China’s rapid push for chip self-sufficiency amid US export restrictions, though Chinese AI systems still often rely on some American components.

Policy Address 2026: Hong Kong will build an ‘AI City Brain’ for urban management: John Lee unveiled the “AI City Brain” initiative to consolidate data for traffic and emergency response across multiple government bureaus, modeled on systems already deployed across mainland Chinese cities since Hangzhou’s 2016 pilot.

Related: Planned AI ‘City Brain’ system not meant for surveillance – top Hong Kong official. Amid lawmakers’ privacy concerns, Hong Kong’s Chief Secretary defended the planned HK$200 million “AI City Brain,” insisting it will only monitor traffic and urban conditions, not individuals or crime.

Policy Address 2026: Hong Kong to appoint AI commissioner and consider deepfake laws – leader John Lee: In his Policy Address, John Lee announced a new AI Commissioner post to combat AI-enabled crime and said the government will study deepfake legislation, following cases of scammers using cloned voices to steal over HK$10 million.

Diaspora Community & Transnational Repression 海外社群和跨国镇压

A detained US scholar’s wife asks Trump for help as Xi’s Washington visit nears: Sylvia Zin, wife of detained scholar Min Zin, urged Trump to secure her husband’s release when meeting Xi next week; Jimmy Lai’s son Sebastien also lobbied Congress for his father’s release, noting Lai’s daughter is undergoing cancer treatment.

HRIC on Twitter/X: An exclusive Newsweek investigation has revealed a political warfare operation originating from China and spreading to the streets of the United States. In March of this year, the slogan “Hands Off Asia” first appeared on social media, and by the end of April, the Tricontinental Institute for Social Research officially launched an online campaign in Beijing. In July, the Colombo conference solidified it into the “Colombo Declaration,” directly targeting the U.S. military presence in Asia. By August, the movement had expanded to Philadelphia and New York.

HRIC on Twitter/X: Four members of Congress—Representatives James McGovern and James Walkinshaw and Senators Jeff Merkley and Tammy Duckworth—have issued a letter calling on the U.S. government to protect individuals who could face severe persecution if returned to China. The letter specifically highlights the cases of Guan Heng and human rights lawyer Wu Shaoping, both of whom HRIC has previously reported on.

Human Rights Defenders & Civil Society 人权捍卫者与公民社会

‘People had naive expectations’: How MeToo has changed in China: As #MeToo journalist Sophia Huang Xueqin was released after five years in prison, Chinese feminism has retreated into private, low-visibility spaces as hashtag campaigns have been scrubbed from the internet and a younger generation remains largely unaware of the movement’s earlier public battles.

Joint Statement: Ensure Sophia Huang Xueqin’s release and guarantee her freedom from arbitrary restrictions: Over 60 civil society organizations urged China to ensure Huang’s genuine freedom upon release, warning against continued surveillance, harassment, or restrictions, and called for legal reforms preventing the misuse of subversion charges against human rights defenders.

Friends, rights groups worry for Chinese #MeToo activist’s life after jail: Friends of Sophia Huang Xueqin and rights groups fear she’ll face a “non-release release” with ongoing surveillance and restricted freedom, a pattern seen with other released Chinese dissidents like Zhang Zhan.

Macau concludes first closed-door nat. security trial against ex-lawmaker and Tiananmen vigil co-organiser Au Kam San: Proceedings concluded in Macau’s first-ever closed-door national security trial against former lawmaker and Tiananmen vigil organizer Au Kam San, who faces up to 25 years for subversion; critics called the secret process “farcical” given he lacked independent counsel.

NGO concerned about South China Morning Post reporter Minnie Chan, 3 years after apparent disappearance: Reporters Without Borders marked three years since defense reporter Minnie Chan vanished after covering Beijing’s Xiangshan security forum, saying sources believe she’s held on undisclosed national-security charges potentially carrying a 10-year sentence.

Two Tibetan Officials Expelled After Joining Prayer Group for the Dalai Lama: Two Tibetan government officials in Lithang County were expelled from their posts after Chinese authorities discovered they’d secretly joined a 2024 prayer group for the Dalai Lama during his knee surgery, illustrating Beijing’s strict suppression of devotion to the exiled leader even among its own officials.

China Shuts Down Livestream After Tibetan Woman Singing a Tibetan Song: Authorities abruptly cut a Tibetan woman’s livestream simply for singing a Tibetan song, part of intensified Sinicization under the new Ethnic Unity Law that removes Tibetan language from public life and livestreaming, a key income source for many Tibetans.

HRIC on Twitter/X: HRIC has translated Gao Zhen’s final statement from his one-day, closed-door trial for infringing on the reputation of “heroes and martyrs” with works created before the law he was charged with, in a strong defense of artistic freedom and rule of law.

Rights group, relatives accuse China of using torture in prison: A Chinese Human Rights Defenders report examined 209 prisoners from 2016–2025 who alleged torture and mistreatment, finding a fifth beaten and 16 dying from denied medical care, with authorities rarely investigating complaints and sometimes punishing those who raise them despite China’s UN torture-convention obligations.

‘Soft resistance’ is the ‘most malicious’ threat to nat. security in Hong Kong – security chief: Security chief Chris Tang called the vaguely-defined “soft resistance” the most dangerous of Hong Kong’s “four great national security risks” precisely because its harm isn’t obvious, a term used since 2021 without ever being legally defined.

Netflix and the Nanny State: An analysis of Chinese streaming platforms’ content restrictions, framing state oversight of entertainment (à la Netflix’s total exclusion from China) as part of Beijing’s broader “nanny state” approach to controlling cultural and media content.

‘Cantonese is strictly forbidden’: Hong Kong school principal apologises after unapproved language ban sparks outrage: Prestigious Good Hope School faced backlash after a leaked graduation video guideline declared Cantonese “STRICTLY FORBIDDEN” in favor of English or Mandarin; the principal apologized, calling it an unapproved draft that didn’t reflect school policy, though the incident fueled fears about Cantonese’s status in Hong Kong.

China’s Reach & Internal Control 中国: 内控与外扩

China expels two top ‘disloyal’ military leaders from Communist Party: Beijing expelled Zhang Youxia—Xi’s longtime ally and second-in-command of the Central Military Commission—and Liu Zhenli from the Communist Party over corruption and disloyalty, continuing a purge that leaves just two active members on the once seven-member CMC, timed days before Xi’s Washington summit.

Policy Address 2026: Hong Kong to expand gov’t-funded national security exhibition: John Lee announced Hong Kong will expand its government-funded National Security Exhibition Gallery — which has drawn 1.9 million visitors since 2024 — to promote the idea that “security brings prosperity.”

International Responses 国际反应

European Parliament calls for sanctions on Hong Kong officials over arbitrary detentions and crackdown on fundamental freedoms: MEPs overwhelmingly passed a resolution urging Magnitsky-style sanctions against Hong Kong and Chinese officials over the jailing of Tiananmen vigil organizers and bookseller Leticia Wong, also calling for repeal of the security laws and review of Hong Kong’s WTO status.

US lawmakers hold hearing on plight of jailed media tycoon Jimmy Lai, as Hong Kong slams ‘hypocrisy’: The Congressional-Executive Commission on China held a hearing featuring Lai’s son Sebastien and introduced a bill targeting officials over Hong Kong political prisoners; Hong Kong’s government angrily rejected the hearing as collusion with “anti-China” forces and denied any press-freedom dimension to Lai’s case.

Taiwan Hits Out at Chinese Checkbook Diplomacy, Even as Also Engaging In It: Leaked documents show that China has offered cash and grants to Pacific and African nations to isolate Taiwan diplomatically. The piece notes Taiwan also supports allies like Eswatini with similar financial inducements, but it is unable to match Beijing’s spending power.

Chinese ship rams Philippines gov’t vessel in South China Sea: Coastguard: A China Coast Guard ship rammed the Philippine fisheries vessel BRP Datu Magat Salamat off Palawan while it delivered fuel to Filipino fishermen, causing damage but no injuries; Beijing blamed Manila for allegedly cutting across its bow.

Current Events 热点新闻

‘This is seriously bold’: How China turned Taiwan tensions into a top-rating TV spy drama: The Long Watch (Jiaofeng), a 40-episode series co-produced with China’s Ministry of State Security dramatizing decades of cross-strait espionage, has become a surprise hit for directly depicting sensitive history, including a fictionalized nod to Taiwan’s 1995-96 strait crisis, surprising viewers with its boldness.

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An open letter to Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping

Re: Human rights improvements ahead of September 24, 2026 visit to Washington, DC

We, the undersigned organizations dedicated to protecting and promoting human rights, democracy, and religious freedom, write on the occasion of your forthcoming visit to Washington, DC. We urge that ahead of your arrival you agree to release prisoners of conscience, pledge an end to transnational repression, and commit to critical legal reforms, among other actions. Such steps would diminish criticism around the visit of your government’s human rights violations.

Since you assumed power in late 2012, our organizations have documented—and some have lived—your government’s widespread, systematic human rights crimes, which violate domestic and international legal obligations. Tibetans, Uyghurs, and other communities continue to face your government’s atrocity crimes designed to erase their culture, identity, and language, and their rights to free speech and fair trials. Your government’s violations of Hong Kong’s once-vibrant civic culture and free media, and of the rights-defense efforts undertaken by faith leaders and communities, feminists, journalists, lawyers, public health experts, and other activists across China are well-documented. Newly-imposed laws, such as the Ethnic Unity and Progress Law, stand in stark contrast to your government’s obligations under international human rights law. We share United Nations human rights experts’ concerns that the scope and scale of arbitrary detention across China may alone constitute crimes against humanity, and stand in solidarity with victims and survivors across the country.

We are equally concerned about your government’s use of transnational repression and collective punishment to arbitrarily silence speech and limit conduct outside China. Many of the signatories to this letter have been harassed, stalked, or surveilled in the United States by Chinese government or Chinese Communist Party authorities or their proxies. Some US-based activists’ family members in China have been targeted by your government in retaliation for those activists’ work. We are encouraged by the US’ and other governments’ efforts to investigate and prosecute these blatantly extralegal activities, and we will continue to document these violations as long as is necessary.

In order to address these grave concerns, we urge that you take the following steps ahead of your visit:

• Immediately and unconditionally release prisoners of conscience, human rights defenders, and those arbitrarily detained for family members’ activism, including but not limited to those with a strong connection to the US and whose release has been sought by US lawmakers: Dr. Gulshan Abbas, Ekpar Asat, Chow Hang-tung, Rahile Dawut, Ding Jiaxi, Dong Yuyu, Pastor Gao Quanfu, Gao Zhen, Gao Zhisheng, the 11^th Panchen Lama Gedhun Choekyi Niyima, Go Sherab Gyatso, Albert Ho, Jimmy Lai, Lee Cheuk-yan, Min Zin, Ilham Tohti, Lobsang Tsering, Wang Bingzhang, Pastor Wang Yi, Yang Maodong, and the leaders of the Zion Church;

• Announce an intent to repeal or amend laws passed during your leadership that breach international human rights obligations, including but not limited to the 2020 Hong Kong National Security Law and the 2026 Ethnic Unity and Progress Law;

• Confirm that individuals outside China, including 2007 US Congressional Gold Medal recipient His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama, who wish to travel to the country to reunite with family members and communities will be allowed to do so, and do so safely; and

• Publicly affirm prior to arrival in the US that all members of your delegation, and its associates based in the US, will refrain from transnational repression and collective punishment in response to acts of protests and resistance around your visit.

Absent such steps we believe your visit will only deepen global public concern about your government’s intentions regarding human rights.

As advocacy organizations we are committed to working on behalf of the communities, principles, and laws that form the basis of our work, and to making recommendations for human rights progress. In this spirit we welcome an opportunity to meet directly with you on this visit. We can be reached via DCChinahumanrights2026@proton.me.

Signatories:

1. Uyghur Academy International

2. Campaign for Uyghurs

3. World Uyghur Congress

4. Committee to Protect Journalists

5. Reporters Without Borders

6. No Business With Genocide

7. Iona Advisory

8. Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation

9. Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights

10. Amnesty International USA

11. Uyghur American Association

12. Hudson Institute

13. Freedom House

14. ChinaAid

15. International Campaign for Tibet

16. Safeguard Defenders

17. Center for Uyghur Studies

18. Uyghur Human Rights Project

19. Georgetown Center for Asian Law

20. Hong Kong Watch

21. Alliance for Citizens Rights

22. Network of Chinese Human Rights Defenders

23. Fortify Rights

24. Network for Uyghur Rights

25. CSW

26. Human Rights Foundation

27. International Tibet Network

28. Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation

29. Human Rights in China

30. Humanitarian China

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This Month: Flooding Tragedy, Social Stability & Censorship

Devastating flash floods along the Nepal–Tibet border in late August exposed the human cost of China’s information controls. While more than 1,000 people were confirmed dead and thousands remained missing across the affected region, Chinese authorities minimized information about casualties, restricted independent reporting, and detained people for sharing information about the disaster.

Eyewitness footage disappeared from Chinese social media, while authorities used image-recognition technology to identify and remove sensitive content and flooded online spaces with official material to bury independent accounts. Authorities reportedly detained or fined at least 10 people for questioning official accounts of the disaster online.

This response reflected a broader pattern in China of prioritizing “social stability” over the free flow of information. Under this approach, authorities restrict information that could generate public criticism, expose official failures, or lead to demands for accountability. At the same time, state media promote carefully managed narratives that emphasize social order and the government’s ability to respond to crises. Following the Nepal–Tibet floods, for example, Chinese state media focused on rescue operations and the government’s response while downplaying the full scale of the destruction. Similarly, five years after the deadly 2021 Zhengzhou floods, in August, authorities continued censoring posts that commemorated victims and preserved public memories of the disaster.

This approach also extended beyond disasters and explicitly political speech. Authorities removed a straightforward WeChat post describing the exhausting security checks required to visit Beijing’s Zhengyangmen gate, illustrating how even ordinary frustration can be censored when it reflects negatively on the government’s security agenda. Similar restrictions affected expressions of grief in Hong Kong, where organizers encountered rejected advertisements and shuttered memorial displays after hundreds gathered to mourn Wang Wang, a stray dog tortured and killed in Guangdong.

Although such censorship may protect the government from criticism and preserve an appearance of stability in the short term, it comes at the expense of public safety and access to reliable information. During a disaster, timely reporting can help residents understand the risks they face, locate missing relatives, identify areas in need of assistance, and make informed decisions about whether to evacuate. Restricting that information can delay emergency responses, fuel rumors, weaken public trust, and make it more difficult to determine the true scale of the damage.

The effects of these controls are not limited to emergencies. A WeChat essay translated by China Digital Times this month described China’s keyword-based censorship as blunt and counterproductive, arguing that it blocks harmless speech, fails to address genuine harms, and forces users to communicate through riddles. The essay highlights how broad and automated restrictions can interfere with ordinary communication, even when users are not criticizing the government or discussing politically sensitive issues.

The examples covered this month—from disaster footage and complaints about security checks to memorials for a stray dog—perfectly illustrate this problem. They show that speech does not need to resemble conventional political dissent to become a target in China. Censorship increasingly shapes not only what people may criticize, but also what they may know, witness, mourn, and say about their everyday lives. As the boundaries of restricted speech continue to expand, the distinction between controlling political dissent and controlling ordinary public expression becomes increasingly difficult to draw.

In Case You Missed It: Other Digital Rights and Cybersecurity News

Great Firewall, Censorship, and Information Control

• Translation: “You Can’t Address Sexual Assault at Banquets Without Addressing the Nature of Power”: A censored WeChat post examined two recent cases of alleged sexual assault by Chinese officials, arguing that piecemeal responses to individual scandals fail to address the systemic issue: the lack of institutional checks on official power that enables such abuse to recur.

• Translations: “Sometimes Forgetting Is as Terrible as the Disaster.” Censored Reflections on the Deadly Zhengzhou Floods, Five Years On: Marking five years since Zhengzhou’s deadly 2021 floods (398 dead, many deaths concealed), two censored Chinese essays reflect on memory, grief, and the “Raincoat Dad” who mourned his drowned daughter, warning that societal amnesia allows man-made disasters to recur. Posts merely commemorating the tragedy, without demanding accountability, were still censored.

• Translation: No Scaling the Great Firewall in the Library: A Hunan Library notice suspended library Wi-Fi after patrons were caught using censorship circumvention tools, publishing partly redacted phone numbers of offenders as a warning that internet use is tied to real identities. Commenters noted circumventing on personal mobile data is safer than on institutional networks, which face heavier scrutiny and retaliation against administrators.

• HRIC on Twitter/X: There has been a recent crackdown on content referencing a traditional bamboo “cicada” toy as satirical commentary on Huawei. The toy, which emits a continuous “wah-wah” sound when shaken, was noticed by netizens for its sound effect similar to the synchronized, exaggerated gasps of surprise from the audience at Huawei launch events. Searches for “bamboo cicada” on Weibo were wiped clean, while Douyin, Kuaishou, Xiaohongshu, and WeChat public accounts saw a flood of account restriction notices. On August 2, “Is it overkill to take down Yu Chengdong parody videos?” trended on hot searches, with some state-affiliated media starting to defend the removals and bans.

AI Propaganda and Social Media Manipulation

• Hanging a Banner for Chinese AI: People’s Daily recently ran a symmetrical, parallel-column front page proclaiming Xi Jinping’s “concern” for both domestic AI development (”beneficial, safe, equitable”) and China’s role in bridging the global AI divide for developing nations. CMP explains: “The unusual column design, with its carefully conceived symmetry—a propaganda appropriation of the traditional parallel saying, or duilian (对联)—is meant no doubt to be a powerful parallelism announcing the Chinese Communist Party leadership’s twin convictions on artificial intelligence, for the country and for the world.”

• HRIC on Twitter/X: The Wall Street Journal reported that multiple new studies have found U.S. artificial intelligence models unconsciously exhibit similarities to China’s censored chatbots when answering certain sensitive questions, while AI companies have made limited efforts to address this issue.

• The Problem with Peach: Chinese AI-generated influencer “Peach Fang,” star of a viral AI drama with 200 million views, sparked controversy after promoting contact lenses she cannot physically wear or test, raising questions about AI personas making false claims to bodily experience. State media and lawyers noted AI “endorsers” lack legal personhood, exposing regulatory blind spots around synthetic marketing.

• Translation: “AI Has Determined That My Press Card Is a Fake”: A China Youth Daily journalist recounts the surreal experience of an interview subject’s AI chatbot confidently declaring his official press card a fake, illustrating the growing, sometimes absurd, ways AI tools are reshaping trust, misinformation, and censorship dynamics in Chinese journalism and society.

Cybersecurity & Data Privacy

• HRIC on Twitter/X: On August 5, U.S. cybersecurity company VulnCheck released a research report stating that routers shipped from Shenzhen Zhibotong Electronics (Zbtlink/ZBT) come pre-installed with a backdoor program in their firmware. As soon as the device is powered on, it continuously initiates outbound connections to several fixed overseas command-and-control servers, with two primary nodes hosted on Alibaba Cloud in Shanghai and Shenzhen, respectively.

• Royal Navy drone cameras linked to China raise security concerns: Cameras on the UK Royal Navy’s Chinese-component K3 Scout surveillance drones, used by UK special forces, were found sending routine “heartbeat” signals to a device in China during a cybersecurity assessment. The UK Ministry of Defence stated that no sensitive data was compromised but has cut the drones’ internet connectivity. The incident adds to mounting concern over Chinese-made components embedded in Western military and critical infrastructure systems.

• Hong Kong mulls AI facial recognition-enabled drones to police smoking ban at construction sites, 39 fines issued so far: Hong Kong’s Labour Department has issued 39 fines and 11 improvement notices since a construction-site smoking ban took effect in mid-July, and is now exploring adding AI facial recognition to its infrared drones (already used to detect cigarette heat signatures) to better identify offenders, with development expected to take 9–12 months. The move raises questions regarding the expanded use of AI facial recognition drones for surveillance purposes.

• Hong Kong police arrest 10 for dangerous driving in first drone-assisted traffic crackdown: Hong Kong police arrested 10 drivers for dangerous driving on the Kwun Tong Bypass in their first drone-assisted traffic operation, using aerial surveillance alongside unmarked “stealth cars” to gather evidence.

• HRIC on Twitter/X: A New York Times’ investigation into a recent leak from cybersecurity researcher Mark Hofner on the “Foreign Personnel Dynamic Control Platform” reveals new details about the tool, which tracked over 700 foreign nationals residing locally. Greg Walton, a senior investigator at the Canadian SecDev Group, described the incident as a symptom of “surveillance proliferation” driven by an ever-expanding ecosystem of vendors, contractors, and public security departments: each additional platform creates more places where sensitive personal data could be misconfigured, copied, or exposed.

Digital Transnational Repression

• Toolkit to Counter the Chinese Communist Party’s Transnational Repression: Human Rights Foundation’s new anti-TNR toolkit includes tips for digital safety for those impacted or potentially targeted by transnational digital repression.

• Taiwan says it was hit by ‘abnormal’ AI-assisted cyber-attack: Taiwan detected a first-of-its-kind cyberattack on government agencies last month, in which hackers used open-source AI agents like OpenClaw to build an autonomous hacking tool that operated like a coordinated cyber team. Taiwan didn’t name a culprit, but has long accused China of “hybrid warfare” including near-daily cyberattacks.

• A fake website and a deluge of CVs: the Australian firm embroiled in an FBI probe into alleged Chinese espionage: A small Brisbane consultancy, Horizzen, discovered a fake AI-generated website impersonating its identity had been used as part of a broader Chinese intelligence recruitment network targeting Western defense and security experts.

Civil Society & Resistance Under Pressure

• From petitions to memes: How students made dissent visible: The piece traces how Chinese student dissent has evolved from formal petitions toward subtler, coded forms like memes, puns, and symbols (echoing tactics from the 2022 “White Paper Movement”) to evade censorship while still expressing discontent. This shift reflects both technology’s role in activism and authorities’ tightening crackdown on any direct challenge to the state.

Technological Competition & State Power

• Nvidia senior manager linked to Supermicro scheme smuggling AI servers to China: Taiwan indicted nine people, including a senior Nvidia manager and two Supermicro employees, for allegedly forging documents to smuggle 74 AI servers with restricted B300 chips to China via Japan, Indonesia, and Hong Kong, evading US export controls.

• The rise of AI weather forecasting as China emerges as a leader in race to improve predictions: As Typhoon Dolphin approached, Chinese AI weather models like Shanghai AI Lab’s Fengwu, Huawei’s Pangu, and Fudan’s Fuxi worked alongside traditional forecasting, with Fengwu predicting the typhoon’s landfall time and location within 30 minutes and 30km five days out. China is emerging as a leader in AI weather prediction, though such models still lag traditional systems in forecasting storm intensity.

• ByteDance trains massive AI model in bid to rival Anthropic: ByteDance is pre-training a roughly 10-trillion-parameter AI model — more than triple the size of Moonshot’s Kimi K3 — aiming to approach the scale of Anthropic’s Mythos system, per industry estimates. The project reflects intensifying competition among Chinese AI labs to match or exceed US frontier models, amid earlier US accusations that Moonshot’s Kimi K3 was built by distilling Anthropic’s technology.

• HRIC on Twitter/X: Forbes reported on August 5 that U.S. AI data labeling companies are supplying OpenAI, Anthropic, and even the U.S. military on one hand, while selling the same sets of training data to China’s top AI labs on the other. For years, Washington has imposed layer upon layer of restrictions on chips, yet has done almost nothing to regulate training data.

• Taiwan detains Nvidia worker in chip smuggling probe: source familiar with case: Taiwanese prosecutors detained an Nvidia employee as part of a widening probe into smuggling roughly 50 AI servers with restricted Nvidia chips to China via forged documents, bringing the total detained to seven people including Super Micro and Albatron staff. Nvidia denies involvement, saying it only sells through vetted partners and “smuggling is a nonstarter.”

• China’s tech advances are causing chaos from Silicon Valley to the White House: A wave of Chinese breakthroughs—free, powerful open-weight AI models like Kimi K3, mass-produced specialty chips, and advanced robotics—has triggered market selloffs and split Silicon Valley, with firms like Microsoft and Nvidia opposing restrictions on open models while OpenAI and Anthropic call them security risks.

Current Events

• Could AI take your job? Some workers in China already know the answer: Chinese workers, from Wuhan taxi drivers displaced by autonomous vehicles to a Beijing cinematographer replaced by AI software, describe deep anxiety over AI-driven job losses, with some winning court-ordered severance after AI replaced them. Even China’s state media now acknowledges the “collision” between AI and traditional labor rights, signaling a shift in Beijing’s tone on the issue.

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In March 2026, Gao Zhen delivered his closing statement in a one-day, closed-door trial for infringing on the reputation of China’s “heroes and martyrs” with artworks he had created decades earlier, more than ten years before the creation of the very law he was charged with. Below, HRIC has translated the full text of Gao Zhen’s final statement to the court.

On August 25, 2026, Gao Zhen was sentenced to three years in prison.

Read the original text in Chinese here. / 读中文原文。

Gao Zhen: A Helpless Defense and Confession

My Final Statement

Your Honor, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Court:

I thank the presiding judge for granting me the opportunity and time, in accordance with the law, to deliver this “final statement.” Given that I am still a suspect awaiting a final verdict, and in the spirit of the principle that a defendant is innocent until proven guilty, please allow me to present my defense and statement as an artist who holds the Christian faith.

At the suggestion of my defense counsel, and to better exercise the legitimate rights granted to a defendant by the Constitution, I have chosen to present my words in writing so that Your Honor has a relatively detailed and comprehensive reference when making the final ruling.

I am ashamed to admit that as a Christian, I do not fully understand why God has allowed this misfortune to befall me in my frail, elderly years rather than twenty years ago, when I was in the prime of my youth and strength. After all, it is the three allegedly illegal sculptures I created over two decades ago that are the primary reason I have been designated a “criminal suspect” by the authorities and find myself standing in the dock today. Faced with such a vast span of time, I feel perplexed, but I trust there is a deeper meaning here that eludes my immediate understanding.

At this moment, I feel as though I have fallen into a dream with no foreseeable end, or perhaps stumbled into a dramatic experimental theater piece where I am forced to play a villainous role for which I am ill-suited; or else, through some twist of fate, I have become an unwitting participant in a collaborative piece of performance art.

Yet, the reality before me is undeniable and must be faced: I am now standing in the dock.

This situation brings to mind two revered figures bearing the surname “Su”: the ancient Greek philosopher Socrates1 and the great Northern Song Dynasty literary giant Su Dongpo. This is likely because both men, in their respective eras, were unfortunate enough to stand in the dock on trumped-up charges, much like myself. Furthermore, the nature of the accusations against them was essentially similar: nothing related to the pursuit of wealth that the world often covets, rather, they were prosecuted for their words (and artistic creation also falls within the scope of freedom of expression).

The former was charged with “showing disrespect to the state’s gods and corrupting the youth,” while the latter was accused of “criticizing the imperial carriage and harboring malicious intent” (slandering the imperial court). The former, upholding his philosophical concept of “knowing that one knows nothing,” frequently scrutinized the “learned scholars” of his time, who fancied themselves all-knowing, and exposed their ignorance; this offended the intellectual elite, who fabricated charges against him and brought him to court. The latter fell into disgrace during the second year of the Yuanfeng era under Emperor Shenzong of the Northern Song Dynasty; after writing poems such as “Ode to the Cypress,” he was removed from his position by a censor and imprisoned—an event known in history as the “Crow Terrace Poetry Trial” (Wutai Shian), which marked the beginning of literary inquisitions in China.

The former voluntarily renounced the opportunity for exile—a legal option at the time to escape the death penalty—and refused a final offer from his wealthy friend Crito to help him flee, instead calmly facing the Athenian court and its grand jury of five hundred citizens to deliver his “final statement” (recorded in Plato’s Apology). At the conclusion of his address, he left behind profound parting words: “The hour of departure has arrived, and we go our separate ways—I to die, and you to live. Which is better? Only God knows.” He then drank the cup of poisoned wine that would cause future generations to sigh with regret, meeting death with composure and bidding farewell to a world fraught with turmoil.

The latter, however, was fortunate enough to have Emperor Shenzong personally review his case file shortly after his imprisonment. The Emperor issued an imperial decree stating, “A poet’s words are of no concern to Ourselves,” ordering his release. Although demoted to a post in Huangzhou, Su went on to pen masterpieces that have captivated readers and endured through the ages: the First Ode on the Red Cliff and the Second Ode on the Red Cliff.

Coincidentally, when Socrates faced charges and when I stood here in the dock, we were both elderly men nearing seventy, with young children at home who still required our care and companionship. Yet, he could calmly let go and face death with magnanimity, whereas I, mindful of my young child waiting day and night for my return, found myself yearning desperately to go home and reunite with my family after just over half a year in prison. This is surely because, in my heart, love, freedom, and the responsibilities of fatherhood far outweigh any adherence to abstract ideologies or the pursuit of posthumous renown.

Your Honor, ladies and gentlemen, and fellow citizens: please forgive me for recounting these historical episodes before addressing the specifics of the case at hand. I do so with no intention of basking in the reflected glory of these sages or seeking cheap fame.

I am under no illusion regarding my own standing compared to these two sages, the former a prophet sent by God during the “Axial Age,” a foundational figure of Western and indeed global civilization, holding a significance for China and the world comparable to that of our own sages Laozi, Confucius, and Mencius; the latter a deeply influential poet, painter, and calligrapher in our native culture. I, however, am merely an admirer of theirs—a contemporary artist weathered by the passage of time, awaiting the judgment and ultimate placement that history alone can bestow.

I mention them not only because of the natural association drawn from our shared experiences of falling afoul of authority, but also to remind everyone—myself included—that we are but wayfarers in the flow of time and the evolution of history. The words and deeds of today determine the roles we will play and the positions we will hold in future histories.

Whether our actions today can withstand the scrutiny of history depends on whether we possess an innate conscience, the professional ethics demanded by our respective roles, and the strength of character, moral courage, and sense of justice to transcend worldly interests.

Using history as a mirror is a spiritual safeguard that prevents us from doing anything today that would disgrace our dignity and honor.

Therefore, I respectfully and humbly remind Your Honor, who holds the power today to determine the defendant’s guilt or innocence and the nature of any offense, that you embody the fairness of the law. Regarding this case specifically, I respectfully request that you rigorously review the prosecution’s indictment to determine whether charging me with the crime of “infringing upon the reputation and honor of heroes and martyrs”—an offense introduced into the Criminal Law in 2021—based on sculptures I created between 2005 and 2009, a period when this specific crime did not yet exist, is in fact compliant with the law?

I earnestly request that you strictly scrutinize the prosecution’s indictment. The prosecution charges me with the crime of “infringing upon the reputation and honor of heroes and martyrs,” a provision added to the Criminal Law in 2021—alleging that sculptures I created between 2005 and 2009 (a time when this specific crime did not yet exist) constitute a criminal offense. I ask: Is this charge compliant with regulations? Does this violate the fundamental legal principle that “what is not prohibited by law is permitted”?

It is the obligatory duty and honor of Your Honor, as the presiding judge in this case, to render a fair and impartial verdict.

Below, I present the necessary and specific arguments and statements in response to the indictment served upon me.

Let us first look at the opening paragraph of the indictment, which identifies my place of residence and status: “The defendant, Gao Zhen... currently resides at Factory Building 7-A, Baishi Jingu Industrial Park, Yanjiao Development Zone, Sanhe City, Langfang City, Hebei Province, and serves as the Supervisor of Sanhe Ruiyi Trading Co., Ltd.”

Regarding my address: The Provisions on the Handling of Criminal Cases by Public Security Organs clearly state that “A place of habitual residence refers to the location where a citizen has continuously resided for more than one year after leaving their place of household registration.” Based on this definition, my place of habitual residence is a location in New York, USA, not the “Yanjiao Baishi Jingu Industrial Park” cited in the indictment.

That location was merely a temporary residence where I stayed for about two months to organize my belongings after returning to China with my wife and children in June 2024. In fact, I immigrated to New York, USA, as an “individual of extraordinary ability” in 2012. Although I have frequently traveled between New York and Beijing over the past decade or so, whenever I returned to China, I primarily stayed in the 798 Art District in Beijing. I never treated the factory building at Baishi Jingu Industrial Park as a place of habitual residence. Its actual function was simply a warehouse for storing items, including artworks.

Therefore, I have reason to suspect that the prosecution designated this location as my habitual residence in order to resolve issues regarding jurisdictional authority over the case.

Next, let us consider the designation of my identity as “Supervisor of Sanhe Ruiyi Trading Co., Ltd.”

I had never heard of this “Supervisor” role before, and to this day, I remain unclear as to what such a position actually entails. In contrast, my identity as an artist is widely known. Given the prosecution’s misidentification of my role, it is necessary to briefly outline my artistic career:

In 1978, following the Cultural Revolution, I was admitted to the Shandong University of Arts and Design. Upon graduating in 1981, I was assigned to the Jinan Mass Art Museum to provide art instruction. Shortly thereafter, I transferred to the Jinan Painting Academy (now the Jinan Art Museum) to pursue professional artistic creation. I became the youngest professional painter at the academy during my twenties and have continued to engage in creating modern and contemporary art ever since, up until my retirement in 2016.

My work has been exhibited in museums, galleries, and other art spaces across the globe. It has been featured in significant academic publications such as A History of China Modern Art, History of Contemporary Chinese Art, A History of Art in 20th-Century China, and A History of Ideas in Pioneering Contemporary Chinese Art. Furthermore, several of my pieces are held in the collections of renowned institutions, including the Centre Pompidou in France and the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art in the United States. These facts amply demonstrate that my true identity is that of an artist, not a “Supervisor” for some company.

What raises questions is that since my detention on August 26, 2024, the investigating officers have interrogated me more than thirty times. They informed me that they had conducted investigations at both the Jinan Art Museum (my former workplace) and my former art studio in Beijing (in the 798 Art Zone), and were fully aware that I am, in reality, an artist.

How, then, after ten months of investigation, could they fail to acknowledge my true identity in the indictment, choosing instead to fabricate the role of “Supervisor”?

When considering the context of the indictment, it is evident that the prosecution identified my address as the Baishi Jingu Industrial Park in Yanjiao and labeled my role as “Supervisor” not merely to establish procedural jurisdiction. Rather, the intent was to deliberately strip away my identity as an artist. By doing so, they sought to portray the incriminated artwork as the “malicious creation” of a non-artist harboring “resentment,” thereby substantiating the “fact” that I had committed the crime intentionally.

In my view, public security, procuratorial, and judicial organs, as state institutions charged with maintaining public order and punishing unlawful acts, ought to operate based on principles of seeking truth from facts and maintaining objectivity and impartiality. They should base their actions on facts and the law, objectively and fairly determining whether a defendant is guilty and what offense has been committed; they must not allow subjective biases to lead to erroneous judgments, the fabrication of “facts,” or even the creation of a specific type of “criminal.”

Acting in such a manner not only violates the contemporary principle of the rule of law but also risks creating unjust, false, or wrongful cases reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution, thereby stripping the current legal system of its due dignity. The catastrophe of the Cultural Revolution serves as a cautionary tale that must be heeded.

The second paragraph of the indictment states: “The investigation of this case was concluded by the Sanhe Public Security Bureau. On November 28, 2024, the case was transferred to this Court for prosecution, with the defendant, Gao Zhen, accused of infringing upon the reputation and honor of heroes and martyrs. After accepting the case... this Court heard the opinions of the defense counsel... The case was returned to the public security organ for supplementary investigation twice due to unclear facts and insufficient evidence, and the review period for prosecution was extended three times due to the case’s gravity and complexity.”

However, during this period, my defense counsel twice applied for my release on bail pending trial, citing my advanced age, frailty, and ailments affecting my waist and legs that hindered my mobility, but these requests were denied. Counsel also proposed that my sentencing align with precedents for similar cases, but this suggestion was likewise rejected.

This demonstrates that while the prosecution “heard” the defense counsel’s opinions, it did not “adopt” them. Therefore, it is misleading to state broadly that the defense’s opinions were “heard,” as this might create the false impression that the defense’s position aligned with that of the prosecution.

The third paragraph of the indictment states: “It has been legally established that between 2005 and 2009, the defendant Gao Zhen, harboring resentment toward a former state leader, conspired with others at a studio in Beijing’s 798 Art Zone to maliciously create a large number of sculptures that distorted and caricatured the heroic image of said leader. These works were then shipped overseas for exhibition and media coverage under the name ‘Gao Brothers.’ Subsequently, Gao Zhen moved the aforementioned sculptures to the Baishi Jingu Industrial Park (Factory Building 7-A) in the Yanjiao Development Zone, Sanhe City, Hebei Province, for storage.”

I acknowledge that the details regarding the timing and location of the creation of the sculptures, the timing of the exhibitions, and the subsequent storage site are substantially accurate; I myself also provided this same account during successive interrogations by the public security authorities.

However, I strongly disagree with the characterizations used in the indictment, such as “harboring resentment” and “distorting and caricaturing.” Such language is highly subjective and arbitrary; it amounts to an attack on my underlying intent based on a presumption of guilt, rather than objective, rigorous legal terminology.

More importantly, this description is fundamentally at odds with my true motives and mindset as a professional artist when creating these works, as well as the artistic concepts ultimately embodied in the pieces.

Below, I offer a more specific rebuttal regarding the inaccuracies in this paragraph.

Let us first address the term “a large number.” This presumably refers to the work titled Miss Mao. Admittedly, in my quest to create a satisfactory Pop Art piece with distinct local characteristics, I did invest a great deal of time and material into experimentation and comparison. I produced various prototype versions in different sizes to determine which effect best aligned with my original creative vision.

However, for an artist, no matter how much effort is expended or how many experimental pieces are produced during the creative process, only one is typically selected as the definitive version for exhibition within the art world. This was the case when the work was exhibited at the Kemper Museum of Contemporary Art in Kansas, USA, where only a single piece was displayed, rather than cluttering the gallery with every experimental model and unfinished prototype.

This follows the same logic as a manufacturer that invests significant resources in designing and comparing multiple prototypes to ensure high product quality, ultimately selecting just one model for market release.

Therefore, it is highly inappropriate for the indictment to conflate a large inventory of experimental pieces, defective items, and semi-finished goods that were awaiting further processing with a “large number” of criminal acts on my part.

As for the other two accused works, The Execution of Christ and Mao’s Guilt, each exists as a unique piece upon completion; there is simply no basis for describing them as a “large number.” The confusion likely stems from the fact that Execution is a large-scale installation composed of eight individual sculptures; its sheer physical size created the misleading impression of a “large quantity.”

Thus, the term “large number” used by the prosecution is not only imprecise but also risks misleading the court into imposing a harsher sentence.

Next, I will present a detailed defense against the allegations of “harboring resentment,” “malicious creation,” and “distortion and vilification,” explaining the creative concepts behind the specific works in question.

Let us begin chronologically with Miss Mao, created between 2005 and 2006.

The primary form of this work derives from a cartoon doll (a “readymade” object) sold in stores at the time. Its hairstyle borrows from a widely recognized public figure, while the addition of Pinocchio’s long nose and a pair of female breasts completes the composition—a work synthesized through the deconstruction and combination of these four elements.

Please note that the use of readymades and public imagery for symbolic transformation that is infused with the artist’s own conceptual intent is a common creative method among contemporary artists worldwide and a hallmark characteristic of Pop Art.

The most classic example is the French artist Marcel Duchamp, who drew a mustache and goatee on a print of the Mona Lisa, thereby pioneering conceptual art. Similarly, the American Pop Art master Andy Warhol transformed portraits of celebrities like Marilyn Monroe and Mao Zedong into mass-reproducible cultural symbols.

Within China’s renowned “Political Pop” movement, the imagery of “former state leaders” (as cited in the indictment) was a primary resource used by artists to represent the cultural characteristics of a specific era. My work Miss Mao represents one such expression within this movement.

In terms of artistic methodology, this figure accurately reflects and expresses the type of complex cultural characteristics of the “post-Mao era” (the period following the Cultural Revolution): it retains traces of past political imprints while simultaneously embodying an atmosphere that was relatively relaxed, absurd, and even humorous.

In short, Miss Mao is an ambiguous artistic figure. I deliberately rendered it in a female or cartoon-like form precisely to avoid having it rigidly equated with any specific real-life individual.

The indictment’s direct equation of the figure with a “former state leader” is not only a serious misinterpretation but also diminishes the work’s conceptual significance—the figure actually represents every Chinese person who lived through that era and was shaped by its prevailing ideologies.

Consider next the works The Execution of Christ and Mao’s Guilt, created between 2007 and 2009.

Both works draw their creative inspiration from the film and television performances of character actor Gu Yue, as well as the scandal surrounding his solicitation of a sex worker, and were created using him as the model.

The Execution also draws upon a visual precedent: the famous painting The Execution of Emperor Maximilian by the French Impressionist pioneer Édouard Manet. I adopted Manet’s classic composition, replacing the original soldiers with seven “lookalike” actors modeled after Gu Yue, all aiming their weapons at a figure of “Jesus Christ” based on a young French man.

The decision to present Gu Yue in the plural, as seven figures, was intended to signal that the image does not specifically refer to the “great figure” he famously portrayed; otherwise, a single gunman would have sufficed.

For a contemporary artist, it is a legitimate artistic pursuit to revitalize art history classics and provoke critical thought through “parody” and “appropriation.”

I hoped that by juxtaposing “Jesus Christ” with the ambiguous figure of Gu Yue—who embodies the roles of ordinary person, celebrity, and lookalike actor—I could prompt viewers to reflect on grand themes such as the relationship between the divine and the human, cultural differences between East and West, violence versus peace, and confrontation versus reconciliation.

How could a work born of such deep artistic contemplation possibly be accused of being “maliciously fabricated” or a “distorted caricature”?

Setting aside the question of whether the work’s model is Gu Yue or a “former national leader,” I urge the prosecutor to compare it with historical footage from 1962 of the relevant leaders handling firearms during the “Grand Military Skills Competition” initiated by Luo Ruiqing. Does my work show any signs of “vilification” in its physical depiction of the subject?

If an artist truly intended to maliciously caricature someone, wouldn’t the concise, potent medium of political cartoons be a far better choice? Why expend nearly three years—along with immense human and material resources—to create a large-scale, realistic sculpture?

This brings to mind an incident from the past: shortly after this work was completed in 2009, I placed a sculpture of the gun-wielding Gu Yue on the ground floor of “The High Place” coffee shop (在树上咖啡) in 798 Art District. I then invited Officer Hou from the police station next door to take a look and determine whether the display was appropriate. After viewing the work, Officer Hou and his superiors all stated: “There is no distortion or vilification; there are no issues.”

Why, then, after seventeen years, have the Sanhe Public Security Bureau and the prosecutor chosen to accuse this same work of “malicious distortion and vilification”?

At a recent pre-trial conference, the prosecutor remarked: “The numerous sculptures and photographs in this case either incorporate elements characteristic of the hero’s image or directly replicate that image.”

This very phrasing demonstrates that there is no “distortion or vilification” in my work; after all, if the work is a “direct replication,” it is impossible for it to result in vilification. This suggests that the claim of “vilification” is merely the prosecutor’s subjective bias rather than an objective fact about the work; such a self-contradictory accusation in the indictment amounts to nothing less than a frame job.

Regarding the creative concept behind Mao’s Guilt: This work was also inspired by rumors surrounding the actor Gu Yue and was modeled on him.

As a character actor known for portraying the “Great Leader,” Gu Yue’s scandals not only damaged his own reputation but also deeply hurt the feelings of admirers who had inextricably linked him with the image of the leader he portrayed (the prosecutor’s view of my work reflects this same deep-seated association).

Artistically depicting Gu Yue in an act of repentance creates a rich artistic tension; at the same time, it allows me, as a Christian, to express a sense of repentance for the “original sin” shared by all humanity, as well as to offer an indirect reflection on the history of the Cultural Revolution.

Kneeling in repentance is the most devout posture a Christian can adopt. It is far removed from the “harboring of resentment” alleged in the indictment. On the contrary, creating this work was, in a sense, an act of benevolent intercession. That is precisely why the figure’s expression was sculpted to appear so solemn, profound, and realistic.

Admittedly, once an artwork is completed, it takes on a life of its own: some have criticized the piece for potentially “glamorizing” the subject (arguing that an atheist could not possibly offer such devout repentance), while others have drawn parallels to West German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s “Kniefall von Warschau” (Warsaw Genuflection) or perceived a message of Christian forgiveness.

Art inherently allows for diverse interpretations. For the prosecutor, who is completely unfamiliar with contemporary art, to level such baseless accusations driven by ideological prejudice is a clear overreach.

Although their aim is to incriminate me, I choose to emulate Jesus Christ on the cross and pray that God forgives them, for “they know not what they do.”

I would even like to thank the prosecutor for using such extreme measures to reignite the latent power of these long-forgotten early works.

At this point, it is necessary to emphasize a fundamental principle: evaluating avant-garde experimental art requires specialized expertise. Evaluations of such art should be left to art critics and scholars, rather than being subjected to the dogmatic, politicized characterizations of individuals lacking this professional background, or even the use of criminal penalties to deprive artists of their freedom.

Relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China grant the accused and their defense counsel the right to request the testimony of individuals with specialized knowledge. This was precisely why we requested during the pre-trial conference that the renowned art critic Dr. Zhu Qi appear in court to provide professional testimony.

Furthermore, the fourth paragraph of the indictment alleges that I, “in collusion with others, transmitted photographic images of the aforementioned sculptures to the X platform for online dissemination... and authorized others to use the images for a book cover.”

Regarding this allegation, I have repeatedly stated: I never authorized Mr. Rong Wei of New York’s Boden Books to use the image for the cover; in fact, I explicitly rejected his request. My attendance at the award ceremony was precisely for the purpose of addressing this matter in person. The testimony from Mr. Rong Wei, as submitted by my defense counsel and certified under the Hague Convention, fully establishes my innocence.

As for the X platform account, it was registered by my younger brother, Gao Qiang, many years ago. I have never posted the images in question on that platform. A recent public statement by Gao Qiang corroborates this point.

The indictment’s claim that these actions “seriously infringed upon the reputation of a former state leader and harmed the public interest” is purely baseless speculation.

If these works which were created twenty years ago truly posed such a grave threat, why did the authorities take no action at that time? By imposing a harsh sentence now and thereby thrusting these works back into the international media spotlight, are they not artificially creating even more severe “harmful” consequences?

I respectfully urge Your Honor to consider the following questions:

Is there any clear legal provision supporting the classification of a historical figure who passed away half a century ago as an untouchable “hero or martyr”?

Do the portrait and privacy rights of such a historical and public figure supersede the public’s right to artistic expression and historical evaluation?

Is a specialized actor (such as Gu Yue) legally equated with the actual leader he portrays?

In all modern civilized nations, public authority must be subject to the supervision and criticism of the citizenry—criticism that naturally encompasses artistic forms.

Today, the grand vision of the state emphasizes the “rule of law” domestically while advocating for “building of a community with a shared future for mankind” internationally. Yet, if the rule of law cannot be genuinely implemented at home, such grand international aspirations remain out of reach.

Although I have lived abroad for many years, I continue to yearn for the realization of the true rule of law in my homeland.

The rule of law entails equality before the law; yet, because this case involved a “high-ranking” revolutionary martyr (as Prosecutor Li put it), the prosecution sought to deviate from the customary sentencing practice for similar cases—which typically results in a term of less than one year—and instead pushed for the maximum three-year sentence. This clearly violates the principle of legal equality.

Moreover, the use of criminal penalties is entirely inappropriate for using artistic reflection to address the actions of historical figures who committed grave errors during their lifetimes (such as instigating the Cultural Revolution).

During the back-and-forth proceedings of this case, Prosecutor Li, who was in charge of the matter, told my defense lawyer that the case was highly sensitive and beyond his decision-making authority, requiring higher-level consultation. However, he implied that if the sentence were around one and a half years, he would advise me to accept a plea deal.

Persuaded by my lawyer and family, and considering that I had already been detained for over six months—being elderly and frail, with a young child in urgent need of my presence—I reluctantly stated: although I maintained my innocence, I would accept a plea deal in order to reunite with my family sooner, provided the sentence followed the precedent for similar cases (around one year). Prosecutor Li sincerely agreed to report this proposal.

Yet, a few days later, Assistant Prosecutor Sun Yang abruptly announced to me that the sentence sought was three years. When I questioned how the policy of leniency for pleading guilty and accepting punishment was actually being applied, she shouted irrationally: “Pleading guilty and accepting punishment means three years! If you don’t plead guilty, the sentence will be even higher!”

I was deeply shocked to see a nation’s statutory sentencing laws and policies of leniency interpreted and manipulated in such a crude manner.

To speak honestly: I have reached the age of seventy, I have endured the hardships of the Great Famine and the humiliations of the Cultural Revolution, I have performed grueling manual labor, taken risks, and experienced both love and pain; and as such, I feel my life has been fulfilled.

If it were not for my young son, who is only six or seven years old, weeping day and night and begging God to let his father come home, and my reluctance to let my children suffer the same pain of losing a father that I endured in my own childhood—then, for me personally, what would a few extra years in prison matter if it meant standing by my convictions?

I was willing to humble myself for my young son’s sake and make a compromise against my conscience just this once, but the prosecution denied me that opportunity. So be it! Spending two more years in prison to preserve my lifelong integrity and conscience is worth it!

In this era rife with taboos, cowardice constantly torments the hearts of those with a conscience. Now, having finally “completed the lesson of imprisonment,” I will no longer feel that inexplicable sense of shame.

This case is not, at its core, an ordinary criminal case, but a political case akin to the “Crow Terrace Poetry Trial” that befell Su Dongpo.

If the court rules to imprison an innocent artist, or even impose the maximum possible sentence, it would not uphold the dignity of the law. Instead, it would tarnish the nation’s image of “governing the country according to the law” and potentially set a terrible precedent for “artistic imprisonment” in 21st-century China.

This would leave a stain on history that the judge presiding over this case would surely not wish to bear.

Finally, it must be emphasized that the works in question were created against a historical backdrop where “reflection on the Cultural Revolution” was advocated from the top down. At that time, Ba Jin called for the establishment of a “Cultural Revolution Museum,” and Premier Wen Jiabao repeatedly warned against a resurgence of the Cultural Revolution. These works were the inevitable products of that specific historical period, which is precisely why there was no action against them back then.

In summary, the prosecution’s charges are based on subjective speculation and ideological bias, standing in stark violation of the fundamental principle that “everything not prohibited by law is permitted.” Therefore, I respectfully urge Your Honor to exercise keen discernment and render a just verdict.

Please forgive me for taking up so much time to read this lengthy statement.

I do this not only to secure my own early release, but also to ensure that other artists do not face charges and imprisonment for similar acts of free expression; and, even more importantly, so that my fellow citizens may all enjoy freedom from fear within a true rule-of-law framework.

Here, I wish to quote the famous words of Mr. Hu Shih: “Striving for your own freedom is striving for the freedom of your country!”

Regarding the final verdict, I shall follow the example of the ancient sage Socrates and calmly accept whatever fate holds in store.

Allow me to conclude my statement with a simple prayer, in the manner of a Christian:

Merciful Heavenly Father, please hear the plea of ​​an innocent artist and prisoner; may the Lord Jesus Christ bestow special grace, mercy, and comfort upon my young children; I humbly ask the Lord to show mercy to me and to my fellow countrymen who are suffering alongside me; may the Lord forgive our debts and sins, and may Your will be done on earth as it is in heaven, forevermore.

Amen!

Thank you all!

Respectfully submitted by the defendant, Gao Zhen

Written on August 28, 2025

Revised on March 28, 2026

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Sophia Huang Xueqin is widely recognized for her work on human rights and commitment to press freedom. She is a journalist and one of the most prominent figures associated with China’s #MeToo movement. For years, she reported on and advocated for gender equality and supported survivors of sexual harassment and gender-based violence.

In September 2021, Sophia was preparing to start graduate studies in the UK. However, she and a friend, human and labour rights activist Wang Jianbing, were arrested in Guangzhou, China on 19 September, and detained incommunicado for more than five months. While in detention, both Sophia and Jianbing were reportedly subjected to ill-treatment, with negative impacts on their health.

During their trial in September 2023, the prosecution focused on their role in co-organizing weekly gatherings with fellow activists, as well as their participation in an online course on non-violence and online posts they had published or shared on issues deemed “sensitive” by the Chinese government.

Their convictions in June 2024 for “inciting subversion of state power” were based solely on the permissible exercise of their human rights, including the rights to freedom of the press and expression as well as association. Their case is emblematic of the Chinese government’s ongoing crackdown on journalists, human rights defenders, feminist activists and civil society voices calling for social justice and respect for human rights.

Wang, who was sentenced to three and a half years, was released in March 2025.

While Sophia Huang Xueqin is expected to be released on 18 September, we are concerned that she will face restrictions after leaving prison. She was subject to a “supplemental sentence” of four years’ deprivation of political rights, a punishment that is routinely imposed on human rights defenders and journalists to restrict their ability to speak, publish and organise long after their prison terms end. The legal provisions permitting this punishment are incompatible with international human rights standards, not to mention the fact that no one should be punished simply for exercising their human rights.

We call on the Chinese authorities to:

• Ensure Sophia Huang Xueqin is released immediately and is not subjected to any further arbitrary detention and allowed to move freely;

• Guarantee her rights to freedom of expression, press, association and peaceful assembly, alongside her right to participate in public life, including her ability to communicate freely with family, friends, supporters and civil society groups;

• Ensure she is not subjected to surveillance, harassment, intimidation, retaliation or restrictions on her movement and communications; and

• Amend domestic laws, notably the Criminal Law, to ensure their compliance with international law and standards, and prevent the misuse of legal provisions to restrict the rights of human rights defenders and others.

Sophia Huang Xueqin’s journalism and advocacy have inspired countless people both inside and outside China. Sophia Huang Xueqin should never have been imprisoned for her human rights and journalism work. As she approaches the end of her sentence, she deserves not only release, but freedom from any and all undue restrictions on her rights.

Signatory organizations:

1. Alliance for Citizens Rights

2. Amnesty International

3. ARTICLE 19

4. Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)

5. Bay Area Friends of Tibet

6. Cambodian Center for Independent Media (CCIM)

7. Cambodian Journalists Alliance Association (CamboJA)

8. Center for Uyghur Studies (CUS)

9. China Deviants

10.CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation

11. Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)

12.Dandelion Solidarity

13.European Values Center for Security Policy (EVC)

14.Fortify Rights

15.Freedom House

16.Front Line Defenders

17.Georgetown Center for Asian Law

18.Global Alliance for Tibet & Persecuted Minorities

19.GreatFire

20.Grupo de Apoio ao Tibete-Portugal

21.Hong Kong Committee in Norway

22.Hong Kong Labour Rights Monitor

23.Hong Kong Media Overseas

24.Hong Kong Watch

25.Hongkonger in Deutschland e.V. 香港人在德國協會

26.Hongkongers in Britain (HKB)

27.Hongkongers in Lothians

28.Human Rights Foundation (HRF)

29.Human Rights in China (HRIC)

30.Human Rights Watch

31.Humanitarian China

32.Independent Chinese PEN Center (ICPC)

33.Index on Censorship

34.International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), within the framework of the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders

35.International Service for Human Rights (ISHR)

36.International Tibet Network

37.International Women’s Media Foundation

38.Legal Initiatives for Vietnam (LIV)

39.Network of Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD)

40.No Business With Genocide

41.Northern California Hong Kong Club

42.PEN America

43.PEN Nederland

44.PEN Sweden

45.Reading UK Stands with HK

46.Reporters Without Borders (RSF)

47.Safeguard Defenders (SD)

48.Santa Barbara Friends of Tibet

49.Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center

50.Students for a free Tibet - India

51.Students for A Free Tibet Oslo

52.Students For a Free Tibet, Japan

53.Swedish Tibet Committee

54.Taiwan Association for Human Rights (TAHR) 55.The Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong (CFHK) Foundation

56.The Rights Practice

57.Tibet Initiative Deutschland e.V.

58.Viet Tan

59.World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), within the framework of the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders

60.World Uyghur Congress (WUC)

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On September 11, 2026, the West Kowloon Law Courts in Hong Kong sentenced three former leaders of the dissolved Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (HKASPDMC) in a national security case on charges of “inciting subversion of state power.” The Alliance, former chairman Lee Cheuk-yan and former vice-chairwoman Chow Hang-tung had been found guilty on August 21, while former vice-chairman Albert Ho pleaded guilty before the trial. Chow Hang-tung was sentenced to seven years and three months in prison, Lee Cheuk-yan to seven years, and Albert Ho to five years and two months. The HKASPDMC was also fined HK$1.5 million.

The case did not involve violence or the threat of violence, “nor had the defendant put forward any specific means of implementation or timetable” to end one-party rule in mainland China, one of the Alliance’s central tenets. Nevertheless, the court still found that the offence was “of a serious nature.” Former HKASPDMC Standing Committee member Lau Ka-yee stated that the HKASPDMC has always upheld freedom of speech and that she believes the sentence is excessive. The UN Human Rights Office criticized the sentences, calling them “regrettable,” while UN High Commissioner for Human Rights urged that sentences be quashed and that Hong Kong’s National Security Law be brought into line with China’s international human rights obligations. Relatives and family members decried their years-long prison terms as “totally unjust,” and have said that two of the defendants will appeal.

In other news, Macau will hold its first national security trial behind closed doors next week, a court said on Friday, in a case against a former pro-democracy lawmaker charged with “subversion.” Former Macau lawmaker Au Kam San in July 2025 became the first person to be arrested under the expanded law, with authorities alleging he had ties to foreign groups endangering China.

Law & Policy 法律与政策

China’s top court posts guidelines on deepfakes, voice cloning, algorithmic price discrimination: China’s Supreme People’s Court issued its first nationwide judicial rules on AI disputes, barring unauthorized deepfakes and voice cloning, holding platforms liable if they fail to act on infringing content, and also addressing algorithmic price discrimination and AI-generated misinformation.

China’s Draft Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law – How Will It Affect Foreign Companies?: China’s draft law extends anti-graft enforcement across borders, requiring foreign companies to cooperate with investigations, restrict evidence-sharing with foreign regulators, and enable retaliatory sanctions, creating potential compliance conflicts for multinationals caught between Chinese restrictions and foreign disclosure laws like the US FCPA.

How not to be a human rights lawyer in China: A new amendment to China’s Lawyers Law, effective September 1, formally enshrines “support for CCP leadership” as a legal qualification for practicing law, converting a prior administrative requirement into statutory political loyalty test that further squeezes space for rights-oriented lawyers.

Cyber Security & Digital Rights 网络安全与数字权利

HRIC on Twitter/X: Anthropic claims that since February 2026, it has identified and blocked unauthorized model distillation activities targeting Claude by seven Chinese AI labs; efforts to train their own models using data and reasoning capabilities generated by Claude.

HRIC on Twitter/X: According to The New York Times, pessimistic sentiments on Chinese social media are continuing to spread, and can no longer be easily covered up by the official “positive energy” narrative.

China’s Online Environment Gets Colder and Darker: Li Yuan describes growing, persistent pessimism across Chinese social media driven by economic slowdown and unemployment, which censors struggle to fully suppress even as the space for substantive critique continues to narrow through AI-powered surveillance tools.

Six Chinese AI firms accused of aggressively copying US frontier models: US agencies (NSA, FBI, CISA) accused DeepSeek, Moonshot AI, Alibaba, MiniMax, StepFun, and Z.AI of running “aggressive, malicious” campaigns since late 2024 to distill capabilities from Claude, GPT, Gemini, and Grok using fraudulent accounts and proxy evasion tactics, with China dismissing the claims as groundless.

Beijing bans drone possession in the city after earlier moves to tighten rules: Beijing will ban possessing drones within city limits starting mid-November, extending an earlier May sales ban, following a fatal June crash in which a small aircraft struck a Beijing skyscraper. The authorities will offer buyback subsidies for existing owners.

China’s Huawei Technologies faces racketeering trial in New York: Jury selection began in Huawei’s long-running US criminal trial over alleged trade-secret theft, sanctions violations in North Korea and Iran, and surveillance assistance to Iran during 2009 protests. Huawei called the prosecution’s narrative “demonstrably false.”

The Global Data Center Boom Is a Gift to Spies: shared “colocation” data centers, where Chinese and American companies often lease space in the same facility, create espionage risks far simpler than hacking, as tenants can physically tamper with neighboring servers.

HRIC on Twitter/X: The New York Times’ latest investigation reveals that, against the backdrop of the United States tightening export controls on advanced AI chips to China, Sugon Group, a Chinese tech company listed on the U.S. Department of Commerce’s “Entity List,” may still be obtaining U.S. advanced AI computing equipment and computing power through channels such as affiliated companies, overseas supply chains, and data centers in Southeast Asia.

HRIC on Twitter/X: According to the New York Times, California cybersecurity firm Calif recently disclosed a high-risk “zero-click” worm attack targeting WeChat, dubbed “WeWorm.” Victims do not even need to click links, download files, or answer calls—a single WeChat call from a compromised contact could serve as the entry point for intrusion.

HRIC on Twitter/X: Judicial materials disclosed by Chinese authorities show that China is increasingly treating Starlink terminals operated by Elon Musk’s SpaceX as a priority concern in border security and cross-border communications control, and has already used criminal prosecution to punish the unauthorized cross-border transport of Starlink equipment.

HRIC on Twitter/X: Due to the inability to normally directly use certain foreign top-tier AIs like ChatGPT and Claude in mainland China, corporate employees have turned to extensively using third-party AI “relay stations.” To get AI assistance with programming, operations and maintenance, and troubleshooting, they may send internal code, server logs, VPN configurations, or even authentication credentials directly to the relay services.

Chinese Online Harassment and Death Threats Against Me Continue as I Speak for Uyghurs: This personal essay is part of an ongoing series in which the Uyghur Times founder recounts continued online death threats and hacking attempts linked to Chinese state networks, alongside the detention of dozens of his relatives in China in apparent retaliation for his journalism abroad.

CDT’s “404 Deleted Content Archive” Summary for July 2026: July’s censorship roundup centered on the deadly Guangxi dam breach and Zhengzhou flood anniversary, alongside a Changsha parking dispute that exposed cadre privilege, controversy over razor-wire fencing at Mount Tai, debate following two Chinese mathematicians’ Fields Medal wins, and comparisons of Taiwan’s outspoken versus China’s muted reaction to food-safety scandals.

Diaspora Community & Transnational Repression 海外社群和跨国镇压

Over 60 TYC activists detained after protesting Xi’s visit near BRICS venue in New Delhi: At least 64 Tibetan Youth Congress activists, including senior leaders, were detained by Delhi Police after staging a late-night protest near the BRICS Summit venue against Xi Jinping’s presence, part of a broader wave of Tibetan demonstrations, surveillance, and preventive detentions during his first India visit in nearly seven years.

The release of the Tibetan historical film “Four Rivers and Six Ranges” in India has been postponed by one week, reportedly due to Xi Jinping’s upcoming visit to the country.: The theatrical release of Four Rivers and Six Ranges, depicting the Dalai Lama’s 1959 flight from Tibet, which Chinese state media has denounced as “separatist,” was pushed back a week in India, reportedly to avoid controversy during Xi Jinping’s visit for the BRICS summit.

An international Tibetology symposium was cancelled in Nepal, which was criticized as an overinterpretation of signals from the Chinese Communist Party.: Some observers argue Nepal’s cancellation of the international Tibetan studies conference under alleged Chinese pressure reflected an overcautious “overinterpretation” of Beijing’s signals rather than an explicit Chinese demand, as the event was ultimately moved online.

Sydney man jailed for three and a half years over fake defence reports prepared for Chinese spies: Alexander Csergo, a Shanghai-based Australian consultant, was sentenced to three and a half years for reckless foreign interference after compiling fabricated, plagiarized reports on Australian defense, AUKUS, and critical minerals for Chinese intelligence operatives in exchange for cash.

Human Rights Defenders & Civil Society 人权捍卫者与公民社会

Two Tibetan Monks Jump into River to Escape Arrest by Chinese Authorities: Two young Tibetans hiding at Nyarong Monastery after being banned from becoming monks jumped into a river and drowned in January 2026 while fleeing Chinese authorities who came to arrest them for illegally residing there.

Dorje Tenzin Rinpoche, the abbot of Mentang Monastery in Jiuzhi County, Tibet, has been missing for nearly nine months since his arrest.: Chogtrul Dorje Tenzin, abbot of Mentang Monastery and founder of a Tibetan-language vocational school in Qinghai’s Golog Prefecture, remains missing nearly nine months after his December 2025 detention, with authorities providing no explanation and his school forced to close.

2 men with autism jailed for 3 years over joining a Taiwan group that advocated independence for Hong Kong: Chan Tai-sum, 27, and Ng Chi-tung, 25—both diagnosed with autism—were sentenced to 36–38 months after pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit secession for their involvement with the Taiwan-based Hong Kong Democratic Independence Union, with the judge rejecting claims that Chan’s attempt to seek foreign asylum should reduce his sentence.

Wall Street Journal publisher convicted in Hong Kong of deterring reporter from union role: A Hong Kong court convicted Dow Jones of unlawfully deterring former reporter Selina Cheng, now chair of the Hong Kong Journalists Association, from running for the press union’s leadership, though it acquitted the company of firing her over her union role, in a case widely seen as a press-freedom bellwether.

HRIC on Twitter/X: “Pillar of Shame” Tiananmen commemoration artwork creator Jens Galschiøt responded to the prosecution’s application in the Hong Kong Alliance case to confiscate “Pillar of Shame” and other June Fourth historical materials, stating that he never transferred legal ownership of the work to the Hong Kong Alliance, nor has he consented to the Hong Kong authorities confiscating, seizing, destroying, disposing of, or transferring it.

China’s Reach & Internal Control 中国: 内控与外扩

USALI This Week in Asian Law: Courts sentenced three senior officials for corruption and the party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection expelled two former ministers from the party and referred both for prosecution on bribery allegations.

A Family Dispute: A licensing fee dispute between a Shaanxi provincial broadcaster and CCTV’s national distribution arm—both ultimately CCP-controlled but nominally commercial entities—reveals the odd internal dynamics of China’s state-owned media landscape, where a struggling provincial network failed to pay $11 million in fees amid a broader collapse in local TV ad revenue and viewership.

HRIC on Twitter/X: A new report released in September 2026 by Safeguard Defenders unveils the other side of the camera lens at China Global Television Network (CGTN). The report interviews eight former CGTN employees, including anchors, editors, and producers, describing a work environment starkly different from that of ordinary international news organizations: news values often give way to political propaganda, and journalists and editors must face strict censorship and self-censorship.

Satellite images show China advancing into contested India border territory as Xi travels to New Delhi: Satellite imagery shows China rapidly building infrastructure in contested Arunachal Pradesh territory near villages like Gelemo and Taksing, with local Tagin residents reporting Indian troops retreating as Chinese forces advance, a stark contrast to Xi’s simultaneous diplomatic “reconciliation” visit to New Delhi.

Related: Xi Jinping gets red carpet at Brics summit amid thaw in India-China relations. Xi Jinping received a ceremonial welcome in New Delhi for his first India visit in seven years, marking a diplomatic thaw since the deadly 2020 Galwan border clash, as India and China publicly project unity within BRICS while quietly competing for regional influence.

International Responses 国际反应

HRIC on Twitter/X: On September 8, Philippine Defense Secretary Teodoro spoke at the Seoul Defense Dialogue hosted in South Korea. As he discussed the South China Sea situation and compliance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a staff member handed him a piece of letter paper from a Chinese military attaché at the Chinese Embassy in South Korea reiterating China’s opffiucial stance rejecting the 2016 South China Sea arbitration ruling.

NSC adviser urges caution on travel to China amid new rules: Ahead of new Chinese entry-exit rules, a Taiwanese national security adviser warned that Taiwan’s civil servants, religious group members, and tech-sector engineers are prime targets for Chinese intelligence gathering, citing cases of police and judicial personnel being questioned about infrastructure and internal operations during China visits.

UN expresses deep concern over China’s tightening restrictions on Tibetans: UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk told the Human Rights Council’s 63rd session that China’s “tightening restrictions” on Tibetan religious freedom are “deeply troubling,” calling for urgent policy change.

Bipartisan U.S. Lawmakers Demand DHS Briefing on Uyghur Forced Labor Law Enforcement: A bipartisan coalition of US lawmakers pressed DHS for a briefing on Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act enforcement, citing concerns over declining detention rates in high-risk sectors despite a record 43-company expansion of the sanctions list.

Conflict over Taiwan would be disastrous, de facto US ambassador warns: The top US diplomat in Taipei, Raymond Greene, said any Taiwan Strait conflict would harm the global economy more than WWII, calling the upcoming Trump-Xi summit an opportunity to avoid “miscalculations” as the US reinforces Indo-Pacific defense partnerships.

Beijing has no right to interfere in vice president’s visit to Italy: MOFA: Taiwan’s foreign ministry rejected Beijing’s criticism of Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim’s visit to a European Parliament-organized democracy conference in Italy, after China lodged formal protests with Rome and Brussels over the “one China” principle.

Current Events 热点新闻

At least 25 dead in cargo ship fire at China’s Qingdao port: At least 25 people died and 5 were hospitalized after a fire broke out aboard the Liberian-flagged Ocean Melody while docked for repairs at a state-owned Qingdao shipyard; Xi ordered urgent rescue efforts and a safety investigation.

Tung Chee-hwa, Hong Kong’s first post-Handover leader, dies at 89: Hong Kong’s first post-Handover chief executive, a Beijing-backed shipping tycoon who governed through the Asian financial crisis, SARS outbreak, and the historic 2003 anti-Article 23 protests before resigning in 2005, passed away last week.

Call in China to end English’s core status sparks debate: A viral post by math teacher Tang Jiafeng calling to strip English of its core-subject status in Chinese schools, arguing AI translation has reduced its necessity, reignited a long-running debate. Critics like Hu Xijin warned against politicizing language education, citing its role in global competitiveness and equity.

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Joshua Wong, one of Hong Kong’s most prominent pro-democracy activists, pleaded guilty last Wednesday to conspiring to seek foreign sanctions against Hong Kong and China, a national security charge that carries a maximum life sentence. This is already his second conviction under the National Security Law following a landmark subversion case. Wong was accused of working with the exiled Hong Kong activist Nathan Law to urge foreign powers to impose sanctions, blockades or other hostile measures against China. Wong has been continuously imprisoned since November 2020, and after spending nearly six years in detention, had been due for release in January 2027. Several civil society groups in Taiwan on Wednesday called for his immediate release. Chanting “Freedom is not a crime, Taiwan has not forgotten,” representatives also called on Taiwan’s government to publicly speak out over Wong’s case.

In other news, Ruth Wang, a partner at Beijing’s VDoor Law Firm who represented detained leaders of the unregistered Zion Church, fled to Taiwan seeking protection after authorities pressured her to dissolve her firm. Taiwan confirmed it had provided her “temporary accommodation,” while rights group ChinaAid emphasized that she and her family must not be forcibly returned to China.

Law & Policy 法律与政策

HRIC on Twitter/X: According to an article from the Lawyers Under Attack Monitoring Committee under the International People’s Lawyers Association, China has established support for the CCP leadership as a statutory practice condition for lawyers.

China defense mobilization law signals preparations for full-scale conflict: Analysts: China’s revised National Defense Mobilization Law, effective October 1, links “unity” directly to wartime transition for the first time, which analysts say constitutes “legal warfare” preparing the state to convert civilian resources for a potential conflict over Taiwan.

Cyber Security & Digital Rights 网络安全与数字权利

HRIC on Twitter/X: A new phishing campaign is targeting Chinese human rights defenders and activists with fake party invitations that appear to come from familiar contacts and trusted invitation services. These messages may lead to fake login pages designed to steal passwords, authentication codes, or active sessions.

As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) covers up the extent of the mudslide disaster in Tibet, several netizens have been arrested for posting related information: Chinese authorities have censored footage and punished at least ten citizens for “spreading rumors” online about death tolls following the catastrophic August 26 Gyirong Port mudslide on the Tibet-Nepal border, while barring foreign journalists from accessing the disaster zone.

Minitrue: Find, Delete, and Block Chai Jing Video on Cultural Revolution Leader: A leaked CAC directive ordered platforms to find, delete, and block a Chai Jing documentary segment on Gang of Four figure Wang Hongwen using video fingerprinting technology, part of broader efforts to suppress Cultural Revolution history.

Open-Weight Diplomacy: How China’s AI Models Are Rerunning the Digital Silk Road: An analysis argues China’s free “open-weight” AI models like Kimi K3 mirror Huawei’s telecom strategy: luring developing countries with low-cost access before entrenching dependency through chips, cloud infrastructure, and training programs, echoing the Digital Silk Road playbook.

HRIC on Twitter/X: People’s Daily opened an account on Threads, complete with a blue verification checkmark, posting feel-good content like Guangzhou night scenes, dragon boat races, and light shows. One post garnered over three thousand views and just eleven likes, but the replies painted a starkly different picture: one comment paired an old photo of Xi Jinping sitting at a computer with the caption “Watch me cut off your VPN.”

HRIC on Twitter/X: A New York Times investigation reveals that, against the backdrop of tightening export controls, Sugon Group, a Chinese tech company listed on the U.S. Department of Commerce’s “Entity List,” may still be obtaining advanced AI computing equipment from the United States through channels such as affiliated companies, overseas supply chains, and data centers in Southeast Asia.

HRIC on Twitter/X: China’s youth employment landscape is already dire, and AI is exacerbating the problem. A record-breaking 12.7 million graduates are entering the job market this year, and the unemployment rate among urban youth aged 16 to 24 rose to 17.9% in July.

Diaspora Community & Transnational Repression 海外社群和跨国镇压

Real Madrid deletes Nepal-Tibet flood post after Chinese backlash: Real Madrid removed a social media tribute to Tibet-Nepal flood victims after Chinese state media and netizens attacked the club for using Tibetans’ preferred name, “Tibet,” instead of Beijing’s preferred Mandarin term “Xizang.”

Related: Real Madrid mourns the victims of the Tibet-Nepal floods, but Chinese state media’s claim that it “crossed the red line of sovereignty” has sparked ridicule online. This companion piece notes that Chinese state media’s claim that Real Madrid’s flood tribute “crossed the red line of sovereignty” drew widespread online ridicule rather than sympathy for Beijing’s position.

The Tibetan Association of New York and New Jersey will erect a monument to commemorate Lobsang Rangtsen, a Tibetan who died by self-immolation: The Tibetan Association of New York and New Jersey plans to build a memorial monument honoring Lobga Rangzen, the Tibetan activist who self-immolated outside UN headquarters on July 2, 2026, in protest against China’s rule over Tibet.

China artists quit S.Korea art show after organisers let ‘Taiwan’ be used in name of exhibition: Chinese artists withdrew from South Korea’s Gwangju Biennale after organizers restored the “Taiwan Pavilion” name for a Taiwanese exhibit (reversing an earlier change to a museum acronym), prompting formal Chinese government protest over violation of the so-called “one China” principle.

Belgian-Chinese man to face trial over suspected semiconductor espionage: A 52-year-old dual Belgian-Chinese national, a former senior researcher at bankrupt chipmaker BelGaN, was detained while attempting to fly to Beijing and faces trial for allegedly transferring gallium nitride semiconductor trade secrets to a rival Chinese firm.

A US journalist sentenced to 2 years in federal prison for acting as an illegal agent for China: American journalist Thomas Pauken II, a former Xinhua contributor, was sentenced to two years in federal prison for acting as an illegal agent of the Chinese government after trying to connect a Trump official with a suspected Chinese intelligence operative.

Human Rights Defenders & Civil Society 人权捍卫者与公民社会

Hong Kong court upholds convictions of Cardinal Joseph Zen and others over protester relief fund: A Hong Kong appeals court upheld the convictions of Cardinal Joseph Zen and four other trustees of the 612 Humanitarian Relief Fund for failing to register the fund, which had aided arrested 2019 protesters, rejecting arguments that the registration requirement unduly burdened freedom of association.

Three arrested on anniversary of 2019 incident involving suspected police violence at Prince Edward station: Police arrested three people, aged 33 to 79, near Prince Edward MTR station for disorderly conduct as people gathered with flowers to mark the seventh anniversary of the 2019 police storming of train carriages there.

Related: 3 re-arrested for alleged sedition after marking anniversary of 2019 Prince Edward police storming. The same three people were re-arrested days later by national security police on sedition charges for allegedly shouting “seditious slogans” and spreading “false information” while commemorating the Prince Edward anniversary.

Elderly woman charged with displaying seditious publications outside flat, remanded at psychiatric centre: A 61-year-old woman was charged with displaying seditious materials outside her Tin Shui Wai flat between March and November 2024; her case was adjourned for psychiatric evaluation, and she faces up to seven years under Article 23 if convicted.

M Lin’s ‘The Memory Museum’ Depicts the Choices and Contradictions of a Generation of Urban Chinese Women Who Rarely Tell Their Own Stories: A review of M Lin’s short-story collection about urban Chinese women who came of age in the 2000s praises its unflinching, untranslated depiction of pandemic-era marriages, censorship, feminism, and diaspora identity.

Danish sculptor writes to Hong Kong court asking for return of Tiananmen crackdown monument: Jens Galschiøt asked a Hong Kong court to return his “Pillar of Shame” sculpture, seized as evidence in the Hong Kong Alliance’s national security trial, following the group leaders’ recent conviction for inciting subversion.

University of Hong Kong student ‘Democracy Wall’ replaced with digital displays: The University of Hong Kong’s long-dormant “Democracy Wall,” stripped of protest posters since 2021, has now been physically replaced with digital displays, part of a broader campus digitization following the university’s split from its student union.

M+ Museum abruptly axes performance by award-winning local musician Wong Hin-yan: M+ abruptly canceled a scheduled performance by singer-songwriter Wong Hin-yan—who has a history of pro-democracy activism, including performing at a 2017 solidarity concert for jailed activists—one day before the show, citing only a vague “program change.”

China’s Reach & Internal Control 中国: 内控与外扩

Information Controls Follow Catastrophic Flooding in Gyirong on the China-Nepal Border: CDT documented a sophisticated Chinese censorship operation after the deadly Gyirong flood, including video fingerprinting to block specific surveillance footage, “sanitized” search results flooded with state-approved content, and hundreds of Weibo trending topics vanishing. describing it as calibrated “public-opinion guidance” rather than blunt deletion.

China restrict Tibetan volunteers, relief efforts in flood-hit Kyirong: Sources told Phayul that Chinese authorities imposed unusually strict limits on Tibetan volunteer relief efforts in flood-hit Kyirong compared to past disasters like the 2025 Dingri earthquake, restricting entry to only officially designated personnel given the area’s sensitive border location.

Borrowed Boats for Bishkek: An analysis of a People’s Daily story celebrating a multilingual Xi Jinping propaganda program broadcast across nine Eurasian and Middle Eastern state media outlets is a demonstration China’s systematic, years-long media-diplomacy partnerships built to amplify Beijing’s narratives.

Language requirement change from Cantonese to Chinese not targeting specific students – HKU med school: HKU’s medical faculty said revising its Cantonese-specific admission requirement to broader “Chinese” proficiency (including Mandarin) wasn’t meant to target any group, while affirming Cantonese remains essential for patient communication.

The Chinese Communist Party’s forced removal of prayer flags in Diqing, Tibet, has sparked concerns among Tibetans: Chinese authorities forcibly removed traditional Tibetan prayer flags in Diqing, Tibet, under the guise of “environmental cleanup,” sparking concern among Tibetans as part of a long-running campaign against visible symbols of Tibetan Buddhist culture and religious practice.

Xi visits Egypt as China seeks deeper influence across the Mideast: Xi Jinping’s first Egypt visit in a decade saw China and Egypt hold their first-ever joint fighter jet exercises, as Beijing positions itself as a stabilizing alternative to the US amid the fallout from Washington’s war with Iran and seeks to expand influence across the broader Arab and African world.

Chinese theater, promoter fined for altered patriotic song in a comedy show: Wuhan authorities fined the venue and promoter behind comedian Guo Degang’s show after he allegedly “distorted” and mocked a patriotic 1950s war song, part of the fallout that has kept China’s most famous xiangsheng performer off stage since the incident.

While forcibly closing Tibetan-language schools across Tibet, the CCP is simultaneously building schools that teach in Mandarin Chinese: While systematically shutting down Tibetan-language schools across Tibet under education policies mandating Mandarin instruction, Chinese authorities are simultaneously constructing new Mandarin-medium schools, part of a broader campaign to erase Tibetan linguistic and cultural identity.

China’s secret lifeline to Russia’s killer drone producer: Internal Russian shipping documents show Chinese state-owned Jilin Chemical Fiber Group disguised shipments of 46 tons of carbon-fiber materials to a Rosatom subsidiary that produces kamikaze drone components, offering some of the clearest evidence yet of direct Chinese support for Russia’s military activities.

China warns of ‘consequences’ over Taiwan presence at Pacific Islands Forum: China’s Pacific envoy Qian Bo warned of unspecified “consequences” over what it called Taiwan’s “sneaky visit” after Taiwan’s foreign minister attended the Pacific Islands Forum’s opening ceremony in Palau, one of Taiwan’s three remaining diplomatic allies in the region.

International Responses 国际反应

USALI This Week in Asian Law: Volkswagen opened a compliance investigation into Changzhou Xingyu Automotive Lighting Systems, a Chinese auto parts supplier, following allegations of labor abuses reported by new hires who were forced out of the company.

Putin, Xi reaffirm Russia-China ties amid ‘unpredictable’ world: At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Kyrgyzstan, Xi and Putin reaffirmed their strategic partnership has grown “more solid.”

Pacific leaders issue joint rebuke over China missile test: Pacific Islands Forum members agreed a joint statement (17 of 18, with Nauru dissenting) registering “concern” over China’s July ICBM test that landed near Tuvalu and Nauru, calling for at least 24 hours’ advance notice of future tests.

Related: Pacific leaders at summit fail to reach unanimous condemnation of China’s ballistic missile launch. The Pacific Islands Forum’s statement of “concern” over China’s missile launch fell short of a sterner rebuke and didn’t name China directly, with Nauru dissenting and Kiribati’s absence highlighting deeper regional divisions amid intensifying US-China-Taiwan competition for influence.

UK to pursue ‘pragmatic relationship’ with China despite US calls for trade barriers: Britain continues signaling a pragmatic, engagement-focused approach to China—prioritizing trade and economic ties.

The U.S. Commission on the Committee on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the Dalai Lama recommended that Congress recognize only the Dalai Lama’s successor selected through the Ganden Phodrang Trust process: The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission urged Congress to formally commit to recognizing only a Dalai Lama successor chosen through the Dalai Lama’s own Gaden Phodrang Trust process, pushing for legislative and diplomatic groundwork ahead of an anticipated succession dispute with Beijing.

Current Events 热点新闻

Mudslide death toll in China rises to 3 after heavy rain from Typhoon Saudel: A mudslide in Jiangxi province’s Suichuan County killed three people and left nine missing after days of torrential rain from Typhoon Saudel, with two additional deaths reported in neighboring Hunan province and over 5,300 residents relocated to safety.

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However, when recipients clicked buttons of “View Invitation,” “RSVP,” “See Who’s Coming,” and “Open Your Invitation,” they were redirected to unrelated and suspicious websites that did not match the displayed hyperlink destination. Some recipients then tried to verify the authenticity of the invitation or simply remove themselves from the mailing list. However, links labeled “Privacy Policy,” “Remove Yourself,” or “Block This Host” also redirected them to malicious websites.

Technical evidence suggests that some emails may have been transmitted through compromised accounts rather than merely using forged sender addresses (a tactic known as “spoofing,” in which the attacker edits the email heading and sender to appear as if it is from a known party). This makes the campaign especially dangerous, as the recipients are more likely to trust a message that comes from a familiar name and a genuine email account.

While there is insufficient evidence to attribute the campaign to the Chinese government or to a specific threat actor, the observed pattern is consistent with an active phishing campaign targeting Chinese human rights defenders and activists. From the examples collected so far, it seems that one possible objective of these emails is credential theft. After clicking a malicious link, a recipient may be taken to a fake Google, Microsoft, or other login page designed to steal a password, authentication code, or active session. More advanced phishing systems may also be capable of bypassing conventional multifactor authentication by capturing session information.

HRIC strongly advises readers not to click any unsolicited invitation links, even when a message appears to come from someone you know. Instead, contact the apparent sender through a separate, trusted channel, and confirm whether the invitation is genuine.

If you have already clicked the link but did not enter any information, close the page immediately and do not revisit. If you entered a password, authentication code, or any other account information, change your passwords immediately, sign out of active sessions and review recent account activity for anything unusual. If available, enable phishing-resistant multifactor authentication, warn your contacts and ask your organization’s security team to examine the email.

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Devastating flash floods along the Nepal-Tibet border last week were met with censorship from the Chinese authorities, who minimized information about casualties and hampered damage assessment in the immediate aftermath of the tragedy that has left over 1,000 people confirmed dead and thousands missing. Much of the information emerged through Nepal, while on the Tibetan side, the authorities tightly controlled information about the scale of the destruction and state media emphasized rescue efforts and the government’s response. Reporting indicates that eyewitness footage disappeared from Chinese social media platforms and that authorities used “image-recognition technology” and “saturated information” tactics to suppress or drown out independent accounts of the disaster.

Tibetan advocacy groups said that information they gathered from sources on the ground suggested a toll “far higher” than official figures. Meanwhile, Chinese authorities penalized 10 people accused of spreading online claims that casualty numbers were significantly higher than the official count. Responding to allegations that information about the disaster had been suppressed, China’s Foreign Ministry responded, stating “malicious smearing and sensationalism using the disaster situation will not receive popular support.” However, suppression of information around tragedies is par for the course for the Chinese government, with many well-documented cases including the 2008 Sichuan earthquake and multiple mass attacks by drivers last year.

In Hong Kong, former organizers of the city’s annual Tiananmen vigils, Chow Hang-tung, Lee Cheuk-yan, and Albert Ho, returned to court on Friday, August 28, for mitigation proceedings after being convicted of subversion under Hong Kong’s national security law in connection with commemorating the Tiananmen Massacre. While Chow Hang-tung was stopped by the judge after reading only the opening sentences of her mitigation statement in court, her full statement was later published on her Patreon page and subsequently translated into English and simplified Chinese by Human Rights in China from the original Cantonese. In the statement, Chow argued that the pursuit of democracy had effectively been turned into a crime, that people’s beliefs cannot legitimately be controlled by law, and that genuine rule of law must be grounded in morality and justice.

The proceedings were accompanied by further signs of restrictions surrounding public discussion of the case. A woman who had been waiting in line for a public-gallery seat to witness the verdict proceedings was arrested outside the court on suspicion of sedition.

Law & Policy 法律与政策

Chinese Legislature Seeks Public Comment on 5 Bills: The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, China’s national legislature, is seeking public comment on draft versions of Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, Banking Supervision and Administration Law, Water Law, Road Traffic Safety Law, and Anti–Cross-Border Corruption Law through September 26, 2026.

China Considers New Legal Tool to Pursue Corruption Suspects and Assets Abroad: The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress started its review of a draft Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law, which would formalize existing practices used by Beijing to track down and pursue former officials who have fled overseas.

Cyber Security & Digital Rights 网络安全与数字权利

HRIC on Twitter/X: A Proton investigation published on August 27 surveyed more than 7,000 mobile VPN apps worldwide and found that of the 390 available for download in the United States, 64 are owned by Chinese companies, and 31 of those conceal that ownership behind shell entities registered in Singapore, Hong Kong, and the UK. US-based users downloaded these apps over 3 million times in June alone. Under Chinese law, companies must hand over user data to the government on request—an app marketed as a privacy tool may, therefore. sit inside the very surveillance system its users are trying to escape. The report also found that 85% of VPNs available in the US contain trackers, and 64 apps collect users’ physical location through GPS and other geolocation data, accounting for roughly a fifth of all downloads studied.

HRIC on Twitter/X: HRIC highlights a recent piece in The China Quarterly by Christian Göbel, a scholar at the University of Vienna, which uses 274,721 Weibo posts to reconstruct the brief online dissent—quickly erased—from the four days following the 2022 Urumqi fire, which was a spark behind the White Paper protests. The study finds that it wasn’t necessarily the disaster itself that ignited public outrage, but the authorities’ response. In an environment where opinion leaders were silenced or co-opted, and ordinary accounts had almost no visibility, netizens’ tactic was to attach criticism directly to the topic tags and retweet chains of official accounts, leveraging the massive follower bases of state media for dissemination. The author calls this “disruptive amplification.”

HRIC on Twitter/X: X’s Global Government Affairs team released results of the investigation on Chinese inauthentic accounts suspected of participating in influence operations. According to X, 200,000 fake accounts located in China had been identified which used the social media platform to manipulate public opinion on U.S. AI data centers and energy policies. X emphasized that the platform will take efforts to suspend accounts violating their authenticity policy and prevent attempts which undermine the integrity of the global public square.

App Life in China: A piece published in China File states that while life in China has become extremely convenient due to being highly digital, with apps like WeChat and Alipay making transportation, shopping, food delivery, and payments extremely convenient, the total reliance on these two platforms also comes with serious downsides. You must have a “mobile phone tied to a verified identity to use Alipay and WeChat Wallet, and these are the only digital wallets that work.” Cameras and facial-recognition systems track people’s movements, and people easily risk losing access to WeChat or Alipay if they violate rules related to online behavior, which in turn makes everyday life extremely difficult as so many services depend on those apps.

HRIC on Twitter/X: Cybersecurity researcher NetAskari recently disclosed that a hacker group calling itself SnowSoul infiltrated the computers of the blue team members in the 2026 Qinghai Province “Cyber Shield” cybersecurity exercise, and publicly released a large batch of internal document lists.

Taiwan steps up AI defenses as China election interference fears grow: After Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party warned that Beijing could use AI, deepfakes, social media impersonation, and fabricated recordings to influence the upcoming November 28 local elections, the Taiwanese Central Election Commission began establishing a specialized task force and an online platform through which candidates can report suspected deepfakes.

US says Chinese-linked hackers attacked NASA, Senate, and gov’t agencies: On August 26, the US Department of Justice announced that it had disrupted a Chinese-linked hacking attempt targeting sensitive US government bodies, including the Department of Justice, NASA, the Federal Reserve, and the US Senate. The operation reportedly dismantled two hacking platforms, QScan and QTRouter, which were used to compromise internet-connected devices and hide the source of attacks.

Taiwan prosecutors probe Unimicron over relabeling of China-made PCBs: The Taiwanese government has launched an investigation into leading printed circuit board maker Unimicron Technology Corp. over allegations that the company mislabeled products manufactured in China and later shipped to Taiwan as “locally made” products.

Diaspora Community & Transnational Repression 海外社群和跨国镇压

Canada ends Hong Kong ‘lifeboat’ immigration scheme launched in the wake of national security law: The Canadian government announced that the “lifeboat” immigration scheme launched in 2021 in response to Hong Kong’s national security crackdown, which allows Hongkongers to gain permanent residency in Canada, closed to new applicants from August 31, 2026. Anyone who applied on or before that date may remain in Canada while their application is processed.

Hong Kongers with settled status in the UK still denied access to their MPF savings: Hong Kong Watch reports that “Hong Kongers who have obtained Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR) in the UK are still being blocked from withdrawing their Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) savings, despite meeting the legal threshold for early withdrawal on the grounds of permanent departure from Hong Kong.” The MPF is a Hong Kong compulsory retirement savings program.

Gen Z ‘Chinamaxxers’ fantasise about life in China. This journalist and this artist can never go back there: Chinese Australian artist Badiucao and Chinese American journalist Melissa Chan’s new graphic novel, “You Must Take Part in Revolution,” avoids lecturing young people who “feel defeated” about their own countries, but hopes to spread the message that authoritarianism is bad no matter where it is. Chan hopes that the book “can get a few people thinking about resistance movements both present and in the past.”

Human Rights Defenders & Civil Society 人权捍卫者与公民社会

HRIC on Twitter/X: In July, 440 recent graduates joined Changzhou Xingyu Automotive Lighting Systems, a major Chinese supplier to European carmakers. Just weeks later, 107 had their contracts terminated under coercive pressure to “voluntarily” resign. In response, the trainees compiled recordings, labor contracts, and interview evidence, and submitted these materials to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, EU compliance channels, and supply chain reporting portals for European clients like BMW, Mercedes-Benz, and Volkswagen. Within days of involving overseas compliance mechanisms, local investigations suddenly progressed and the company issued an apology, raising questions about the relative effectiveness of Chinese labor laws and implementation.

HRIC on Twitter/X: Last week, a Chinese court sentenced artist Gao Zhen, aged 70, to three years in prison for multiple sculptural works from nearly 20 years ago that satirized Mao Zedong. Less than a day after the verdict was announced, the news spread rapidly across North America, Europe, Asia, Oceania, Latin America, and Africa. Mainstream media outlets, major art publications, international human rights organizations, and governments issued public condemnations of the decision.

Related: China: Dissident artist jailed for satirical Mao sculptures. “‘We feel outraged,’ Gao’s wife Zhao Yaliang told the Reuters news agency. ‘Ever since I learned of the ​verdict, I haven’t been able to recover from it. It’s devastating.’”

Hong Kong’s independent bookstores, a refuge for Chinese readers, are under threat: Arrests over “seditious” books and harassment of independent bookstores and their associates has led to the closure of multiple prominent bookstores in Hong Kong this year. Readers mourn the loss of these spaces and the access to information that comes with them, and express concern that Taiwanese publishing generally may become more inaccessible in the future.

Blank Walls on Hong Kong Campuses: The University of Hong Kong (HKU) was once known for its politically active student union and its “Democracy Wall,” where students could freely post political messages and pro-democracy posters. In July 2021, after the introduction of Hong Kong’s national security law, HKU stopped recognizing the student union, took away its control of the wall, and removed the posters and messages displayed there. By 2026, the university had built panels around the once-famous Democracy Wall and announced plans to replace it with a digital display.

China’s Reach & Internal Control 中国: 内控与外扩

China Sinicizing Tibetan education in move to implement Ethnic Unity Law: The Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy reports that Qinghai, Gansu, and Sichuan provinces are reportedly revising Tibetan language textbooks and course materials in a move to promote Mandarin language and Han Chinese culture. In Tibet, new textbooks on national unity have also been introduced under China’s recently implemented Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress (Ethnic Unity Law).

China seeks public tips on procurement violations in elite Rocket Force: China has launched a campaign inviting the public to submit tips about irregularities in procurements in areas such as supplies and services, engineering projects, supplementary food supplies, medical equipment, and consumables.

China Pushes Ahead with Media Diplomacy with Africa: The Seventh China-Africa Media Cooperation Forum (第七届中非媒体合作论坛) hosted representatives from 45 countries last week in Beijing in an apparent move to get African media aligned with Chinese political narratives. Attendees reportedly signed a joint declaration, the text of which is not public, but reportedly contains a commitment to “work together to present a true, multi-dimensional and comprehensive image of China-Africa development to the international community.”

International Responses 国际反应

MAC advises caution for ‘high-risk nationals’ traveling to China: After a Taiwanese national was interrogated in Shanghai over his alleged links to Amnesty International, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council issued a travel warning to its citizens. His father alleged that Shanghai authorities questioned him for six hours about his work with international non-governmental organizations, including advocacy related to China, Hong Kong, Uyghurs and Tibet. He was also asked whether he had any contacts with politicians or human rights activists. He was released only after giving up his plan to enter China and returned to Taiwan the same day.

Leaders of China, Russia and India are among heads of state meeting to counter US influence: Chinese, Russian and Indian leaders gathered in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on August 31 ahead of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. On the sidelines of the gathering, Russian President Vladimir Putin held a bilateral meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

As India-China Talks Resume, Tibet’s Unresolved Question Lingers Behind the Line: India and China resumed high-level border talks in Beijing, with Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi leading the 25th round of the Special Representatives talks. In a preliminary statement, the Indian Embassy in Beijing said the discussions focused on maintaining peace and tranquility along the volatile border, amid renewed tensions along the Line of Actual Control.

Trump moves toward levying new tariff on China for flooding market with cheap goods, AP sources say: According to a source familiar with the matter who spoke to AP News, U.S. President Donald Trump is considering imposing a new 7.5% tariff on China, a move designed to work around a Supreme Court ruling that struck down his broader high-tariff plan.

Current Events 热点新闻

Translations: Surprise Viral Hit “Niu Lai” Represents “a Revenge-Vote by Chinese Filmgoers” Amid Ban Rumors: The ultra low-budget Chinese animated film titled “The Cow Comes” or “Here Comes the Cow” has become a surprise hit of the summer. Although the movie sold fewer than 300 tickets in its first 10 days in theaters, its budget later surpassed 40 million yuan ($6 million) in box-office revenue among rumors that it the authorities may even ban it. Commentator Wang Yongzhi “argues that “The Cow Comes” has a kind of clumsy sincerity, an authenticity that audiences seem to appreciate—especially compared to the often preachy, disingenuous, or inauthentic state-approved films frequently promoted at the box office.”

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During mitigation proceedings on Friday, August 28, Chow was stopped by the judge after reading only the first few sentences of her mitigation statement. However, her full statement was later uploaded to her Patreon page. Read her full statement translated into English and simplified Chinese from the original Cantonese by Human Rights in China.

[后附中文版]

Statement to the Court by Chow Hang-tung

1. The 206-page judgment, stripped to its essence, says only this: pursuing democracy is a crime.

2. I do not believe that any political party may treat the sovereignty of a nation as its private property, proclaim itself the people’s choice and the nation’s sole leader, and then declare that everyone is legally obliged to uphold the throne it has bestowed upon itself. Such “law” is merely another name for tyranny.

3. To believe that dictatorship is wrong and democracy is right—what is that, if not a conviction? The Court and the Government may repeat like an incantation that our convictions are not on trial. But that cannot change the reality that, under this judgment, there is no longer any place for those who believe in “ending one-party dictatorship.” In the eyes of such “law,” merely holding this belief is unconstitutional, unlawful, and an original sin. Even when we do something entirely legitimate—such as commemorating June Fourth—it becomes a crime because our thoughts are deemed “incorrect.”

4. But the law cannot control anyone’s thoughts. Not only will it fail to do so; when the law insists on setting itself against conscience, it is the law that will lose, and the law alone that will forfeit its legitimacy.

5. Human beings must have moral boundaries, and so must the law. The distinction between democracy and dictatorship is among the most fundamental of those boundaries, because there can be no rule of law under a dictatorship. When the Court strips the call to “end one-party dictatorship” of all its factual origins and all questions of right and wrong, and blindly emphasizes only the will of the regime and a supposed duty to obey the law, it is effectively saying that those who lived under Nazi Germany had a duty to participate in the extermination of the Jews. That is absurd. Such an approach deprives the law of its soul—the pursuit of justice—and reduces it to a puppet manipulated by power.

6. It was precisely this attitude—asking nothing about right and wrong and demanding only obedience—that produced tragedy after tragedy under Nazism and other totalitarian regimes. Today, both the Court and the state are following the same dangerous path. Indeed, with technological advances and the growing power of the state, and with the country now widely recognized as a “great power,” the danger today is even greater than it was then.

7. As citizens, we have a responsibility to place state power back within the confines of democracy. As the true masters of the country, we have a duty to control and scrutinize that power. We must do so not only to seek justice for the wrongs of the past, but also to prevent even greater catastrophes from occurring again. If, in the name of national security, we continue to feed a state machinery that we cannot control while allowing it to devour our humanity and conscience, tragedy will be only a matter of time.

8. Ending one-party dictatorship is therefore an inescapable responsibility of our generation, whether we identify as Hongkongers or as Chinese. We must accomplish this ourselves. Only we can accomplish it. No outsider can do it for us.

9. These are my sincere thoughts and convictions. They are not mine alone: thirty years of candlelight vigils in Victoria Park have already proved that. “Ending one-party dictatorship” is a fundamental demand of the people and a universal aspiration. If the law overestimates its own power and attempts to defy that aspiration, it will succeed only in humiliating itself.

10. The Court seeks to portray the issue as one not of spreading ideas, but of allegedly spreading hostility. Yet the conviction that one-party dictatorship must end has never depended upon dividing the world into enemies and allies, nor upon inciting hatred. We need only present the facts and reason our case. That is enough to win the support of all who are willing to see reason.

11. Dictatorship is itself one of the greatest and most obvious forms of injustice. It disregards the equality and autonomy of every individual. It imposes a system of rule for which no rational justification can be offered, reducing free citizens to slaves without a choice. Ending one-party dictatorship is simply a struggle to reclaim the dignity that belongs to every human being. Anyone who is not merely pretending to be asleep should be able to understand this.

12. Only those who cannot persuade through reason must constantly mobilize people through hatred. We have no need to do so. Only those utterly lacking in confidence see hostility everywhere. That is not how we view the world. We have absolute confidence in what we believe and what we stand for. The fact that a dictatorship depends upon hatred to sustain its rule does not mean that everyone must adopt its methods, nor does it mean that the world truly revolves around hatred. Faith in equality and justice, and respect for humanity and truth, have always been forces more powerful and enduring than hatred.

13. Convictions cannot be calculated or traded. To plead for mercy or apologize for what one believes is an act of profound hypocrisy and an insult to everyone who shares those convictions. I will not do so. I cannot do so. Even the executioners responsible for the massacre have yet to come forward and apologize—how could it possibly be our turn to apologize? Even when right and wrong have been turned upside down, we must not apologize for the wrongs committed by the regime and thereby become part of that moral inversion ourselves.

14. As for everything we have done, I refuse to use the language and concepts of criminality to assess how “serious” or “minor” our conduct may have been. If the Court truly seeks guidance, it may consult the Office for Safeguarding National Security, led by the Communist Party. Its officials certainly know how to view efforts to advance democracy and human rights through the lens of criminality. They have repeatedly and openly declared that this case is grave and must be severely punished, apparently without the slightest concern that they are interfering with judicial independence. In any event, if the Court ultimately finds that our conduct was “of a grave nature,” I will take that as a compliment, because it would mean that our work truly made a difference.

15. To discover a cause in which one believes, and to find companions with whom one can struggle side by side, is one of life’s greatest blessings. I therefore have no regrets whatsoever about the path I have walked with the Hong Kong Alliance and with the people of Hong Kong. I regret only the hardship endured by my family and by those who love me. They are the only people from whom I need to seek forgiveness.

16. As for the future, whether inside or outside prison, I will continue working for the release of pro-democracy activists, the vindication of the 1989 Democracy Movement, accountability for the massacre, the end of one-party dictatorship, and the building of a democratic Hong Kong and China. I will continue to learn, strengthen myself, and pursue every possible course of action until democracy arrives. This is a promise I have made publicly countless times. It is the solemn vow I made to the victims amid a sea of candlelight, and I have no intention of breaking my word.

17. If doing so makes me a criminal forever, and if the law truly cannot tolerate our convictions, then I would rather be a criminal than a person who betrays her conscience. Together with all Hongkongers who refuse to surrender to fate, I will continue along this unfinished road to democracy.

18. A sea of candlelight,
    Hearts surging like waves;
    Though shattered against the shore,
    We will not rest until injustice ends.

陈情书——邹幸彤

1. 206页判词，说来说去，就是追求民主有罪。

2. 我不认为任何政党可以将国家主权私相授受，自称代表人民的选择，自称是唯一的领导，然后还宣称每个人在法律上都有义务拥护它这个自封的王位。这样的所谓法律，不过是暴政的同义词。

3. 相信专政是错的、民主是对的，这不是信念，又是什么？即使法庭和政府不停念咒，声称我们接受审判的并非信念，也改变不了一个事实：在这份判决之下，相信“结束一党专政”这一理念的人，再无立足之地。在这样的“法律”眼中，我们只要抱有这种思想，就已经违宪、非法，犯下了原罪。即使我们所做的只是一件完全正当的事情，例如悼念六四，也会因为我们思想上的“不正确”而变成犯罪。

4. 但是，法律无法控制任何人的思想。不但控制不了，当法律执意与良知为敌，输的只会是法律，失去公信力的也只会是法律。

5. 做人要有底线，法律同样要有。民主与专政之辨，就是其中最重要的一条底线，因为专政之下没有法治。当法庭完全抽空“结束一党专政”这一诉求之所以产生的事实背景和是非对错，只是一味强调政权的意志和所谓守法的义务，其实就等于说，生活在纳粹德国统治之下，就有义务参与屠杀犹太人一样荒谬。这样的做法，只会使法律失去彰显公平正义的灵魂，沦为任由权力驱使的傀儡。

6. 纳粹和极权统治之下一次又一次的惨剧，正是这种不问是非、只求服从的态度造成的。如今，无论是法庭还是国家，都在重走同一条危险的老路。甚至随着科技进步、国家力量增强，随着国家成为公认的“大国”，今天的危险只会比当年更加严重。

7. 作为国民，我们有责任将国家权力重新关进民主的牢笼，履行我们作为国家主人的义务，对它加以控制和监督。这样做，不仅是为了替过去的伤害讨回公道，也是为了防止更大的灾难再次降临。一味以国家安全之名，喂养一部我们无法控制的国家机器，任由它蚕食人性与良知，悲剧的发生只是迟早的事。

8. 因此，结束一党专政，是我们这一代香港人也好、中国人也好，都无可回避的责任。这件事必须由我们自己完成，也只能由我们自己完成，没有任何外人可以代劳。

9. 这是我真诚的想法和信念，而且不只是我一个人的信念——维园三十年的烛光已经证明了这一点。“结束一党专政”是人民的底线，是普世的诉求。当法律不自量力地试图挑战它，只会自取其辱。

10. 法庭假装问题不在于传播思想，而在于所谓散播敌意。但是，“结束一党专政”这一信念，从来不需要依靠什么敌我思维，也不需要煽动仇恨来维系。我们只需要摆事实、讲道理，就足以得到所有明事理者的支持。

11. 因为专政本身就是最大、最明显的一种不公义。它无视每个人的平等和自主，将一套毫无道理可讲的统治秩序强加于人，把自由的公民统统贬低为无权选择的奴隶。结束一党专政，不过是要争取人之为人应有的尊严。这个道理，任何不是装睡的人都应该看得明白。

12. 只有道理讲不通的人，才总要依靠仇恨进行动员，而我们根本不需要这样做；只有毫无自信的人，才会看什么都充满敌意，而我们也根本不会这样看待世界。对于我们所相信和坚持的一切，我们有绝对的信心。专政依靠仇恨维持统治，不等于所有人都必须采用它的那一套，也不等于这个世界真的围绕仇恨运转。对平等与正义的信念，对人性与真相的尊重，从来都是比仇恨更加强大、更加持久的力量。

13. 信念是无法计算、无法交易的。为了自己所相信的一切而求情、道歉，是最虚伪的事情，也是对所有抱有同样信念者的侮辱。所以，我不会这样做，也不能这样做。连屠城的刽子手都还没有站出来道歉，什么时候轮到我们道歉？！即使世道颠倒，我们也不应该为政权做错的事情道歉，让自己也成为颠倒是非的一部分。

14. 对于过去的一切，我拒绝使用犯罪的语言和概念，去分析我们所做的事情有多么严重或不严重。如果法庭真的需要什么参考，可以去问由共产党领导的国安公署。他们才真正懂得如何用犯罪的眼光看待争取民主和人权的努力。他们还一直毫不避讳地声称，本案性质严重，必须严惩，完全不认为自己是在干预司法独立。无论如何，如果法庭最后真的裁定我们属于“情节严重”，我会把它当作对我们的赞美，因为这说明我们确实做出了一些成绩。

15. 能够找到自己所相信的使命，找到可以并肩作战的伙伴，是人生最幸福的事情。因此，对于我与支联会、与香港人共同走过的道路，我一点也不后悔。只是辛苦了我的家人和爱我的人，我唯一需要请求原谅的，也只有他们。

16. 至于将来，无论身在狱中还是狱外，我都会继续为释放民运人士、平反八九民运、追究屠城责任、结束一党专政、建设民主香港与民主中国而努力。我会继续学习、充实自己，进行各种尝试，直到民主到来的那一天。这是我曾经无数次公开作出的承诺，也是我在烛海之中向死难者许下的庄严誓言。我不打算做一个言而无信的人。

17. 如果这样做会使我成为永远的罪犯，如果法律真的容不下我们的信念，那么我宁愿做一个罪犯，也不愿做一个背叛良知的人。我会和所有不认命的香港人一起，继续走完这条尚未走完的民主之路。

18. 烛光如海，
    人心成涛；
    粉身拍岸，
    不平不休。

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On the morning of August 25, a court in Sanhe, Hebei, sentenced artist Gao Zhen to the maximum statutory penalty of three years’ imprisonment for “infringing upon the reputation and honor of heroes and martyrs.” Only two of his brothers were permitted to attend the sentencing as observers, while personnel from the U.S. Embassy were denied entry. Gao Zhen, who holds a U.S. permanent resident card, was originally detained and his artworks seized in 2024 when he returned to China with his wife and child to visit family. Considering time served, Gao’s sentence will run until August 25, 2027. His wife remains restricted from leaving China on grounds of “national security,” and their young son, a U.S. citizen, is still unable to return to school in New York. HRIC calls on the Chinese authorities to immediately and unconditionally release Gao Zhen, lift the exit restrictions on his family members, and return all seized works.

On August 21, the West Kowloon Magistrates’ Court in Hong Kong ruled that the already-disbanded Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China (the Alliance), former chairman Lee Cheuk-yan, and former vice-chairperson Chow Hang-tung were guilty of the charge of “inciting others to subvert state power.” Another defendant, former vice-chairperson Albert Ho, had previously pleaded guilty and will be sentenced separately. This conviction highlights the erosion of freedoms in the territory under the National Security Law. Human rights groups say the law’s broad provisions have been used to dismantle much of Hong Kong’s organized political opposition and restrict individual freedoms that once distinguished the territory from mainland China. The foreign ministries of France, Germany, United Kingdom, and Australia have also released official statements condemning the conviction.

Speaking about Chow Hang-Tung, former Hong Kong lawyer Kevin Yam stated: “She’s not afraid of anything or anyone… For a lot of us who are outside Hong Kong now and sometimes feel a bit dispirited by things, her example and her inspiration is a big factor in us not losing hope and keeping our spirits up.” Meanwhile, Tang Ngok-kwan, another former member of the Alliance, continues to personally and discreetly commemorate June Fourth.

Law & Policy 法律与政策

NPCSC Session Watch: Cross-Border Corruption, Traffic Regulation, Legal Profession, Defense Mobilization & Agriculture: China’s top legislature convenes from August 25–28 to review ten bills, including a new draft Anti–Transnational Corruption Law targeting cross-border corruption and asset recovery, alongside returning bills on healthcare security, farmland protection, defense mobilization, and regulation of lawyers. A new draft revision to the Road Traffic Safety Law would also add rules governing autonomous-driving vehicle testing.

USALI This Week in Asian Law August 16 – August 22: Shanghai authorities released the city’s latest Five-year Plan for Women’s and Children’s Development with calls for employers to create “family-friendly” workplaces.

China Proposes New Personal Information Registration and Oversight Committee Requirements for Large Companies: China’s cyberspace regulator proposed draft rules requiring “large-scale” personal information processors to register with the CAC and establish independent oversight committees to supervise data-protection compliance, consolidating two earlier draft regulations into one regime.

Cyber Security & Digital Rights 网络安全与数字权利

HRIC Digital Rights Report - July 2026: In July, China expanded both its international influence over AI governance and its domestic capacity for digital information control. The launch of a new global AI alliance came as Chinese AI models continued to reflect political and ideological restrictions, raising concerns about how these standards may influence AI systems beyond China. At the same time, new surveillance and censorship technologies showed that the Chinese authorities are developing new ways to monitor digital activity and identify tools used to bypass online restrictions.

Translation: “Extreme Security” at Tiananmen Landmark in the Maddening Summer Heat: A censored WeChat post described, in a matter-of-fact tone with no overt political criticism, the exhausting gauntlet of ID checks, pat-downs, and bag searches required just to visit Beijing’s Zhengyangmen gate near Tiananmen Square, illustrating how even non-political commentary on daily inconveniences gets scrubbed.

Translation: “You Can’t Address Sexual Assault at Banquets Without Addressing the Nature of Power”: A censored WeChat post examines two recent cases of alleged sexual assault by Chinese officials, arguing that piecemeal responses to individual scandals fail to address the systemic issue: the lack of institutional checks on official power that enables such abuse to recur.

In Hong Kong, mourning a stray dog killed in mainland China means walking a fine line: Hundreds of Hong Kongers and mainland visitors gathered to mourn Wang Wang, a stray dog tortured and killed by minors in Guangdong, but organizers faced censorship hurdles from rejected bus ads to shuttered memorial displays, reflecting how even largely apolitical grief can run into Hong Kong’s shifting speech restrictions.

Nvidia senior manager linked to Supermicro scheme smuggling AI servers to China: Taiwan indicted nine people, including a senior Nvidia manager and two Supermicro employees, for allegedly forging documents to smuggle 74 AI servers with restricted B300 chips to China via Japan, Indonesia, and Hong Kong, evading US export controls.

Hanging a Banner for Chinese AI: People’s Daily recently ran a symmetrical, parallel-column front page proclaiming Xi Jinping’s “concern” for both domestic AI development (”beneficial, safe, equitable”) and China’s role in bridging the global AI divide for developing nations. CMP explains: “The unusual column design, with its carefully conceived symmetry—a propaganda appropriation of the traditional parallel saying, or duilian (对联)—is meant no doubt to be a powerful parallelism announcing the Chinese Communist Party leadership’s twin convictions on artificial intelligence, for the country and for the world.”

Diaspora Community & Transnational Repression 海外社群和跨国镇压

HRIC on Twitter/X: The German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution released a 16-page brochure, including a hotline for assistance, aimed at individuals exiled in Germany who are threatened by their home regimes. The target audience includes people who have fled to Germany seeking asylum from authoritarian countries such as China, Russia, and Iran, encompassing dissidents, journalists, and those at risk due to SOGI minority status.

Gwangju Biennale Controversy Reflects Chinese Pressure on Taiwan in the Art World: Ten Taiwanese artists accused South Korea’s Gwangju Biennale of political censorship after it dropped “Taiwan” from their exhibit’s promotional branding in favor of “NTMOFA,” despite prior agreement on a “Taiwan Pavilion” name; Korean artists and Taiwan’s Ministry of Culture both condemned the move as capitulation to Chinese pressure.

Human rights and diaspora groups urge UK Prime Minister to act on reported use of prohibited weapons at Chinese Embassy in London: Nineteen human rights and diaspora groups wrote to UK PM Andy Burnham demanding action after Chinese Embassy personnel allegedly used prohibited weapons (stun guns) against peaceful mourners at a vigil for Tibetan activist Lobga Rangzen, urging the government to treat such intimidation as a national security matter.

Thousands rally in Dharamsala to mark 49th day since Pawo Lobga Rangzen’s self-immolation: Over 5,000 Tibetan exiles, led by CTA President Penpa Tsering, marched in Dharamsala to mark the 49th day (a significant milestone in Tibetan Buddhist tradition) since activist Lobga Rangzen’s self-immolation, demanding China repeal its “Ethnic Unity and Progress Law” and calling for UN intervention.

Human Rights Defenders & Civil Society 人权捍卫者与公民社会

HRIC on Twitter/X: Gao Pu, son of Zion Church Senior Pastor Gao Quanfu, revealed on social media that the Zion Church case has been transferred to the Beilin District People’s Court in Xi’an. After the pre-trial meeting on August 10, the family publicly released the indictment and sentencing recommendation for Gao Quanfu’s case: he has been charged with “fraud” and recommended a fixed-term imprisonment of 12 to 13 years, along with a fine.

HRIC on Twitter/X: Guangxi rights defender Lu Huihuang was released on August 18, after serving 4 years and 6 months’ fixed-term imprisonment for “inciting subversion of state power.” Lu’s friends were reportedly detained for questioning by police when they visited his home seeking information about his time of release.

HRIC on Twitter/X: Currently imprisoned human rights defender Du Bin’s mother is reportedly critically ill. His family submitted a request to allow Du Bin to go home to see her, but the request was denied. Procuratorate personnel said there will be a verdict by the end of the month, but if there is an appeal, family visits will not be allowed. The family believes the prosecution is indirectly using this situation to coerce Du Bin not to appeal.

HRIC on Twitter/X: Former Xinhua photographer Tang Shizeng, who captured numerous photos of the 1989 Democracy Movement, passed away at 65. Through Tang Shizeng’s lens, a piece of history was preserved.

China investigates comedian after he altered a revolutionary song lyric onstage: China’s best-known xiangsheng comedian Guo Degang is under investigation and has had multiple shows canceled after changing a lyric in a revolutionary 1950s war song from “Weishan Lake” to “the Forbidden City” during a July Wuhan performance, after a complaint accused him of “distorting” and “vulgarizing” a patriotic classic.

Related: Netizen Voices on the Investigation of Comedian Guo Degang for Riffing on a “Red” Tune: “The Cultural Revolution Never Ended”. Chinese netizens reacted with alarm and cynicism to the Guo Degang investigation, with many calling it a politically motivated overreaction reminiscent of Cultural Revolution-era persecution of performers, and recalling Guo’s own history of being targeted in a 2010 “anti-vulgarity” campaign.

China tightens restrictions on online advocacy, prison visits for imprisoned Tibetan businessman: Chinese authorities continue denying prison visits and deleting online posts advocating for Dorjee Tashi, a Tibetan businessman serving a life sentence since 2008 on contested “loan fraud” charges. His family has been prevented from visiting since 2024 and his lawyers faced retaliation for raising abuse allegations.

University of Hong Kong to convert ‘Democracy Wall’ into digital display: The University of Hong Kong fenced off its long-empty “Democracy Wall” bulletin board—stripped of protest posters since 2021—to convert it into a digital display, part of a broader digitization of campus notice boards following the university’s 2021 split from its student union.

Hong Kong court orders now-defunct Apple Daily to pay HK$1.5 million to couple in defamation lawsuit over 2019 articles: A Hong Kong court ruled that the now-defunct, Jimmy Lai-founded Apple Daily newspaper defamed businessman Xiang Xin and his wife in 2019 by branding them Chinese spies, ordering HK$1.5 million in damages after the paper, now a “prohibited organization,” presented no evidence in its defense.

China’s Reach & Internal Control 中国: 内控与外扩

China Expands Religious Scrutiny Into Chengdu Schools, Hospitals: Leaked documents show that Chengdu authorities now require hospital employees to disclose religious affiliations and schools to record students’ and families’ religious backgrounds, part of Beijing’s “Sinicization of religion” push extending beyond traditionally targeted Tibetan and Uyghur regions into the wider Han population.

Tibetan representation shrinking under centralized Beijing rule: A new ICT “2026 Tibet Leadership Report” found that only 25.8% of 240 senior positions in Tibetan areas are held by Tibetans, describing an emerging “seventh generation” of officials whose careers are shaped by Party loyalty and the new Ethnic Unity Law rather than genuine Tibetan representation or autonomy.

The Chinese Communist Party has banned Tibetans from making pilgrimages to Jizhong Lhakhang Monastery in Sangri County: Chinese authorities banned Tibetans from making pilgrimages to Jizhong Lhakhang Monastery as part of a broader, long-running pattern of restricting religious travel and monastery access across Tibetan areas, especially during politically sensitive periods.

Beijing resumes demolition of major Tibetan Buddhist academy, satellite imagery shows: Satellite imagery shows that the Chinese authorities have cleared roughly 2.5 acres of monastic residences at Larung Gar Buddhist Academy since mid-July. The academy, once home to 40,000 monastics, has now been reduced to about half its peak size.

Related: China Deploys Troops and Tightens Controls at Larung Gar as Demolitions Continue. Chinese authorities have deployed troops and intensified security at Larung Gar as demolitions continue, restricting visitor and pilgrim access alongside the destruction of monastic residences under the new Ethnic Unity Law framework.

China ‘likely’ ran targeted campaign to align Pacific with its latest five-year plan: A new report from The Alliance Futures Initiative found that China “very likely” ran a coordinated diplomatic campaign since October 2025 with over 30 documented instances of pressuring Pacific nations to align their development strategies with Beijing’s five-year plan, using persuasion focused on green development and economic partnership to deepen dependency and erode Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic ties in the region.

Indonesia and China discuss increasing defense cooperation and energy security: Indonesian and Chinese officials agreed to deepen defense cooperation, including a joint munitions factory with Chinese technology transfer starting 2027.

Related: Chinese Maritime Activity Aimed at Reinforcing Claims Over Taiwan Continues. Taiwan pressed Indonesia to clarify planned joint naval exercises with China’s PLA east of Taiwan, seen as reinforcing Beijing’s territorial claims.

International Responses 国际反应

US demands China release ‘wrongfully detained’ American held on spying charges: The U.S. State Department formally designated Min Zin as wrongfully detained after nearly 11 weeks of “interrogations, isolation and detention,” with officials saying the case has chilled other scholars’ willingness to engage with China for fear of similar entrapment.

Related: China denies US citizen held since June is wrongfully detained. China rejected the US State Department’s designation of detained Myanmar scholar Min Zin as “wrongfully detained,” insisting that he is under investigation for endangering national security. Min was arrested in June after traveling to Yunnan at Beijing’s invitation for an academic conference, becoming the second American given this designation alongside seismologist Youlin Chen.

HRIC on Twitter/X: The U.S. House Select Committee on China sent a letter this week to FDA Acting Commissioner Kyle Diamantas, urging the agency to stop accepting trial data from China in new clinical trials and drug applications. The letter mentions three recently exposed subject death incidents, two of which involved children, all occurring in investigator-initiated gene-editing trials (IIT) conducted within China.

Pentagon orders audit of 30 universities’ partnerships with foreign institutions: The U.S. Department of Defense has ordered Harvard, MIT, Johns Hopkins, and 27 other U.S. universities to audit and terminate “problematic” partnerships with 130 blacklisted foreign institutions (mostly Chinese) within two weeks or risk losing federal research funding, as part of intensified scrutiny of academic ties to China.

HRIC on Twitter/X: U.S. Representative Chris Smith, Co-Chair of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC), released a statement condemning reports that CCP officials pressured the U.S.-China Catholic Association to remove Purdue University professor Yang Fenggang from its conference.

Australian Senator urges targeted sanctions on Chinese leaders enforcing transnational Ethnic Unity Law: Senator Dean Smith called on Australia to recognize transnational repression as a national security threat and impose sanctions on Chinese officials enforcing the Ethnic Unity Law, warning it could criminalize Australian Tibetans’ basic activities like voting in exile elections or supporting the Dalai Lama.

Taiwan proposes a record $35B defense budget for 2027 as China’s military pressure grows: Taiwan proposed a record NT$1.12 trillion (US$35 billion) defense budget for 2027, an 18% jump, amid growing Chinese military and political pressure.

Japanese lawmakers visit Beijing seeking to mend ties after fallout from Takaichi’s Taiwan remark: A cross-party group of Japanese lawmakers traveled to Beijing seeking dialogue after PM Sanae Takaichi’s remark that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could justify Japanese military intervention triggered a diplomatic rupture and economic fallout; Takaichi has not retracted the comment.

Current Events 热点新闻

Chinese court sentences founder of troubled property developer Evergrande to life in prison: Hui Ka Yan, founder of the collapsed property giant Evergrande, was sentenced to life in prison by a Shenzhen court for large-scale financial fraud, with the group fined $2.3 billion and dozens of executives sentenced up to 18 years, marking a milestone in China’s most consequential corporate collapse.

The floodgates are open after another Chinese company lands a reusable rocket: A second Chinese launch company successfully landed an orbital-class reusable rocket booster within a month of China’s first successful attempt, with the Zhuque-3 capable of carrying over 17,600 lbs to low-Earth orbit.

Related: China scraps ambitious launch of Chang’e-7 lunar mission due to need for ‘absolute success’. China abruptly postponed its ambitious Chang’e-7 mission, designed to search for water ice at the lunar south pole, citing a “comprehensive assessment” and the principle of ensuring “absolute success,” with the mission now delayed until at least 2027.

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This Month: Chinese AI and Technological Control Becomes Increasingly Sophisticated

In July, China expanded both its international influence over AI governance and its domestic capacity for digital information control. The launch of a new global AI alliance came as Chinese AI models continued to reflect political and ideological restrictions, raising concerns about how these standards may influence AI systems beyond China. At the same time, new surveillance and censorship technologies showed that the Chinese authorities are developing new ways to monitor digital activity and identify tools used to bypass online restrictions.

China’s New AI Alliance and the Global Expansion of Its AI Control Model

On July 17, China launched the WAICO, a 29-country AI cooperation body headquartered in Shanghai, at the annual World Artificial Intelligence Conference. Xi Jinping attended in person for the first time since 2018, describing the organization as a “major move by China to answer the call of the Global South and unite the international community together to vigorously promote AI development and governance.” At the conference, the government also announced that it would provide 5,000 AI training and study opportunities for developing countries over the next five years and expand cooperation with ASEAN, the Arab League, the African Union, and BRICS countries.

Simultaneously, Moonshot AI’s latest Kimi K3 model, launched in July, has reportedly narrowed the performance gap with leading U.S. AI systems, even outperforming OpenAI and Anthropic’s most advanced models on certain benchmarks. Moreover, Deepseek has reportedly begun developing its own AI inference chip. The effort is intended to reduce the company’s reliance on Nvidia and Huawei amid tightening U.S. export controls, while following a broader industry trend toward custom AI chips.

Through these developments, the CCP seeks to shape the global AI landscape and the rules that govern it. China’s growing international role in AI is particularly significant given the extensive political and ideological controls imposed on generative AI within the country. Government censorship does not stop at traditional media or online platforms; political requirements are increasingly incorporated into the design and operation of AI systems themselves. A July 2026 report by the Resilience Innovation Lab and Strategic China Policy Group, found that political requirements have increasingly been embedded into China’s technical standards for generative AI. Within AI safety and security frameworks, content that deviates from Party-approved narratives was treated as a content security risk, resulting in restrictions or removal before the content is even published.

HRIC’s testing of the Kimi K3 model illustrated these restrictions in practice. When asked to evaluate Xi Jinping or the Chinese Communist Party, or to explain what happened in China on June 4, 1989, the model avoided answering and instead suggested changing the topic. By contrast, when asked to evaluate Donald Trump, it provided a direct and detailed reply. These polar opposite responses demonstrate the CCP’s influence over Chinese AI models which are being exported around the globe, hiding information about its own government while freely providing answers about another.

Even without explicit government control, AI systems can become susceptible to the information environments in which they are created and trained. A July study by Meta’s independent Oversight Board tested ten leading AI models, including models from outside China, and found that they refused 34 percent of requests for political criticism involving restrictive countries, compared with 14 percent for more permissive countries. For example, while some models were willing to produce material criticizing leaders in the United States or United Kingdom, they refused similar requests involving China or other restrictive governments.

Taken together, these developments raise concerns that extend beyond China’s growing technological competitiveness. As China produces stronger AI models, develops greater independence in semiconductor production, and expands its role in international AI governance, the political norms embedded in its domestic AI ecosystem may gain wider influence. The question, therefore, is not only whether China can compete with the United States in AI capabilities, but also whether its growing global role could normalize a model of AI governance in which political censorship and ideological conformity are treated as components of AI safety and security.

Growing Sophistication of General Information Control

Beyond generative AI, China’s technical tools for surveillance and information control are also becoming more sophisticated. Researchers from the People’s Public Security University of China developed a forensic technique that can analyze faint electromagnetic signals emitted by smartphones. According to the researchers, the method can identify both which apps are being used and some of the actions being performed on the device, even when a phone is offline, in airplane mode, locked, or encrypted. The technique could give law-enforcement authorities another way to obtain information about digital activity without directly accessing the contents of a phone.

Moreover, the crackdown on VPNs continues. Leaked documents revealed that the ability of China’s “Great Firewall” to identify various mainstream circumvention tools has been significantly upgraded, and that it can identify specific VPNs in use. Thus, authorities may increasingly be able to determine that a user is trying to access uncensored information, but also which type of VPN or circumvention technology is being used to do so. More precise detection would make it easier for the authorities to track which VPNs are in use, identify the services that still work, and decide where to focus future blocking or enforcement efforts.

In Case You Missed It: Other Digital Rights and Cybersecurity News

Great Firewall, Censorship, and Information Control

• Censorship, Secrecy, and Speculation Continue After Pilot in Beijing CITIC Tower Collision Identified: After a light aircraft crashed into Beijing’s tallest skyscraper, all mention of the incident—from videos and photos to keywords in online posts—were wiped from popular social media apps in China. Many questions also remain as to the future of aviation regulations following this massive security breach.

  • Related: After Impact.

  • Related: HRIC on Twitter/X.

• The Party at 105: Adept at Struggle, Even Better at Censorship: The day after Xi Jinping spoke at a ceremony for the 105th anniversary of the founding of the CCP “a video from the Communist Youth League Central Committee, ‘100 Heartwarming Seconds from the Ceremony Celebrating the 105th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China,’ was apparently blocked on Tencent’s QQ Space platform for ‘suspected violation of national policies and regulations.’” Commenters reacted sarcastically, pointing to the state’s censorship of its own propaganda videos.

• Translation: “How Do These Comments Break the Rules?”: A WeChat blogger’s translated essay describes bewilderment at China’s automated comment-censorship system, which flags seemingly innocuous reader comments as rule violations with no discernible logic.

• Minitrue: 718 Leaked Directives from Video Platform LeTV: China Digital Times published 718 leaked censorship directives issued to video platform LeTV between 2017 and 2020, detailing granular content-control demands and reporting requirements from Chinese cyber-authorities.

• Translation: Euphemism and Censorship Surround Guangxi Flooding, Dam Breach News: Deadly typhoons and a dam breach at Liulan Reservoir in Guangxi which left over 26 dead triggered heavy censorship. Critical WeChat posts questioning the dam’s failure just a year after a costly safety upgrade were deleted. One surviving essay dissects state media’s euphemistic use of “a gap appeared” instead of “collapsed” or “breached” to describe the disaster.

• “Everything Is Sensitive”: Foreign Correspondents’ Club Survey Echoes Netizen Frustration at Unpredictable Red Lines: The Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China’s 2025 survey found journalists facing harassment and access denial on an ever-widening range of topics often unrelated to a story’s actual sensitivity. It echoes domestic netizens’ frustration with unpredictable censorship, where even positive posts get deleted and vague rules leave people guessing.

• Translations: On Foreign and Domestic Media and “Man-Made Problems Lurking Behind Natural Disasters”: As China braces for more deadly storms following twin typhoons Bavi and Maysak this month, online news about these tragedies, mainly those which highlight government failings such as inadequate disaster-prevention and disaster-relief efforts as well as inaccurate reporting on the injuries and deaths taking place, have been suspiciously taken down.

• HRIC on Twitter/X: In the World Cup third-place match, England defeated France 6-4. This score unexpectedly referenced “64” as in “June Fourth,” China’s top sensitive term which refers to the June Fourth Tiananmen Massacre. A related CCTV News Douyin video garnered 197,000 likes but only 80 comments, showing clear signs of comment control.

• Turtles for the Traitors: Based on three years of analysis of WeChat posts from China’s Ministry of State Security, China Digital Times found that the MSS’s definition of intelligence gathering from “external hostile forces” has slowly expanded to cover most areas of everyday life, from dating apps to sea turtles.

AI Propaganda and Social Media Manipulation

• The Propaganda Promise of AI: China Daily’s editor-in-chief wrote in Qiushi that AI is turning state media from a “cognitive tool” into an “action tool” capable of directly producing propaganda content for global audiences, though the piece notes such AI-generated content (e.g., a PLA video) has drawn mockery online as “AI slop.”

Cybersecurity & Data Privacy

• Navigating Risks From Chinese Apps: A new report details the risk of using Chinese-developed applications, specifically due to their ability to collect and store sensitive personal data which must be turned over to the Chinese authorities on request.

Digital Transnational Repression

• HRIC on Twitter/X: A July 2026 report by cyber intelligence firm Graphika revealed that the Chinese government-linked influence operation Spamouflage recently employed a new tactic: distributing altered event leaflets in an attempt to disrupt events critical of the Chinese Communist Party which were held in the United States and Europe.

Civil Society & Resistance Under Pressure

• China’s graduate glut: millions enter a job market with little use for them: A record 12.7 million Chinese college graduates are entering an oversaturated job market this year, with AI automation increasingly eroding entry-level positions even as Beijing pushes AI-related job schemes to absorb them.

Technological Competition & State Power

• China has AI ‘cyber nuclear weapon’: Chinese company Zhipu AI (Z.ai) released a statement claiming that its AI model is equal to Anthropic’s Mythos model when it comes to finding cybersecurity vulnerabilities.

• Facing US export controls, China’s DeepSeek plans to make its own chips: DeepSeek is developing its own AI inference chip to cut reliance on Nvidia and Huawei amid tightening US export controls, joining rivals like OpenAI and Anthropic in pursuing custom silicon.

• Apple Intelligence approved for launch in China with Alibaba and Baidu: Apple’s generative AI has been approved for launch in China, with the provision that Apple will integrate Alibaba’s Qwen AI model into Apple’s operating systems and work with Baidu search engine, which already complies with the Chinese government’s censorship requirements.

• HRIC on Twitter/X: A Deepseek investor meeting memo shines a light on the long-standing controversy over evading export controls. It quotes founder Liang Wenfeng openly admitting that his company purchases large amounts of restricted and non-compliant chips. Equally noteworthy is that this meeting urged investors not to leak specific numbers or details and prohibited screen recordings or external sharing.

• White House accuses China’s Moonshot of stealing Anthropic AI: The director of the U.S. White House Office of Science and Technology Policy has claimed that Moonshot AI “distilled” Anthropic’s Fable to develop its K3 model at a scale that may warrant sanctions.

• Recent Incident Highlights Use of Chinese Parts in Biometric Equipment in Police, Coast Guard, and Customs: The Taiwanese government has been using Chinese-manufactured technology for matters which relate to national security. Legislator Lin Chun-hsia suggested that “designated government agencies should not be allowed to decide on purchases of equipment that store biometric or other sensitive data.”

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This week, financial firm Wise reactivated three bank accounts of UK-based Hong Kong activist Finn Lau—including one for diaspora outlet Points Media—after they were suddenly closed citing “internal policies,” following intervention from Reporters Without Borders and Hong Kong Watch. Lau, whose passport was cancelled by Hong Kong in 2024 and is part of a group of activists with HK$1 million bounties on their heads, called the closures an act of transnational repression.

Relatedly, the Human Rights Foundation has released a practical toolkit offering guidance on digital security, physical safety, and long-term resilience for Uyghur, Hong Konger, Tibetan, Southern Mongolian, and Chinese diaspora members facing Beijing’s transnational repression tactics, including AI-enabled surveillance and deepfakes.

In case you missed it: HRIC has published a profile of human rights defender Zhang Yi, who was recently arrested for showing a Dalai Lama photo in Lhasa, through his son Zhang Hongyuan’s eyes—recounting a childhood shaped by Zhang Yi’s 1989 Tiananmen imprisonment, decades of surveillance, and forced “vacations” with state security minders. Now in the Netherlands, Zhang Hongyuan has spent three years preparing to advocate publicly for his father, explaining that speaking out is his family’s only real defense.

Law & Policy 法律与政策

HRIC on Twitter/X: The Ministry of Public Security’s new network regulations will expand digital surveillance powers. The “Measures for the Supervision and Inspection of Cybersecurity in Cyberspace by Public Security Organs,” which will take effect on October 1, 2026, will form a more comprehensive network control system through methods such as online inspections.

Cyber Security & Digital Rights 网络安全与数字权利

Taiwan says it was hit by ‘abnormal’ AI-assisted cyber-attack: Taiwan detected a first-of-its-kind cyberattack on government agencies last month, in which hackers used open-source AI agents like OpenClaw to build an autonomous hacking tool that operated like a coordinated cyber team. Taiwan didn’t name a culprit, but has long accused China of “hybrid warfare” including near-daily cyberattacks.

HRIC on Twitter/X: The Wall Street Journal reported that multiple new studies have found U.S. artificial intelligence models unconsciously exhibit similarities to China’s censored chatbots when answering certain sensitive questions, while AI companies have made limited efforts to address this issue.

Translation: The Deluge of Blocked Words Online – Why We Feel We “Cannot Speak Openly”: A translated WeChat essay argues that China’s keyword-based online censorship is blunt and counterproductive, unnecessarily blocking harmless speech while failing to target genuine harms, forcing users to communicate in riddles. The author calls for human review, an appeals process, and greater transparency to reduce “senseless collateral damage” to free expression.

The Problem with Peach: Chinese AI-generated influencer “Peach Fang,” star of a viral AI drama with 200 million views, sparked controversy after promoting contact lenses she cannot physically wear or test, raising questions about AI personas making false claims to bodily experience. State media and lawyers noted AI “endorsers” lack legal personhood, exposing regulatory blind spots around synthetic marketing.

The rise of AI weather forecasting as China emerges as a leader in race to improve predictions: As Typhoon Dolphin approached, Chinese AI weather models like Shanghai AI Lab’s Fengwu, Huawei’s Pangu, and Fudan’s Fuxi worked alongside traditional forecasting, with Fengwu predicting the typhoon’s landfall time and location within 30 minutes and 30km five days out. China is emerging as a leader in AI weather prediction, though such models still lag traditional systems in forecasting storm intensity.

Hong Kong police arrest 10 for dangerous driving in first drone-assisted traffic crackdown: Hong Kong police arrested 10 drivers for dangerous driving on the Kwun Tong Bypass in their first drone-assisted traffic operation, using aerial surveillance alongside unmarked “stealth cars” to gather evidence.

A fake website and a deluge of CVs: the Australian firm embroiled in an FBI probe into alleged Chinese espionage: A small Brisbane consultancy, Horizzen, discovered a fake AI-generated website impersonating its identity had been used as part of a broader Chinese intelligence recruitment network targeting Western defense and security experts.

Diaspora Community & Transnational Repression 海外社群和跨国镇压

HRIC on Twitter/X: According to Voice of America, the U.S. Select Committee on China and the Committee on Education and the Workforce recently jointly released a 53-page report accusing Harvard of failing to adequately protect U.S. scientific research outcomes and national security from CCP infiltration. Harvard denied the report’s characterization of the university’s conduct but expressed agreement with the two committees’ concerns about geopolitical threats, including those from the CCP.

UK confirms ex-Hong Kong lawmaker Wu Chi-wai will not face deportation after immigration hiccups: The UK Home Office confirmed former Hong Kong Democratic Party leader Wu Chi-wai will not face deportation, with the migration minister stating overseas convictions shouldn’t automatically bar BNO settlement applications, following advocacy from ex-governor Chris Patten after Wu’s rocky Heathrow entry.

A World out of Words: This profile traces the history of Shanghai’s legendary Jifeng bookstore, which was closed by Chinese authorities in 2018 after two decades as a hub for liberal intellectual life, and its 2024 rebirth as JF Books in Washington, D.C., exploring themes of exile, censorship, and diaspora identity. The piece questions whether a bookstore built on Chinese repression can sustain itself financially and politically in an increasingly hostile American landscape.

Taiwan court sentences a woman to 7 years in prison for conspiring with Chinese officials: Hsu Chun-ying, a “mainland spouse” advocate born in China, was sentenced to seven years for violating Taiwan’s Anti-Infiltration Act by coordinating with Chinese officials on political strategy and illegally transferring $760,000 from China, in a case that intensified scrutiny of the mainland-spouse community.

Related: In Taiwan, Chinese-born spouses face questions of loyalty and, some say, discrimination. Around 369,000 “mainland spouses” in Taiwan face unequal citizenship rules and suspicion of CCP loyalty amid rising cross-strait tensions. Legal distinctions treat China-born spouses differently from other foreign spouses, requiring longer waits for citizenship and government jobs.

German journalist was followed by Chinese woman in Taiwan: Bureau: Taiwan’s Investigation Bureau confirmed German scholar Jürgen Kremb, who researches Chinese intelligence, was tailed by a Chinese woman with a northern Chinese accent while vacationing in Alishan in 2025.

Uyghurs residing in Australia have been repeatedly questioned when returning to their hometowns to visit relatives. Chinese officials have demanded that they secretly film Uyghur activities in Australia, saying, “You have to give us an explanation.”: Human Rights Watch reports that the Chinese authorities interrogate Uyghur Australians visiting family in Xinjiang, pressuring them to surveil and report on Uyghur activists, language schools, and community organizations back in Australia, using family separation as leverage.

China slams ‘groundless’ espionage claims by New Zealand spy agency: China’s embassy in Wellington called “groundless” and “fabricated” a New Zealand intelligence report alleging Beijing conducts espionage “at scale,” including an attempt to covertly install space-tracking infrastructure via the military-linked Purple Mountain Observatory.

Amnesty International UK Chapter Launches “Uyghur Solidarity Month” Campaign: Amnesty International UK kicked off a month-long, volunteer-led August campaign featuring daily creative content from 30 Uyghur diaspora artists to build grassroots UK solidarity with Uyghur rights, timed near the fourth anniversary of the UN’s 2022 Xinjiang report.

Mass Protest in Chandigarh: Over 500 Tibetans Rally Against Chinese Genocide Law: Over 500 Tibetans from across North India rallied in Chandigarh, holding a candlelight vigil to denounce China’s “Ethnic Unity Law” as genocide and honoring 171 Tibetan martyrs including self-immolated activist Lobga Rangzen.

Tibetan delegation meets UNHRC special representative, presents six demands: A Tibetan delegation, accompanied by family members of Lobga Rangzen, met UN Human Rights Council Special Representative Anne Siyota to advocate for their six demands, including implementing past UN Tibet resolutions, dismantling China’s residential boarding-school system, and formally opposing Beijing’s new Ethnic Unity Law.

Human Rights Defenders & Civil Society 人权捍卫者与公民社会

HRIC on Twitter/X: According to RFA reports, 73-year-old Pastor Wang Sanyuan of Changchunli Church in Jinan has been deprived of his freedom for nearly five months since being taken away by police on March 17 this year. He suffers from cardiovascular and cerebrovascular diseases and has been hospitalized multiple times, raising serious concerns about his health.

HRIC on Twitter/X: The court statement by Li Yuanfeng (original name Li Weizhong), an independent journalist and human rights defender charged with “subversion of state power.” As Li explains, the evidence for this charge was drawn from his work defending the rights of migrant workers and promoting migrant worker literature.

HRIC on Twitter/X: Pastor Cao Sanqiang (John Cao), a U.S. permanent resident dedicated to Christian humanitarian relief, education, and charitable work in impoverished areas of China and along the China-Myanmar border, was arrested by Chinese authorities in March 5, 2017, for his humanitarian and missionary work and was subsequently sentenced to seven years in prison. HRIC has shared a petition calling for his release.

Translation: Migrant Worker Jing Shuren On Trial After Two-Year Detention for Reposting Unpaid Wage Complaints: Lanzhou migrant worker Jing Shuren, detained for two years, is now on trial for reposting online content about unpaid wages. A former journalist’s plea for his release was censored, and his lawyer reports being obstructed by security personnel outside court.

Teen gets 18-month probation for ‘seditious’ toilet graffiti, marking rare non-custodial sentence for nat. sec offence: 19-year-old Lung Kai-lok received an 18-month probation order—the first non-custodial sentence for a national security offense in Hong Kong—after pleading guilty to sedition for scrawling anti-government graffiti, including “Bomb Lee Ka-chiu to death,” in a Tsim Sha Tsui bathroom.

2019 protests: 6 seek appeals for obstructing justice over PolyU campus bridge escape: Six people convicted of perverting the course of justice for fleeing Hong Kong Polytechnic University via a bridge rope escape during the 2019 siege are appealing, arguing that merely accepting a getaway ride should not constitute an independent offense.

Hong Kong court acquits woman over possessing laser pointers in 2019: Ami Chan, arrested at 15 and charged years later after returning from Australia, was acquitted of possessing laser pointers and spray paint during the 2019 protests after a magistrate ruled she wasn’t near any demonstration when she was intercepted.

How an escalating crackdown on Hong Kong’s independent bookstores put Taiwan publishers in the spotlight: Hong Kong’s raids on independent bookstores, triggered partly by Customs intercepting “seditious” books shipped from Taiwan (including one featuring Uyghur and exiled Hong Konger interviews), have exposed the deep reliance of the city’s bookshops on Taiwanese publishers and sparked concerns Taiwanese publishers might now self-censor shipments to avoid implicating local sellers.

China’s Reach & Internal Control 中国: 内控与外扩

New visuals show intensified demolition at Larung Gar, monk detained after protest: New photos and videos show ongoing demolition at Larung Gar Buddhist Institute, part of a campaign begun July 13 targeting over 1,000 monastic residences, and a monk was detained on August 9 after displaying a portrait of the 10th Panchen Lama in protest from a residence marked for destruction.

HRIC on Twitter/X: According to Xinhua, former Premier Zhu Rongji passed away in Beijing on August 12, at the age of 97. Zhu, the CCP’s “iron-fisted reformer,” was also a ruthless tyrant.

Related: Late former premier Zhu Rongji used economics to tighten China’s grip on Tibet. Following the death of former Chinese premier Zhu Rongji at 98, Tibet experts noted his “Western Development Strategy” deepened Beijing’s political control over Tibet and accelerated migration into the region, seen by critics as blueprint for the Belt and Road Initiative.

China Pushes New Narrative Claiming Zhang Zhung Civilisation as the Origin of Tibetan Buddhism: UC Merced archaeology professor Mark Aldenderfer warned that the Chinese authorities force Tibetan historical and archaeological research to produce findings in alignment with state narratives, including the “Ethnic Unity and Progress Law” and Belt and Road propaganda. Thus, research must promote the narrative that the ancient Zhangzhung kingdom, not independent Tibetan tradition, is the true origin of Tibetan civilization and buddhism.

The Shoton Festival in Lhasa, Tibet, has been met with strict control over the unveiling of the Buddha statue, as the Chinese Communist Party intensifies restrictions on Tibetan religious activities: Lhasa’s Shoton Festival took place under heightened security and restrictions as Chinese authorities intensify control over Tibetan religious activities, continuing a pattern of heavy policing during major Buddhist observances.

Xi Jinping will skip UN ahead of Trump summit: Xi Jinping will skip the UN General Assembly during his planned September US trip, instead meeting Trump at the White House on September 24 for a tightly scoped bilateral summit. This will be his second in-person meeting with Trump this year.

International Responses 国际反应

Indian parliamentarians have called on New Delhi authorities to guarantee the safety of Tibetans in India and to take a firm stance in supporting Tibet: Indian parliamentarians called on New Delhi to guarantee the safety of Tibetans in India and take a firmer stance supporting Tibet, following a Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile advocacy campaign warning that China’s new Ethnic Unity Law extends Beijing’s capacity for transnational repression into India.

How China-India border tensions are rising again over encroachment claims: A fact-finding team from a BJP-allied Arunachal Pradesh party alleged that China has denied Indian army patrol access and encroached on land in the remote Upper Subansiri district, sparking political controversy in New Delhi just weeks before Xi Jinping’s expected BRICS visit to India.

‘TikTok wouldn’t open at all’: Taiwan simulates an internet blackout, with an eye on China threat: As part of annual Han Kuang military drills, Taiwan deliberately throttled mobile internet speeds across 14 cities for the first time, simulating a Chinese attack on communications infrastructure; TikTok and streaming became unusable while officials urged residents to prepare backup communication methods.

Merkley, Risch Lead Bipartisan Push to Strengthen the United States’ Commitment to Tibet: U.S. Senators Jeff Merkley and Jim Risch recently introduced the bipartisan Assuring the Future of Tibet Act, which would recognize the Central Tibetan Administration as Tibet’s legitimate representative, push for its UN observer status, and designate the Gaden Phodrang Trust as sole authority over future Dalai Lama recognition, thus ensuring U.S. support continues beyond the 14th Dalai Lama’s lifetime.

The Nepalese Prime Minister met separately with the Chinese and Indian ambassadors for the first time, drawing attention after the cancellation of the International Tibetology Conference: Nepal’s PM Balendra Shah broke from his practice of only meeting foreign ambassadors in groups, holding his first one-on-one meetings with India’s and China’s envoys on the same day. The shift drew attention, as it came right after Nepal’s cancellation of the International Tibetology Conference under reported Chinese pressure.

The west turns a blind eye to Xi Jinping’s repressive regime in China: Columnist Simon Tisdall argues that Western governments, particularly Britain, have grown fatalistic about confronting Xi Jinping’s human rights record, prioritizing short-term economic ties over consistent criticism.

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“Usually, it’s fathers who go to the police station to collect their sons. For me, it was a son going to the police station to collect his father.”

(Read the Chinese version here / 中文版)

On the afternoon of 1 July 2026, at Sera Monastery in Lhasa, Tibet, Zhang Yi, a retired man from Wuhan, saw a Tibetan woman praying and wanted to borrow a mat from her. They didn’t share a common language; she couldn’t speak Mandarin. Zhang Yi pulled out his mobile phone, found an old photograph, and showed it to her.

There were two people in the picture. One was the Dalai Lama, and the other was a friend Zhang Yi had known for years—a Han Chinese Buddhist monk who had previously been imprisoned in China for his beliefs. Only this spring, the two friends had travelled together across southern China for a fortnight.

Zhang Yi simply wanted to tell the woman in front of him: The man in this photo is my friend, and he has met the Dalai Lama.

Instead, the woman frantically waved her hands and quickly looked away. She didn’t dare to look.

Her reaction caught the attention of two men in black nearby. They walked over and demanded to see the photo as well. Zhang Yi ignored them and turned to leave. The two men in black exchanged a few more words in Tibetan with the woman.

Shortly after, while Zhang Yi and his brother were browsing souvenir stalls inside the monastery, they noticed the two men filming them on their mobile phones. Before the brothers could even step out of the monastery gates, the police had arrived. At around 5:30 PM, the pair were taken to the Lhasa Public Security Bureau.

His brother was later released; Zhang Yi was kept in custody.

A mat meant for prayer, an old photograph on a mobile phone, and a failed attempt at conversation—these ultimately became the entire basis for a case of “inciting separatism.”

“Usually, it’s fathers who go to the police station to collect their sons”

Following his father’s arrest, Zhang Hongyuan, living in the Netherlands, did not consider returning to China immediately.

This might differ from what people imagine a son’s instinctive reaction to be. But Zhang Hongyuan knew full well that going back wouldn’t save his father; it would likely just deprive his family of its only voice on the outside. In the Netherlands, he can contact local governments, international organizations, and friends across Europe. If he returned to China, he would almost certainly be forced into silence, just like his father.

“There is much more I can do on the outside,” he told Human Rights in China.

However, choosing not to return didn’t mean he didn’t want to bring his father home.

In truth, Zhang Hongyuan has been trying to do just that since he was a young teenager.

Once, he came home from school to find his father missing. After asking around, he discovered Zhang Yi had been taken to the police station again. Zhang Hongyuan was only fourteen or fifteen at the time. He walked into the police station alone and told the officers that he needed to eat and there were no adults left at home.

The staff at the station gave him a pot noodle. He sat there and waited.

“If you don’t let him go, I’m not leaving,” he said.

In later years, Zhang Hongyuan would often recount this memory with a bitter smile: “Usually, it’s fathers who go to the police station to collect their sons. For me, it was a son going to the police station to collect his father.”

That wasn’t the only time in his childhood he had to face the state apparatus invading his home.

One evening during the early days of Xi Jinping’s rule, a group of state security agents (guobao) and police escorted Zhang Yi home for a raid. Zhang Hongyuan remembers being about thirteen or fourteen. Seeing so many police officers standing in his house for the first time, he was understandably terrified. His father simply told him: “Don’t worry.”

Zhang Hongyuan went back to his room, shut the door, and began to play the piano.

Outside the door, the police were rummaging through their belongings and confiscating the computer; inside, a teenage boy played the piano non-stop. He couldn’t prevent the search, nor did he know if his father would be taken away again. The only thing he could do was use the music to drown out the noise outside, and to mask his own fear.

After the police left, he was the only one left in the flat.

Looking back years later, Zhang Hongyuan still remembers how his father came in to comfort him before being taken away. Zhang Yi always seemed to be comforting others, even when he was the one in real danger.

The place where his father ‘worked’

When he was little, Zhang Hongyuan didn’t know why the police kept taking his father away.

Even earlier on, Zhang Yi had taken him to an abandoned detention facility near Hanzheng Street. The building was being used by local merchants as a warehouse; it was dim and dilapidated. His father walked him around inside and said, “I used to stay here.”

Young Zhang Hongyuan misheard, thinking his father had said, “I used to work here.” In a child’s imagination, being a policeman was an impressive career. For a long time, he even believed his father used to be a police officer.

It wasn’t until secondary school that he realized it wasn’t a place his father had worked, but a place where he had been locked up.

Following Xi Jinping’s rise to power at the end of 2012, the crackdown on civil society and dissidents escalated rapidly. The following year, Zhang Yi began facing heavier surveillance for continuing to engage with civil society figures and attending a friend’s wedding. State security personnel came to his door every month to take his photograph. The history his father had carefully kept hidden could no longer be kept from his son.

That was when Zhang Hongyuan finally learned that his father’s life was permanently tethered to another year: 1989.

Zhang Yi graduated from university in 1988 with a degree in law. By 1989, he was working as an electrician for the Wuhan water board. He was not a “student leader” as some reports have claimed, but after the June Fourth crackdown, he joined the local protests in Wuhan and was arrested for blocking the Beijing-Guangzhou railway for roughly two hours. The family still keeps the old newspapers that reported the incident.

More than three decades later, Zhang Yi still talks about that year. He once told those close to him: “I should have died in ‘89. I didn’t die; I’m just dying late.”

To Zhang Hongyuan, this wasn’t an expression of suicidal thoughts, but rather his father’s way of explaining the rest of his life. For Zhang Yi, 1989 never truly ended. Every time he voiced support for someone, visited a political prisoner, or was summoned and detained, it felt like a long, drawn-out echo of that year.

When he first learned the truth as a young teenager, Zhang Hongyuan told his father: “Dad, I think you’re brilliant.”

But “brilliance” woven into the daily fabric of family life isn’t always an easy burden to bear.

A great father, but also one his son once resented

Zhang Hongyuan does not paint his father as a flawless hero who never caused his family pain.

He remembers the family’s hardest times. His father was under constant surveillance, which restricted his job prospects. The family drove a cheap Alto, and during Chinese New Year, they sometimes had to borrow ten or twenty thousand yuan from friends just to get by.

Back then, he felt aggrieved.

He saw other fathers focusing on their careers, making money, and providing for their families, while his father was always at civil society gatherings: supporting someone today, visiting someone else tomorrow, attending a friend’s funeral the day after. Then would come the state security visits, the summons, the police stations, and a family constantly waiting for the next crisis.

It’s hard for a child not to ask: Why can’t my dad just focus entirely on our family, like everyone else?

Zhang Hongyuan admits he used to resent him. Not because he thought his father was doing the wrong thing, but because political persecution never just targets one person. It seeps through the front door, onto the dinner table, into a child’s school fees and holidays, and eventually alters how a family views one another.

Later, through a friend who had also been imprisoned, Zhang Yi started working as a distributor in Wuhan for Dawu Liquor, owned by the entrepreneur Sun Dawu. The family’s income finally stabilized, and Zhang Hongyuan’s school fees and living expenses were no longer such a stretch.

Zhang Yi wasn’t actually a good drinker. His son recalls that in the early years, a small glass was enough to make him drunk. He slowly trained himself to handle alcohol just to do the job. This man, who rarely bowed to reality throughout his life, was learning in his own way how to be a father who needed to put food on the table.

Yet, he never stopped participating in public affairs.

Zhang Yi would take his son to gatherings within the Wuhan citizen circles, introducing him to his friends. Sitting at the dinner table, Zhang Hongyuan listened to these people share their experiences of being detained, suppressed, and stripped of their rights. Hearing and seeing so much, he slowly came to realize that his father wasn’t constantly stepping out the door because he didn’t care about their home.

It was precisely because he couldn’t only care about his own home.

“Many people only realize that someone has always been resisting on their behalf when the iron fist finally smashes into their own interests,” Zhang Hongyuan said.

The resentment his father once made him feel eventually transformed into a more complex understanding: Zhang Yi might not have been a father who could shelter his family from the storm, but he was a man who couldn’t pretend not to notice when others were drowning in it.

The state security agent who came to the house to ‘make friends’

The person responsible for Zhang Yi’s long-term surveillance was a local state security (guobao) chief in Wuhan. Zhang Hongyuan said that at the time, his father was one of the primary “stability maintenance targets” in their district. The agent once explicitly stated he wanted to “make friends” with the father and son, even coming to their home to eat and drink, staying until 11 PM.

Zhang Hongyuan, still in secondary school, finally couldn’t take it anymore. He told the man very seriously: “You need to leave. You are not welcome in our home. We need to sleep, and your wife and children are waiting for you at home too. You need to leave right now.”

The agent eventually went downstairs. Before leaving, he remarked to Zhang Yi how surprised he was that Zhang Hongyuan, who was younger than his own son, dared to speak to him like that.

From that day on, Zhang Hongyuan never saw him again.

But out of sight didn’t mean the surveillance was gone.

During politically sensitive periods, Zhang Yi would be forcibly taken out of Wuhan—a practice state security referred to as a “forced holiday” (被旅游). Zhang Hongyuan experienced this alongside his father twice. The two of them would travel, flanked by four state security agents. Food, accommodation, and transport were all paid for out of special funds. Zhang Hongyuan saw with his own eyes how meals that cost a few hundred yuan were invoiced for one or two thousand, and a thousand-yuan hotel stay was receipted as three thousand.

To him, his father wasn’t just treated as a person needing control; he had been turned into a profitable “stability maintenance project.” The state security agent was the “project manager,” and Zhang Yi was the asset.

Later, as local government budgets tightened, these “holidays” became much more basic. Agents stopped taking Zhang Yi out of town. Instead, they would find a farmhouse on the outskirts of Wuhan and lock him in for a few days. He might be able to fish and eat, and it didn’t look like a prison, but he couldn’t leave, nor could he decide where to spend his time.

In China, controlling a person doesn’t always require a prison cell. Sometimes it’s a car trailing behind them, a dinner table shared with monitors, a farmhouse room they cannot freely leave, or a man who turns up on schedule every month to take a photograph.

“I knew he would definitely be arrested, it was just a matter of time”

Zhang Hongyuan eventually left China and moved to the Netherlands.

The very day he left, a media outlet reported on his situation. The local police station immediately deployed officers to put Zhang Yi under 24-hour rotational surveillance. From April right through until the end of the June Fourth anniversary, three people took turns guarding him.

The father remained in China; the son gained his freedom. For Zhang Hongyuan, these two realities could never truly be separated.

During a festival in Amsterdam, seeing people who had moved from China to Europe dancing freely in the crowd, he unexpectedly broke down in tears. He later understood this feeling as survivor’s guilt: Why do I get to live in a free country, while countless people I know are still living in fear?

“I can’t just enjoy a free life in the Netherlands and forget everything back home,” he said.

Foreign friends advised him not to worry so much, telling him not to carry the weight of the world on his shoulders. His response was: “Because I love this world. All these people and events have something to do with me.”

Freedom didn’t sever his ties to the past; it only made his attachments sharper. He knew that his departure could put his father at even greater risk.

“From the day I got out, I knew Zhang Yi would definitely be arrested. It was just a matter of time,” he noted.

Because of this, he spent three years preparing for the day his father would actually be taken. He built networks, identified governments, institutions, and human rights workers to turn to, and constantly mapped out who he should contact first, what he should say, and how to get the word out as quickly as possible when that day finally came.

A son spent three years preparing for his father’s inevitable arrest.

This preparation couldn’t numb the pain when it actually happened. It only ensured that when the agony arrived, he wouldn’t be entirely paralyzed.

“From the outside I have been constantly speaking out and rallying support, and I will never back down!” Zhang Hongyuan stated.

Who exactly did one photograph ‘incite’?

On 18 July, Zhang Yi was moved from administrative detention to criminal detention, held at the Lhasa Detention Centre on suspicion of “inciting separatism .” About twelve days later, his formal arrest was approved.

Lawyers hired by the family attempted to visit him, but because such cases are categorized under “endangering state security,” the scope for legal defense is extremely limited. The family also worries that the authorities might impose a “government-appointed lawyer,” severing Zhang Yi’s contact with the legal counsel his family actually trusts.

The pressure quickly rippled from Lhasa back to Wuhan.

In late July, municipal and district state security officers sought out Zhang Yi’s brother. Presenting screenshots of reports published by Human Rights in China and other human rights websites, they interrogated him about whether he was in touch with Zhang Hongyuan overseas and whether he had leaked details of the case. The agents demanded that Zhang Hongyuan “stay quiet on the outside,” “stop exaggerating propaganda,” and warned that he “will have to return to China eventually.”

This is a language the families of Chinese dissidents know intimately: using the safety of loved ones as a tool to gag those who might speak out.

But Zhang Hongyuan read a different message from their visit.

“The fact that they went out of their way to visit over this proves that they saw it, and they care,” he said.

This is exactly why he insists on speaking out publicly. Silence has never guaranteed a father’s safety; it only makes it easier for an unjust imprisonment to carry on in the dark.

The charge against Zhang Yi stems from Article 103 of China’s Criminal Law. In the political rhetoric of the Chinese authorities, the Dalai Lama has long been branded a “separatist,” even though he publicly abandoned the pursuit of Tibetan independence years ago, seeking instead genuine autonomy within the framework of the PRC. In Tibet, merely possessing or displaying his photograph can invite severe punishment.

But even understanding this political backdrop, Zhang Hongyuan cannot accept the fundamental logic behind the charge.

“A tourist in Lhasa showed a photo of the Dalai Lama to someone who didn’t even share his language, someone who was too scared to even look at it—and they say he incited separatism ,” he questioned. “What did he incite? And what did he secede?”

Zhang Yi didn’t organize a rally, he didn’t give a speech, and he didn’t persuade anyone to support Tibetan independence. He simply pulled out a photo of a friend and tried to strike up a conversation with a stranger.

Perhaps what is truly terrifying isn’t the photograph itself, but the fact that in a highly controlled environment, a person still retains a memory that isn’t dictated by orders: he recognizes the man in the photo, and he is willing to let others see it.

“Speaking out is definitely useful”

Zhang Hongyuan is fully aware that the outlook for his father’s case is grim.

Zhang Yi’s involvement in 1989, his three decades of public engagement since, and his son’s political activities abroad could all serve as excuses for the authorities to “settle old scores.” For this reason, the family and lawyers are incredibly cautious, desperate to ensure no unverified claims are used to exacerbate the case.

But caution does not mean silence.

“Speaking out is definitely useful,” Zhang Hongyuan stressed repeatedly.

This statement isn’t born of blind optimism. He knows that an article, a letter, or a public statement might not instantly throw open the detention center doors. But the fact that state security agents ordered the family to stay quiet proves in itself that the authorities do care whether the outside world is watching.

For Zhang Hongyuan, speaking out achieves at least one thing: it ensures his father isn’t silently erased from the world.

Many years ago, he sat in a police station with a pot noodle, telling the officers: “If you don’t let him go, I’m not leaving.” Back then, he was just a child powerless against the state apparatus. All he could do was stay put and let the police know someone was waiting outside the door.

Today, he is separated from his father by national borders, a detention center, and a judicial system that refuses to operate in the light. He can no longer sit in the corridor of the Lhasa Detention Centre and wait, nor can he personally bring his father home.

What he can still do is stay put—only this time, he is standing squarely in the public eye.

“I am campaigning, I am not running away, and I will absolutely not back down,” he said.

It seems Zhang Yi’s life never truly moved past 1989; and Zhang Hongyuan’s upbringing was defined by one attempt after another to bring his father home. Thirty-seven years later, the same force has once again separated this father and son across two different countries.

The woman in Sera Monastery ultimately never got a clear look at the photograph. Yet, because of Zhang Yi’s arrest, the very picture she was too afraid to look at is now being seen by many more.

Inside the photograph, a monk stands beside the Dalai Lama. Outside the photograph, a newly retired man from Wuhan is locked up in Lhasa; and his son is in Europe, repeating his father’s name over and over again.

He is waiting for his father to come home.

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“人家都是父亲去派出所领儿子，我是儿子去派出所领父亲。”

2026年7月1日下午，西藏拉萨色拉寺。

来自武汉的退休人士张毅看见一名藏族妇女正在朝拜，便想向她借一块垫子。两人语言不通，对方不会说汉语。张毅掏出手机，翻出一张旧照片，递到她面前。

照片里有两个人。一个是达赖喇嘛，另一个是张毅相识多年的朋友，一名汉传佛教僧人。这个朋友曾因信仰在中国坐牢。今年春天，两人还曾一同在中国南方游历半个月。

张毅原本只是想告诉眼前的妇女：照片里的这个人是我的朋友，他见过达赖喇嘛。

妇女却连连摆手，慌忙避开视线。她不敢看。

她的反应引起了附近两名黑衣男子的注意。两人走过来，也要求查看照片。张毅没有理他们，转身离开了。两个黑衣人又用藏语与妇女交谈了几句。

不久后，张毅和同行的弟弟在寺内浏览纪念品摊位时，发现那两名男子举起手机对着他们录像。兄弟俩尚未走出寺门，警察已经赶到。下午约五时半，两人被带往拉萨市公安局。

弟弟后来获释，张毅被留下。

一块用来朝拜的垫子，一张手机里的旧照片，一次没有说通的话，后来成为一宗“煽动分裂国家”案的全部起点。

“人家都是父亲去派出所领儿子”

张毅被捕后，远在荷兰的张弘远没有想过立即回国。

这或许与人们想象中一个儿子的本能反应不同。但张弘远很清楚，回去并不能救出父亲，还可能让这个家庭失去唯一能够在外面发声的人。在荷兰，他可以联系当地政府、国际机构和欧洲各国的朋友；回到中国，他很可能与父亲一样，被迫沉默。

“我在外面可以做的事情更多。”他对中国人权说。

只是，不回去并不意味着他不想把父亲领回家。

事实上，从十几岁开始，张弘远就在做这件事。

有一次，他放学回家，发现父亲不见了。打听后才知道，张毅又被带到了派出所。那时的张弘远不过十四五岁。他一个人走进派出所，对警察说，自己要吃饭，家里已经没有大人了。

派出所的人给了他一碗泡面。他就坐在那里等。

“你们不放他，我就不走。”他说。

后来，张弘远常用一句带着苦笑的话讲起这段往事：“人家都是父亲去派出所领儿子，我是儿子去派出所领父亲。”

那不是他童年里唯一一次面对闯入家门的国家机器。

习近平上台初期的一天晚上，一群国保和警察带着张毅回家搜查。张弘远记得，当时自己大约十三四岁。第一次看见那么多警察站在家里，他当然害怕。父亲对他说：“不要担心。”

张弘远回到自己的房间，关上门，开始弹琴。

门外，警察翻查家里的物品，搬走电脑；门内，一个十几岁的孩子不停地弹琴。他无法阻止搜查，也不知道父亲会不会再次被带走。他唯一能做的，是用琴声盖住外面的动静，也盖住自己的恐惧。

警察离开后，屋子里只剩下他一个人。

多年以后回想起来，张弘远仍然记得父亲在被带走前进来安慰他的样子。张毅似乎总是在安慰别人，哪怕真正身处危险的人是他自己。

父亲“工作过”的地方

张弘远小时候并不知道父亲为什么会不断被警察带走。

更早的时候，张毅曾带他去过汉正街附近一处已经废弃的看守场所。建筑后来被商户当作仓库使用，里面昏暗、陈旧。父亲带着他在里面走了一圈，说：“我以前在这里待过。”

年幼的张弘远听错了，以为父亲说的是“在这里工作过”。在孩子的想象里，警察是一个威风的职业。很长一段时间，他甚至以为父亲曾经当过警察。

直到上初中后，他才明白，那不是父亲工作过的地方，而是父亲被关押过的地方。

2012年底习近平上台后，对民间社会和异议人士的压制迅速收紧。次年，张毅因为继续接触公民社会人士并参加朋友的婚礼，开始受到更频繁的监控。国保人员每月上门给他拍照。父亲过去一直小心藏起来的那段历史，也终于无法再向儿子隐瞒。

张弘远这才知道，父亲的人生停留着另一个年份：1989。

张毅在1988年完成大学学业，学的是法律。1989年时，他已经在武汉的自来水系统做电工，并非一些报道中所称的“学生领袖”。但六四镇压发生后，他参加了武汉当地的抗议，并因阻拦京广铁路约两小时而被捕。家里至今保存着当年报道此事的旧报纸。

三十多年后，张毅仍会谈起那一年。他曾对身边的人说：“八九年我就该死了。我没有死，只是晚死了。”

在张弘远看来，这句话并不是在表达轻生，而更像是父亲对自己余生的一种解释。在张毅的生命里，1989年并没有结束。此后每一次声援、每一次探望政治犯、每一次被传唤和拘押，都像是那一年漫长的回声。

刚知道真相时，尚在读初中的张弘远对父亲说：“爸爸，我觉得你好伟大。”

但“伟大”落进一个家庭的日常里，并不总是一个轻盈的词。

伟大的父亲，也曾是一个让儿子埋怨的父亲

张弘远并没有把父亲写成一个从未令家人受伤的英雄。

他记得家里最困难的时候。父亲常年受到监控，工作机会也受到限制。家里开的是一辆便宜的奥拓，逢年过节甚至要向朋友借一两万元，才能把日子撑过去。

那时候，他也会委屈。

他看见别人的父亲专心工作、赚钱、养家，而自己的父亲总是在参加公民聚会：今天声援这个人，明天去探望另一个人，后天又参加某个朋友的葬礼。接着是国保上门，是传唤，是派出所，是一家人对下一次意外的等待。

一个孩子很难不问：为什么父亲不能像别人一样，把全部心思放在自己的家里？

张弘远承认，自己曾经埋怨过。不是因为他认为父亲做错了，而是因为政治迫害从来不会只落在一个人身上。它会进入家门，进入餐桌，进入孩子的学费和新年，最后进入一个家庭看待彼此的方式。

后来，张毅经一位曾经入狱的朋友介绍，开始为企业家孙大午旗下的大午酒业在武汉经销白酒。家庭收入才逐渐稳定下来，张弘远的学费和生活费也不再那么捉襟见肘。

张毅其实不善饮酒。儿子说，早年一小杯就足以让他醉倒。为了做这份工作，他才慢慢练到能喝一点。这个一生很少向现实低头的人，也用自己的方式学习做一个需要养家的父亲。

可他仍没有停止参与公共事务。

张毅会带儿子参加武汉公民圈的聚会，让他认识自己的朋友。张弘远在饭桌边听那些人讲述被拘留、被打压、被剥夺权利的经历。听得多了，见得多了，他慢慢明白，父亲不断走出家门，并不是因为不在乎这个家。

恰恰是因为他无法只在乎自己的家。

“很多人只有自己的利益被铁拳砸到时，才会明白，原来一直有人在替他们反抗。”张弘远说。

父亲曾经让他感到的委屈，后来变成一种更复杂的理解：张毅或许不是一个能让家人避开风浪的父亲，却是一个无法假装看不见别人正在风浪中的人。

那个来家里“交朋友”的国保

长期监控张毅的，是武汉当地一名国保负责人。张弘远说，当时张毅是所在辖区最主要的“维稳对象”之一。对方曾直言要和他们父子“做朋友”，还到家里吃饭、喝酒，一直坐到深夜十一时。

那时仍在读初中的张弘远终于忍不住，十分严肃地对他说：“你该走了。我们家不欢迎你。我们要休息，你的老婆和孩子也在家里等你，你赶快走。”

那名国保最终下了楼。临走时，他对张毅感叹，张弘远明明比自己的儿子还小，却敢这样同他说话。

从那以后，张弘远再也没有见过他。

但看不见，并不等于监控消失了。

在一些政治敏感时期，张毅会被强行带离武汉，进入维稳人员口中的“被旅游”。张弘远曾两次与父亲一同经历这种日子。父子两人出行，身边却跟着四名维稳人员。吃饭、住宿和交通都从专项经费中支付，而张弘远亲眼看见，实际只花几百元的餐费会被要求开出一两千元的发票，只花一千多元的住宿会开成三千元。

在他看来，父亲不仅被当作一个必须控制的人，也被变成了一项可以带来经费的“维稳项目”。国保是“项目经理”，张毅则是项目本身。

后来，随着地方财政日益紧张，“被旅游”也变得简陋。维稳人员不再把张毅带往外地，只在武汉市郊找一家农庄，把他关上几天。那里或许可以钓鱼、吃饭，看起来不像监狱，但他不能离开，也不能决定自己在哪里度过那些日子。

在中国，控制一个人未必总要使用牢房。有时是一辆跟随他的汽车，一桌由监控者陪同的饭，一间不能自行离开的农庄客房，或者一个每月准时上门拍照的人。

“我知道他一定会被抓，只是早晚”

张弘远后来离开中国，前往荷兰。

他离开的当天，有媒体报道了他的情况。当地派出所随即派人对张毅实施二十四小时轮班监控。从四月一直到六四纪念日结束，三个人轮流守着他。

父亲留在中国，儿子得到自由。对张弘远而言，这两件事从来无法真正分开。

在阿姆斯特丹的一次节日活动中，他看见从中国来到欧洲的人在人群中自由跳舞，竟忍不住哭了。他后来把那种情绪理解为幸存者的内疚：为什么自己可以生活在一个自由的国家，而无数熟悉的人仍留在恐惧中？

“我没有办法在荷兰享受自由的生活，然后忘掉国内的一切。”他说。

有外国朋友劝他不要担心太多，不要把全世界的问题都背在自己身上。他的回答是：“因为我爱这个世界。所有的人和事，都和我有关系。”

自由没有让他与过去切割，反而使那份牵挂变得更清晰。他知道，自己的离开也可能让父亲面临更大风险。

“从我出来的那一天起，我就知道张毅一定会被抓，只是早晚。”他说。

因此，在父亲真正出事之前，他已经准备了三年。他建立联系，寻找能够求助的政府、机构和人权工作者，反复设想那一天到来后自己应当先联系谁、说什么、如何让外界尽快知道。

一个儿子用三年时间，为父亲迟早会到来的被捕作准备。

这种准备并不能减轻事情真正发生时的痛苦。它只能让他在痛苦到来时，不至于完全失去行动的能力。

“我在外面一直讲，我奔走呼号，绝不退让！” 张弘远说。

一张照片，究竟“煽动”了谁？

7月18日，张毅从行政拘留转为刑事拘留，被羁押在拉萨看守所，涉嫌“煽动分裂国家”。约十二天后，他被正式批准逮捕。

家属聘请的律师试图会见，但这类案件被归入“危害国家安全”范畴，辩护空间极为有限。家人也担心，当局可能安排所谓的“政府指定律师”，切断张毅与家属真正信任的律师之间的联系。

压力很快从拉萨传回武汉。

7月下旬，武汉市及辖区国保找到张毅的弟弟，拿出中国人权及其他人权网站刊登的报道截图，追问他是否与海外的张弘远联系、是否向他透露案情。国保要求张弘远“在外面噤声”，“不要夸大宣传”，并警告说他“以后总要回国的”。

这是中国异议人士家属极为熟悉的一种语言：把亲人的安危变成封住一个人嘴巴的工具。

张弘远却从这次上门中读出了另一层信息。

“他们专门为这个上门，就证明他们看到了，而且他们在意。”他说。

这也是他坚持公开发声的原因。沉默从来不能确保父亲安全，只会让一场不公正的关押更容易在无人看见的地方继续。

张毅所面对的指控源自中国《刑法》第一百零三条。在中国当局的政治语境中，达赖喇嘛长期被贴上“分裂主义者”的标签，即使他早已公开放弃西藏独立主张，转而寻求在中华人民共和国框架内实现真正自治。在西藏，持有或展示他的照片本身就可能招致惩罚。

但即使了解这些政治背景，张弘远仍无法接受这项指控最基本的逻辑。

“一个游客在拉萨展示了一张达赖喇嘛的照片，给一个语言都不通、甚至不敢看的人看了一眼，就说他煽动分裂国家。”他问，“他煽动了什么？又分裂了什么？”

张毅没有组织集会，没有发表演讲，也没有劝说任何人支持西藏独立。他只是拿出一张朋友的合照，试图与一个陌生人说上一句话。

真正令人恐惧的，或许并不是那张照片，而是一个人在高度管控的地方仍然保留着不受命令支配的记忆：他认得照片里的人，也愿意让别人看见。

“声援一定是有用的”

张弘远很清楚，父亲的案子前景并不乐观。

张毅的1989年经历、此后三十多年的公共参与，以及儿子在海外的政治活动，都可能成为当局“算旧账”的理由。家属和律师因此格外谨慎，不希望任何未经证实的说法被用来加重案件。

但谨慎不等于沉默。

“声援一定是有用的。”张弘远反复强调。

这句话并非出自盲目的乐观。他知道，一篇报道、一封信或一次公开表态未必能立即打开看守所的门。但国保要求家属噤声，本身已经说明，当局并非不在乎外界是否看见。

对张弘远而言，发声至少能够做到一件事：让父亲不被悄无声息地从世界上抹去。

许多年前，他坐在派出所里，守着一碗泡面，对警察说：“你们不放他，我就不走。”那时候，他只是一个没有能力与国家机器对抗的孩子。他能做的，只有留在那里，让警察知道门外还有人在等。

如今，他与父亲之间隔着国境、看守所和一套拒绝公开运作的司法制度。他已经无法再坐在拉萨看守所的走廊里等，也不能亲手把父亲领回家。

他能做的仍然是留下来，只是这一次，他留在公众的视线中。

“我奔走，不逃，绝不退让。”他说。

张毅的一生似乎始终没有真正走出1989年；张弘远的成长，也始终伴随着一次又一次把父亲领回家的尝试。三十七年后，这对父子又被同一种力量分隔在两个国家。

色拉寺里的那名妇女最终没有看清照片。可正因为张毅被捕，这张她不敢看的照片如今被更多人看见。

照片里，一名僧人站在达赖喇嘛身旁。照片外，一名刚退休的武汉人被关在拉萨；他的儿子则在欧洲，一遍遍讲述父亲的名字。

他在等父亲回家。

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On August 6, China announced restrictions on drone exports to the United States and blacklisted six entities in response to trade sanctions imposed by Washington over forced labour and national security concerns. In a surprising turn of events, Human Rights in China (HRIC) was listed as one of the six sanctioned entities. The Chinese government’s decision to sanction HRIC is a blatant act of retaliation against entities working to ensure that international trade and commerce are not tainted by forced labor and other serious human rights abuses. It is another attempt by the Chinese government to intimidate and silence organizations that advocate for universal human rights and corporate accountability. Read our full statement here.

Following the announcement, Pulse HK released a report discussing reactions from Chinese internet users behind the Great Firewall, who learned about HRIC’s existence for the first time. HRIC has also faced increasing cyberattacks on our platforms, including DDoS attacks.

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Law & Policy 法律与政策

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Cyber Security & Digital Rights 网络安全与数字权利

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ByteDance trains massive AI model in bid to rival Anthropic: ByteDance is pre-training a roughly 10-trillion-parameter AI model — more than triple the size of Moonshot’s Kimi K3 — aiming to approach the scale of Anthropic’s Mythos system, per industry estimates. The project reflects intensifying competition among Chinese AI labs to match or exceed US frontier models, amid earlier US accusations that Moonshot’s Kimi K3 was built by distilling Anthropic’s technology.

Royal Navy drone cameras linked to China raise security concerns: Cameras on the UK Royal Navy’s Chinese-component K3 Scout surveillance drones, used by UK special forces, were found sending routine “heartbeat” signals to a device in China during a cybersecurity assessment. The UK Ministry of Defence stated that no sensitive data was compromised but has cut the drones’ internet connectivity. The incident adds to mounting concern over Chinese-made components embedded in Western military and critical infrastructure systems.

HRIC on Twitter/X: Forbes reported on August 5 that U.S. AI data labeling companies are supplying OpenAI, Anthropic, and even the U.S. military on one hand, while selling the same sets of training data to China’s top AI labs on the other. For years, Washington has imposed layer upon layer of restrictions on chips, yet has done almost nothing to regulate training data.

Diaspora Community & Transnational Repression 海外社群和跨国镇压

Professor suspended for ‘hiding Tiananmen reference’ in Tokyo university website: The University of Tokyo suspended a professor for three days after he embedded “six four Tiananmen” characters in his department’s website code between 2020 and 2023, likely causing China’s Great Firewall to block the page for mainland Chinese visitors, including prospective students. The university called the act “unbecoming of a faculty member” and revised its code-verification procedures.

China expresses ‘grave concern’ as internal documents reveal suicide warning before death in Melbourne immigration detention: A Chinese woman died by suicide in a Melbourne immigration detention center on July 10, despite internal documents showing staff had been warned of her self-harm risk. Victoria Police called the death non-suspicious, but scrutiny has intensified on contractor Secure Journeys.

HRIC on Twitter/X: On July 24, HRIC hosted an event, “China’s Human Rights Issues from the Perspective of a Younger Generation,” at NYU School of Law to highlight the work of this year’s Summer Intern Program. HRIC staff, intern mentors, legal scholars, students, and members of the public gathered to discuss contemporary human rights challenges in China and practical approaches to advocacy, legal research, and community organizing.

Anguish and hope: why Tibetan activist Lobga Rangzen set himself on fire in New York: A profile of Lobga Rangzen (born Lobsang Palden), a 52-year-old Tibetan activist and Uber driver who self-immolated outside UN headquarters on July 2, reveals he meticulously planned the act, leaving a farewell video declaring it a sacrifice “for the Tibetan nation.” His death, on the eve of China’s new “Ethnic Unity” law, has galvanized exiled Tibetan activists into a rallying point for renewed protest.

Tibetans protested the Chinese Communist Party’s “National Unity Law” at the Chinese Consulate in Mumbai: Around 15–20 (reports vary, with other accounts citing over 250) Tibetan refugees and Tibetan Youth Congress members protested outside the Chinese Consulate in Mumbai against Beijing’s new “Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law,” with several detained by police while attempting to deliver a memorandum. The protest was part of a coordinated global campaign launched by Tibetan exile groups following the law’s July 1 implementation.

Human Rights Defenders & Civil Society 人权捍卫者与公民社会

Tibetan monk critically ill two years after detention over Kamtok dam protests: Gonpo Tsering, a monastery administrator detained during 2024 protests against the Kamtok hydropower dam, remains in critical condition after being severely beaten in custody, where he sustained brain injuries and lost his ability to speak.

HRIC on Twitter/X: In China, human rights lawyers do not face mere one-time punishments, but a “social death” that extends from the courtroom to their doorstep, from their profession to their daily lives. An analysis recently published in Asia Democracy Chronicles points out that the authorities rarely rely solely on a criminal sentence; instead, they layer administrative measures, economic strangulation, daily surveillance, and personal control, ensuring that even after release from prison, the individual has no possibility of regaining an autonomous life.

Chinese activist Zhang Xinyan, wanted by Hong Kong gov’t, finally arrives in Canada after Thailand detention: Falun Gong practitioner and Hong Kong Parliament member Zhang Xinyan, who is wanted by Hong Kong national security police, finally reached Canada following a three-month ordeal in Thailand where she was detained and very nearly deported to China.

‘Isolated incident’: Hong Kong halts investigation into jailed media tycoon Jimmy Lai’s Next Digital as liquidation proceeds: Hong Kong’s government formally closed its five-year investigation into Jimmy Lai’s Next Digital (Apple Daily’s parent company) as it undergoes liquidation, with the finance chief calling the firm’s governance issues “an isolated incident.”

Hong Kong 47: 11 jailed democrats granted permission to appeal to top court: Eleven jailed pro-democracy figures from the landmark “Hong Kong 47” subversion case, including Leung Kwok-hung and Gwyneth Ho, were granted permission by the Court of Appeal to take their case to the Court of Final Appeal, the first time such issues will reach Hong Kong’s top court.

Pro-democracy retailer ordered to make multiple rectifications as Buildings Dep’t threatens court: As One, a pro-democracy shop known for distributing Tiananmen anniversary candles, was ordered by Hong Kong’s Buildings Department to fix multiple alleged defects, including its signboard and air conditioners, reflecting what advocates call heightened bureaucratic scrutiny of dissident-linked businesses.

5 years after arrests, passports returned to 8 figures not charged in Hong Kong 47 subversion case: Eight people arrested but never charged in the Hong Kong 47 case, including former lawmakers James To and Roy Kwong, finally had their passports returned more than five years after their 2021 arrests.

Barrister group asks court to overturn decision clearing democrat Margaret Ng of misconduct linked to 2019 protest conviction: Hong Kong’s Bar Association is seeking judicial review to overturn its own disciplinary tribunal’s decision that barrister and democracy figure Margaret Ng’s 2019 unauthorized-assembly conviction did not constitute professional misconduct.

Hong Kong’s Lingnan University Students’ Union disbands after 59 years: Hong Kong’s Lingnan University Students’ Union, founded in 1967, disbanded citing “changes in circumstances,” leaving only two of the city’s public universities with active student unions amid a broader post-2020 pattern of such groups folding.

Security chief slams press union’s ‘black-box’ leadership election, as chair cites ‘intense harassment’ for withheld candidate list: Security chief Chris Tang criticized the Hong Kong Journalists Association for not publicizing its leadership election candidates; HKJA’s chair said the secrecy was necessary due to “intense harassment campaigns” against board members in recent years.

China’s Reach & Internal Control 中国: 内控与外扩

A Tibetan studies conference is canceled in Nepal at the request of officials: Nepal’s government ordered Kathmandu University to withdraw from hosting the 17th IATS Tibetan studies seminar (expected to draw 700+ scholars) following sustained Chinese diplomatic pressure tied to fears of protests over Beijing’s new Ethnic Unity Law.

Related: Tibet conference in Nepal pushed online. Organizers moved the conference online instead, calling the last-minute intervention a “worrying development” with implications for academic freedom.

When Chinese parents outsource control over their adult children: A rebranded “internet addiction” industry in China now helps parents forcibly confine their legally independent adult children in private disciplinary institutions—sometimes for months—over their relationships, sleep habits, or careers, with police frequently declining to pursue cases. Investigations found facilities housing adults up to 33 years old, revealing a stark enforcement gap between adult civil rights on paper and the reality of parental coercion sold as a commercial service.

A rare glimpse into Tibet, where some hope to preserve language and customs despite China’s new law: On a Chinese government-organized trip, AP found Tibetans like a 73-year-old calligraphy student embracing their language even as China’s new “ethnic unity” law mandates Mandarin as the primary language for schools and government.

Africa wants more homegrown solar to boost self-reliance, but China’s shadow remains: African economies like Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia and Morocco are ramping up domestic solar manufacturing to reduce reliance on Chinese imports, even as Chinese renewable energy investment in Africa has reached $66 billion since 2010.

International Responses 国际反应

Nepal arrests senior foreign ministry official over fake travel documents issued to Tibetans: Nepal police arrested Foreign Ministry Joint Secretary Pushpa Raj Bhattarai in a 17-year-old case alleging he illegally issued travel documents to Tibetan refugees in 2009 without required approvals, diverting booklets meant for Nepal’s Cairo embassy to help Tibetans travel to Germany. If convicted, he faces up to three years in prison and a fine.

Taiwan kicks off annual military drills to counter a potential Chinese attack: Taiwan launched its annual 10-day Han Kuang exercises simulating a response to a Chinese invasion, testing 24-hour defense sustainment, “gray-zone tactics” countermeasures, and urban resilience drills for internet disruptions. The drills come as China maintains near-daily military pressure around the island and Taiwan awaits a pending $14 billion US arms sale.

Trump administration reportedly drafting ban on Chinese datacenter components: The FCC is reportedly developing a measure to block imports of new Chinese optical transceivers, which are components enabling high-speed data transfer in datacenters, over fears of espionage, malware, or service disruption, with publication targeted by year’s end. It follows earlier FCC bans on Chinese routers, drones, and humanoid robots, part of broader Trump administration efforts to curb Chinese tech in critical U.S. infrastructure.

Pacific nations fail to agree on statement condemning China missile test: The Pacific Islands Forum failed to reach consensus on a joint statement condemning China’s short-notice intercontinental ballistic missile test last month, which landed near Solomon Islands, Nauru, and Tuvalu; New Zealand’s foreign minister accused holdout members (understood to include China-friendly Kiribati and Nauru) of appeasing “outsiders” rather than regional interests.

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HRIC’s summer interns presented the Campus Human Rights Advocacy Handbook, which they developed collaboratively, as well as their individual research projects on rural women’s land rights, labor rights in Belt and Road Initiative projects, transnational repression, and the use of data analysis in human rights documentation.

(Chinese version here / 中文版)

Cultivating a New Generation of Human Rights Advocates

In his opening remarks, HRIC Executive Director Zhou Fengsuo introduced the goals of the summer internship program. He explained that the program is an important part of HRIC’s long-term strategy to engage university students in human rights work, cultivate a new generation of human rights advocates, and prepare future leaders.

He emphasized that the summer projects are only a starting point and that HRIC hopes to build lasting relationships with these young advocates. He also shared examples of former interns who continued their involvement in human rights and activism after completing the program and exchanged ideas with the interns about working in the NGO sector.

The Campus Human Rights Advocacy Handbook: From Security to Organization-Building

The first half of the event focused on the Campus Human Rights Advocacy Handbook, a practical guide developed by the interns to help students establish and sustain human rights initiatives on university campuses.

The interns discussed how to assess the particular risks in one’s city and campus environment and how to find like-minded collaborators through classes, faculty members, student organizations, and informal gatherings such as a “human rights hotpot.” Rather than immediately bringing new contacts into a core team, they recommended beginning with small-scale collaboration and gradually building trust through working together.

During the Q&A session, participants discussed the potential of AI-assisted storytelling and visual media to communicate human rights issues more effectively to broader audiences. They also explored different forms of student organizing, including online commemorations, internal training, small-scale actions, and public offline events.

The interns also shared practical lessons on event organizing and fundraising, including securing venues early, developing contingency plans, and weighing different funding sources such as government grants, individual donors, NGOs, and student funds. The discussion also addressed the advantages and disadvantages of formally registering as a legal entity such as a 501(c)(3): formal registration can facilitate access to funding, but it can also increase the public exposure of an organization and its members.

Digital security was another important component of the handbook, including the handling of sensitive event materials, the use of encrypted communications, and careful, non-confrontational approaches to getting to know and vetting new members.

On the long-term sustainability of student organizations, participants discussed the particular security risks faced by students affiliated with the White Paper movement, as well as the importance of building long-term, reciprocal relationships with other student groups and NGOs. The interns also addressed practical challenges such as preventing burnout, training successors, and planning leadership transitions. They emphasized the importance of creating “community warmth”—making room beyond activism itself for participants to build trust, friendships, and everyday connections.

Rural Women’s Land Rights: Economic Development Has Not Eliminated Systemic Discrimination

The second half of the program featured presentations on the interns’ individual research projects.

One project focused on rural women’s land and property rights in China. Drawing on case studies compiled in collaboration with Chinese lawyers, the researcher examined how the household registration, or hukou, system, marriage practices, and local governance affect rural women’s ability to obtain and retain land rights.

The research found that the tangible benefits associated with rural hukou status are not equally available to women. Women who marry outside their place of household registration may lose their membership in their original rural community and the associated land and property rights, while men generally do not face the same consequences upon marriage. At the same time, women who marry into a village from elsewhere may be recognized as members of that village.

The research also found that local governments exercise considerable discretion in determining these identities and rights. Land seizures from farmers by local and central authorities to address revenue shortfalls have further increased pressure on rural women’s land rights.

Notably, despite China’s rapid economic development and rising land and property values, this systemic inequality against women has not diminished and, in some respects, has become more severe. Women seeking to defend their land rights through petitions and other channels also face significant obstacles related to divorce proceedings and hukou status.

Labor Rights in Overseas Belt and Road Projects

Another project examined the impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Indonesia, focusing on its effects on both local businesses and Chinese workers employed in Chinese-invested projects.

This research argued that some Chinese companies have exported poor labor practices to their overseas operations while tightening control over Chinese workers through restrictions on their movement, communications, and employment. These practices not only undermine workers’ ability to defend their rights but also limit their contact and integration with local communities, while serving as a means for Beijing to advance its interests abroad.

Wang Han: Using Legal Mechanisms to Counter Transnational Repression

Wang Han, a participant in the White Paper movement and a first-year law student, presented on how democratic countries can use legal mechanisms to address transnational repression targeting overseas Chinese communities and political dissidents.

He examined how existing legal systems can provide avenues of redress for victims of cross-border intimidation and harassment. Participants also discussed international legal cooperation and the potential misuse of international mechanisms such as Interpol Red Notices.

Wang also described his work assisting victims of transnational repression in pursuing legal action, including compiling case documentation and supporting strategic litigation on behalf of victims.

Using Data to Identify “Invisible” Political Prisoners

The final research project explored the role of data analysis in human rights advocacy and documentation.

The research highlighted the new possibilities created by data-driven approaches while also examining their limitations. Large quantities of data do not automatically produce meaningful conclusions; careful and rigorous analysis must accompany data collection.

The project used Chinese court verdict databases to identify and document previously unknown political prisoners, demonstrating the potential of data analysis as a tool for human rights documentation and investigation.

Together, these presentations reflected the breadth of contemporary human rights challenges in China while showcasing the talent, commitment, and creativity of a new generation of human rights advocates. The quality of the interns’ research and their dedication to advancing human rights left a strong impression on participants.

HRIC extends its sincere thanks to Katherine Wilhelm and NYU School of Law for providing the venue and supporting this thoughtful and engaging exchange.

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